bull

__________________
What's the difference between people who pray in church and those who pray in casinos?
The ones in the casinos are serious.

lulldapull

Boy! bull was right on the bulls eye! Bravo Bull. At least you put it like it is. Instead of the usual "political mileage" rubbish we hear on this forum of why the U.S. supports Israel because of democracy and blah blah.

Officer of Engineers

You will find that both Pakistan and India are heads and shoulders militarily above the ME states you've mentioned. Just because Israel can beat them up doesn't mean that they are scare anybody else. Nor are they a measure of Israel's prowness.

__________________
Chimo

bull

You got me wrong,what i said was that india cant handle one pakistan what will they do if they had 4-5 similar countries around them?i am not saying israel is going to threathen pak or india.

Do you doubt isreali prowess they could be having ne of the finest fighting machines.You wanna measure isreali prowess read about the war with gulf states and see how they used their airpower to ground the egyptian airforce completely and then take on jordanian and syrain.

What did india do when china attacked,they hid their airforce why???lack of political will.THAT EXACTLY IS MY POINT!

Its not only about equipments.what matters is those people sitting in those ****ing seats in south bloc..

ajaybhutani

Well i think we are handling Pakistan very well .We should realise that its actually the chinese supporting paksitna in terms of nucelar bombs. and koreans for missiles.Its like this china had to keep india buzy so taht latter cannot become a threat or issue for chineese and so they have made paksitna nuclear. Now we have a pain in the ass sending terrorists round the clock into our territory . But thats nothin new there are camps of maoists and NE terrorists in Nepal Bhutan Mayanmar and Bangladesh too. We are handling that and we still spend just 2.4% of our GDP on defence . While paksitan toda spends 6% . india is actively trying to look out for ABM defence system to neutralise the nuclear threat from paksitan and once that is done its gonna be a same situation as it was before paksitan went nuclear .BTW another factor is the non support of paksitans main allies ( china and US) against india. This is what has actually made paksitan come on the discussion table that it left by stabbing india in the midst of the talks in the form of a kargil mischeif.


When china attacked it was 1962 and our armies werent well prepared . We became indepent peacefully and our PM preferred not to concentrate on our military. Well the 1962 war came as a lesson for him . Later there were mroe situations when we were in about to go to war but chineese couldnt dare to attack india. Its there in the threads here.
India is a peace loving country and you shouldnot take it as a problem .Every time pakistan tried a mischeif it was slapped on his face. And once even broken into two.

bull

i dont think so the mischiefs against india was returned with a slap as you say.There are so many numerous examples around us,kargil where we played the good boy role perfectly for US,parliament attack where we said e will "do it "and ended up giving a list of 20 odd terrorists on wanted list tp pakistan.What happened to that lists.Its clearly known where the people behind bombay serail blasts are...what the use???india is still happy being a good boy and what it get back for that... candies???
Pathethic..thas what i call it.

Officer of Engineers

Yes, I do. I'm not impressed. They are good but not that great. The ME states were not and are not a WWIII force. When the Israelis were threatened by intervention by a WWIII force (Soviets), they chickened out.

There has been confrontations with China since then and India did not back down.

ZFBoxcar

They were threatend with nuclear weapons. The Soviet Army itself could not (in the required time) be deployed against Israel.

ajaybhutani

well after paksitan went nuclear its no more possible to do it the war way. An all out war between two nuclear powers isnt good at all. We preffered a diplomatic way.
1.Keeping them, off stuff like f16.
2.Making frnds with china to reduce the support and force pakstan come on the discussion tale.
3. Building a base in Tajikistan.
4. Surrounding Paksitan with indian influence on iran afganistan tajikistan etc.
5. Dams in J&K.
In the 1990's indian military underwent a long neglect that left its edge blunt. And we learned a lesson in terms of kargil.But since we couldnt go for an all out war surely we preffered the other ways.

Officer of Engineers

The Soviets threatened conventional intervention. The US responded by putting two CVBGs going to DEFCON II.

ZFBoxcar

The Arabs were prepared to allow the Soviet Army into Syria and Lebanon? I can see this alarming the Jordanians and Saudis like crazy. And yeah, I guess you could call it chickening out, but the war was pretty much over from Israel's perspective. Occupying Syria and Egypt would not be fun tasks. The Israelis were shelling Damascus and had recrossed the Suez Canal by the time the Soviets threatend intervention. Why fight a super power for nothing?

lulldapull

Nothings working Ajay!

China still sells about $2 billion per year worth of hardware to pakistan.

Now Unkal Sam is also giving it up for free again ( $1 billion per year worth of arms almost)! Plus economic aid, to lay off of India for now!

And you are mistaken that peace has been achieved. if kashmir issue is not resolved, then 'Cross-border' infiltration and rehashing of the JKLF and Hurriyat and the dozen other separatist outfits will restart.

Trying to 'isolate' paksitan is not as easy as your 1 2 3 points up above
Its been 55 years. So far no "isolation"!

ajaybhutani

Well its about the strategic weapons that make a difference .And india has done good in containing the supplies to paksitna from russia as well as F16 from US.
About china. What paksitan has lost is the fact that china now no longer takes paksitans side on every issue( evident from kargil issue.).

What has changed is the fact that paksitna who preffered to backstab the peace process in the form of kargil is today has himself come on the table and talk about peace.
Well terrorism stopped in punjab. It will stop in J&K too. Why do u think they will restart . ?? Did terrorism start again in punjab??

bull

Containing supplies....what abt china supplying advaned weapons,they acquiring weapons from france,sweden india is not going to stop that.

China doesnt take pak side..what that???Vocally yes but hardware will be supplied as far as china is concerned they need pak to distract india and india is playing into their hands

Terrorism i just hope it ends!!! frankly yes but i am sure this is not the way,extending a hands hake and then getting stabbed in that same hand.
How many times do we repeat it,and howmany times wud we indians be humilitaed like this by this neighbour of ours.

Officer of Engineers

That's one thing about history. It's so facinating
meria

Middle East Review of International Affairs

Vol. 4 No. 4/December 2000



The Russians Were Coming: The Soviet Military Threat in the 1967 Six-Day War
by Isabella Ginor *



Editor's Summary

New evidence reveals that during the 1967 Six-Day War the Soviet Union set in motion military operations to assist Egypt and especially Syria, first in seeking to overcome Israel and then in response to Israel's pre-emptive attack. These potential steps included a naval landing, airborne reinforcement and air support for ground operations. Action was aborted at the last minute due, among other factors, to a firm US response and dissension among Soviet leaders in Moscow.





8:48 a.m. on June 10, 1967 was "a time of great concern and utmost gravity" in the White House Situation Room, according to U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Llewellyn Thompson, one of the presidential advisors present there. 1 A message had just been received over the Moscow-Washington hotline from Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin threatening a Soviet military action that might lead to nuclear confrontation. 2 Newly received evidence now shows the threat was not an empty one: the Soviets had prepared a naval landing, with air support, on Israel's shores.

New evidence summarized in this article indicates that the Soviet intervention was not only planned but actually set in motion before being aborted. Soviet officials interviewed insist that such operations were meant only to deter Israel from overwhelming Egypt and, especially, Syria, as well as to stop the United States from intervening on Israel's side. In order to achieve this outcome, however, the projected action had to be made known to these adversaries, and this was carefully avoided by the Soviets. Yet details of the operation were kept in total secrecy, have been denied to this day, and remained generally unknown to Israeli and American intelligence.

Thus, unless the Soviets grossly overestimated the other side's intelligence capability, this indicates that the operation was to be implemented, not just threatened. Moreover, preparations for this operation began well before the Soviets even accused Israel of offensive designs, the supposed reason for the intervention.

Well before 1967, Israel had been targeted by the KGB's Foreign Intelligence (First) Directorate as a theater of operations during a larger East-West conflict. Preparations had been made there for parachuting at least diversionnye razvedyvatelnye gruppy (DRGs--sabotage-intelligence groups) to destroy Israeli targets. During 1964-66, according to documents supplied by the defecting KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin, Israel was one of the countries where caches of arms and radio equipment were prepositioned for such operations. Mitrokhin claims some of these were boobytrapped and may be in place to this day. 3 The direct involvement of Soviet personnel on Israeli soil, at least on a small scale, had thus already been considered and approved.

The Soviet Union played a central role in escalating Middle East tensions to the brink of war in 1967, and evidence is accumulating that it actually instigated the conflict. In his recently published memoirs, Nikita S. Khrushchev asserts that the USSR's military command first encouraged high-ranking Egyptian and Syrian delegations, in a series of "hush-hush" mutual visits, to go to war, then persuaded the Soviet political leadership to support these steps, in the full knowledge they were aimed at starting a war to destroy Israel. 4

The conventional Western chronology of this crisis starts on May 13, 1967 when Egypt made the false charge, based on information provided by the USSR, that Israel was massing forces on its border with Syria in preparation for an attack. But even as the crisis unfolded, on May 26, a U.S. diplomat remarked to a Soviet interlocutor: "It almost seemed as though the Soviet Union had been aware in advance of the coming Near Eastern crisis, since [Communist Party Secretary Leonid I.] Brezhnev had first called for withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet [from the Mediterranean] on April 24." 5

The Soviet Ambassador in Tel Aviv, Dmitri S. Chuvakhin, declined an Israeli invitation to see for himself that the charges of troop concentrations were baseless. Twenty-four years later, Chuvakhin maintained in an interview that "[Israeli Prime Minister Levi] Eshkol did pose the question, but unfortunately it isn't a diplomat's assignment to tour frontiers and see whether forces are being massed there or not." 6 Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban correctly identified the Soviet source of the Egyptians' "bad intelligence" and complained to U.S. Ambassador Walworth Barbour that "talking with the Soviet Ambassador here [is] like talking to someone from a different planet." 7

General Muhammad Fawzi, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, did go to Syria to see for himself and reported that "there was no sign of Israeli troop concentrations and the Russians must have been having hallucinations." 8 But the KGB is reported, by a defector, to have planted agents among Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's closest advisors 9 , and he apparently chose to believe them--or simply stuck to a plan agreed upon previously with the Soviets.

The Soviet press, including Pravda's Cairo correspondent Yevgeny Primakov (later Russia's SVR [Foreign Intelligence] chief, foreign minister and premier) contributed inflammatory allegations about Israel's aggressive intent. 10 For the first time, Moscow sent much of its Black Sea and Northern Fleets into the Mediterranean 11 and discreetly backed Nasser when he demanded the removal of the UN force from Sinai and blocked Israeli shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba to the port of Eilat. The U.S. embassy in Cairo was certain that Egypt had "full Soviet backing" on the latter move and was concerned that the State Department thought otherwise. 12

In Moscow several days later, Thompson asked a "well-informed" Soviet source "point blank whether Soviets knew in advance of Egyptian action in closing Gulf of Aqaba. He was obviously embarrassed...and after a long pause said he thought Nasser had acted on his own." 13 At the UN, where Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Fedorenko was stalling proposals to lift the blockade, his Canadian and Danish colleagues told him they had "a nasty feeling [the] USSR [was] playing [a] game of allowing crisis to build to force Israel to act." 14

Ex-KGB General Oleg Kalugin, then the agency's deputy "resident" [station chief] for political intelligence in Washington, recalls that "no one in Moscow had any doubt" that Israel would be quickly defeated. 15 When the war did erupt, the Soviet ambassador in Jordan said to his American counterpart "in a perfectly matter-of-fact way you know, our estimate is that if the Israelis do not receive large-scale outside assistance... we think the Arabs will win the war, if [it] is allowed to be fought to the finish." 16

On May 18, with the situation rapidly escalating, Eban handed Barbour a letter to President Lyndon B. Johnson stating, "There may be an impression in Cairo and Damascus that Soviet support...is assured, and that therefore they have no need of restraint." He asked for "an emphatic clarification by the United States to the Soviet Union of the American commitment to Israel".I can hardly exaggerate the importance and urgency of such an approach." 17 The same day, Undersecretary of State Eugene Rostow expressed to Soviet Charge d'Affaires Chernyakov "concern...over Israeli-Syrian tensions and told him of Syrian Government rumors...that Syria had been promised unlimited military and political support by USSR," of which Chernyakov said he was unaware. 18

The next day the U.S. defense attaché in Israel attended a briefing by Israeli Military Intelligence chief Aharon Yariv and reported that Yariv shared the belief of the Egyptian and Syrian governments that their "present actions [have the] backing of USSR." Yariv, however, was "not sure how deep USSR is committed." 19 Nonetheless, on May 19 the State Department informed the main U.S. embassies "that if conflict occurred in the Middle East, the USSR would be in difficult spot. Russian temptation would be to aid Egypt and Syria, but [the] USSR was reluctant to promote hostilities in Arab world as means to exert pressure on US over Vietnam. The USSR realized [a] Middle Eastern War would be hard to control. They would make at least unilateral efforts to stop it." 20

In Washington on May 20, Israel Ambassador Avraham Harman called "urgently" on Undersecretary Rostow to report full details of Eban's "disturbing" conversation with Chuvakhin: "[The] latter asserted [that] terror incidents on Syrian border [were the] work of [the] CIA, adding, 'We have warned you. You are responsible.'" Harman raised, "[The] possibility we may be getting double talk from [the] Soviets...[and the] possibility of Soviet-Syrian-Egyptian collusion." 21

On May 24, Deputy Undersecretary of State Raymond L. Garthoff had one of his frequent appointments with Boris N. Sedov, "KGB officer and second secretary of the Soviet Embassy" as Garthoff later described him. 22 "Sedov left the general impression that if the United States were to become directly involved militarily in the escalating Middle East conflict, the Soviet Union, too, would have to become involved. But he was vague and noncommittal as to the way it would become involved." This reminded Garthoff of Sedov's mentioning to him, a month earlier, Brezhnev's demand for withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean, and this time he included it in his report of the conversation. 23 Sedov would soon become much more specific.

In Moscow on May 26, newly appointed KGB Chairman Yuri V. Andropov briefed the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party on the Middle East situation, referring to a report prepared by his agency. The day before, he stated, "at a meeting of Israel's propaganda services' chiefs, Propaganda Minister [Israel] Galili declared that the government of Israel had decided to commence military operations against [Egypt] in two or three days. This data...is confirmed by reports received from Israeli military circles. The Eshkol cabinet has completed its war preparations." The KGB report assessed that American military intervention was likely, especially to open the Gulf of Aqaba, and stated that "aircraft of the Sixth Fleet are, since May 23, routinely carrying out reconnaissance flights over the northern coast of [Egypt] and in the region of Gaza." 24

The next day--Saturday--Chernyakov requested an urgent meeting with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and presented a letter from Kosygin. The note warned, in line with the KGB report, that "Israel is actively engaged in military preparations and evidently intends to carry out armed aggression...Israeli militant circles are attempting to impose...an 'adventurist' action...[and] may cause an armed conflict." Kosygin warned that "if arms should be used this could be the beginning of far-reaching events. Should Israel commit aggression and military operations begin, then we will render assistance to those countries that are subject to aggression." Rusk took this seriously enough to urgently inform allied leaders and urged Johnson--then at his Texas ranch--to relay Kosygin's message to Eshkol immediately, with a warning against preemptive action "which would make it impossible for friends...to stand by you." Johnson did so but toned down the warning. 25

Ambassador Thompson, before coming to Washington, had cabled from Moscow on May 28 about a warning from the Egyptian Embassy's political counselor that "Nasser has [a] larger commitment from [the] Soviets than anyone (presumably including the source) had realized."[The] Soviet objective is to transform Arab-Israeli struggle into showdown between Communists and anti-Communists for control of Middle East, and Soviets are succeeding. If Nasser wins this one, monarchies and Western oil interests will go." Thompson however "emphasized" that his "source was distraught, that he claimed to be 'not in the know' and that his views [were] probably colored by his clear dislike of both Nasser and Soviets." 26 The United States, in sum, had formed no assessment of Soviet offensive intentions.

On June 5, Israel launched a pre-emptive strike against its Arab neighbors (which, over six days, cost the lives of 35 Soviet advisors stationed at Egyptian and Syrian military installations). 27 Kosygin immediately activated the Moscow-Washington teletype hotline for the first time since it was installed following the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara recounted recently that when the line rang at 7:15 am, he awoke Johnson. "The president comes on the line and says, 'What in the hell are you calling for at this hour?'" McNamara told him. Within fifteen minutes they, along with Rusk, had begun what became a nearly continuous conference in the White House Situation Room. 28

A total of 20 messages were exchanged. "The president watched with great care" this material, according to Johnson's advisor McGeorge Bundy. At the outset, the Americans were "mainly concerned with the awful shape we would be in if the Israelis were losing. We didn't know anything about the situation on the ground."It was in a way reassuring when it became clear that the fighting was the Israelis' idea and the idea was working." 29

For the first five days of the war, the messages dealt mainly with securing a cease-fire on the Israeli-Egyptian front and exchanging information on the USS Liberty incident, which will be discussed later. Although the Soviet side made no explicit threat to use force over the hotline, hints were dropped elsewhere. Soviet Ambassador Chuvakhin told his German counterpart in Tel Aviv, Rolf Pauls, "In [an] unusually serious vein," as Pauls related to his American counterpart, "If now Israelis become quite drunk with success and pursue their aggression further the future of this little country will be a very sad one." 30

Then, on June 10, the Soviet premier weighed in with a stern warning over the hotline: Israeli forces, after routing Egypt and Jordan, were according to Kosygin "conducting an offensive toward Damascus," the Syrian capital. 31 "The feeling of those in the Situation Room," as Thompson recorded for the National Security Council history file, "was that the Israelis were probably doing so." 32 The Americans no longer had a manned embassy in Damascus and-incredibly-no independent assessment of the Israeli offensive on the Golan Heights. This was true despite a dispatch from Ambassador Barbour two days earlier, stating that in conversations with other diplomats "We have already taken steps to calm what I believe is exaggerated impression of Israeli military ambitions. We have [the] impression [that] 25 kilometers will be [Israel's] maximum penetration [of] Syria." 33 This assessment had apparently not been relayed to the Situation Room, where CIA Director Richard Helms was called in for his evaluation. The best he could do was to try and reach "friendly powers" that still had diplomatic missions in Syria. 34

According to a top-secret memoir contributed by Helms to the NSC history dossier, conversation in the Situation Room "was in the lowest voices he had ever heard."The atmosphere was tense." 35 Kosygin's message went on: "A very crucial moment has now arrived which forces us, if military actions are not stopped in the next few hours, to adopt an independent decision. We are ready to do this. However, these actions may bring us into a clash which will lead to a grave catastrophe".We propose that you demand from Israel that it unconditionally cease military action."We purpose to warn Israel that if this is not fulfilled, necessary actions will be taken, including military." 36 This hasty translation was read to President Johnson and his seven aides present. Thompson was asked to double-check that the original Russian text indeed threatened military action by the USSR. It did. "In effect," says McNamara, "it said:`Mr. President, if you want war, you'll get war.' That's how tense the situation was." 37

Anatoly F. Dobrynin, then Soviet Ambassador in Washington, now claims not to have been privy to Kosygin's message of June 10. In a recent interview he insisted that the USSR never meant to intervene militarily and never even threatened it. Confronted with Kosygin's words, he persisted:

"I don't see any direct military intervention here. That's your interpretation and it doesn't arise directly from Kosygin's text".That's diplomatic language which is used to permit certain variations and leave room for future negotiation."He might have wanted to leave some uncertainty, that's what you call diplomacy."

Q. It says "including military."

A. "Necessary measures" might be various. It doesn't go into detail. Don't read into it what it doesn't say. What's more, the course of events showed there was no military action on our part. 38

Still, all the American aides present on June 10 in the Situation Room recalled--in Bundy's words--"considerable discussion about what in fact the Soviets would be able to do to the Israelis if they did try to carry out their threat." Bundy thought that "the Russians' possibilities were really not that impressive." 39 McNamara, on the other hand, states now: "We did not have any specific intelligence on [a Soviet plan to intervene]. But we were fearful that Syria might call on the Soviets for support to attack Israel, and Israel's very existence would be at stake." 40 New evidence now reveals that the Soviets were indeed poised to attack Israel, just as McNamara had suspected, and had been preparing for such a mission all along.

As early as May 11, Soviet Arabic-language interpreters stationed in Egypt were summoned to the Soviet Embassy in Cairo. One of them later recounted to journalist Aleksandr Khaldeev that they were told war between Egypt and Israel was inevitable. Later they were taken to Alexandria and informed they would be posted to the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, now cruising off the Israeli shore. "One of the interpreters...said he knew for sure that we would be attached to a 'desant' (MEANING =descent, landing) force that would be landing in Haifa [Israel's main commercial harbor and naval base] or slightly northward." The interpreters were to handle liaison with Israel's Arab population, "who were longing for us." 41

This backs up an eyewitness account received recently from a participant in the putative landing. Yuri N. Khripunkov was in June 1967 a young gunnery lieutenant on board a new BPK (large anti-submarine ship), then the fastest, most advanced model in the Soviet Navy. It was part of a large reinforcement force for the Mediterranean flotilla which arrived from the Black Sea base of Sevastopol in early May 42 , shortly after Brezhnev demanded the withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet. At least one more detachment--including four destroyers, two "hydrographic vessels" (a cover name for intelligence ships) and even one "icebreaker"--went through the Turkish straits on May 31. 43

The Israelis appear to have been more concerned about the threat posed by the Soviet fleet than the Americans were. The Israeli military's spokesman told the U.S. defense attache on May 25: "We are very anxious to know what [the] Soviet fleet in [the] East Mediterranean is doing. We knew they were in the area of Crete and think they may have moved north." This was however only 17th among the points he made. 44 A member of the Israeli general staff at the time recalls hearing that a Soviet landing "had been discussed at cabinet sessions, but only as a theoretic[al] possibility." 45

The Israeli concern was well-based in fact. Khripunkov relates how on June 5 his captain ordered him to raise and command a 30-man detachment of "volunteers" for a landing on the Israeli coast. Similar parties were being assembled on all the 30-odd Soviet surface vessels in the Mediterranean, for a total of some 1000 men. The assignment for Khripunkov's platoon was to penetrate Haifa port. 46

The Russian military historian Col. Valery A. Yaremenko confirms that such a directive was issued. "In order to influence Israel, the order was given to raise quickly, on board the ships of the squadron in the Mediterranean, units of untrained marines-that is, regular seamen. They were supposed to sail toward Alexandria and make a trial `desant' in that port. But the order was rescinded almost immediately as unrealistic." Yaremenko is unaware of written orders mentioning an Israeli target for the landing. But he adds that there was a standing order from the commander of the Soviet Navy that "If the Israelis try to blockade the Egyptian or Syrian coast, or to hamper the activity of Soviet vessels bringing arms and materiel to these countries, steps should be taken and arms used if necessary." In a comment unconfirmed as yet by any other source, Yaremenko adds that "There were minor incidents between Soviet ships and Israel patrol craft, which fortunately ended peacefully." 47

Khripunkov was told that in addition to the improvised landing parties "there was also one BDK [large amphibious ship] with about 40 tanks and maybe a battalion of infantry." 48 On June 8, briefing an emissary from the White House, General Yariv said "[We] knew that [a Soviet] ship had left Russian port in last few days which was loaded with 70 tanks and anti-aircraft material," but he attributed this to Soviet resupplying of Egypt. 49

Dobrynin maintains that "there was no"intention on the part of the Soviet government [to intervene]. There were rumors, but there could be any kind of rumors. But there was no real intention on the part of the government. This I know for sure." Still, he admits, "[Generals] have their own considerations...They plan all kinds of variations that may or may not be realized." 50

According to one account, Acting Defense Minister [later full Minister] Andrei A. Grechko and Andropov were "pressing for the immediate dispatch of Soviet forces to the Middle East. They were supported by [Nikolai G.] Yegorichev, party boss for the city of Moscow, who suggested a landing on the isthmus of Sinai [perhaps the land spit between the Bardawil lagoon and the Mediterranean] to start a march on Tel Aviv;" Yegorichev now denies making any such recommendations. 51 He had just (April 1967) visited Egypt and, according to other sources, reported that both that country and Syria needed much greater Soviet military support to confront Israel successfully. 52

On board Khripunkov's BPK, only one sailor refused to "volunteer." He was later transferred but not otherwise punished. The hazards of the operation were obvious. The seamen were neither trained nor equipped for a commando raid on land. Khripunkov later recalled: "What were we supposed to accomplish, with my pistol and the sailors' AK-47s? Get in there and see, they told us. `Throw your RG-42's [depth grenades designed for use against frogmen]. Wipe out the enemy forces.'" Wait for reinforcements, they were told in general terms "but nothing concrete was said. The air force was going to support us." Not that Khripunkov and his men expected much from the promised air support. "Who was going to look for the landing force? How could we contact them? We had nothing ready-no radio gear, no codes, no signal rockets, nothing." 53

A retired Soviet air force lieutenant general, Yuri V. Nastenko, confirmed recently that bomber and fighter/reconnaissance units, the latter comprising MiG-21s under his command, were put on full operational alert on the evening of June 5, and he was convinced this was in preparation for "real combat." The armed aircraft were flown the next day to an airbase "on the border"--presumably with Turkey--and the crews were scrambled several times over the following three days. "The command was working on the assumption that we would land at Syrian bases, and thus would have to overfly a neutral country such as Turkey. The Soviet government was deliberating what to do if this passage was denied, since breaking through anyway might mean war! Common sense finally prevailed, the units were returned to base and the all-clear was given." 54 Professor Ze'ev Katz of the Hebrew University interviewed two immigrants to Israel in the early 1990s, former Soviet paratroopers who reported that their units also spent several days in transport aircraft on the runways, prepared for a drop in the Middle East. 55

On June 10, while Kosygin's message was being analyzed in the White House, Garthoff was again invited to lunch by Sedov. This time Garthoff immediately sent an urgent, secret memo to Undersecretary of State and former Ambassador in Moscow Foy D. Kohler, relating that Sedov brought up the situation in Syria and "expressed very great concern over Israeli intentions to take Damascus."He sought to elicit the American reaction if the Soviet Union sent troops to Syria. I said that would be 'a new war'....We were allies of Greece, Turkey and Iran, and it would be a hostile act to send Soviet troops through their air space if, as I would suppose, they did not give permission."Sedov smiled and said they probably wouldn't bother to ask."I emphasized it would be extremely unfortunate and dangerous if the Soviet Union should intervene in Syria." 56

Dobrynin responded angrily when confronted by the present writer with this report, belittling Sedov as just one of many embassy staffers. "I know he [Sedov] wasn't authorized to ask this question. If he did so in a conversation, it was only that--a talk between two diplomats trying to get something out of each other. It's difficult for me to comment on something I didn't authorize him to speak about." 57

But Sedov's inquiry was far from hypothetical. On June 8, the U.S. ambassador in Turkey reported that he had been contacted, late the previous night, by senior Foreign Office official Ilter Turkmen (later foreign minister). Turkmen informed him that on June 6, the "Iraqi government through [the] Turk[ish] Ambassador in Baghdad had requested [the government of Turkey] to grant overflight rights to MiG-21s which Iraq was receiving from USSR. [The] Iraqis cited US-UK intervention in Middle East as reason for obtaining aircraft but were vague about numbers involved or timetable for delivery. Turkmen said [Turkey] had not been approached by USSR re[garding] MiGs. Turks were replying...[that] they would be unable to grant request because of [the UN] Security Council cease-fire resolution and questions regarding Turkish security. Turkmen requested this information be held very closely." 58 The Turks clearly considered the proposed aircraft passage to be connected with the Arab-Israeli war and thus coming under the Security Council resolution. Sedov had technically been truthful in saying the Soviets had not asked directly for permission to make overflights.

McNamara says the Soviet preparations for an invasion were unknown to him at the time, but "[Israel's] intelligence services, ours, [and] the British all had information that Nasser was going to attack Israel and literally destroy the country".There was a great risk that if Egypt attacked [Israel and that if Israel] defeated Egypt, that the Soviets would [intervene] in support of Egypt. We wanted"to be in a position to apply our military force in [Israel's] support to prevent [its] being annihilated by a combination of Egypt, Syria and the Soviet Union. And we feared that if [Israel] pre-empted"and"then needed U.S. military support, our people would say 'Dammit, why the hell should we support them, they started the war.' So we tried to persuade [Israel] and we thought we had persuaded [it] not to pre-empt." But after Israel did attack and succeeded, "Johnson and I were wondering."What will Syria do? And what will the Soviet Union do, with Egypt-their client-being severely weakened?" 59

Khripunkov says he and his men were well aware they were pawns in this global power play. Losing 1000 men, he remarked, was "nothing for the USSR. They started counting at five million. Each side wanted to demonstrate its dominant role".The United States sends in the [Sixth] Fleet. We bring in our Black Sea Squadron. They send in spy planes. We start preparing a landing in Israel. The Israeli tanks move through Sinai and are ready to skip over the Suez Canal. What then? We land our force and World War III begins?"The whole world would be destroyed" 60 . This was, ultimately, the "grave catastrophe" threatened by Kosygin.

McNamara refuses to this day to discuss the still-controversial USS Liberty incident, and dismisses the ironic possibility that Israel's attack on the intelligence ship prevented an early warning of the Soviet