Ray

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"Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

HAKUNA MATATA

Blademaster

Well, I think we should have launch an offensive across the LOC to cut off the line of supply along the chicken neck thing. Then we can easily starve the enemy holding out on the peaks.

One thing is clear. We need massive bombardment or carpet bombing capability. We can't afford to let Pakistan inflict heavy casaulties on our regiments from an advantaged location with few men.

Anoop C

Blade Master,

You might find the book 'A Ridge Too Far' by Capt (R) Amarinder Singh, informative on various aspects of the Kargil conflict, particularly the use of bunker busters in some cases. There are even photographs of damaged sangars.

As far as the choking off of supplies, escape routes and isolating cross-defences is concerned, that's exactly what 8 Sikh did (for nearly 2 months!) before 18 Grenadiers dealt the death blow on Tiger Hill.

Colonel,

Thanks for the feedback on that estimate on BR. However, the 55 hours was purely for sailing, not including mobilization and embarking. I remember reading a post of yours a long time ago that said it was virtually impossible to keep a battalion on 24 hour readiness for any length of time. Can you elaborate what the limitations are? Is it division of labor, lack of sleep, lack of hospitable accomodation?

Anoop C

Ray sahab,

You had mentioned that induction of new weapons in the IA is not optimal due to manpower limitations.

I am assuming that these new weapons are the anti-material rifles and the Carl Gustaves, which are heavy and whose ammo needs to be carried too. I am further assuming that if a rifle-man can engage with a Carl Gustav (C-G) prior to the assault, he can exchange that weapon for a rifle during the assault, because the two actions will not be simultaneous. So the real limitation is that he cannot carry both his rifle & ammo & supplies as well as the C-G into battle.

From the ToE of the infantry battalion available on Orbat.com

http://www.orbat.com/site/toe/toe/india/infbn.html

there are about 59 un-accounted for men in the Admin Coy, which you had once stated also double up as fighting-porters. Even with that number, we are still hard-pressed to maintain bayonet strength upon induction of new weapons?

Please elucidate to the extent possible on an open forum. Thank you.

Officer of Engineers

Essentially a detoriation of skill, alertness, and equipment. You can keep a force on stand-by for about maximum 90 days, preferably 30. You're keeping people on edge, getting ready to go into action. That cannot be kept up. Sooner or later, you have to step back, allow the people to rest and retrain them back to their performance edge. If you sit around waiting to go on mission, you don't have time to train, at least not properly.

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Chimo

Ray

Officer of Engineers

Sir,

Perhaps the best answer to your question about possible InA future transformation is a simple question.

Would YOU feel comfortable in commanding a NATO brigade?

As an aside, I would be honoured in serving under you.