Ray

Another pearl in the "string of pearls" strategy of China.

Coco Islands, Gwadar and Chittagong. I believe they are also on for another port in Bangladesh.

A very good strategic initiative from the Chinese standpoint.

It has serious repercussions as far as India is concerned and that is why the jockeying will commence.

No wonder India is showing concern for a strategic relationship with Vietnam.

Ray

An overview of the Chinese connection with the Gwadar port and the strategic environment.

Ray

The gen on Coco Islands in brief.

indianguy4u

Its time we start showing serious force projection in IOR. We need to show chinese, dont mess with us attitude. What can be done to achieve this?

__________________
Hala Madrid!!

Ray

India is encircled by hostile nations that are friendly with China. India’s longtime adversary, Pakistan, is out to reduce India’s influence in the region at every opportunity. Relations with Bangladesh are deteriorating steadily since the time Khaleda Zia came to power in October2001. The need for improvement of relations with Myanmar has therefore gained more importance.

The insurgency problem in the North East States of India cannot be controlled effectively without help from Myanmar. Despite assurances by U Win Aung, Foreign Minister of Myanmar, during his recent visit (Jan 19-24, 2003) to India, that his country will not allow insurgent groups to carry out anti-India activities, it is seen that Myanmar has not been able to fully implement its assurances. One reason could be the the shortage of manpower and another could be its own endemic insurgencies.

Myanmar has officially confirmed in Jan 2002 that it is building a nuclear reactor. Two Pak scientists are known to have been in Myanmar in an advisory capacity. Though the reactor (as per IAEA officials) is unlikely to be suitable for production of nuclear weapons, Chinese and Pakistan’s help to Myanmar for this purpose at a future date cannot be ruled out.

The drugs from Myanmar and the arms from Thailand are smuggled to the Indian insurgent groups from Tamu and a few other places on the Indo-Myanmar border. Myanmar’s help is very much needed to effectively stop this traffic.

Myanmar Foreign Minister’s Visit to India

There has been a hype in the Indian media and in the political circles about the recent visit of the Myanmar Foreign Minister U Wing Aung to India from 19-24 January 2003. He met PM Atal Behari Vajpayee and held talks with several key ministers including the Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha. The two foreign Ministers signed a protocol which establishes regular bilateral ministerial consultations. More than the protocol and the agreement the strategic partnership that was forged during this visit is being considered a breakthrough in the bilateral relations. Some observers feel Myanmar now seeks good ties with Delhi as a way to balance their dependence on Beijing for trade, soft loans and military hardware. If so, it is a good development and India should cash on this.

Conclusion: With the successful India-Asean Summit in Nov 2002, India’s “Look-East” policy must be more pro-active and be more aggressive in promoting regional economic integration. Myanmar has a large economic potential which is already being exploited by other Asean nations and India could also reap the benefits of this developing economy. Myanmar being one of the BIMST-EC countries India could play a dominant part to make the initiative more meaningful for improving the relationship with Myanmar. There is scope for improved bilateral cooperation in energy (oil and gas exploration), health, education, defence (supplies and training) and IT sectors. India should be more committed in improving the relations by frequent high level visits to voice its concerns without giving a feeling that India is competing with China or is trying to wean Myanmar away from China. India need not compete with China either as both have sufficient political and economic space for development of the region.

(Most of the inputs for this paper have been extracted from the article posted on the South Asia Analysis Group Forum by Vijay Sakhuja, Maritime Security Analyst and Research Scholar at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi)
http://www.saag.org/papers6/paper596.html

Ray

BEIJING'S SURGE FOR
THE STRAIT OF MALACCA
by Yossef Bodansky(1)

The Strait of Malacca is one of the world's hottest and most crucial strategic choke points. It is considered by experts to be one of the ten most vulnerable objectives which neutralization by hostile forces not only will cause tremendous harm to the well being, perhaps very existence, of the economy of the West, but is also very easy to accomplish. Controlling the Strait of Malacca is presently a key strategic objective of the PRC to the point of risking armed conflict with the regional states and even the US.

INTRODUCTION

The Strait of Malacca is a narrow waterway between Malaysia and Sumatera island of Indonesia. Virtually the entire commercial sea traffic between the Far East and Europe, the Middle East, and India and passes through the Strait of Malacca. The entire fuel and gas shipments purchased from the Persian Gulf for the Far East passes there. Further more, the region's largest oil fields are virtually in the eastern mouth of the Strait. Moreover, Singapore -- the region's largest commercial and communications center and key port -- lies at the eastern mouth of the Strait of Malacca.

The Strait of Malacca dominates more than the commercial and economic life lines into and out of the rapidly expanding economies of East Asia. The global strategic growth and expansion of aspiring powers can be contained and regulated through the mere control over the movement of their naval forces through the Strait of Malacca.

For Beijing, this reality is increasingly a vital interest. Any Chinese naval and military surge into the Indian Ocean -- a major strategic priority of Beijing -- must pass through the Strait of Malacca. Beijing considers its surge into the Indian Ocean as part of a strategic surge of global proportions aimed at consolidating military posture in a hostile environment (from a both global and regional strategic point of view), and in a strategic grand design that anticipates the possibility of a major military clash with the US in the foreseeable future.

This grim assessment and the resolute commitment to resolve it were not reached hastily. Back in 1992, the CMC had already resolved, at least in principle, to establish a high performance blue water fleet, including the acquisition of an aircraft carrier. However, at the time, the strategic principles and priorities had not been determined. Nevertheless, several promising PLA officers were already sent to study the principles of modern high-technology naval and aerial warfare. Back in 1992, the CMC envisaged the completion of the first phase of this build-up to be between 1997 and 2000.

In early 1993, the naval build-up and modernization plan decided upon by the CMC was getting shape. The PLA was instructed to operate on the principle that China was committed to building "the world's most powerful navy." The PLA navy already had clear strategic priorities and tasks in mind. "In the short-term, the central strategic task of naval construction must be to transform the navy from a coastal defense force into an offshore fleet capable of defending territorial interests." China's ship designers and builders were told that the PLA navy had already resolved that the only way these national interests could be defended was through an assertive military surge. This concept should determine the character of the PRC's future navy. "This fleet's main tasks will be to control nearby waters, notably by exercising air and sea control in the East China and South China Seas to protect territorial waters and to defend shipping lanes." However, these instructions and policy guidelines covered only the first stage of a far larger and more ambitious strategic surge already decided upon.

The PLA's commitment to a regional assertive strategy based on a naval breakout southward was also stated explicitly by the PLA High Command in early 1993. Zhao Nanqi, director of the General Staff Logistics Department of the Chinese Navy, issued a top-secret memorandum that explained in great detail the PLA's strategic plans to consolidate control over the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean under the new doctrine of "high-sea defense." Zhao stated that "We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only an ocean of the Indians." In order to enable the PRC to consolidate the strategic posture Beijing spires to, Zhao envisages a massive naval build-up and assertive use of sea power. Only activist use of sea power can be considered the primary means to enable the PRC to finally secure its control over the oil-rich South China Sea. Beijing has no doubt that its strategic surge would be opposed by its neighbors. "We are taking armed conflicts in the region into account," Zhao stated in his top secret memorandum.

By 1993, the PLA High Command was already considering the surge toward the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca the greatest and most urgent strategic challenge facing the PRC. This threat assessment was stated in the July 1993 milestone book Can the Chinese Army Win the Next War? which outlined authoritatively Beijing's perception of future wars. The book stressed the inevitability of a strategic clash with the US over the future of East Asia, to be waged primarily through numerous local wars involving the PLA in clashes with US allies and proxies, as well as the US itself. The book stressed that "the Chinese Army is making active preparations for coming local or regional wars." Despite the existence of numerous treaties between the US and local powers that might compel the US to intervene militarily on their behalf, the PLA High Command singles out the situation in the Spratly Islands as the primary catalyst for a US military intervention in the region against the PRC. "Once China uses force to protect its national sovereignty in that area, a quite large scale local war will be unavoidable, at which time the South China Sea will become a second Persian Gulf!"

Thus, Beijing had committed itself already in 1992-93 to this massive naval build-up. Examining the prevailing strategic posture in the region, the allotted time frame envisaged at least five years for the completion of the first phase of build-up. The ensuing build-up has been more than just acquiring weapon systems and training their crews. The PRC has simultaneously embarked on an all-out surge throughout the region to create the regional circumstances so that the impact of the Chinese new military power will be maximal. This surge includes a host of covert operations including sponsorship of terrorism by China's close allies. This campaign was accelerating as of mid 1994. However, in early 1995, a sense of urgency was suddenly introduced into Beijing's assertive strategic grand design.

In early 1995, Beijing concluded that its apprehensions about a hostile US policy were fully justified. US East Asian strategy is based on evoking the "China Threat" in order to remove potential competition. Moreover, Washington now intended to use India in order "to help contain China." This was only a component of an effort to form ties with China's neighbors in order to encircle China. The PRC's naval threat analysis in the summer of 1995 specifically pointed to the growing naval cooperation between the US and India as well as to India's own naval build-up programs and other naval activities of India's Eastern Naval Command. These were identified as reasons for strategic apprehension that the PRC must take into consideration. After all, the emerging strategic posture in the Indian Ocean, if permitted to evolve, would significantly challenge Beijing's ability to carry out its strategic naval surge planned for the end of the decade.

Therefore, in the spring of 1995, as these strategic calculations were being made, Beijing resolved to markedly expedite its surge, at the least parts of it, so that it would be impossible for its enemies to forestall its rise to global power. The most urgent task identified by the PLA strategic analysts is to consolidate control over the Strait of Malacca so that no other power is capable of blocking the surge of the Chinese Navy the moment it is capable of surging into the Indian Ocean and Beijing gives the order to do so.

While the PLA High Command has no qualms about the CMC's policy decision that it is imperative for Beijing to control the Strait of Malacca, they know that it is not that easy to accomplish in peacetime. Presently, the PRC cannot just occupy the Strait of Malacca -- take on Singapore, Malaysia or Indonesia by force of arms. Therefore, the CMC instructed the PLA High Command to come up with a practical strategy of attaining as much of the original goal within the confines of prevailing world conditions. Beijing concluded that what the PRC can do is to encircle the Strait of Malacca and, through covert operations, create intolerable conditions for potential enemies and opponents in the region.

Consequently, it has become imperative for the PRC to consolidate direct control over both approaches to the Strait of Malacca while neutralizing the states in between through covert action. The approaches to the Strait of Malacca can be dominated from the Spratly islands and Burma's coastline on the Bay of Bengal (most of the region's islands being Indian territory). The key to the covert action is having Beijing's close allies -- Iran and Pakistan -- either win over the Muslim governments of the key regional states or subvert the Muslim population of other key states in the region so that the internal crisis and instability will prevent them from resisting the Chinese strategic surge and rise to hegemonic position.

And so, in the fall of 1995, Beijing is proceeding on an accelerated implementation of its ambitious and multi facetted program to consolidate control over the Strait of Malacca as a key to controlling the China Sea, the eastern Indian Ocean and chocking Western commercial traffic. Even the completion of the first phase, in which Chinese forces stay out of the Strait themselves, will put Beijing in effective control over this major choke point. Subsequent steps by the PRC and its allies to complete the surge have demonstrated a sophisticated combination of use of military power in peacetime with the exploitation of state-sponsored terrorism to achieve strategic tangible results.
THE SPRATLY ISLANDS

The Spratly Islands -- the Nansha Islands in Chinese -- is a multitude of small islands and reefs, mostly uninhabited, that spread over a vast area (700km by 600km) between the coasts of Vietnam and the Philippines (Palawan island), just north of Malaysia and Indonesia (Sabah island). These islands have long been claimed by numerous countries, each of which presently occupies a few islands and reefs within the huge ocean space.

The importance of the Spratly Islands grew in the late 1980s following the discovery of huge oil fields -- conservatively estimated at 100 million barrels -- just underneath the ocean space. The importance of these oil deposits will significantly grow, both economically and strategically, as the overall economy and especially industrialization of east Asia continues to expand at a rapid pace. The new era of the importance of the Spratly Islands was heralded in 1988, when the PLA Navy in two brief clashes (March and November) seized six positions near Johnson Reef from the North Vietnamese and attacked Vietnamese naval patrols respectively. The Johnson Reef is placed at the center of the Spratly Islands.

By the early 1990s, the PLA High Command was operating in accordance with Beijing's growing sense of urgency. One of the first major projects reflecting growing interest in activities in the South China Sea was the major upgrading of SIGINT collection capacity. At first, the large SIGINT complex on Hainan Island was vastly expanded. Then, the PRC built another SIGINT station on rocky Island (Shi-tao) near ***** Island (Lin-tao) in the Paracel Islands. This is the highest point in the area, and the local station vastly improves coverage of the entire Spratly Islands area, the Philippines, and the Strait of Malacca. These new facilities were largely operational in the summer of 1995.

Meanwhile, the PLA began taking a closer look at contingency plans to consolidate control over the Spratly Islands. They found them to be a daunting challenge because of the PLA's acknowledged military shortfalls -- particularly the absence of high performance air power (from aircraft carriers or far away land bases). Indeed, the milestone July 1993 book Can the Chinese Army Win the Next War? stressed "how urgent and complex the Nansha Islands question is for China's Naval leaders. However, the new generation of leaders, filled with a strong spirit of nationalism, will never abandon their efforts to bring about the return of the Nansha Islands to the bosom of the motherland." The professional analysis of the PLA's options stressed the dire implications of the lack of an aircraft carrier and ensuing limitation on the all too crucial air power. The study concluded that under present conditions -- early 1993 -- the PLA could occupy the entire Nansha Islands basin. However, the true challenge would be holding them and to them against a determined naval blockade. Considering the PLA's preoccupation with the ramifications of the use of air power in such a blockade, Beijing's strategic calculations were based on the assumption that only the US Navy can put such a blockade while using locally available naval and port facilities.

Beijing's preoccupation with the mounting crisis Spratly Islands, including the PLA's deficiencies in air power, were quickly addressed. In 1992, the PRC reached an agreement with Russia for the speedy supply of 24 Su-27 fighters -- the only non-Western fighter which range can permit it to operate over the Nansha Islands without aerial refueling. The absorption of these fighters progressed rapidly, befitting Beijing's sense of crisis.

Already in early February 1993, the first 24 Su-27s acquired from Russia began flight testing in a PLA Air Force base at Wuhu near Nanjing. Flight training was conducted in the border area between Anhui and Jiangsu provinces. Russian pilots, military instructors, and technicians assisted the PLA to study the Su-27 and enter it into operational use as quickly as possible. Despite the major technological advance over existing weapon systems in the PLA arsenal, the Chinese did not have too many problems with learning the aircraft. However, early progress was slow. In February 1993, only 12 of the 30 Chinese pilots in the first conversion course, run by Russian Air Force instructors, passed their exams and were qualified on the Su-27. The PLA technical crews were doing better, and by February already succeeded to maintain about 70% serviceability.

Meanwhile, a joint command of the PLA Air Force and Navy was busy building the permanent base for the Su-27 -- clearly demonstrating Beijing's intention for the long-range fighter. The permanent base of the Su-27 is on Hainan Island -- at the Yulin naval port, near Sanya City, the southernmost city of Hainan Province -- slightly more than 1,000 nautical miles away from Zengmu Atoll, the southernmost part of the Nansha Islands, but barely within the Su-27's operational range. However, in order to make better use of the Su-27 in its optimal configuration which reduced its range to about 810 nautical miles, the PLA embarked on the construction of a forward base in the Paracel Islands. In the summer of 1993, the PLA completed the first phase of a runway construction in Xisha Airport in the Paracels. More then 8,202ft (2,500m) long, the new runway was ideal for extending the already impressive reach of the Su-27s. By early 1995, when the crisis over the Spratly Islands broke into the open, the Xisha Airport facilities were expanded to support other PLA aircraft including the J-7 and J-8-II fighters, A-5 "maritime bombers," and H-6 bombers as well.

The true expression of both the growing determination and self confidence of the CMC and PLA High Command came in their "Walking Towards the Deep Blue" endeavor in the fall of 1994 with the nomination of, and growing importance given to, PLA Navy Deputy Commander He Pengfei. More than many other PLA senior commanders, He Pengfei personifies "the strategic conceptions of the PLA Navy in its rush to the high seas." In September 1994, during the transitionary period in the rise to his top command position, he was "the overall site commander for this East China Sea Shensheng (Sacred) major exercise." It was one of the largest scale naval warfare exercises conducted in the PRC, using the Choushan Islands as the site for dress rehearsals for amphibious operations into the Nanshas Islands. The mere selection of He Pengfei to first command this exercise and then immediately be nominated as Deputy Commander of the PLA Navy testifies just how central is the acquiring of military capabilities in the Spratly Islands.

Meanwhile, also in late 1994, Pan Shiying, a highly authoritative though ostensibly unofficial Chinese expert on the Nanshas Islands warned US officials in Hong Kong that the PRC was adamant on reclaiming its territorial rights on the Islands. If Vietnam, or anybody else would try to resist the Chinese claim, Pan warned, "China will have no choice but to take control of the islands forcibly."

By now, early 1995, the PLA was ready to begin raising the ante in the Spratly Islands. This development reflected a profound transformation of the Chinese interest in, and commitment to, the Spratly Islands. In ADDITION to the still valid and growing economic interest, Beijing has concluded that a surge into the islands constitutes a key to the PLA Navy ability to reach and ultimately dominate the Strait of Malacca.

Significantly, Chinese officials considered the US Navy as the primary potential threat necessitating the PLA's surge into and reinforcements in the Spratly Islands. "The Nansha Islands are at a strategic point in the sea lane between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. Among the 16 strategic wartime channels announced by the US Navy in 1988, two are in the Nansha region (at the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Sunda). In the 1980's, 270 ships passed through the Nansha waters every day, and a very large proportion were carrying petroleum and strategic materials."

In the spring of 1995, the military assessment in Beijing remained that the PLA was capable of seizing any island from the regional powers, but that the PLA will face great difficulties if the US Navy joined operations in the area because of the air power challenge the US Navy will be introducing into the theater. Therefore, considering that the US vacated its bases in the Philippines in 1992, it was now imperative for Beijing to get a true reading of the US commitment to its allies in the region.

Therefore, Beijing launched in early 1995 a political provocation that, if successful, will be of military importance in case of future military escalation. In January 1995, the PLA established an advanced post on Mischief Reef in the eastern Spratly Islands just 100 miles (170 kms) west of the Philippine's island of Palawan. Some eight Chinese ships, including armed merchantmen and fishing trawlers, as well as naval vessels, also deployed to the area. Manila, as well as other regional governments, did virtually nothing except for protests. Beijing's swift and harsh reactions in February and March to the efforts by the Philippines to demonstrate sovereignty over the disputed islands, culminating in the late March meetings in Beijing between senior officials of the foreign ministries left no doubt in Manila as to Beijing's determination to escalate the crisis, including the use of force.

Beijing has thus begun a still evolving strategic test of Washington's resolve. The PLA seized Mischief Reef not just because the Philippines are the closest ally of the US in the region. The Subic Bay installations are still the best military facilities from which the US can quickly deploy and project air power into the Spratly Islands. Therefore, it is imperative for the PLA to have early warning on such activities as preparations proceed for a surge toward the Strait of Malacca.

Indeed, as the political crisis surrounding the Chinese presence on Mischief Reef was peaking in the spring, Beijing began to state its strategic reading of the situation in the Philippines in order to ensure that it elicited the right response from Washington. In April, Beijing stressed its conviction that Manila's strong stand over the Spratly Islands dispute was serving other powers, thus alluding to US interests. Beijing was gratified by denials by American officials. In late June, with the PRC's military preparations progressing, Beijing raised the Subic Bay issue explicitly. Chinese officials pointed to a series of recent developments to suggest that an effort to establish a US-inspired encirclement of China is underway. They specifically brought up the example of the possible return of the US Navy to Subic Bay in the Philippines as part of challenging the PRC over the Spratly Islands. An alarmed Manila not only denied such a possibility, but, in mid August, hosted Sino-Philipino high level negotiations on the international status of the islands, thus in fact virtually surrendering to Beijing's pressure.

By now, Manila, as all other capitals in the region, was witnessing the marked expansion and up-grading of the PLA's military capabilities. Since initiating the dispute with the Philippines over the Chinese Post established on Mischief Reef in early 1995, there has been a transformation in the PLA priorities and modus operandi in the Spratly Islands. In the spring and early summer of 1995, there was already a distinct modification of the PLA Navy's approach to the Spratly Islands challenge as new forces and tactics were introduced to better cope with the new strategic importance and direction.

Once the crisis broke in early 1995, the PLA immediately began to reinforce and strengthen its garrisons throughout the region. According to Chinese officials, the declared objective of the initial build-up was to create an early warning system against possible escalation. "China's coastline is long, its littoral islands are spread all over, all the islands in the South China Sea are far from the mainland, and it is very difficult for the surveillance network of shore-based air corps radar and aircraft to cover all of the area. This has created an opportunity for an invasion, even an unbridled invasion -- such is the situation today in the Nansha Archipelago."

The specifics of the build-up suggested more assertive designs. The Chinese Marine Brigade took part in the engineering projects on Yongsu Reef, Nansha Islands, and other reefs and shelves -- building camps, guard positions, and other installations. Elite troops from the PLA Marine Brigade were now deployed to garrison the new installations, reflecting on their growing importance. In the spring of 1995, anticipating escalation, the South Sea Fleet organized a fully integrated rapid resupply system to the various garrisons on the islands. The system is capable of sustaining operations in both peace and war. The PLA claims that it takes about one fifth the time previously required to reach the islands from the mainland.

In the summer of 1995, the PLA troops in the Nanshas [Spratly Islands] belong to PLA Navy and Marine. They operate in 33 groups of officers and enlisted men. They hold a few fortresses on the Yongshu, Huayang, Chigua, Nanxun, Dongmen, and Zhubi reefs. In addition, the PLA operates naval patrols in the waters of the South China Sea which interact with the island garrisons. Because of the challenges in the area, a special branch of the Communist Party ensures the high spirits, reliability and commitment of the troops. The Nanshas garrisons and installations also supervise and track down the high volume of international shipping passing through the area, making sure they cannot harm the vital interests of the PRC. Local officers are fully aware of the crucial importance of the undersea oil and mineral for the future development programs and economic growth of the PRC.

The rapidly accelerated military actions and preparations since the spring of 1995 have been based on Beijing's assessment that "the Nansha Islands are in a tense situation in which six countries and seven parties have entered into rivalry. ... As events develop, there is a greater and greater possibility that countries such as the United States and Japan will meddle in the South China Sea situation to protect the important routes and their strategic interests in the southern Asian-Pacific region." Beijing was pessimistic about the prospects of a peaceful settlement of the disputes. "Due to serious differences over the issue of sovereignty and the sharp military confrontation, it seems that it will be very difficult to bring the Nansha issue within the peaceful orbit ... while there is a greater possibility of an outbreak of military conflict."

Moreover, the PLA was arguing forcefully that if military action was required, it should be launched in the immediate future. Examining the rate of military build-up throughout East Asia, the PLA identified a dangerous period at the beginning of the 21st century where the local countries will have absorbed the new generation of weapons acquired from the West before the next generation of PLA equipment and major weapon systems, primarily the aircraft carrier and new generation of combat aircraft, is operational. The PLA High Command stressed that the Nansha Islands crisis must therefore be resolved soon, or else "the overall strategic situation may be unfavorable to China's qualitative changes. Hence, the last five years of the 1990s are the critical period for settling the Nansha issue and China may miss an historic opportunity beyond that." Subsequent PLA military actions throughout the Spratly Islands confirm that Beijing accepted the PLA's reading of the situation.

In March 1995, with the tension surrounding the Spratlys growing, the CMC and the PLA High Command convened a series of policy formulation sessions in Beijing. The sessions also covered the issue of Taiwan and other major national security challenges facing the PRC. Concerning the Nanshas, the main decision was to conduct large scale military exercises in the Spratly Island -- the first large scale PRC naval activity since the clashes with Vietnam in 1988. High officials participating in the March meeting explained that the logic behind the planned exercises involved both a demonstration of might and testing of the PLA's ability to deploy forces and conduct key missions. "The Spratlys manoeuvres conducted by vessels based in Guangdong and Hainan provinces, would involve pursuit drills using live ammunition," they explained. "China's South Sea Fleet, based at Zhanjiang in southwestern Guangdong, includes two escort vessels and one mine warfare squadron, plus about 300 patrol and coastal vessels. The exercises would meet the CMC's overall training objectives, which called on the navy to 'strengthen training in warship combat tasks and in the actual use of weapons'." Politically, the exercises in the Spratly Islands are intended to be used by Beijing to reiterate the PRC's "indisputable" claim to the entire region and sea space.

Indeed, soon afterwards, in March-April, the PLA Navy already calculated the size of a naval task force it would need to deploy in order to conduct a major war in the Spratlys. The PLA correctly identified their greatest weakness "in providing air cover for any task force." Therefore, they based their ability to provide air cover, beyond the limited fighter assets, through denial. Another major consideration in organizing the task force is speed. Chinese military sources provided a detailed assessment of the PLA approach and the required preparation time. They believe that "the shortest preparation time for completing the formation of a special task force fleet ... is about seven days." The specific composition is based on the vital missions the PLA is determined to accomplish and the anticipated enemy forces. "Taking into account its rivals' military strength and the required scope of operations, the Chinese special naval task force should have the following lineup:" In the spring of 1995, the majority of the assets required for the special task force, particularly missile-equipped surface combatants and submarines, were already allocated to the South China Sea Fleet.

Special attention was paid to providing amphibious warships for Marine landings. According to Chinese sources, the PLA "trains the Marine Corps to be a strong force suited for amphibious assaults. In the South China Sea and the Nansha Islands, the Marine Corps will be a dynamic, decisive armed force." Chinese military sources estimate that at least "two to three battalions" from the PLA Marine Brigade will be among the very first used in the Nanshas.

Air power constitutes the main problem facing the PLA primarily because of the acute shortage of air bases and runway volume. The only two viable bases are on Hainan Island, at the Yulin naval port, near Sanya City, the southernmost city of Hainan Province, and Xisha Airport in the Paracels. The PLA is determined to deploy as many aircraft of as many types as possible into the area, but, given the range problem, it is aware of the great difficulties ahead. Indeed, deficiencies in air power might play a key role in the emerging Chinese doctrine. Chinese military sources explain: "Since the Chinese Army is quite weak in employing the airborne early warning methods, it will be difficult to quickly discover any missile attack launched by the enemy. Therefore, No.7 [J-7] fighter-bombers should try their best to hunt down enemy guided missile ships and destroy them in a preemptive way."

The PRC anticipates a lengthy and complex war evolving from the fighting in the Spratly Islands. Region-wide escalation is not excluded, giving a new meaning to the recent missile launch exercises. Indeed, Chinese military sources stressed the strategic role of ballistic missiles under such considerations: "Part of the medium-range DongFeng No.3 [ballistic] missiles of the Second Artillery Corps should be refitted with regular warheads to train on our rivals' naval and air bases, but they should not be employed unless it is inevitable to do so. However, if the war does not progress smoothly, launching a direct missile attack on the very soil of our enemies will dampen the morale of their armies and peoples and hopefully bring the war to an early close."

Being sensitive to political nuances, Beijing stresses the defensive character of the future war in the Nanshas. However, the Chinese military sources repeating this doctrinal tent do not conceal the PLA's intention to seize the initiative and widen the war beyond the deterrence element. "As long as the Chinese Army deals a severe blow to the first aggressor who invades its territory and, by taking advantage of the opportunity, recaptures territory and territorial waters occupied by the aggressor, it will serve as a warning to others and will play a positive role in China's recapturing of its lost territory and territorial waters and to stabilize the situation in the South China Sea."

The PLA is fully aware of potential complexities that such a war would entail. "Of course, war is not the game of a single side, and the enemy will also launch a counter-offensive when an opportune moment comes, but if the Chinese Army can keep its losses within the limit of 20 percent, it could be considered as successful. The biggest problem is how to defend the Nanshas after recovering them? This is precisely the most difficult problem." This is exactly the deficiency and the most daunting problem originally identified in the summer of 1993. At the time, the PLA planners could see no alternative to a Chinese aircraft carrier. In the spring of 1995, the military sources also identified the urgent need for a carrier as the sole viable solution for the PLA's air power requirements. However, although the PLA High Command, and their political masters, are fully aware of this grave deficiency and vulnerability, they are nevertheless determined to be ready to operate in the Spratly Islands in the very near future. This decision is so important because it was reached despite the fully acknowledged carrier-factor -- thus reflecting the urgency felt in Beijing.

Indeed, in the summer of 1995, the PLA was ready to vastly expand the areas of military exercises and other military preparatory activities in the Spratly Islands zone. All the planned activities both serve as political strategic signaling as well as have direct military ramifications. These exercises are the outcome of the March series of policy formulation sessions followed by the professional planning work done by the PLA High Command. They do not seem to be a reaction to subsequent events. Thus, this intensifying military activity strongly expresses Beijing's determination to initiate and pursue the consolidation of control over the Spratly Islands in the foreseeable future.

Meanwhile, Beijing revived threats of the dire ramifications of the new US-led provocations in mid July -- once the PLA completed its initial preparations of intensified activities in the Nanshas.

The PLA's Navy demonstrated intense activism in and around the Spratly Islands in the context of exercises in the South China Sea in the summer of 1995. Starting late July 1995, there has been a series of intense exercises of the PLA naval forces in the South China Sea, in the Spratly Islands and in related ocean spaces. These exercises included unannounced live firing maneuvers of both naval artillery and cruise missiles launched from ships into the South China Sea in areas claimed by the PRC.

The summer operations were spear headed by a destroyer detachment of the East Sea Fleet running "coastal waters and deep sea" exercises. It was a unit with a larger than usual number of commanders and senior technical personnel because it is intended to serve as the core for mobilization and activation of reserve crews and vessels. This destroyer force completed a complex long-range exercise that included "single-vessel and combined offensive and defensive drills in the Pacific Ocean. They also conducted supply drills in the Indian Ocean; passed through the four major channels of Taiwan, Qiongzhou, Gonggu, and Balintang to patrol the Xisha [Paracel] and Nansha [Spratly] Islands; and reviewed troops in Zengmu Ansha." During the exercise, the commanders also exercised the activation and running of wartime headquarters as well as command and control of naval task forces. The operational tasks included "surge from coastal waters to the deep sea," as well as "ship-to-ship, ship-to-aircraft, and ship-to-submarine confrontation." Some of the participating destroyers were brand new, having made "their maiden voyages to the Pacific and Indian Oceans" during this exercise.

In early August, with the destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, the exercise developed into a live fire phase. In the course of this phase, a PLA destroyer fired a cruise missile -- most likely a SILKWORM -- that detonated very close to an American-owned natural-gas drilling platform south of Hainan Island. The shockwaves in the water nearly caused and ignited a high-pressure gas leak -- the ensuing explosion would have destroyed the entire project. Interestingly, this drilling site is a Chinese project intended to feed Hong Kong area for the next two decades via a 778-km long underwater gas pipe. Yet, the missile firing was not an accident. The PRC risked their own project in order to demonstrate that this was their own territorial water where they can conduct live fire exercises without an international warning, as well as to demonstrate their resolve to fight for the Spratly Islands irrespective of the price.

In mid August, Rear Admiral Wang Yongguo, then deputy commander of the Guangzhou Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and commander of the South Sea Fleet of the Chinese Navy, led a naval formation on a visit to Jakarta's Tanjung Priok port. It was the PLA Navy's first visit to Indonesia and as such served as a demonstration and reminder to local powers of the PRC's naval reach and might.

Then, in late August, PRC was getting ready to conduct yet another air and naval exercises over the Spratlys Islands. The exercise took place in the eastern Spratly Islands area, close to the Mischief Reef and other areas claimed by Manila -- Beijing's way of stressing who is the local hegemon. Indeed, in the aftermath of these exercises, the PRC has not shown any indication of vacating its growing garrison on Mischief Reef.

The importance of these exercises is best understood in the context of a major study by Luo Yuru, the Honorary Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Chinese Maritime Academy, on the Chinese sovereignty rights to the Spratly Islands. The Islands are "in the South Sea area which is under China's jurisdiction," is the study's premise. Luo criticizes that in the West "such things as the Chinese navy's normal training and legitimate patrols, escorts, and protection of fishing are looked upon as a 'threat.'"

Beijing argues that it was only after the discovery of oil and other raw materials in the area that other regional countries "discovered" their claims of rights to the islands while China has verified historical rights. Luo stresses that "China's sovereignty in the Spratlys and nearby sea area cannot be disputed by any country, and no words or actions of China in safeguarding its sovereignty in the Spratlys constitutes the slightest threat to any country. This is determined by China's basic foreign policy. ... China cherishes its sovereignty in the Spratlys and definitely will not permit anyone to use any excuse to interfere with or infringe upon Chinese sovereignty."

Luo laments that despite Beijing's preference for a negotiated settlement, the other regional countries "unscrupulously continue to expand their military occupation and intensify their unilateral petroleum exploitation, and use various arbitrary means to obstruct Chinese fishermen from fishing on the sea and interfere with Chinese scientists' observation and study." Luo concludes that the situation cannot be tolerated for long, and not just because of the local peculiarities, but because the precedent it is setting:

"China is a continental country as well as a coastal country. It has more than 18,000 km of coastline and more than 6,500 islands, as well as numerous reefs, shoals, and sandbars, and various scientific and technical forces that use the ocean for development and exploitation, and China's own maritime resources to be used for exploitation. It has developed strong maritime defense forces to safeguard China's own maritime interests and protect Chinese fishermen who fish on the sea and Chinese scientific observation and study teams' work on the sea and guard against foreign aggression. This is completely the internal affair of a sovereign country. From this it can be seen that spreading the argument that 'China is a threat to the South China Sea' is a sinister attempt to sow discord in China's relations with some surrounding countries to limit the development of China's navy (including other maritime forces) and weaken China's maritime defense forces. So, under the pretense of opposing 'the threat that China creates for the South China Sea,' they create the excuse for the countries concerned to seize and swallow up China's Spratly Archipelago and attempt to make their seizing of China's Spratly Archipelago permanent and legal."

By now, starting the summer of 1995, Beijing has been warning that the US is reviving the spirit of the Cold War, using the "China threat" as an excuse for a military build-up and the drive for "world leadership status." The struggle for the Nansha islands is a central point in Washington's new onslaught. "There are indications that the United States is tentatively playing the 'Nansha card' and inciting relevant neighboring states to oppose China." Beijing stresses that the US "is ready to provide help to any party making territorial claims [on the Spratlys]."

Moreover, Beijing argues, Washington is looking for new ways to increase tension with the PRC having failed to intimidate the PRC with the "Taiwan Card," consequently "seriously harming the foundation of Sino-US relations and throwing bilateral relations into a 'danger zone.'" The ensuing US policy in East Asia gave Beijing reason to fear that "the United States is exploring ways of playing the 'Spratlys Card' to incite neighboring countries to oppose China, in order to implement its policy of containing China." Beijing considers these developments to be of great strategic significance. "Sino-US relations are at a crucial stage."
BURMA

Burma is the other main surge point of the PRC. With a very long coast line stretching along the Bay of Bengal and a few islands offshore, Burma offers a strategic staging point for controlling the western approaches to the Strait of Malacca. The only other strategic facilities in the area are India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Beijing has long been aware of the strategic importance of Burma for surging into the Indian Ocean. Although the PRC has been a great and staunch supporter of the military regime in Yangon (Rangoon) from the late 1980s, primarily because of their anti-West policies and confrontational policies in the region, the build-up of strategic infrastructure did not expand until the early 1990s, as the PRC's regional strategy began to take shape. The extent of the Chinese military assistance reflects Burma's growing strategic significance. Since deliveries started in August 1990, the PRC has supplied $1.0-1.2billion worth of weapons and other military equipment, including J-6 and J-7 fighters, radar and radio equipment, surface to air missiles, tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery anti-aircraft guns, multiple rocket-launcher systems, trucks, and naval ships. Most of the weapons supplied have already proven useful in the regime's relentless counter-insurgency campaigns. Indeed, the pace of weapons delivery is growing.

However, what is of strategic importance is the Chinese development of the military infrastructure in Burma, particularly naval facilities, including the local naval forces, and electronic intelligence sites. The present work, impressive as it is, is only the beginning of a long term ambitious projects decided upon in late 1994. In mid December, Hou Jie, the PRC Minister of Construction, visited Rangoon and signed a major memorandum on comprehensive long-term cooperation in major joint construction programs. His visit was followed, in late December 1994, by a visit to Rangoon by Li Peng, the PRC Premier and the driving force behind the Trans-Asian Axis doctrine. In Rangoon, Li Peng highlighted his visit, calling in an "important event" for Beijing. Indeed, he signed on Chinese strategic commitments to the regime in Burma, as well as provided guarantees stemming from the far reaching ramifications of the specific Sino-Burmese construction agreements signed earlier that month.

By now, the PRC was already completing the first phase of the modernization of Burma's strategic infrastructure.

Since mid 1990, Beijing has been upgrading and modernizing the air force, including an air bases infrastructure exceeding the size of the local air force. The first J-7 squadron was delivered in May 1991, and two more in May 1993 and May 1994. Burma is also in the process of absorbing two squadrons of A-5M ground attack aircraft, which are suitable for counterinsurgency operations. In order to sustain this growth in air power, PLA technicians vastly expanded the Meiktila air base, south of Mandalay. They also upgraded a smaller air base at Lashio, in the northeast, as a forward facility for aircraft refueling and resupply. While presently used as a forward base in Burma's counter-insurgency, the Lashio air base is of crucial importance for a rapid deployment of PLA Air Force assets from the PRC into Burma.

A Chinese deployment into Burma will also be expedited by the recent upgrade of the road and railway system from Yunnan to several ports along the Burmese coast of the Bay of Bengal. The extent of the expansion of the transportation infrastructure, all in harsh jungle and mountainous terrain, exceeds by far the needs of even the most optimistic outlook for Sino-Burmese commercial relations.

In mid 1991, the PRC and Burma began specific discussions on naval modernization and cooperation. To demonstrate Beijing's commitment, the first six HAINAN-class fast attack craft (FAC) were delivered later that year. Consequently, in the summer of 1992, Beijing and Yangon (Rangoon) agreed that the PRC would provide major assistance in modernization of Burmese naval facilities in return for building major naval facilities on Hainggyi Island and Great Coco Island. (More on these highly significant sites below.)

Since then, there has been a close correlation between the continued increase in the Burmese navy and the growing Chinese military presence in, and, to a great extent control over, Burma's coastal infrastructure. By the time the PRC took over, Burma's naval facilities were limited to a number of bases built during World War II and hardly changed since then -- Sittwe (Akyab) in Arakan State in the west, Bassein in the Irrawaddy delta, Monkey Point near Rangoon and Mergui in the southeastern Tenasserim Division. Starting 1992, Chinese experts vastly improved and militarized the Burmese port facilities in Akyab, Kyaukpyu and Mergui -- all on the Bay of Bengal. The PRC not only upgraded the naval facilities in Sitwe (Akyab) and Mergui, but installed there new support bases capable of handling far larger forces than Burma has.

Meanwhile, the size of the Burmese navy continued to increase. Another four HAINAN-class FACs arrived in 1993. They were accompanied by some 70 Chinese naval experts, with over half of them mid-rank officers. Officially, they were to assist the Burmese in operating the boats, training local crews and maintaining the equipment. In reality, they were also involved in maintaining newly installed radar equipment -- the beginning of the PRC's still growing electronic intelligence system in Burma. In the summer of 1994, with the naval infrastructure expanded, Burma purchased two SSM-equipped JIANGHU-class frigates from the PRC as the center of a major naval modernization program, as well as two additional HAINAN-class FACs. Ultimately, this major "naval modernization" was not more than a ploy to increase Chinese naval presence in Burma. Indeed in the summer of 1995, even the older PRC-supplied patrol boats of the Burmese navy were still run and maintained by Chinese technicians.

But, with the modernization programs advancing rapidly, the PRC was ready to upgrade its strategic presence in Burma. In the summer of 1994, General Li Jiulong, the commander of the PLA's Chengdu Military Region (CMR), visited Burma. The Chengdu MR is more than the command headquarters and major supply base for the Chinese troops in Tibet. Since the early 1990s, the CMR has also been responsible for the Chinese military supplies and assistance to Burma. These activities were but a component of a strategic activity of greater importance. Indeed, General Li paid special attention to Burma's naval facilities during his visit -- an important event considering that the Chengdu MR is landlocked. Indeed, it was during General's Li visit that Rangoon agreed that the PRC would get the new naval bases in Hainggyi Island and Great Coco Island.

The PRC has been constructing major naval base in Hainggyi Island near the Irrawaddy river delta for sometimes now. Work on the deep water port in Hainggyi Island in the delta of the Irrawaddy river began in late 1992. By 1993, Chinese technicians were helping the Burmese to build new bases both at Hainggyi and in the old base near Bassein -- a base that would soon be swallowed by the sprawling Hainggyi facilities. Massive construction has accelerated since 1994. The Hainggyi base is already capable of providing support and services to visiting Chinese naval vessels much larger and sophisticated than what the Burmese have. If build-up continues at the present pace, it will soon include support facilities to sustain submarines, most likely nuclear submarines with SLBMs.

By far the most important strategic development in and out of Burma is the rise of the PRC's electronic intelligence system.

Among these installations, the most important is the maritime reconnaissance and electronic intelligence station on Great Coco Island in the Bay of Bengal, some 300 kms south of the Burmese mainland. Along with the Small Coco Island where the Chinese Army is also building bases, these two islands are in the Alexandra Channel between the Indian Ocean and the Andaman Sea, and they lie north of India's Andaman Islands and are thus located at a crucial point in traffic routes between the Bay of Bengal and the Strait of Malacca. The Coco Islands are also an ideal place for monitoring the major Indian naval and missile launch facilities in Andaman and Nicobar Islands to the south toward the Strait of Malacca, movements of the Indian Navy and other navies throughout the eastern basin of the Indian Ocean, as well the overall western approaches to the Strait of Malacca.

Work in the Great Coco Island station began in late 1992 with the construction of a 45-50m antenna tower, numerous radar sites, and other electronic facilities. Essentially, the PRC was building a comprehensive ELINT/SIGINT collection facilities station. Significantly, all the material used in this project were Chinese made and specially brought over -- even the most mundane items that are readily available locally. In mid 1993, some of the 70 Chinese naval personnel that arrived in Burma began operating and maintaining the then newly installed radar equipment. In the summer of 1994, the PLA completed building the radar and signal intelligence bases, and considered them ready for use. Burmese sources readily acknowledged that the Chinese technicians were working for Beijing's intelligence agencies in order to monitor this sensitive maritime region. According to Japanese intelligence sources, the two islands in the Indian Ocean -- Great Coco Island and Little Coco Island -- have been "on lease to China" since 1994.

The strategic importance given to the facilities in the Great Coco Island is demonstrated in the marked up-grading of the local harbor facilities from a desolate fishing harbor to Burma's most improved military port facilities, up to handing of LUHU-class destroyers. As of 1994, the Chinese have been conducting massive dredging operations in order to construct a port which can accommodate the PLA's largest-class vessels. Once completed, the PLA's main warship, the LUDA-class missile destroyers, will be able to dock there.

The intelligence collection facilities on the Great Coco Island are only the beginning. In the summer of 1994, Rangoon permitted Chinese intelligence access to other islands -- Sittwe in Western Arakan state, and Zedetkyi Kyun or St Matthew's island off the Tenasserim coast in the southeast. The latter island is especially sensitive because it is located off the coast of Burma's southernmost tip -- Kawthaung or Victoria Point -- close to the northern entrance to the Straits of Malacca. A military base there would enable the PRC to threaten the approaches to the Strait of Malacca. Also in 1994, Chinese technicians built a series of smaller ELINT/SIGINT stations along the Burmese coast of Bay of Bengal, thus achieving a thorough and overlapping coverage of the Bay of Bengal and Strait of Malacca.

In 1995, there were reports of revival/reactivation of a Chinese SIGINT site near Sop Hau in Laos -- a site used during the 1960s and early 1970s. The activation of the site will complete coverage of the entire Strait area -- from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean.
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

The case of the Islamist terrorism in and around the Strait of Malacca is extremely important not just because of the strategic ramification of the distabilization of such countries as the Philippines and Thailand. Taken together, this terrorism campaign is a classic case of the true meaning of state-sponsored terrorism. In this specific case, the Islamist subversion of several countries is intensified because of the strategic interests of a third party -- the PRC -- and, to a lesser extent, of its close allies. However, it is the close allies -- Pakistan and Iran -- who bear the brunt of the sponsorship of, and support for the terrorist escalation. They do so more because of the strategic calculations concerning the PRC than having vital interests in the Far East.

This is not to say that the bulk of the locally active terrorist and subversive are completely artificial. On the contrary. Local issues, outstanding grievances of the local population, existing indigenous terrorist and subversive organizations are exploited by the sponsoring states as the basis for their operations and a source for local support and legitimization. Once the sponsoring states take over an indigenous subversion and terrorist movement, the intensity of the armed struggle markedly rises and the character of the modus operandi of the local forces is altered, at times drastically, in order to serve the interests of the sponsors.

The local forces are active and willing participants in this cynical game of nations because it is in their self-interest to escalate their own fight against the local governments. In order to affect the desired escalation, the sponsoring states provide tremendous all around assistance -- training, expertise, weapons, and funds -- which the local organizations use for both the pursuit of their own indigenous objectives as well as for operations on behalf of the sponsoring states. Moreover, it should not be ignored that in principle, the intelligence services involved -- mainly the Iranian VEVAK and the Pakistani ISI -- the various Islamist operatives that they use to organized local on-site networks, and the local terrorists are all ideological brethren and genuine solidarity does exist among all the participants.

The mere presence of operatives and terrorists of the sponsoring states in the ranks of the local organizations legitimizes and sanctifies the close cooperation in what is essentially the furthering of the global strategic interest of the PRC and the Trans-Asian Axis (of which the Islamists are a major component). As will be discussed below, one of the outcomes of this state-sponsored escalation is the consolidation of a major forward base for exporting Islamist terrorism into the United States itself.

Indeed, Islamist forces sponsored by Iran and Pakistan and spearheaded by thoroughly trained local 'Afghans' are distabilizing the local states overlooking the Strait of Malacca. The Islamists are currently winning in Indonesia and Malaysia, influencing policies of local governments that are otherwise pro-Western. The Islamists are subverting Thailand -- using both the local Patans in the countryside and spectacular operations by experts terrorists arriving from the sponsoring states -- while also maintaining subversive infrastructure in Indonesia as deterrence for Jakarta, as well as taking over the struggle of the Rohingya Muslim minority in Burma to exercise additional pressure on Rangoon to cooperate with Beijing.

Moreover, because of the direct strategic bearing of Philippines on the issue -- Manila's claim to the Spratly Islands -- there has been a marked escalation of Islamist subversion and terrorism as well -- again both the uprising of the Moros in the countryside as well as spectacular and highly lethal operations by a combination of Philipino Abu Sayyaf forces and experts terrorists arriving from the sponsoring states -- made possible by a large infusion of sophisticated weapons and expertise in the fall of 1994. Indeed, it is NOT by accident that at the very same week in mid August 1995 that Philipino and Chinese negotiations on international law concerning the Spratly Islands were being concluded in Manila -- significantly, the mere fact the Manila agreed to these negotiations is one step away from surrender to Beijing's pressure -- a major terrorist alert was declared in the Philippines concerning a major surge of Abu Sayyaf and other Islamist militant groups.

The Moro struggle in the Philippines is one of the longest Muslim separatist struggles in East Asia. It emerged from a local resistance to the penetration of Christian Philipino settlers and a growing socio-economic plight of the indigenous Muslim population. Since the Second World War, the Moros' struggle has been characterized with surges of extreme sectarian violence. However, it was not until the 1980s, with the expansion of the first cycle of state sponsorship, and especially the mid 1990s, when the regional strategic interests necessitated the further distabilization of the Philippines, the local Islamist terrorism and subversion markedly expanded and escalated. By then, the Philipino Islamists have already been thoroughly penetrated and subverted by the Iran-controlled Islamist terrorist system. This effort was conducted out of Tehran's genuine commitment to pan-Islamic causes. However, it was the emergence of tangible regional strategic interests -- mainly the PRC's -- that made the sponsoring states -- Iran and Pakistan -- dramatically increase the extent of their material support for and direct intervention in the operations of the Philipino Islamist terrorists.

The majority of the Philipino Islamist forces operate under the banner of the Moro Islamic liberation Front (MILF) and their armed forces -- the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF). In the early 1990s, there were major improvements in the overall military capabilities of the MILF/BIAF primarily due to assistance from Philipino 'Afghans,' Pakistani, Afghan, and Iranian instructors. The key development was the institutionalization of a system of camps and secure lines of communications. Upon the completion of the modernization process in mid 1994, BIAF has about 120,000 mujahideen in six divisions and an elite "National Guard" comprised of 6,000 veteran fighters and Philipino 'Afghans'.

It was not by accident that the marked up-grading of the BIAF military capabilities was taking place in the fall of 1994 -- just when Iran and Pakistan were getting ready to escalate the subversion of the Philippines in conjunction with Beijing's building pressure on Manila in connection with the Spratly Islands, as well as furthering plans of the terrorism sponsoring states to use their local bases to support a new wave of terrorist operations against the US and Latin American states.

In October 1994, Iran arranged for massive weapon supplies. A shipload of RPG-2s, six 75mm dual-use guns, numerous ZU-23-2 dual-use automatic guns, 81mm mortars, a few Stingers, and large quantities of ammunition of all types was safely unloaded on the Mindanao coast. These supplies also constituted the beginning of a second phase of the BIAF's build-up to 180,000 troops. The political objective is the completion of the MILF's control of the rural areas of Mindanao by 1995-96 preferably through encroachment small scale insurgency and political pressure rather than a massive military confrontation with the government forces. By the spring of 1995, this method was working very effectively. An Islamic religious, political, and educational system sympathetic to the MILF is already dominant all over Mindanao. A flow of new recruits, all vetted and cleared through the local mosque system, to regional MILF camps and on for training with the BIAF is rapidly growing.

This marked escalation of Islamist terrorism and subversion throughout the southern islands of the Philippines has a major effect on Manila. The security forces and the government were increasingly preoccupied with the escalating subversion and growing instability. Larger assets of the military and security forces, including Naval and Marines forces, were allocated to fighting the Islamist subversion. With Manila's attention focused on the Moros, the government was completely surprised by the Chinese surged into the eastern Spratly Islands -- islands that the Philippines claim sovereignty on. Moreover, by the time the crisis erupted in the spring of 1995, the Philipino Navy and Marines -- the services responsible for dealing with the Chinese surge -- were already thinly stretched by, and completely committed to, the fighting against the escalating Islamist subversion. Consequently, Manila found itself lacking viable military option to assert its sovereignty in the disputed reefs. Manila had no alternative by to gradually acquiesce to the Chinese bold surge.

Moreover, by now, the ISI and VEVAK have already established a high quality and tightly controlled Islamist terrorist force in the Philippines specifically in order to carry out spectacular and highly lethal operations aimed at distabilizing the government in Manila and support international terrorism throughout the region and world.

Since the mid 1980s, Tehran was spearheading the establishment of alternate extremist fringe organizations. They received close support from the HizbAllah. Tehran believes in the dual approach combining extreme violence with active acquisition of popular support through extensive social services. While the MILF was gaining widespread popular support, the extremist organizations were challenging the government through the use of terrorism. As the terrorist struggle was escalating, Tehran markedly upgraded its on-site level of expertise by nominating Kamal Sajjadi, a veteran Pasdaran intelligence official, as the Iranian head of mission in Manila. His primary mission is to support the escalation of the HizbAllah-led Islamic struggle and terr