tarek

Uncommon valour

4 Army Aviation Squadron: The unit that did not surrender

Part-1
Brig S Liaqat Bokhari

Actively engaged in various major heliborne operations in East Pakistan throughout 1971, all pilots of 4 Army Aviation Squadron flew very hazardous missions throughout. They carried Commanders, Commandos, ammunition and ration from one sector to the other at the time when PAF had been neutralised and enemy had achieved complete air superiority over the entire province. Night flying without proper navigational instruments and equipment in helicopters is most dangerous and this Squadron undertook all the missions at night during the war. Their untiring efforts at the greatest risk to their lives played a vital role in the Eastern theatre during 1971 Indo-Pak war.

The unit has the distinction of being the only one that did not surrender during the 'Fall of Dacca', and flew all the helicopters and aircraft under its command safely to Pakistan via Burma. The pilots flew 861 day and night operational missions in East Pakistan during the crisis, including the historical actions of Bairab Bazaar and Belonia Buldge.

Three officers of 4 Army Aviation Squadron were awarded Sitara-i-Jurat during Bairab Bazaar operation, and four were recommended for Sitara-i-Jurat for their heroic action in the Belonia night operation. For its war efficiency, excellent performance and valiant action in 1971 Indo-Pak War, 4 Aviation Squadron was recommended for Battle Honours.

In March 1971, the rebels with the support of local population and Indian intruders took over control of all of East Pakistan, except the cantonments. They disobeyed orders by the Central and provincial Government, but immediately implemented all Sh Mujib-ur-Rehman's directives. Civil administration in East Pakistan was completely paralysed. Rail, road and water communications came to a complete standstill. Most of the vital bridges were blown up, ferries and launches had disappeared overnight. All locals had joined hands with the Indian army infiltrators. The army units of East Bengal Regiment (EBR), East Pakistan Rifle (EPR) and police had revolted and taken over the control of the province. West Pakistani officers and Other Ranks serving with the EBR/EPR units were massacred ruthlessly along with their families.

To clear the area from the rebels and restore normalcy, the Pakistan Army had only one Infantry Division (14 Division) located at Dacca Cantt. Only one Aviation flight of 4 Army Aviation Squadron (Logistic flight - Eastern Command) comprising two MI-8 and two Alouette helicopters, with seven pilots under my command was provided to the Headquarters 14 Division for the imminent gigantic operations. A number of times these helicopters were fired at, but due to the efficiency of pilots and following the laid down SOPs, no major material damage was suffered.

Chittagong Operation: Sh Mujib-ur-Rehman wanted to take over the control of Chittagong, the only seaport and the second largest city of East Pakistan, in order to prevent the Pakistan Army from getting reinforcements and supplies by the sea route. Brigadier Mojamdar, Commandant EBR centre had virtually taken over the control of the city and local rebels with the help of Indian intruders organised slaughterhouses where they systematically killed non-Bengalis.

Major Zia ur Rehman, 21C 8 EBR (who later became the President of Bangladesh and was killed by his own troops) revolted on 27 March, '71 with his entire Battalion after killing his Punjabi Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel A Rashid Janjua along with other Pakistani personnel posted in this unit. He proclaimed himself as the C-in-C of Bangladesh Army.

Since the rail, road and river communication had come to a standstill, we flew a number of MI-8 and Alouette helicopter sorties to and from Chittagong, including for casualty evacuation, critically required supplies, medicines and conveyance of arms and ammunition, to different units.

On 26 March 71, two MI-8 helicopters airlifted 40 SSG troops from Comilla to Chittagong to ensure a speedy and successful capture of the civil airport. This was vital for the quick build-up of troops by the PAF C-130 and PIA Fokker aircraft.

On 27 March 71, I flew to Chittagong with General Officer Commanding 14 Division, Major General Khaki Raja to check up on the Brigade Headquarters and its troops, which had lost contact with the Division Headquarters. While descending to site own troops, we were fired upon by heavy automatic weapons. Bullets hit the tail and pierced through the floor in front of the General Officer Commanding -- luckily no one was hurt.

The Squadron flew 18 sorties to relieve 20 Baloch which had been cut off by the rebels and surrounded. Tank/Small arms ammunition, rafts and rations were flown in to enable 20 Baloch to continue their operations.

Bairab Bazaar Operations: Bairab Bazaar bridge provided the only link between Chittagong and Dacca, which was vital for the movement of Pak Army units. Its tactical importance, approximately 1000 Indian regular troops and Bengali rebels seized control. Heavy automatic weapons were sited all along the bridge. They also prepared it for demolition by fixing 38 explosive charges in case Pak Army tried to capture it.

General Officer Commanding Major General M Rahim Khan decided to capture this bridge intact by a heliborne operation which was to be conducted in complete secrecy and with lightening speed so that enemy could not get any reaction time to detonate the charges. This mission was assigned to the Logistic Flight, Eastern Command and 3 SSG Commandos Battalion.

On the 15th April '71, two MI-8 helicopters (with 30 SSG troops each) and two Alouette helicopters (with 5 SSG troops each) took off from Dacca at 0600 hours and arrived at the target area at 0630 hours. The first MI-8 helicopter flown by me landed at the objective next to the eastern edge of the bridge. The Indians and rebels opened up their heavy automatic weapons from all directions. On touch down, 30 SSG personnel under the command of Major Tariq Mahmood (later known as Brigadier T. M.) got out of the helicopter and charged towards the objective. Simultaneously, the second MI-8 helicopter piloted by Lieutenant Colonel A. L. Awan landed on the northern side of the bridge and disembarked his 30 SSG Commandos. Two Alouette helicopters followed soon after with 5 SSG personnel each.

The SSG Commandos assaulted the bridge with such speed and surprise that the enemy did not get any time to react. They were caught completely unaware. The bridge was captured intact. 1000 Indian, EBR and EPR soldiers were routed by 70 Pakistani SSG troops, who were dropped at the target by the Aviators. After dropping the first wave of SSG Commandos at the objective, all helicopters returned to the forward Base at Narsindgi where reinforcement, ammunition and refueling arrangements were made. During the routine inspection by the ground crew it was discovered that the main rotor spar of the first MI-8 helicopter was hit by the bullets and was damaged. This helicopter was grounded and the operation continued with the remaining 1xMI-8 helicopter and 2 Alouette helicopters till 1800 hours. The gallants flew 51 missions to support this operation. In this action, 500 Indian soldiers were killed, one Major, one Captain and 100 Other Ranks were taken prisoners and large dumps of arms and rations were seized. Casualties on our side were only 1 killed and 5 wounded. Bairab Bazaar Bridge was captured intact as planned.Lieutenant Colonel A. L. Awan, Major Riazul Haq and myself were awarded Sitara-I-Jurat for this operation.

Belonia Operation: This operation has a very special place in the combat history of Pak Army. It was the first time that the helicopters were used to drop the troops behind the enemy position at night. This heliborne operation defeated the enemy without suffering any loss or casualty on our part.

On the morning of 18 June '71, two infantry battalions, 20 Baloch and 24 FF, commenced their two-pronged advance to clear the Belonia enclave from the Indian Regular army and the EBR rebels, which was 4 miles wide and 20 miles long, surrounded by low hills. The advance was restricted to the road due to the water and mines laid all over the area.

Soon after they started their march, both the units faced stiff opposition by the enemy positions. The leading companies of 24 FF were caught in the middle of a minefield and came under heavy artillery shelling. They suffered 28 casualties and the advance was halted at about 1000 hours.

General Officer Commanding 14 Division, Major General M. Rahim Khan was going to Coxs Bazar in an Ml-8 helicopter flown by me on a routine inspection. En route, he was to stop at Feni to get the latest briefing on the Brigade Advance in Belonia. On landing he was shocked to know about the losses suffered by 24 FF.

General Officer Commanding 14 Division asked me to proceed to Chittagong hill tracts and collect all available SSG Commandos located there. The other Ml-8 helicopter piloted by Major Ali Kuli Khan (Lieutenant General Retired) and Major P. C. Tierney was summoned from Dacca to evacuate the wounded to Combined Military Hospital and then be available at Feni for further operation.

Major Jawahar and I managed to pick only 22 SSG Commandos from the different posts and returned to Feni in the late afternoon. In the evening Brigade Commander briefed me to drop two helicopter load of troops in the rear of Indian infantry units, which stopped the advance of 24 FF and inflicted heavy losses on the leading elements.

This operation was to be conducted at night in complete darkness without any ground help. To keep the secrecy of the operation, pilots were not allowed to reconnaissance the objective during daytime and the PAF sorties were not provided due to the proximity of Indo-Pak border.

They had no pathfinders available to guide them during their blind landing. Meanwhile, a bewildered young Lieutenant arrived at the Feni helipad and introduced himself as the designated Commander of the troops who were to be dropped at the target. He was the Brigade Liaison Officer (LO) and the troops he was to command belonged to 24 FF rear elements. In short, every one in this ad hoc force was a stranger to one another. After a short briefing, I, the fight commander, was all set go for this most demanding and historical night heliborne landing.

Soon after the last light Major Jawahar and I took off in the first helicopter with 24 SSG commandos, followed by the second helicopter piloted by Major Ali Kuli and Major Tierney with 24 FF ad hoc troops.

One would be hard put to find a braver lot that ever went into battle like this. The helicopters followed the road till they hit the bridge and climbed to 3000 feet. From the bridge they were to fly for 3 minutes at 180 km/hr on a pre-determined bearing and land in the blind area, which they hoped to be the objective.

The first 3 minutes were uneventful, but once the descent commenced for the landing by the leading helicopter, the nightmare started. Indian troops opened up with all their heavy automatic weapons. Since the helicopters were flying without any light, the hostile ground troops could not see them and they kept on firing erratically towards the direction of the sound. Luckily, none of the helicopters were hit. One moment the leading helicopter could be spotted by the second, and the next moment it was lost in the darkness. Flying without light added another hazard of air collision to the already long list of impending dangers.

Major Jawahar and I were the first to land and disembark the SSG Commandos who were familiar with the heliborne operation. They jumped out unhesitatingly and the helicopter took off within two minutes, allowing the second helicopter to land. Major Ali Kuli and Major Tierney were not as lucky with their cargo of assorted troops, as it took them over twenty minutes to convince the young officer to get off the helicopter with his troops. This helicopter had to hover at six different places within a radius of 1000 yards, before they could disembark their load and take off for the Base. As luck would have it, this landing was made right in the centre of the Indian position. The forward company thought that their rear had been overrun by the Pakistan heliborne force and the rear company assumed that their forward positions had been captured. In the panic they started firing at each other and suffered heavy self-inflicted causalities.

The enemy, which had thwarted the advance of a complete Brigade, got so frightened and jittery by this heliborne landing that they vacated the entire Belonia enclave and withdrew into the Indian territory.

Next morning 24 FF and 20 Baloch resumed their advance without any resistance and captured Belonia without any further casualties. All four pilots were recommended for the award of Sitara-I-Jurat for conducting this operation with unprecedented success by the General Officer Commanding 14 Division.

Escape to Burma: On the night of 16 December, '71, Chief of Staff, Eastern Command, while passing the instructions for the unfortunate surrender, ordered the destruction of all equipment including guns, tanks, and aircrafts before the surrender. I suggested that instead of destroying the helicopters, they should be flown to Pakistan via Burma. After obtaining the approval from the General Headquarters, permission to fly out was given to the Commanding Officer by the Commander Eastern Commander, Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi.

At 0320 hours on 16 December, '71, I and Major Riaz ul Haq, along with Major Ali Khan took off in the first MI-8 Helicopter, followed by Major M. Akram and Major Jawahar in the second helicopter at 0325 hours. The cargo helicopters carried about 30 passengers each, against the 16 authorised with full internal fuel tanks. To take off from the Golf Course, surrounded by tall trees, in pitch dark without any lights, with a heavily loaded helicopter was very risky and hazardous. It was only the proficiency and determination of the 4 Aviation Squadron pilots that made it a success.

Major Naoman Mahmood and Major P. C. Tierney took off at 0330 and 0335 hours respectively in their Alouette helicopter. Flying time from Dacca to Akyab in an Alouette helicopter was over three and half hours, whereas their safe endurance was much less. They had to carry extra fuel in jerry cans for their en route self-fuelling at some unknown place in the hostile area.

The sky was completely overcast and there was not even any starlight. In the pitch dark, the helicopters had to fly as low as possible to avoid detection by the enemy radar, at a pre-determined speed at an interval of 5 minutes to avoid mid air collision. Indian Aircraft carrier 'Vikrant' was positioned next to Coxs Bazar to monitor any likely escape by the Pakistani helicopters. This was the most difficult and hazardous mission for the aviators to fly without adequate instruments to another country at night without light and ground navigational aid under complete enemy air superiority.

Major Tauhid ul Haq, Major Masud Anwar and Major Zareef took off from Dacca under the nose of the enemy at 1300 hours, when advance Indian elements had already entered Dacca Cantt. They had to fly at tree top level to avoid detection by the enemy fighters. Their landing in hostile area during daytime for refueling was very demanding. They landed safely at Akyab at 1630 hours, and joined the rest of the unit.

This unit also evacuated Major General M. Rahim Khan, who was badly wounded, and 130 women and children safely. The pilots and crew left Akyab on 22 December, '71 for Meiktella airforce airbase, from where they were flown to Rangoon the same day.

Women and children came back to Karachi on 26 December, '71 and the Gallants arrived in Pakistan on the 16 January, '72 thus saving Pakistan Army precious equipment and helping in regaining some of the lost pride.

The writer commanded Logistic Flight Eastern Command, Dacca, and after promotion in August 1971, 4 Army Aviation Squadron in East Pakistan, and was awarded Sitara-i-Jurat for his courage during this crisis and the war. He did his Masters in English literature and LLB during his service in the army

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when they make no laws but what they themselves and their posterity must be subject to; when they can give no money, but what they must pay their share of; when they can do no mischief, but what must fall upon their own heads in common with their countrymen; their principals may expect then good laws, little mischief, and much frugality

lemontree

Correction points
- There were no Indian troops in Bairab Bazar (Pak Army Op Searchlight). Please see link below for the Bengali East-Pakistani units that had mutinied in that area.
http://www.bangladeshmariners.com/HmdrRprt/witness.html
- Belonia Bulge operation was, the mutinied EBR troops that were holding out. No Indian troops. Belonia was captured by 20 Rajput in Nov '71.
- The helicopters that escaped contained 2 Brigadiers and their families.

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Cheers!...on the rocks!!

zulu

1000 soldiers on one bridge

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Jhingalala-Jhingalala, Hurr-Hurr!!! :eek:

aussie

It was a timebomb!!!!