Asim Aquil

Quite honestly not meant to offend the Indian members here. It just gives me great pride to honour these heroes of the 1965 War. Oh and the large fonts are supposed to be just for the purpose of formatting. I've tried to keep things in APA format. You can check . Makes the whole thing look neater too. Too much of a lazy bum to quote links.

OVERVIEW

Indiaصs attack against Lahore was held and beaten back with heavy losses to the attackers. The Pakistan Army units defending on the ground, supported by the Pakistan Air Force were able to blunt the Indian offensive and roll it back. Two days later on 8th September India launched its main attack against Sialkot using its armoured division and other strike formations. What ensued has been described as the largest tank battle since the second World War. It was a hard and bitter struggle fought over many days and nightصs resulting in casualties on both sides. In the end the Indian main attack was held and severely mauled. Its armoured division was force to withdraw owing to very high losses in men and material. South of Lahore, Pakistan launched its own counter attack and captured Indiaصs Khem Karan and beyond. This posed a serious threat to the rear of Indian troops facing Lahore.

In the South Pakistan took the initiative to push back Indian troops and enter Indian territory. During the operations India captured about 400 square miles of Pakistan territory but lost around 1600 square miles of its own to Pakistan. The war ended with the mediation effort of the USSR and a peace agreement was signed at Tashkent.

During the 1965 war every citizen of the country was solidly united behind the government, although it was a military one, of Field Marshal Ayub Khan. The national priorities were clear and unambiguous in those days, any danger to the country called for unity and unstinted support to the government and the armed forces. There was no question of any political party or leader taking advantage of the war to berate the government for political or personal gain. This came much later when President Ayubصs health suffered a set back and personal ambitions of those he had brought into prominence came to the fore.

-- Defence Journal

THE THREE PRONGED ATTACK




The War of Rann of Kutch

Skirmishes at the Rann of Kutch flared up almost accidentally in the spring of 1965, and India and Pakistan found themselves drawn into the first of their two undeclared wars. The dispute goes back to the days of the British rule in India. The Rann was the bone of contention between the princely state Kutch
and British Indian province of Sind.
When British India was partitioned, the issue was inherited by India, to whom Kutch acceded, and Pakistan, whom Sind joined, involving some 3,500 miles of territory leading to frequent border incidents, from January 1965 onwards. By all accounts the Indian forces were badly mashed in the Kutch area by the Pakistan army.

It was at the Common Wealth conference at Britain, that the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both India and Pakistan to sign an agreement on June 30 to resolve the dispute. Failing to do so bilaterally, a tribunal was set up which announced its verdict on February 19,1965 by giving 350 sq. miles in Northern part to Pakistan and the rest of Rann area to India.


The War in Kashmir

Events in Kashmir were also moving towards a climax. The Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri added more fuel to the fire by taking steps to absorb Kashmir further into the body politic of India and said Kashmir problem occupied a secondary place to successful relations between India and Pakistan. The application of articles 356 and 357 of the Indian constitution to the Kashmir state, which enabled the President of India to establish President rule in Kashmir and legislate there, were efforts to amalgamate Kashmir completely into the Indian union.

Sheikh Abdullah, the Kashmiri leader took extensive foreign tours to enlist international support for the Kashmiri cause. But he was arrested and the Kashmir legislative assembly adopted the constitutional amendments bill on March 30, providing:

-the Sardar-i-Riyasat would henceforth be known as Governor and would be appointed by President of India instead of being elected by the local assembly.
-the Prime Minister would be styled as Chief Minister, as in the states of the Indian union.

The Kashmiri people called for an all out war against the Indian imperialism and claimed to establish a National Government of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Having spill-over effect, the Azad Kashmir become increasingly restive. The Indian army made a series of new moves across the cease-fire line with her regular armed forces.

The Lahore Offensive

At 3:00 a.m. on September 6, without a formal declaration of war, Indians crossed the international border of West Pakistan and launched a three-pronged offensive against Lahore, Sialkot and Rajasthan. There was a fierce tank battle on the plains of Punjab. The domestic Indo-Pak conflict transformed into an international conflict and raised super power concerns.

The U.S. suspended military supplies to both sides during the Indo-Pak war. Both the Soviet Union and the United States took a united stand to curtail the conflict within the boundaries of Indo-Pakistan from escalating into a global conflict. China had threatened to intervene and offered military support on behalf of Pakistan Because India was the offender and Pakistan, the Defender. It was the fear of India being crashed by Pakistan and also the chance of china also getting in the War that both the Soviet Union and the United States pressured the UN to arrange for an immediate ceasefire, to keep China away from this conflict. In there opinion if China also attacked, India would be History. The main diplomatic effort to stop the fighting was conducted under the United Nations auspices and a cease-fire came into effect on September 23, 1965.

The Soviet Union which remained neutral when India and Pakistan went to war in September 1965, played the broker afterward at Tashkent. A Soviet Government communiqué, formally announced on December 8 that the Indian Prime Minister Castro and the Pakistani President Ayub would meet at Tashkent on January 4, 1966. The most interesting thing was that Shastri Died of heart attack just after seeing the Pakistani General.

The Tashkent conference lasted from January 4 to January 10. The Soviet Premier Kosygin earned the praise as a peace maker. The main achievement of the conference was to withdraw, not later than February 25, 1966, all armed personal to the position held before August 5, 1964. In the South Pakistan took the initiative to push back Indian troops and enter Indian territory. During the operations India captured about 400 square miles of Pakistan territory but lost around 1600 square miles of its own to Pakistan. The war ended with the mediation effort of the USSR and a peace agreement was signed at Tashkent

The world saw that how an Army, Half the size of the offender, gave a greater-in-size army a Memorable Thrashing and the so called Bharati Forces were screwed off. The Indian General who quoted "I WILL HAVE TWO PEGS OF SCOTCH WHISKY TODAY AT 6-PM AT LAHORE GYMKHANA CLUB" while Indian Army attacked Pakistan, was shown by the Pakistan Military that No bloody Indian Soldier can even touch our Motherland. Even his generation will get a nightmare of this defeat. It goes to show nobody can mess with Pakistan and nobody will!



HONOURED HEROES OF THE WAR


Major Aziz Bhatti



Born 1928 in Hong Kong. Commissioned into the Punjab Regiment, 1950. On 6 September 1965, as Company Commander in the Burki area of the Lahore sector, Major Bhatti chose to move with his forward platton under incessant artillery and tank attacks for five days and nights in the defence of the strategic BRB canal. Throughout, undaunted by constant fire from enemy shell arms, tanks and artillery, he organized the defence of the canal, directing his men to answer the fire until he was hit by an enemy tank shell which killed him on 10 September 1965. He was 37 years old.

Sq. Ldr. Mohammad Mahmood Alam
Record holder till today!



On 6th September, 1965, during an aerial combat over enemy territory, Squadron Leader Mohammad Mahmood Alam flying as pilot of an F-86 Sabre Jet, shoot down two enemy Hunter aircraft and damaged three others. For the exceptional flying skill and valor displayed by Squadron Leader Mohammad Mahmood Alam in operations, he was awarded Sitara-i-Juraat. On 7th September, 1965, in a number of interception missions flown by Squadron Leader Mohammad Mahmood Alam against the enemy aircraft attacking Pakistan Air Force Station, Sargodha, Squadron Leader Alam destroyed five more enemy Hunter aircrafts. In less than a minute , which remains a record till today. Overall he had nine kills and two damagers to his credit. For the exceptional flying skill and valour shown by him in pressing home his attacks in aerial combats with the enemy, Squadron Leader Mohammad Mahmood Alam is awarded a bar to his Sitara-i-Juraat.

Sq. Ldr Alauddin Ahmed



Squadron Leader Alauddin Ahmed, led his squadron in twenty combat missions against the Indian ground and air forces. His leadership throughout the operations was cool, courageous and most determined which inspired the greatest confidence amongst pilots of his formations and resulted in destruction of many Indian tanks and vehicles. In his last sortie, he attacked and blew up an important ammunition train at Gurdaspur rail-head in complete disregard to his personal safety. During this attack on September 13, his aircraft was damaged and was reported missing over enemy territory. Subsequently, it was confirmed that the officer died in this action. For his exemplary leadership, courage and valour, Squadron Leader Alauddin Ahmed was awarded Sitara-i-Juraat.

Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal



Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal flew many operational missions which played a vital part in the success of the Pakistan Air Force during the India-Pakistan war. He carried out these missions with determination, enthusiasm, outstanding ability and at great personal risk. His performance, throughout, was exemplary and highly inspiring for the personnel under his command. For his outstanding leadership, valour, loyalty and invaluable services to the Pakistan Air Force and the country, he was awarded Sitara-i-Juraat.

Squadron Leader Munir Ahmed



During the war a high-powered heavily defended radar station near Amritsar was attacked repeatedly by PAF fighters. In all these missions, Squadron Leader Munir unhesitantly volunteered to fly without regard for his personal safety, exposed himself to intense ack ack fire for long periods in attempts to locate and destroy the target. In the final successful attack on September 11, he made the supreme sacrifice when his aircraft was hit. Before his last sortie, Munir flew eight combat missions and shot down an IAF Gnat on September 10. For displaying courage and determination in the face of heavy odds and beyond the call of duty, Squadron Leader Munir-ud-Din Ahmed was awarded Sitara-i-Juraat.

Squadron Leader Sarfaraz Ahmed Rafiqui



On 6th September, 1965, Squadron Leader Sarfaraz Ahmed Rafiqui led a formation of three F-86 aircraft on a strike against Halwara airfield. Soon after crossing the Indian border Squadron Leader Rafiqui had been warned about a large number of enemy interceptors being in the air by the leader of a returning F-86 formation. He, however, continued his mission single-mindedly. On the way back, the formation was intercepted by about ten Hunter aircraft out of which Squadron Leader Rafiqui accounted for one in the first few seconds. After Squadron Leader Rafiqui shot down one Hunter aircraft, his guns jammed due to a defect and stopped firing upon which he refused to leave the battle area as he would have been perfectly justified to do; he, instead ordered his No. 2 to take over as leader and continue the engagement with the enemy. He himself now took up a defensive position in the formation in an attempt to give it as much protection as was possible by continuing fighting maneuvers in unarmed aircraft whilst the remainder proceeded to give battle to the enemy. This called for a quality of courage and dedication on the part of Squadron Leader Rafiqui equal to the best in the history of air-fighting. The end for him was never in doubt. He chose to disregard it and in the process, his aircraft was shot down and he was killed but not without his action enabling his formation to shoot down three more Hunter aircraft. Squadron Leader Rafiqui thus provided exemplary leadership in battle and displayed outstanding courage in the face of exceptionally strong opposition. His inspiring leadership and selfless example significantly affected the subsequent course of the air war in which the P.A.F. never failed to dictate terms to an overwhelmingly larger and better equipped enemy. Squadron Leader Rafiqui's conduct was clearly beyond the call of duty and conformed to the highest tradition of leadership and bravery in battle against overwhelming odds. For this and his earlier exploits, he is posthumously awarded Hilal-i-Juraat.

Flight Lieutenant Saifullah Khan Lodhi



Flight Lieutenant Saifullah Khan Lodhi was a navigator of exceptional ability and a completely dedicated officer. He possessed unusual skill, enthusiasm and drive, which enabled him to make a valuable contribution towards operations. He undertook several operational missions most cheerfully and enthusiastically, invariably attaining outstanding results. It was on one such mission on 11 September 65, that he lost his life. For his extreme dedication to duty, Flight Lieutenant Saifullah Khan Lodhi was awarded Sitara-i-Juraat.

Flight Lieutenant Younus Hussain



Flight Lieutenant Younus Hussain fought in air battles aggressively, fearlessly and with great professional skill. During one such engagement, he fought singly against six enemy aircraft and shot down two Hunters. Though his own aircraft was damaged in this encounter, he managed to bring it back to base safely. On 6 September, while attacking Halwara airfield, his small formation was intercepted by a large number of enemy and, although his aircraft was hit, he refused to break off the engagement, in complete disregard of personal safety, and was reported missing from this mission. He became a symbol of courage and professional ability for other pilots. For his , valour, professional skill and devotion to duty he was awarded Sitara-i-Juraat.

Aircraftman Anwar Hussain



Leading Aircraftman Anwar Hussain was on duty at a vital point. His position was rocketed by enemy aircraft and the place caught fire. Anwar Hussain was the only person on duty over there. He fought the fire single-handedly with the available fire appliances and managed to control it and thus saved expensive equipment. His death is an example of courage and unfaltering devotion to duty towards the service as well as to the country. He was awarded Tumgha-i-Juraat.

pagaldil

nice history lesson for me.

Asim Aquil

Haha, ok. And Welcome Aboard!

Although I must appologize for posting an article where the author could've chosen better words to portray his emotions. But at the same time, the emotions connected to this day go deep and thus cannot be ignored. Lahore almost fell into Indian hands!

rhytha

convienently forgetting what happened in august are'nt we

Pakistan Army Committed Kargil Like Disaster in 1965 War As Well

WASHINGTON, Sept 6: A new book on Pakistan, scheduled to be released worldwide on Sept 11, gives out a detailed account of how the Pakistan Army planned a military operation to capture Akhnur in August 1965 which ultimately led to the India-Pakistan war and how mysterious decisions led to its failure, a la the Kargil fiasco of 1999.

The book Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, The Army, And America's War On Terror, written by Hassan Abbas, a former police officer from Pakistan and currently a Research fellow at the Harvard Law School and a PhD. candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, provides a befitting backdrop to the 1965 war, the 39th anniversary of which is being observed in Pakistan today.

The book, already among the top 100 bestsellers at Barnes and Nobles, also examines the rise of religious extremism in Pakistan and analyzes its connections to Pakistan Army's policies and the fluctuating US-Pakistan relations. It includes profiles of leading Pakistani Jihadi groups and gives details of the conspiracy behind General Zia-ul-Haq’s plane crash in 1988, a botched military coup by fundamentalists in army in 1993-94 and lastly about how General Musharraf handled the volatile situation after the 9/11 attacks.

Leading writers and intellectuals including Stephen P Cohen of the Brookings Institution, Harvard University Professor Jessica Stern, Peter Bergen, Terrorism Analyst, CNN and author of The Holy War Inc and Arnaud de Borchgrave, Editor-at-Large of The Washington Times and UPI, have praised the book in glowing terms.

It raises an oft repeated but a pertinent question about the conduct of the top Pakistan Army brass in 1965 when Pakistani troops were just three miles from Akhnur and its capture was imminent, the military commander was changed and so much time was deliberately wasted that a successful war was turned into a defeat.

Following excerpt of the book throws more light on how, on this day, the Pakistan Army wrote an inglorious epitaph to a glorious plan which it failed to execute:

“When the Pakistan Army inflicted a short, sharp reverse on the Indians in the Rann of Kutch in mid-1965, Ayub’s spirits got a boost. More important, the international arbitration that followed the Kutch dispute (resulting in favor of Pakistan) put Pakistan under the assumption that if the Kashmir problem was to be solved, the Rann of Kutch route would have to be replicated - a limited clash in Kashmir leading to a threat of all-out war, and then an intervention and arbitration by the great powers.

Hence at this point there was considerable confidence among the Pakistanis about the strength of their own arms, which was bolstered by their newfound friendship with China. Utter frustration over Indian intransigence on Kashmir coupled with sympathy for the gathering hopelessness of the Kashmiris and concern over the rapid rearmament of the Indian armed forces on account of Western military aid, were factors that played a crucial role in Pakistan’s drift toward considering a military solution of the Kashmir issue.

Bhutto, in his letter to Ayub of May 12, 1965, drew his attention to increasing Western military aid to India and how fast the balance of power in the region was shifting in India’s favor as a result. He expanded on this theme and recommended that “a bold and courageous stand” would “open up greater possibility for a negotiated settlement.”

Ayub Khan was won over by the force of this logic, and he tasked the Kashmir Cell under Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed, to draw up plans to stir up some trouble in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir, which could then be exploited in Pakistan’s favor by limited military involvement.

The Kashmir Cell was a nondescript body working without direction and producing no results. It laid the broad concept of Operation Gibraltar, but did not get very far beyond this in terms of coming up with anything concrete. When Ayub saw that the Kashmir Cell was making painfully little headway in translating his directions into a plan of action, he personally handed responsibility for the operation over to Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, commander of the 12th Division of the Pakistan Army. This division was responsible for the defense of the entire length of the Cease-fire Line (CFL) in the Kashmir region.

General Akhtar Malik was a man of towering presence and was known for his acuteness of mind and boldness of spirit. He was loved and admired by his subordinates, but was far too outspoken to be of any comfort to most of his superiors. His professional excellence, however, was acknowledged both in military and civilian circles.

The plan of this operation (Gibraltar) as finalized by General Malik and approved by Ayub Khan was to infiltrate a sizable armed force across the CFL into Indian Kashmir to carry out acts of sabotage in order to destabilize the government of the state and encourage the local population to rise up against Indian occupation.

In order to be able to retrieve the situation in case this operation got into trouble, to give it a new lease on life, or to fully exploit the advantage gained in the event of its success, Operation Grand Slam was planned.

This was to be a quick strike by armored and infantry forces from the southern tip of the CFL to Akhnur, a town astride the Jammu-Srinagar Road. This would cut the main Indian artery into the Kashmir valley, bottle up the Indian forces there, and so open up a number of options that could then be exploited as the situation demanded. According to some Pakistani Army officers, it was foreseen then that the value of Operation Gibraltar would be fully enchased after Grand Slam succeeded in wresting control of Akhnur.

There was not enough time to fully prepare and train the men who were to infiltrate, and the three-month deadline given was considered to be not nearly enough for this, but the 12th Division was told that, because of certain considerations, no further time could be given.

Most of the men to be trained belonged to the Azad Kashmir Regular Forces, which meant that they would have to be withdrawn from the defensive positions along the CFL. The denuded front lines therefore had to be beefed up by other elements. Having no reserves for this purpose, General Malik decided that the only option for him was to simultaneously train a force of Azad Kashmiri irregulars (mujahids) for this purpose.

But when he called the C-in-C, General Musa, to ask for weapons to equip this force, the latter refused. General Malik then made a call to Ayub, apprised him of the difficulty he was having with the C-in-C, and concluded that if the Kashmiris were not to be trusted, they were not worth fighting for. Ayub then called Musa, told him why the new Mujahid Companies needed to be armed and equipped, and ended with the same note, that is, people who cannot be trusted were not worth fighting for. Soon General Malik got a call from Musa: “Malik, people who cannot be trusted are not worth fighting for - go ahead, arm them.”

Operation Gibraltar was launched in the first week of August 1965, and all the infiltrators made it across the CFL without a single case of detection by the Indians. This was possible only because of the high standards of Pakistan’s security measures, as acknowledged by a senior Indian Army general. The pro-Pakistan elements in Kashmir had not been taken into confidence prior to this operation, and there was no help forthcoming for the infiltrators in most areas.

Overall, despite lack of support from the local population, the operation managed to cause anxiety to the Indians, at times verging on panic. On August 8 the Kashmir government recommended that martial law be imposed in Kashmir. It seemed that the right time to launch operation Grand Slam was when such anxiety was at its height. But it was General Malik’s opinion that this be delayed till the Indians had committed their reserves to seal off the infiltration routes, which he felt was certain to happen eventually.

On August 24, India concentrated its forces to launch its operations in order to seal off Haji Pir Pass, through which lay the main infiltration routes. That same day General Malik asked General Headquarters (GHQ) permission to launch Operation Grand Slam. The director of military operations, Brigadier Gul Hassan, passed on the request to General Musa, and when he failed to respond, reminded him again the following day.

But Musa could not manage to gather the confidence to give the decision himself and sent ZA Bhutto to obtain the approval from Ayub Khan, who was relaxing in Swat, 200 miles away - strange way to fight a war with the C-in-C unwilling to give decisions and the supreme commander unable to do so.

The decision finally arrived on August 29, by which time the Indians had bolstered their defenses in the sector where the operation was to be launched with the induction of three infantry units and an artillery regiment. Still a few more precious hours were wasted by the GHQ, and the operation went to the early morning of September 1, more than a week after the commander in the field had first asked for the go-ahead.

By early afternoon of the first day all the objectives were taken, the Indian forces were on the run, and Akhnur lay tantalizingly close and inadequately defended. “At this point, someone’s prayers worked” says Indian journalist, MJ Akbar: “An inexplicable change of command took place.”

What happened was that, in a surprising turn of events, General Musa landed in the theater of operations and handed the command of the 12th Division over to General Yahya Khan, whom he had brought along. General Malik was asked to get into the helicopter and was flown away by Musa.

For nearly 39 years now the Pakistan Army has been trying to cover up this untimely and fateful change of command by suppression and falsification of history.

Loss of time is inherent in any such change, but for reasons that cannot be explained but by citing the intrusion of ego, Yahya insisted on changing Malik’s plan and therefore lost even more time. Whereas Malik had basically planned to invest and bypass the strongly defended localities, subordinating everything to reaching and capturing Akhnur with the least delay, Yahya took a different route - he crossed river Tawi and went straight into Troti, in which crucial time was lost. And this was enough for the Indians to bolster the defenses of Akhnur and launch their strike against Lahore across the international frontier between the two countries.

This came on September 6 while the Pakistani forces were still three miles short of Akhnur. This was the contrived end of an operation, which had been meticulously planned and had promised a lot.

On September 6, after the Indian attack across the international border, Ayub and Bhutto tried to invoke the 1959 US-Pakistan bilateral agreement, to ask for American help against Indian aggression, but to no avail.

Instead, President Johnson suspended military aid to both India and Pakistan. Pakistan immediately turned to China for help. These efforts brought about a strong Chinese condemnation of India’s aggression against Pakistan, and this was followed by a Chinese warning against Indian intrusions into Chinese territory.

And then on September 16 they sent a note to India to say that as long as Indian aggression against Pakistan continued, it would not stop supporting Pakistan in its just struggle. On September 19, Ayub and Bhutto flew to Beijing for a top secret meeting with the Chinese leadership. China promised Pakistan all the help, but told Ayub that he should be quite prepared to withdraw his army to the hills and fight a long guerrilla war against India.

For this neither the Sandhurst-trained Ayub nor the Berkeley-educated Bhutto was quite prepared. On the international scene there was already considerable concern that any direct Chinese involvement in the conflict may escalate and broaden the war involving other countries. Pakistan was pressed by the Western ambassadors to not encourage the Chinese to step up their engagement any further.

Pakistan knew it did not have the wherewithal to break through the stalemate on the battlefront. Thus it knew this was the end. Now Pakistan was prepared to accept a cease-fire. The guns fell silent on the afternoon of September 23. As to the final outcome of the war, Dennis Kux aptly says that India “won simply by not losing.”

Immediately after the war, on the Pakistan side the major controversy that occupied the minds of many was the change in command of Operation Grand Slam. The “view both in India and even amongst ‘sensible army officers’ in Pakistan was that Malik’s sudden replacement led to the failure of Grand Slam.”

But the “sensible” Pakistani Army officers were restrained from discussing this subject. It was taboo to do so in the army messes and officers’ gatherings, though in private this was most passionately debated. It was only after General Malik’s death in 1969 that GHQ gingerly started putting together a theory to justify this change and to propagate it.

It was now claimed that the change was preplanned and that this plan laid down that General Malik would command the first phase of the operation up to the river Tawi, and thereafter the command would be assumed by General Yahya Khan. However, there is not a shred of evidence to support this. The operation itself was a set-piece attack for which the operation orders are a part of the historical record, and there is no such mention in these.

And any doubts there might have been on the issue were laid to rest by General Gul Hassan, who was Director of Military Operations during the war and the one person who would have known of such a change. He has specifically denied having any knowledge of the same.

Indeed, not a single army officer except Musa and General Yahya seem to have known about this change, which shifted the initiative from Pakistan to the Indian Army. It now seems fair to speculate that the change in command was preplanned only in the sense that it was a conspiracy between Ayub, Musa, and Yahya; that if the operation got into trouble, Malik could keep the command and also the blame that would accrue as a result, but that if it held promise of success, Yahya would be moved in to harvest it.

Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, one of the very respected senior Indian military commanders, was one of the few to have appreciated the full military value of Operation Gibraltar as a part of Grand Slam rather than seeing the two in isolation. According to him, “The plan of infiltration was brilliant in conception,” and as for Grand Slam, he thought it was “aptly named Grand Slam for had it succeeded, a trail of dazzling results would have followed in its wake, and the infiltration campaign would have had a fresh lease of life,” and that “it was only the last minute frantic rush of reinforcements into the sector . . . that prevented this debacle from deteriorating into major catastrophe.”

It seems therefore that but for the change of command at a critical time during Operation Grand Slam, the aim of Gibraltar was well within realization, that is, to “de freeze the Kashmir problem, weaken Indian resolve, and bring India to the conference table without provoking general war.”

It would be highly educative to read General Akhtar Malik’s views on the subject. This unpublished letter from General Malik to his younger brother, Lieutenant General Abdul Ali Malik, is a new source of information on the subject, and for this purpose is quoted here in full:

Pakistan’s Permanent Military Deputy
Embassy of Pakistan
Ankara
23-11-67

My Dear brother,

I hope you and the family are very well. Thank you for your letter of 14 Oct. 67. The answers to your questions are as follows:

a. The de facto command changed the very first day of the ops [operations] after the fall of Chamb when Azmat Hayat broke off wireless communications with me. I personally tried to find his HQ [headquarters] by chopper and failed. In late afternoon I sent Gulzar and Vahid, my MP [military police] officers, to try and locate him, but they too failed. The next day I tore into him and he sheepishly and nervously informed me that he was ‘Yahya’s brigadier’. I had no doubt left that Yahya had reached him the previous day and instructed him not to take further orders from me, while the formal change in command had yet to take place. This was a betrayal of many dimensions.

b. I reasoned and then pleaded with Yahya that if it was credit he was looking for, he should take the overall command but let me go up to Akhnur as his subordinate, but he refused. He went a step further and even changed the plan. He kept banging his head against Troti, letting the Indian fall back to Akhnur. We lost the initiative on the very first day of the war and never recovered it. Eventually it was the desperate stand at Chawinda that prevented the Indians from cutting through.

c. At no time was I assigned any reason for being removed from command by Ayub, Musa or Yahya. They were all sheepish at best. I think the reasons will be given when I am no more.

d. Not informing pro-Pak Kashmiri elements before launching Gibraltar was a command decision and it was mine. The aim of the op was to de freeze the Kashmir issue, raise it from its moribund state, and bring it to the notice of the world. To achieve this aim the first phase of the op was vital, that is, to effect undetected infiltration of thousands across the CFL [cease-fire line]. I was not willing to compromise this in any event. And the whole op could be made stillborn by just one double agent.

e. Haji Pir [Pass] did not cause me much anxiety. Because [the] impending Grand Slam Indian concentration in Haji Pir could only help us after Akhnur, and they would have to pull out troops from there to counter the new threats and surrender their gains, and maybe more, in the process. Actually it was only after the fall of Akhnur that we would have encashed the full value of Gibraltar, but that was not to be!

f. Bhutto kept insisting that his sources had assured him that India would not attack if we did not violate the international border. I however was certain that Gibraltar would lead to war and told GHQ so. I needed no op intelligence to come to this conclusion. It was simple common sense. If I got you by the throat, it would be silly for me to expect that you will kiss me for it. Because I was certain that war would follow, my first choice as objective for Grand Slam was Jammu. From there we could have exploited our success either toward Samba or Kashmir proper as the situation demanded. In any case whether it was Jammu or Akhnur, if we had taken the objective, I do not see how the Indians could have attacked Sialkot before clearing out either of these towns.

g. I have given serious consideration to writing a book, but given up the idea. The book would be the truth. And truth and the popular reaction to it would be good for my ego. But in the long run it would be an unpatriotic act. It will destroy the morale of the army, lower its prestige among the people, be banned in Pakistan, and become a textbook for the Indians. I have little doubt that the Indians will never forgive us the slight of 65 and will avenge it at the first opportunity. I am certain they will hit us in E. Pak [East Pakistan] and we will need all we have to save the situation. The first day of Grand Slam will be fateful in many ways. The worst has still to come and we have to prepare for it. The book is therefore out.

I hope this gives you the gist of what you needed to know. And yes, Ayub was fully involved in the enterprise. As a matter of fact it was his idea. And it was he who ordered me to by-pass Musa while Gibraltar etc. was being planned. I was dealing more with him and Sher Bahadur than with the C-in-C. It is tragic that despite having a good military mind, the FM’s [Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto’s] heart was prone to give way. The biggest tragedy is that in this instance it gave way before the eruption of a crisis. Or were they already celebrating a final victory!!

In case you need a more exact description of events, I will need war diaries and maps, which you could send me through the diplomatic bag.

Please remember me to all the family.

Yours,
Akhtar Hussain Malik

It is quite obvious what had happened. In the words of Justice Muhammad Saraf: “Had Akhtar been continued in his duty... he would have been the only General in Pakistan with a spectacular victory to his credit and it would then have been very difficult for President Ayub to ignore his claim to the office of the Commander-in-Chief, after the retirement of Musa, which was quite near.”

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, one of the main players of this game, also later argued that, “Had General Akhtar Malik not been stopped in the Chamb-Jaurian Sector, the Indian forces in Kashmir would have suffered serious reverses, but Ayub Khan wanted to make his favorite, General Yahya Khan, a hero.”

However, the very idea of Operation Gibraltar was controversial in itself. The military initiative robbed Pakistan of its moral high ground vis-à-vis the Kashmir conflict. In retrospect, it would have been better if Pakistan had focused more on continuing its efforts toward the resolution of the dispute through UN or third-party mediation. Ayub and his top generals also misread how far Kashmiris (in India) were willing to cooperate with Pakistan in this kind of adventure.

(After the war) the army also underwent major though subtle changes in personnel. Musa retired soon after the war, to be replaced by General Yahya Khan as C-in-C of the army. This was not a popular choice, but as Yahya settled in, he subtly started to gather power by promoting and placing his own loyalists in critical spots. A sick and disheartened Ayub was too careworn to notice this. And besides, he had implicit faith in Yahya’s loyalty.

He may also have been quite certain that his new choice of army chief came with the kind of baggage that would foreclose the possibility of his gaining the sort of following that could eventually threaten Ayub’s position. Ayub was wrong. He could not see that Yahya could collect any number of equally discredited officers around him. Among the first to be swept off the stage was General Akhtar Malik. He was posted out to CENTO in Ankara, Turkey.

Yahya told him that Pakistan needed a sensible and mature officer there, and Malik had replied: “Being a sensible and mature officer, I quite realize why I am needed there.” Concurrently with this, all officers considered to be Malik loyalists were sidelined. This was a major step along the road inaugurated by Ayub himself, of promoting the interests of personal loyalty over those of competence and professionalism. Professional pride progressively gave way to servile behavior.

Already the army had embarked on a crash program of making up shortages in the ranks of the officer class. To meet the target, standards were consciously and conspicuously lowered, thus making it a self-defeating exercise.

Also, in the aftermath of the war, one would have expected the army to analyze its performance. Not only was such an appraisal not carried out beyond the merest whitewash, the attempt deliberately falsified the record to save reputations, because after the war many of those were promoted whose reputations needed to be saved.

But the formality of a war analysis had to be fulfilled, and most ironically the task was entrusted to General Akhtar Malik. He did this in two parts; one dealt with the performance of junior leadership, and the other with that of the higher command.

Brigadier Mohammad Afzal Khan, who read the latter in manuscript form, and Major Qayyum, under whose supervision it was typed, both commented upon the scathing criticism to which this document subjected the prosecution of the war at higher levels. After the death of the general, no one has seen the record of this document in the army GHQ."


http://www.satribune.com/archives/sept04/P1_habook1.htm

Asim Aquil

thread crapper.

My long post at least had picures for everyone's entertainment. See the big fonts actually make the post look neat.

We can and have debated that for ages. I'm honouring Lahore's defence and the lives that were sacrificed to maintain that!

rhytha

Lol nice defense

Officer of Engineers

This goes to show what I know for a very long time. All we know about the battle is that the shooting has stopped and either we are forward or backward from our original positions.

The REMFs tell us later, too much later for me to care (usually because there are new people shooting at us and we at them), whether we won or lost.

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Chimo

Hawk_eye

Thankyou to the author. Wonderful Post. Very informative.

And an important lesson was learned, one that we now count as a blessing. The message was Self Reliance.!

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Great spirits have always found violent opposition from mediocre minds. The latter cannot understand it when a [person] does not thoughtlessly submit to hereditary prejudices but honestly and courageously uses their intelligence.
--Albert Einstein

Ray

Indeed.

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"Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

HAKUNA MATATA

lemontree

As usual the number of Indian fighters as cliamed to have been shot down is taken from a dream. Please read a book written by a Pakistani airforce officer Asgar Ali "The second round". I dont blame the present generation of Pakistanis who think that 5 hunters were shot in less that a minute by a sabre that too with cannons and not missiles.

The only worth while ace was Sqd Ldr Rafiq, he was good. The rest fabricated stories because they failed against a weak and outdated Indian airforce of 1965.
Gnats (subsonic) were shooting F-104s and Sabers. Same was the case with the Pattons, WWII shermans and centurians were knocking them.

Could we have the airwar score as per your official air historian.