Pakistani Sovereignty - Page 3

1 Observer · 01-30-2008, 18:21 PM

Tuesday's missile strike happened in Khushali Torikhel, a village in North Waziristan
about 40 miles east of the border, local officials said on condition of anonymity because
they were not authorized to speak to journalists.

A resident said an armed drone may have carried out the strike.

"We could see a small, white plane flying over the village for the past several days,
" villager Dildar Khan said.

An Interior Ministry spokesman said he had no information about any missile strike.

The government often uses airstrikes to attack militants in areas that its ground
forces and artillery cannot reach, but some of the aerial attacks near the border
in recent years are believed to have been launched by missile-armed U.S. drones flying
from Afghanistan.

Authorities in both the U.S. and Afghanistan have denied knowledge of such operations.

maqsad · 01-31-2008, 03:27 AM

It was probably a US drone. I am not sure paf/pa has armed drones yet. The driver probably set them up in a trap.

Quote:

MIRAMSHAH, Jan 30: Militants retrieved and buried on Wednesday the bodies of 12 foreigners who had been killed in a missile attack on a residential compound in the Khushali Toorikhel area of North Waziristan on Monday night.

Local people said the identity of the militants killed in the attack remained unknown but according to unconfirmed reports seven of them were Arabs while the other five from central Asian.

The compound, located about three kilometres south of Mirali town, is owned by Abdus Sattar, a driver, who survived the attack.

A large number of militants had surrounded the site to get the bodies which the later buried in a local graveyard.

“Militants are still keeping the local people away from the place,” a villager told Dawn on phone. He said that unmanned air vehicles had hovered over the area on Wednesday.

The attack is a mystery because it is still not known who had fired the missile.

Some local people claimed that a drone had fired the missile but officials have been keeping quiet.

“I heard the sound of a plane just before the explosion,” said the man who identified himself as Zaheer Gul.

Several places in the North Waziristan have come under attack in the recent past. A house was attacked in Mosaki village in Mirali tehsil in December 2005 in which Al Qaeda’s operational commander Hamza Rabia was killed.

Meanwhile, militants attacked a security base in the Razmak sub-division of North Waziristan on Wednesday.

According to sources, two army soldiers were killed while another was injured in the afternoon attack.

They said that the militants had sneaked into Razmak from the adjacent Makin area where security forces had launched an operation against supporters of Baitullah Mehsud.

1 Observer · 01-31-2008, 10:04 AM

“Local people said the identity of the militants killed in the attack remained unknown but according to unconfirmed reports seven of them were Arabs while the other five from central Asian.”
7 Arabs & 5 central Asians ... I wonder … Central Asians ... Chechnya’s Dagestinians Azerb's Kazaks... how central?
…"Must have been a fashionable gathering. It had drawn the finest type"…
... I don't care who has admitted doing what. Without even knowing more, one could surmise, just from the eclectic nature of this group, that they could easily have been the types we are looking for. Or … at X $ a head, theirs were as good as any. I understand that is not out side the realm of the possible either.

1 Observer · 01-31-2008, 19:32 PM

Hey boys! Remember what I was asking about? CHeck this out ...

Top al-Qaida Figure Killed in Pakistan

In a photo released by IntelCenter, an organization which monitors al-Qaida messaging, a Libyan al-Qaida commander Abu Laith al-Libi speaks during a videotaped interview at undisclosed location by al-Qaida's al-Sahab media wing on April 27, 2007.

By ROBERT H. REID (Associated Press Writer)
From Associated Press
January 31, 2008 5:57 PM EST

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan - One of al-Qaida's top figures, Abu Laith al-Libi, has been killed in Pakistan, an Islamist Web site announced Thursday. Pakistani officials and residents said a dozen people, including seven Arabs, died in a missile strike in northwestern Pakistan near the Afghan border.

Al-Libi was believed to be the key link between the Taliban and al-Qaida and was blamed for masterminding the bombing an American base while Vice President Dick Cheney was visiting Afghanistan last year. He was listed among the Americans' 12 most-wanted men with a bounty of $200,000 on his head.

Pakistani officials denied any knowledge of al-Libi's death. The killing of such a major al-Qaida figure is likely to embarrass President Pervez Musharraf, who has repeatedly said he would not sanction U.S. military action against al-Qaida members believed to be regrouping in the lawless area near the Afghan border.

A Web site that frequently carries announcements from militant groups said al-Libi had been "martyred with a group of his brothers in the land of Muslim Pakistan" but gave no further details.

However, Pakistani intelligence officials and residents said a missile struck a compound late Monday or early Tuesday about 2 1/2 miles from the Pakistani town of Mir Ali in North Waziristan, killing 12 people, including seven Arabs as well as Pakistanis and Central Asians.
Residents said they could hear U.S. Predator drones flying in the area shortly before the explosion, which destroyed the compound.

The Pakistani newspaper Dawn said the victims were buried in a local cemetery.

Rumors spread Thursday in the border area that al-Libi or his deputy died in the missile strike. But Pakistan's Interior Ministry spokesman, Javed Iqbal Cheema, insisted authorities had "no information" indicating al-Libi was dead.

One intelligence official in the area, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter, said the bodies of those killed were badly mangled by the force of the explosion and it was difficult to identify them. The official estimated 12 people were killed, including Arabs, Turkomen from Central Asia and local Taliban members.

In Washington, a Western official said that "it appears at this point that al-Libi has met his demise," but declined to talk about the circumstances. "It was a major success in taking one of the top terrorists in the world off the street," the official said. He added that the death occurred "within the last few days."

Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he did not "have anything definitive" to say on reports of al-Libi's death.

The Libyan-born al-Libi was among the most high-profile figures in al-Qaida after its leader Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahri.

In spring 2007, al-Qaida's media wing, Al-Sahab, released a video interview with a bearded man identified as al-Libi. In it, he accuses Shiite Muslims of fighting alongside American forces in Iraq, and claimed that mujahedeen would crush foreign troops in Afghanistan.

The U.S. says al-Libi was likely behind the February 2007 bombing at the U.S. base at Bagram in Afghanistan during a visit by Cheney. The attack killed 23 people but Cheney was deep inside the sprawling base and was not hurt.

The bombing added to the impression that Western forces and the shaky government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai are vulnerable to assault by Taliban and al-Qaida militants.

Al-Libi also led an al-Qaida training camp and appeared in a number of al-Qaida Internet videos.

He was known to maintain close ties with tribes living on the Pakistani side of the mountainous border, where U.S. officials believe al-Qaida has been regrouping.

A Pakistani intelligence official said that al-Libi was based near Mir Ali until late 2003 when he moved back into Afghanistan to take charge of al-Qaida operations on both sides of the border area. But he retained links with North Waziristan, the official said on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the information.

Mir Ali is the second-biggest town in North Waziristan and has a strong presence of foreign militants, mostly Uzbeks with links to al-Qaida who fled to Pakistan's tribal regions after the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001.

The U.S. has in the past sought to kill top al-Qaida leaders but with limited success.

Al-Zawahri, al-Qaida's second-in-command, was the target of a U.S. airstrike in Pakistan near the Afghan border on Jan. 13, 2006, but he was not at the site of the attack. Pakistan condemned the missile strike that killed at least 17 people in the village of Damadola in the Bajur tribal area, about four miles inside Pakistan.

Pakistani security officials said four top operatives were believed to be killed in that strike. The officials said the operatives included Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar, who the U.S. Justice Department called an explosives and poisons expert; Abu Obaidah al-Masri, the al-Qaida chief responsible for attacks on U.S. forces in eastern Afghanistan; and Abdul Rehman al-Maghribi, a Moroccan and relative of al-Zawahri, possibly his son-in-law.

Some of the officials also said a fourth man, Khalid Habib, the al-Qaida operations chief along the Afghan-Pakistan border, was believed to be dead.

-----
Now I'm ready to have something in a short glass ... so little good news now days ... It would apear that this should qualify.

stasha · 02-01-2008, 09:49 AM

Way to go troops! Although Hamin must say he was unaware IMO he is wearing two faces. Lets face it he can't come out and back USA openly or he's as good as dead. I would prefer the Pakistan's turn over anyone affilated with terrorist, but this could be the next best thing. To all our allies, "Stay safe".

Ray · 02-02-2008, 15:33 PM

Quote:

USIPeace Briefing
A Toxic Cocktail: Pakistan's Growing Instability

By J Alexander Thier

February 2008

* A Toxic Cocktail
* Elections: Pressure Cooker or Release Valve?
* Growing Militancy and the "Nightmare Scenario"
* A Way Out?: Conclusion and Recommendations

Pakistan, a nuclear-armed, predominantly Muslim nation of 165 million, has experienced a dramatic rise in political turmoil and violence in the last year. Following the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007, analysts have raised serious concerns about Pakistan's stability and the possibility of a collapse of the federation.

With elections scheduled for February 18, 2008, amidst political turmoil, a succession of suicide bombings in major cities, and open warfare between state security forces and Islamist militants in the tribal areas, further shocks to the system could ignite broader conflict in Pakistan. The nation must overcome a confluence of serious challenges in the coming months to move back toward stability, including: holding legitimate national elections and restoring democratic rule; confronting the increasing power of militant Islamist groups; and assuaging widespread minority grievances fueling separatist movements.

How many more shocks to the system can Pakistan bear? Does the situation in Pakistan indeed "pose a potential threat to the federation of Pakistan"? What are the dangers of schisms within the military and security forces, and the implications for state integrity and nuclear security? As turmoil continues, is consolidation of militant control over the border areas with Afghanistan inevitable? What is the likely impact on Afghan stability? A group of veteran Pakistan watchers and policymakers gathered at USIP on January 14, 2008, to discuss the potential for worsening conflict in Pakistan, and the prospects for stability. Participants included: General David Barno (Ret.), Lisa Curtis, Christine Fair, Col. John Gill (Ret.), Qamar-ul Huda, Minister Ali Jalali, Daniel Markey, Barmak Pazhwak, Bruce Riedel, Larry Robinson, Ambassador Howard Schaffer, Col. David Smith, and Marvin Weinbaum. The views presented in this report do not necessarily represent the views of these participants.

A Toxic Cocktail

The situation in Pakistan has become dangerous and unpredictable due to a confluence of volatile factors that are interact in a high-tension environment. Since the unconstitutional sacking of the chief justice of the Supreme Court in March 2007, the government led by President (and then Army Chief) Pervez Musharraf has been on the defensive.1 Nationwide protests and a successful court challenge led to the reinstatement of the chief justice, who was then sacked again, along with most of the Supreme Court, when Musharraf effectively declared martial law in November 2007. Acting under the cover of this state of emergency, the Musharraf government eviscerated the independent judiciary, revoked media freedoms, and arrested thousands of opponents and civil society activists.

During this period of political turmoil, the government has also faced a dramatic challenge from invigorated and coordinated militant groups affiliated with the Pakistani Taliban and al Qaeda. This campaign has included brazen attacks on Pakistani security forces, targeted assassination campaigns against government officials, politicians, and tribal leaders, and the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) incident that lead to a bloody siege in the heart of Islamabad, the capital. Militants have adopted suicide bombing as a key tactic, with over 60 suicide bombings in every corner of the country in 2007 and early 2008, up tenfold from 2006. The armed insurgency has also begun to spread beyond its base in the unregulated Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into the provinces, most notably when militants captured the Swat Valley, a summer resort area, in November 2007, provoking a full-scale military intervention. These factors combine with a low-level nationalist insurgency in Balochistan, heightened Sindhi disenfranchisement, and extremist groups that continue to provoke both Sunni-Shia sectarian violence and the conflict with India over Kashmir. It is sadly ironic that the very region relied upon by Pakistan as bulwark against an advancing Indian Army should itself become the crucible for an existential threat to the Pakistani state.

This toxic cocktail came together in December 2007 when Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's most popular politician, recently returned from exile, was assassinated. Days of rioting in southern Sindh province caused hundreds of millions of dollars in damage, and stoked smoldering sentiments of alienation, distrust, and disenfranchisement. This event and its aftermath provided an intersection for each of these deep faults within Pakistani society. Numerous foreign and domestic commentators were led to despair for the future existence of the national federation, and raised the specter of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal falling into the wrong hands.

With the world on high alert, it is important to ask whether Bhutto's assassination was a dramatic enough warning to bring Pakistan's population and political class back from the brink of unraveling, or whether the roots of further deterioration are now taking hold.
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Elections: Pressure Cooker or Release Valve?

Several scenarios for increased conflict, as well as an easing of tensions, center around the parliamentary elections now scheduled for February 18, 2008. Postponed after the Bhutto assassination, these elections are scheduled to take place in a hostile climate due to anger at the Musharraf regime, an incompletely lifted state of emergency, suspicion of government involvement in Bhutto's death, increased ethnic and sectarian tensions, past history of government vote rigging, and a surge of militant terror attacks throughout the country.

If the elections are perceived as free and fair and result in a change of political regimes, including the marginalization or removal of the deeply unpopular President Musharraf, political tensions in the country could be significantly reduced, and the new government will be able to focus on the challenges of Islamist militancy, building a national consensus on how to deal with the problem.

However, at present, it is highly unlikely that the elections on Pakistan will be either free or fair, and even less likely that they will be perceived by the public to have been credible. Therefore, in the event elections are held, but the outcome does not comport with public expectations, there will likely be massive nationwide protests. At the same time, any attempt to further delay the polls without the consent of the major parties will be seen as a Musharraf effort to deny the opposition parties their right to rule. Thus, in the event that the elections are postponed, there is also a high likelihood of crippling protests.

These protests may be unruly, portending further violence. They may also pit Musharraf, and the military and police forces, against the population—forcing a confrontation that will end either in the collapse of the government or government violence against its citizens. This continued political turmoil, while itself threatening violence, has an enormous secondary impact: the inability and unwillingness of the national political and military leadership to focus on the enormous threat posed by militants in the West of the country.

Growing Militancy and the "Nightmare Scenario"

The threat of a nationwide collapse of government and military command structures, resulting in a meltdown of the state and loose nuclear weapons and/or an extremist government, while critical to consider, does not appear high. However, state failure in Pakistan is a key stated objective of al Qaeda, In her final interview, Benazir Bhutto said "I now think al Qaeda can be marching on Islamabad in two to four years."2 Safeguarding against these events, which would have catastrophic consequences for Pakistan, the U.S., and regional and international security, should be considered a long-term policy goal, rather than simply a crisis response.

In the near-term, a key threat is loss of control of territory in Western Pakistan to a unified and increasingly capable alliance of Pakistani militant groups, Pakistani Taliban recently united as Tehrik-i-Taliban under one leader, and a resurgent al Qaeda3. The Pakistani Taliban leader, Mullah Baitullah Mehsud, has pledged his allegiance to Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar, and to aims of al Qaeda's Osama bin Ladin and Ayman al Zawahiri4. Warfare between these groups and the Pakistan security services has grown in scope and intensity, including the capture of soldiers, munitions, and recently established forts in the FATA and surrounding areas. Intimidation tactics against girls schools, music and video shops, and other Taliban "vice" targets are also increasing in the Northwest Frontier Province, creating an atmosphere of fear and a sense of loss of government control.

The ability of the Pakistani military and security forces to deal with the current threat, let alone a widespread insurgency, is questionable. The Pakistani military is organized and trained for set-piece warfare with India, not counterinsurgency against its own people in the forbidding physical and social geography of the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region. The use of artillery, helicopter gunships, and other air-to-ground munitions has literally led to overkill, deepening the enmity of the tribal belt population towards the government. The militant groups, once assets of the military Inter-Service Intelligence branch, or ISI, have seemingly turned against their patrons, severing Pakistani government means of influence over these groups short of military tactics.

At the same time, Pakistani popular opinion is thus far not in favor of the use of military tactics to combat Islamist militancy. While a vast majority of Pakistanis favor democratic government and an independent judiciary, and a majority see the Taliban and al Qaeda as a threat to the vital interests of Pakistan, fewer than 50 percent approve of using the army to combat the Taliban and al Qaeda on Pakistani soil5. The reluctance or refusal of the members of the Pakistani Frontier Corps, drawn from the areas where they are deployed, to fight the local population, reinforces this view.

Even more striking, the population of Pakistan is resolutely opposed to the presence of U.S. or other foreign troops to fight al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan. Fully 80 percent of the population rejects U.S. troops engaging in Pakistan, as 84 percent of Pakistanis view the U.S. military presence in Asia as an important or critical threat to Pakistan. Tellingly, 86 percent of Pakistanis believe that a U.S. goal is to weaken and divide the Islamic world6. In other words, the grave threat posed by home-grown militancy is still perceived to be far less than that of U.S. hegemony.

This combination of factors leads to what several experts have termed the more realistic "nightmare scenario": an act or series of actions that would lead to a full-scale insurrection of the Pushtun-dominated regions of Pakistan against the government. Military intervention on the part of U.S. forces, or potentially further heavy-handed action from Pakistani forces, could ignite such a development. It is easy to imagine either of these triggers coming to fruition. As with the London train bombings and numerous other attacks, there is a high likelihood that a significant terrorist attack in the U.S. or Europe would be traced back to groups within Pakistan. In such an event—perhaps intended to influence U.S. elections—the call for unilateral military action against terrorist groups in Pakistan would be very strong. Similarly, the continued decline of security in Afghanistan will also lead to demands for action on the part of Pakistan. The negative reaction to such a U.S. or European response in Pakistan could then touch off a far-wider insurgency that would quickly overwhelm Pakistani capacity to contain it. The logic of this progression is such that al Qaeda may well attempt to provoke such a reaction-cycle in hopes of escalating the conflict in Pakistan.

This scenario raises the conundrum that the very actions intended to deal with the threat may make it far worse. Indeed, the U.S. government is already discussing increasing the presence of U.S. military and intelligence assets in Pakistan—with or without the assent of the Pakistani government7. The Pakistani government has rebuffed recent offers of increased support in training for and fighting counterinsurgency. Furthermore, as noted above, the longer that Pakistan's military and political elite remain deadlocked over the politics of leadership in Islamabad, the less likely they are to be willing or able to confront these growing threats.

A Way Out? Conclusion and Recommendations

Pakistan faces the prospect of further and worsening instability in the near future due to a mixture of factors and forces. In order to forestall further violence and turmoil, Pakistan, with the support of the U.S. and other allies, must act to simultaneously restore democracy and stability to the national political system, while also addressing the threat that militant Islamist groups pose.

First, it is critical for U.S. and European policy makers to remember that Pakistan is more than a geographically necessary ally in fighting militant Islam. It is a complex and poor country of nearly 165 million Muslims, only a fraction of whom are engaged in anti-Western militancy, and the vast majority of whom want democracy— along with security, education, and a decent standard of living. The failure to treat the partnership with Pakistan as more than an unpleasant marriage of convenience has created deep mistrust, and dangerously undermined the aspirations of its people. President Musharraf, who has suppressed moves toward democracy, is deeply unpopular in Pakistan, and is seen by the population and militants alike as an agent of the U.S.

It is also essential to look at the problems in Pakistan in a regional context, and to get others in the region—such as India, China, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan—to take steps to reduce tensions and increase cooperation in Pakistan.

Restoring Democracy

The upcoming elections hold enormous possibility for unrest or reconciliation. However, more than just holding elections, Pakistan must emerge from this crisis with a democratic government. As such:

* The February 18 elections must be free and fair, and must be perceived as such;
* efforts must be made immediately to create a more level playing field by reforming those elements in the electoral administration that give advantage to government loyalists;
* if elections are postponed, it must be with the consent of key opposition parties, and would entail formation of a temporary national unity government.
* The fundamental precepts of constitutional rule must be restored, in particular the re-establishment of judicial independence and the re-instatement of improperly removed judges.
* The armed forces, security and intelligence services should be placed under civilian control.
* The beginning of a process that will legally incorporate the FATA into the Pakistani political system, including allowing political parties to compete in the FATA and the suspension of egregious provisions of the antiquated Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) governing the FATA, should take place. The goal should be to eventually replace the FCR altogether.

Addressing Extremism

As militant groups in Pakistan grow in strength, controlling territory and extending their violent reach to all corners of the country, it is clear that the current measures in place are not succeeding. Several steps should be taken to address this challenge more effectively:

* begin national debate and information campaign aimed at shaping Pakistani public opinion about the threat of extremism, and directed towards shaping policy to ensure popular support;
* enhance the performance of Pakistani military and security forces conducting counterinsurgency operations in the provinces bordering Afghanistan and the FATA;
* work with the Afghan government and NATO forces to cut off the free flow of men and munitions across the frontier, and to isolate the hard-core militants from the tribal population that has been skeptical of but increasingly sympathetic towards militant aims;
* eschew support for militant groups, even those the Pakistani government believes to be in their interest (e.g. Kashmiri groups);
* promote political and education reform in the FATA that will end its isolation from Pakistan;
* increase support for education and development throughout Pakistan, focusing especially on the Western provinces and the FATA;
* align U.S. policy in Pakistan to support the aspirations of its people, rather than picking specific allies who, as a result, will be estranged from the population.

Due to the near and long term dangers it presents and its nexus with stability in Afghanistan, Pakistan has leapt to the top of the global security agenda. The unraveling of the country is by no means a foregone conclusion, but its current course must change to prevent catastrophe. The greatest threat posed by an unstable Pakistan is, of course, to its own population.

Notes

1. President Musharraf officially gave up his command as Chief of the Army on November 28, 2007.

2. Gail Sheehy, "A Wrong Must be Righted: An Interview with Benazir Bhutto" Parade Magazine, December 27, 2007.

3. See "The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland," National Intelligence Estimate, National Intelligence Council, July 2007, stating "We assess [Al-Qa’ida] has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)...," and; Bruce Riedel, "Al-Qa’ida’s Resurgence in Pakistan," CTC Sentinel, December 2007, Vol 1:1.

4. Interview with Baitullah Mehsud, Al-Jazeera Television, January 2008.

5. Fair, Ramsey, and Kull, "Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamist Militancy, and Relations with the US," WorldPublicOpinion.org and U.S. Institute of Peace, January 7, 2008. Accessible at: http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pi..._Jan08_rpt.pdf.

6. Fair et al. "Pakistani Public Opinion"

7. Steven Lee Myers, David E. Sanger, and Eric Schmitt, "US Considers New Covert Push Within Pakistan, New York Times, January 6, 2008; and Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, "Pakistan Shuns C.I.A. Buildup Sought by U.S.," New York Times, January 27, 2008. At present, the U.S. has nearly 28,000 troops in Afghanistan, but they are officially restricted crossing into Pakistan to pursue Taliban or al Qaeda militants.
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Of Related Interest

* Pakistanis Want Larger Role for Both Islam and Democracy
News Release, January 7, 2008
* On the Issues: Afghanistan/Pakistan
An interview with J Alexander Thier, January 4, 2008
* Sanctuary? The Afghanistan-Pakistan Border and Insurgency in the 1980s, 90s, and Today
Event, December 7, 2007 (Audio Available)
* Troubles on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border
USIPeace Briefing, December 2006
* Religious Education in Pakistan: A Trip Report
Event, March 20, 2006 (Audio Available)

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This USIPeace Briefing was written by J Alexander Thier, senior rule of law advisor in the Rule of Law Center of Innovation at the United States Institute of Peace. He would like to thank Azita Ranjbar and Madalina Cristoloveanu for their assistance with this USIPeace Briefing. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of USIP, which does not advocate specific policies.

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, national institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development, and increase peacebuilding capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peacebuilding efforts around the globe.

A Toxic Cocktail: Pakistan's Growing Instability: USIPeace Briefing: U.S. Institute of Peace

Apart from this, my backgrounder is:

The SWJ "Strategic Design Considerations for Operations in Pakistan’s Tribal Areasust-up along the North-West Frontier" by William S. McCallister is one of the finest articles that has covered the psyche that governs the lawless badlands of western part of Pakistan.

Indeed, Pakistan is a curious mix of tribalism, feudalism, modernity, military supremacy and an attempt at democracy. It is an interesting pot pourri that does not mix and exude a pleasant aroma.

Pakistan is a country that has a serious identity crisis. It rejects its Indian past and is struggles to conjure an exclusiveness of being a historical separate indentity called the Indus Valley civilisation. This in fact encourages a further schism wherein the Mohajirs (immigrants from India due to the Partition) are forgotten and slighted! Interestingly, this search for a new identity ignores the fact that a large part of the Moslem population of pre Independent India were low caste convertees (to be free of the horrid caste system) or those who were converted to avoid the subjugation through the jezia (unbearable tax on non Moslem) or because of the Sword!

Thus, Pakistan is actually at war with itself and seized with a national schizophrenia, in a manner of speaking!

Jinnah, the Founder of Pakistan, was initially with the Congress Party and was not really concerned about the Moslem cause. But like all politicians when he realised that he could not wrest power from Gandhi and others, he took up the cause of Moslem's and for a separate homeland for the Moslems. It was merely a power quest that worked itself into a powerful political movement that brought about the birth of Pakistan. It was but a fait accompli without a solid foundation in reality of existence.

It is important to note what Jinnah had said in the inaugural address of the Pakistan Parliament. He had said:

Quote:

We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community, because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on, and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatris, also Bengalis, Madrasis and so on, will vanish......

Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.

This indicates that Jinnah's main aim was for power and not really for Islam!

And anyway, he was as secular as one could be. He ate pork, he drank and he married outside Islam! His sentiments was in actual fact that of an Ideal Indian's that one could be proud of! Totally beyond narrow divides of religion's stranglehold!

The birth of Pakistan though rejoiced by the Moslems of India, actually put into place a power struggle amongst the various segments. The Mohajirs being more educated than those who were from the parts that became Pakistan took all the plum posts in the bureaucracy, judiciary, education etc. The actually population of what became West Pakistan, steeped in feudalism and power as the land owning "aristocracy" and the backbone of the Indian Army felt threatened. This is the genesis of the struggle in Pakistan between the military and democracy.

The Mohajirs , who were rootless but intelligent, realised that there had to be a common cause wherein their legitimacy as inheritors of the promised land was not up for the grabs, used Islam as the catch all for all eventualities. Given that Pakistan was created for Moslems, the military and the landed satraps could not contest this excellent ploy.

Kashmir came handy for the military, who used the Mohajir inspired identity of Islam to the hilt. The military sprang into action as the true defender of Islam and went to war. This ensured that the exchequer became military oriented and beholden to it for defending Islam, as the sword arm, and extracted their pound of flesh.

Islam being partial to an aggressive mindset accepted the military's domination over democratic norms and thus this psyche gave legitimacy to successive military govt and its stranglehold over the economy wherein the army put its finger in every economic pie. It also turned the Nelson's eye to the military's infiltration and thus stranglehold over the bureaucracy by appointing serving and retired military officers in important bureaucratic and economic appointments.

This unholy churn and mismatch of governance is the cause of Pakistan's woe wherein the democratic institutions and norms have been sabotage and totally put out of shape.

While Islam ruled supreme in Pakistan, it had not yet been encased ''in the show window''.

It was Zia, who ensured Pakistan breathed and slept Islam! It was again a Machevillian ploy of an illegitimate dictator to legitimise his regime and the US strategic interest in Afghanistan was his Allah given gift.

Zia's "vision" of Islamic predominance of all matters temporal is what has added to the identity crisis. Fundamentalist Wahhabism and the ummah, an unrealistic dream of all Moslems, has seized the people.

Therefore, all one can say is, Quo Vadis, Pakistan?

Agnostic Muslim · 02-03-2008, 11:59 AM

Quote:

Pakistan is a country that has a serious identity crisis. It rejects its Indian past and is struggles to conjure an exclusiveness of being a historical separate indentity called the Indus Valley civilisation. This in fact encourages a further schism wherein the Mohajirs (immigrants from India due to the Partition) are forgotten and slighted! Interestingly, this search for a new identity ignores the fact that a large part of the Moslem population of pre Independent India were low caste convertees (to be free of the horrid caste system) or those who were converted to avoid the subjugation through the jezia (unbearable tax on non Moslem) or because of the Sword!

Thus, Pakistan is actually at war with itself and seized with a national schizophrenia, in a manner of speaking!

Salim,

While "rejecting" its "Ancient Indian past" (different from Indian in the modern context) is not a good idea, it would also be incorrect to ignore the "Central Asian and Afghan past" of Pakistan. The people of Pakistan have historically been under the influence of empires and civilizations from both East and West, so I would argue that this "rejection" you implicitly attribute to plain "hate India/Hindu" attitudes has more complex roots. The people and culture of Pakistan are tied to both East and West. The question of what is "Pakistaniat" depending on who you ask, will give you different answers - for many now it is religion, for many others a hybrid of Pakistan and Islam, and for people like me, Pakistaniat is the sum of all our history - pre-Islamic, Afghan, Central Asian, "Ancient Indian", Islamic etc. This isn't "war", it is part of a national discourse that a small minority would rather settle with guns and violence.

With respect to the "slighting of the Muhajir" - the country is little over sixty years old, and integration between communities, especially when divided along the lines you mentioned, will take time, and the change is even now visible - with Muhajir/Punjabi, Muhajir/Sindhi marriages becoming quite commonplace - and that is what is important - that there is a continuation in such positive change, even though we may not be where we would like to be.

Quote:

Jinnah, the Founder of Pakistan, was initially with the Congress Party and was not really concerned about the Moslem cause. But like all politicians when he realised that he could not wrest power from Gandhi and others, he took up the cause of Moslem's and for a separate homeland for the Moslems. It was merely a power quest that worked itself into a powerful political movement that brought about the birth of Pakistan. It was but a fait accompli without a solid foundation in reality of existence.

Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.
This indicates that Jinnah's main aim was for power and not really for Islam!

And anyway, he was as secular as one could be. He ate pork, he drank and he married outside Islam! His sentiments was in actual fact that of an Ideal Indian's that one could be proud of! Totally beyond narrow divides of religion's stranglehold!

You can interpret Jinnah's secularism and lack of interest in an "Islamic State" vs a "Muslim State" in different ways. You have chosen to follow the narrative that fits the Indian tale - a power hungry Jinnah who chose to create an entirely new nation in his quest for that power. My own interpretation is a bit simpler - Jinnah was never interested in an "Islamic State" - he was interested in a "Muslim State" - out of concern for a minority being mistreated by a Hindu Majority, or perhaps because he was sold on the narrative of the Muslims of South Asia (west Pakistan specifically) being historically distinct from the rest of India, or perhaps a combination of both.

Ray · 02-03-2008, 13:06 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Agnostic Muslim

Salim,

While "rejecting" its "Ancient Indian past" (different from Indian in the modern context) is not a good idea, it would also be incorrect to ignore the "Central Asian and Afghan past" of Pakistan. The people of Pakistan have historically been under the influence of empires and civilizations from both East and West, so I would argue that this "rejection" you implicitly attribute to plain "hate India/Hindu" attitudes has more complex roots. The people and culture of Pakistan are tied to both East and West. The question of what is "Pakistaniat" depending on who you ask, will give you different answers - for many now it is religion, for many others a hybrid of Pakistan and Islam, and for people like me, Pakistaniat is the sum of all our history - pre-Islamic, Afghan, Central Asian, "Ancient Indian", Islamic etc. This isn't "war", it is part of a national discourse that a small minority would rather settle with guns and violence.

With respect to the "slighting of the Muhajir" - the country is little over sixty years old, and integration between communities, especially when divided along the lines you mentioned, will take time, and the change is even now visible - with Muhajir/Punjabi, Muhajir/Sindhi marriages becoming quite commonplace - and that is what is important - that there is a continuation in such positive change, even though we may not be where we would like to be.

You can interpret Jinnah's secularism and lack of interest in an "Islamic State" vs a "Muslim State" in different ways. You have chosen to follow the narrative that fits the Indian tale - a power hungry Jinnah who chose to create an entirely new nation in his quest for that power. My own interpretation is a bit simpler - Jinnah was never interested in an "Islamic State" - he was interested in a "Muslim State" - out of concern for a minority being mistreated by a Hindu Majority, or perhaps because he was sold on the narrative of the Muslims of South Asia (west Pakistan specifically) being historically distinct from the rest of India, or perhaps a combination of both.

Indeed, one cannot ignore history.

Fortunately, the Central Asian including the Mongols is included in our history text books. Areas of what is Undivided India itself have been subjected to the influence of various invasions and its effect. Maybe that is the reason for its diverse culture.

You are right that there are various interpretation of Pakistaniat, and fortunately, there is a growing group of people who are being influenced by history and finding their identity.

The unfortunate part is that there is a whole lot of people who think it is “war” and are keen to settle things through guns and violence to prove that they are a “super race”. The posts in your forum is indicative of the same, though I will concede that of late there are moderating influences at play that makes debate more pleasant and educative.

As far as the Mohajir problem is concerned, I was surprised that it was there to the extent that it was disturbing, more so, when I saw educated people commenting adversely in PDF. My family is from East Bengal and I will say that this type of discrimination or abject dislike has not been felt in West Bengal and so I found it odd and disturbing. I may add that the East Bengalis are taken to be more educated and culturally well endowed!

I would go by your interpretation of Jinnah since that would be more plausible. What I meant was something similar, and maybe the way I wrote it, did not come out the way I wanted to express. The image of Jinnah being after power is slowly disappearing so much so the BJP leader, Advani, called Jinnah secular! Of course, there was hell to pay from the radical characters, but he has ridden out and the radicals (who made no difference to the general population as such) have been sidelined in their latest Party conclave.

1 Observer · 02-03-2008, 23:44 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Ray

The unfortunate part is that there is a whole lot of people who think it is “war” and are keen to settle things through guns and violence to prove that they are a “super race”. The posts in your forum is indicative of the same, .

Careful with that lot Mate, they get at you with the "R" paint brush and you'll play hob getting it off!

Ray · 02-04-2008, 02:28 AM

Not really.

There is enough to quote from there that will pass muster of the ICJ, UN and any other court if you wish!

lex · 02-04-2008, 02:37 AM

Usama bin ladin is just a myth, like a painted rust...nothing else man ! and he is not in pakistan for sure ! its all crapp !!! Dont you remember ppl what they did in Afghanistan??? why the High Tech. US couldnt find a person on earth as they can prove the Alien story "the truth is out there"

Tronic · 02-04-2008, 04:31 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by lex

Usama bin ladin is just a myth, like a painted rust...nothing else man ! and he is not in pakistan for sure ! its all crapp !!! Dont you remember ppl what they did in Afghanistan??? why the High Tech. US couldnt find a person on earth as they can prove the Alien story "the truth is out there"

Haha, Was that in reference to X-Files??

dave lukins · 02-04-2008, 13:04 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Tronic

Haha, Was that in reference to X-Files??

The X-File poster is now an X file himself

1 Observer · 02-04-2008, 13:10 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Ray

Not really.

There is enough to quote from there that will pass muster of the ICJ, UN and any other court if you wish!

Granted ... quite sobering too ... If you're into that sort of pastime

01-30-2008, 18:21 PM	#31 (permalink)
1 Observer Banished Regular Join Date: 01-28-08 Location: Highplains Posts: 123 Country:	Anyone know more about this? Tuesday's missile strike happened in Khushali Torikhel, a village in North Waziristan about 40 miles east of the border, local officials said on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to journalists. A resident said an armed drone may have carried out the strike. "We could see a small, white plane flying over the village for the past several days, " villager Dildar Khan said. An Interior Ministry spokesman said he had no information about any missile strike. The government often uses airstrikes to attack militants in areas that its ground forces and artillery cannot reach, but some of the aerial attacks near the border in recent years are believed to have been launched by missile-armed U.S. drones flying from Afghanistan. Authorities in both the U.S. and Afghanistan have denied knowledge of such operations.

01-31-2008, 10:04 AM	#33 (permalink)
1 Observer Banished Regular Join Date: 01-28-08 Location: Highplains Posts: 123 Country:	“Local people said the identity of the militants killed in the attack remained unknown but according to unconfirmed reports seven of them were Arabs while the other five from central Asian.” 7 Arabs & 5 central Asians ... I wonder … Central Asians ... Chechnya’s Dagestinians Azerb's Kazaks... how central? …"Must have been a fashionable gathering. It had drawn the finest type"… ... I don't care who has admitted doing what. Without even knowing more, one could surmise, just from the eclectic nature of this group, that they could easily have been the types we are looking for. Or … at X $ a head, theirs were as good as any. I understand that is not out side the realm of the possible either.

01-31-2008, 19:32 PM	#34 (permalink)
1 Observer Banished Regular Join Date: 01-28-08 Location: Highplains Posts: 123 Country:	Hey boys! Remember what I was asking about? CHeck this out ... Top al-Qaida Figure Killed in Pakistan In a photo released by IntelCenter, an organization which monitors al-Qaida messaging, a Libyan al-Qaida commander Abu Laith al-Libi speaks during a videotaped interview at undisclosed location by al-Qaida's al-Sahab media wing on April 27, 2007. By ROBERT H. REID (Associated Press Writer) From Associated Press January 31, 2008 5:57 PM EST ISLAMABAD, Pakistan - One of al-Qaida's top figures, Abu Laith al-Libi, has been killed in Pakistan, an Islamist Web site announced Thursday. Pakistani officials and residents said a dozen people, including seven Arabs, died in a missile strike in northwestern Pakistan near the Afghan border. Al-Libi was believed to be the key link between the Taliban and al-Qaida and was blamed for masterminding the bombing an American base while Vice President Dick Cheney was visiting Afghanistan last year. He was listed among the Americans' 12 most-wanted men with a bounty of $200,000 on his head. Pakistani officials denied any knowledge of al-Libi's death. The killing of such a major al-Qaida figure is likely to embarrass President Pervez Musharraf, who has repeatedly said he would not sanction U.S. military action against al-Qaida members believed to be regrouping in the lawless area near the Afghan border. A Web site that frequently carries announcements from militant groups said al-Libi had been "martyred with a group of his brothers in the land of Muslim Pakistan" but gave no further details. However, Pakistani intelligence officials and residents said a missile struck a compound late Monday or early Tuesday about 2 1/2 miles from the Pakistani town of Mir Ali in North Waziristan, killing 12 people, including seven Arabs as well as Pakistanis and Central Asians. Residents said they could hear U.S. Predator drones flying in the area shortly before the explosion, which destroyed the compound. The Pakistani newspaper Dawn said the victims were buried in a local cemetery. Rumors spread Thursday in the border area that al-Libi or his deputy died in the missile strike. But Pakistan's Interior Ministry spokesman, Javed Iqbal Cheema, insisted authorities had "no information" indicating al-Libi was dead. One intelligence official in the area, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter, said the bodies of those killed were badly mangled by the force of the explosion and it was difficult to identify them. The official estimated 12 people were killed, including Arabs, Turkomen from Central Asia and local Taliban members. In Washington, a Western official said that "it appears at this point that al-Libi has met his demise," but declined to talk about the circumstances. "It was a major success in taking one of the top terrorists in the world off the street," the official said. He added that the death occurred "within the last few days." Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he did not "have anything definitive" to say on reports of al-Libi's death. The Libyan-born al-Libi was among the most high-profile figures in al-Qaida after its leader Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahri. In spring 2007, al-Qaida's media wing, Al-Sahab, released a video interview with a bearded man identified as al-Libi. In it, he accuses Shiite Muslims of fighting alongside American forces in Iraq, and claimed that mujahedeen would crush foreign troops in Afghanistan. The U.S. says al-Libi was likely behind the February 2007 bombing at the U.S. base at Bagram in Afghanistan during a visit by Cheney. The attack killed 23 people but Cheney was deep inside the sprawling base and was not hurt. The bombing added to the impression that Western forces and the shaky government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai are vulnerable to assault by Taliban and al-Qaida militants. Al-Libi also led an al-Qaida training camp and appeared in a number of al-Qaida Internet videos. He was known to maintain close ties with tribes living on the Pakistani side of the mountainous border, where U.S. officials believe al-Qaida has been regrouping. A Pakistani intelligence official said that al-Libi was based near Mir Ali until late 2003 when he moved back into Afghanistan to take charge of al-Qaida operations on both sides of the border area. But he retained links with North Waziristan, the official said on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the information. Mir Ali is the second-biggest town in North Waziristan and has a strong presence of foreign militants, mostly Uzbeks with links to al-Qaida who fled to Pakistan's tribal regions after the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001. The U.S. has in the past sought to kill top al-Qaida leaders but with limited success. Al-Zawahri, al-Qaida's second-in-command, was the target of a U.S. airstrike in Pakistan near the Afghan border on Jan. 13, 2006, but he was not at the site of the attack. Pakistan condemned the missile strike that killed at least 17 people in the village of Damadola in the Bajur tribal area, about four miles inside Pakistan. Pakistani security officials said four top operatives were believed to be killed in that strike. The officials said the operatives included Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar, who the U.S. Justice Department called an explosives and poisons expert; Abu Obaidah al-Masri, the al-Qaida chief responsible for attacks on U.S. forces in eastern Afghanistan; and Abdul Rehman al-Maghribi, a Moroccan and relative of al-Zawahri, possibly his son-in-law. Some of the officials also said a fourth man, Khalid Habib, the al-Qaida operations chief along the Afghan-Pakistan border, was believed to be dead. ----- Now I'm ready to have something in a short glass ... so little good news now days ... It would apear that this should qualify.

02-01-2008, 09:49 AM	#35 (permalink)
stasha Regular Join Date: 01-02-08 Location: Connecticut, USA Posts: 37 Country:	Way to go troops! Although Hamin must say he was unaware IMO he is wearing two faces. Lets face it he can't come out and back USA openly or he's as good as dead. I would prefer the Pakistan's turn over anyone affilated with terrorist, but this could be the next best thing. To all our allies, "Stay safe".

02-04-2008, 02:28 AM	#40 (permalink)
Ray Postmaster General *Military Professional* Join Date: 08-20-03 Posts: 27,239 Country:	Not really. There is enough to quote from there that will pass muster of the ICJ, UN and any other court if you wish!

02-04-2008, 02:37 AM	#41 (permalink)
lex Banished New Member Join Date: 02-03-08 Location: Pakistan Posts: 6 Country:	Usama bin ladin is just a myth, like a painted rust...nothing else man ! and he is not in pakistan for sure ! its all crapp !!! Dont you remember ppl what they did in Afghanistan??? why the High Tech. US couldnt find a person on earth as they can prove the Alien story "the truth is out there"