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    A Self Important Senior Contributor troung's Avatar
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    Guerilla Warfare

    Guerrilla
    Guerrilla (also called a partisan) is a term borrowed from Spanish (from "guerra" meaning war) used to describe small combat groups. Guerrilla warfare operates with small, mobile and flexible combat groups called cells, without a front line. Guerrilla warfare is one of the oldest forms of asymmetric warfare. Primary contributors to modern theories of guerrilla war include Mao Zedong, Wendell Fertig, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Che Guevara. While "asymmetric warfare" is the military term for guerrilla tactics, it is often referred to in the pejorative as "terrorism".
    Etymology
    The term was invented in Spain to describe the tactics used to resist the French regime instituted by Napoleon Bonaparte (one should however remember, that the tactics themselves were known and used even centuries earlier). The Spanish word means "little war". The Spanish word for guerrilla fighter is guerrillero. The change of usage from the tactics to the person implementing them is a late 19th century mistake. In most languages the word still denotes the style of warfare. However this is changing under the influence of the English usage.

    Tactics
    Guerrilla tactics are based on ambush, sabotage, and espionage, and their ultimate objective is usually to destabilize an authority through long, low-intensity confrontation. It can be quite successful against an unpopular foreign regime: a guerrilla army may increase the cost of maintaining an occupation or a colonial presence above what the foreign power may wish to bear.

    However, guerrilla warfare has generally been unsuccessful against native regimes, which have nowhere to retreat to and are highly knowledgeable about their own people and their society and culture. The rare examples of successful guerrilla warfare against a native regime include the Cuban Revolution and the Chinese Civil War, as well as the Sandinista overthrow of a military dictatorship in Nicaragua. More common are the unsuccessful examples of guerrilla warfare, which include Malaysia, Bolivia, Argentina, and the Philippines. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), fighting for an independent homeland in the north and east of Sri Lanka, achieved significant military successes against the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) sent to the island by Rajiv Gandhi to stabilize the situation, but waged a win-loss war against the Sri Lankan government itself for twenty years. The loss of their stronghold in the Jaffna Peninsula to government forces in December 1995 struck a blow to the Tigers' war morale, which culminated in their ceasefire following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

    Guerrillas in wars against foreign powers do not principally direct their attacks at civilians, as they desire to obtain as much support as possible from the population as part of their tactics. Civilians are primarily attacked or assassinated as punishment for collaboration. Often such an attack will be officially sanctioned by guerrilla command or tribunal. An exception is in civil wars, where both guerrilla groups and organized armies have been known to commit atrocities against the civilian population.

    Mao Tse-tung during the Chinese civil war, condensed guerrialla warfare into the following points for his troops;

    The enemy advances, we retreat. The enemy camps, we harass. The enemy tires, we attack. The enemy retreats, we pursue.

    Guerrillas are often characterised as terrorists by their opponents. Guerrillas are in danger of not being recognized as combatants because they may not wear a uniform, (to mingle with the local population), or their uniform and distinctive emblems may not be recognised as such by their opponents. Article 44, sections 3 and 4 of the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, "relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts", does recognise combatants who, due to the nature of the conflict, do not wear uniforms as long as they carry their weapons openly during military operations. This gives non-uniformed guerrillas lawful combatant status against countries that have ratified this convention.

    Guerrilla warfare is classified into two main categories: urban guerrilla warfare and rural guerrilla warfare. In both cases, guerrillas rely on a friendly population to provide supplies and intelligence. Rural guerrillas prefer to operate in regions providing plenty of cover and concealment, especially heavily forested and mountainous areas. Urban guerrillas, rather than melting into the mountains and jungles, blend into the population and are also dependent on a support base among the people.

    Foreign support in the form of soldiers, weapons, sanctuary, or, at the very least, statements of sympathy for the guerrillas can greatly increase the chances of victory for an insurgency. However, it is not always necessary.

    Maoist theory of people's war divides warfare into three phases. In the first phase, the guerrillas gain the support of the population through attacks on the machinery of government and the distribution of propaganda. In the second phase, escalating attacks are made on the government's military and vital institutions. In the third phase, conventional fighting is used to seize cities, overthrow the government and take control of the country.

    Guerrilla Tactics were summarized into the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla in 1969 by Carlos Marighella. This text was banned in several countries including the United States. This is probably the most comprehensive and informative book on guerrilla strategy ever published, and is available free online. However, also available, are texts by Che Guevara and Mao Tse-tung on the subjects of Guerrilla warfare.

    John Keats wrote about an American guerilla leader in World War 2: Colonel Wendell Fertig, who in 1942 organized a large force of guerillas who harassed the Japanese occupation forces on the Phillipine Island of Mindanao all the way up to the liberation of the Philippines in 1945. His abilities were later utilized by the United States Army, when Fertig helped found the United States Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

    Examples
    Examples of successful guerrilla warfare:

    Algeria
    Angola
    the First Boer War
    Indonesia
    Mozambique
    portions of the Wars of Scottish Independence; notably, actions led by Robert the Bruce
    Anglo-Irish War 1919-1921
    Viet-Cong forces throughout the Vietnam War in the early 1960s (though eventual success came at the price of heavy losses).
    In many cases, guerrilla tactics allow a small force to hold off a much larger and better equipped enemy for a long time, as in the Second Chechen War and the Second Seminole War.

    Guerrillas in Europe
    Introduction
    The first aspects of guerrilla warfare occured in modern day Israel with the guerrilla leader Judah, ofen referenced to in the Bible. For years he fought off the Seuclids. In centuries of history, many guerrilla movements appeared in Europe to fight foreign occupation forces. The tactics of Roman dictator Quintus Fabius Maximus against Hannibal could be considered a predecessor of guerilla tactics. In expandind their own Empire, the Romans encountered numerous examples of guerilla resistance to their legions. During The Deluge in Poland most of guerrilla tactics were applied. In the 19th century, peoples of the Balkans used the tactics to fight the Ottoman empire. in 17th century Ireland, Irish irregulars called tories and rapparees used guerrilla warfare in the Irish Confederate Wars and the Williamite war in Ireland.
    Europe 1800 – 1900
    = Napoleonic Wars =
    In the Napoleonic Wars many of the armies lived off the land. This often led to some resistance by the local population if the army did not pay fair prices for produce they consumed. Usually this resistance was sporadic, and not very successful, so is not classified as guerrilla action. There are three notable exceptions though:
    The rebellion in the Tyrol of 1809 lead by Andréas Hofer.
    In Napoleon's invasion of Russia of 1812 two actions were ordered by Tsar Alexander which could be seen as initiating guerrilla tactics. The Burning of Moscow after it had been occupied by the Napoleon's Grand Army so depriving the French of shelter in the city is a classic guerrilla action. The second was his imperial command that the Russian serfs should attack the French, this did not so much spark a guerrilla war as encourage a revengeful slaughter.
    In the Peninsular War the British gave aid to the Spanish guerrillas who tied down tens of thousands of French troops. The British gave this aid because it cost them much less than it would have done to equip British soldiers to face the French troops in conventional warfare. This was one of the most successful partisan wars in history and is the origin of the word guerrilla in the English language.
    = Others =
    The Poles used it during the January Uprising.

    Europe 1900 – 2000
    = Anglo–Irish War =
    The wars between Ireland and the United Kingdom have been long and over the centuries have covered the full spectrum of the types of warfare. The Irish fought the first successful 20th century war of independence against the British Empire and the United Kingdom. After the military failure of the Easter Rising in 1916, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) resorted to guerrilla tactics involving both urban warfare and flying columns in the countryside during the Anglo-Irish War of 1919 to 1921. The British security forces were fought to a standstill and the government of the UK agreed to meet representatives of the Irish uprising to negotiate a settlement. The settlement which resulted — the Anglo-Irish Treaty — satisfied few. It created the Irish Free State of 26 counties as a dominion in the British Empire; the other 6 counties remained part of the UK. The IRA fought an unsuccessful civil war against the Irish free staters using tactics similar to those used against the British but lost. The partition of Ireland laid the seeds for the later troubles.

    = World War II =
    In World War II, several guerrilla organisations (often known as resistance movements) operated in the countries occupied by Nazi Germany. These included the Polish Home Army, Soviet partisans, Yugoslav Partisans, French resistance or Maquis, Italian partisans, ELAS and royalist forces in Greece. Many of these organisations received help from the Special Operations Executive (SOE) which along with the commandos was initiated by Winston Churchill to ""set Europe ablaze". The SOE was originally designated as 'Section D' of MI6 but its aid to resistance movements to start fires clashed with MI6's primary role as an intelligence gathering agency. When Britain was under threat of invasion, SOE created Auxiliary Units to conduct guerrilla warfare in the event of invasion. Not only did SOE help the resistance to tie down many German units as garrison troops, so directly aiding the conventional war effort, guerrilla incidents in occupied countries were useful in the propaganda war, to help repudiate German claims that the occupied countries were pacified and broadly on the side of the Germans. When the USA entered the war the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) co-operated and enhanced the work of SOE as well as working on its own initiatives in the Far East.

    = Post World War II =
    After World War II, during 1940s and 1950s, thousands of fighters in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania participated in unsuccessful guerrilla warfare against Soviet occupation.

    In the late 1960s the Troubles in Northern Ireland which had their seeds in the Anglo-Irish War started, they came to an end with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in the mid-1990s. The peace is fragile and it is too early to tell if a permanent end to the conflict has occurred and which group, if any, won. Although both loyalist and republican paramilitaries carried out terrorist atrocities against civilians which were often tit-for-tat, a case can be made for saying that attacks such as the Provisional IRA carried out on British soldiers at Warrenpoint in 1979 was a well planned guerrilla ambush http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/d...00/3891055.stm. The Provisional IRA, Loyalist paramilitaries and various anti-Good Friday Agreement splinter-groups could be called guerrillas but are usually called terrorists by both the British and Irish governments. The news media such as the BBC and CNN will often use the term "gunmen" as in "IRA gunmen" http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/tro...tiations.shtml or "Loyalist gunmen" http://www.cnn.com/almanac/9611/27/ committed a "terrorist" act. Since 1995 CNN also uses guerrilla as in "IRA guerrilla" and "Protestant guerrilla" http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9712/27/n.ireland.killing/. Reuters, in accordance with its principle of not using the word terrorist except in direct quotes, refers to "guerrilla groups"http://www.reuters.co.uk/newsPackageArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=5843 30§ion=news.

    Europe post-2000
    Currently, the Basque ETA and Corsican FLNC and other groups such as the Greek Marxist Revolutionary Organization 17 November claim to be guerrillas, but are commonly recognized as terrorists since they almost exclusively murder civilians instead of attacking legitimate military targets, and this is how the governments and media of their respective countries prefer to refer to them.

    The ongoing war between pro-independence groups under the in Chechnya and the Russian government is currently the most active guerrilla war in Europe. Most of the incidents reported by the Western news media are very gory terrorist acts against Russian civilians committed by Chechen separatists outside Chechnya. However within Chechnya the war has many of the characteristics of a classic guerrilla war. See the article History of Chechnya for more details.

    Guerrillas in the American Revolutionary War
    While the American Revolutionary War is often thought of as a guerrilla war, guerrilla tactics were uncommon, and almost all of the battles involved conventional set piece battles. Some of the confusion may be due to the fact that generals George Washington and Nathaniel Greene successfully used a strategy of harassment and progressively grinding down British forces instead of seeking a decisive battle. Nevertheless the theater tactics used by most of the American forces were those of conventional warfare. One of the exceptions was in the south, where the brunt of the war was upon militia forces who fought the enemy British troops and their Loyalist supporters, but used concealment, surprise, and other guerrilla tactics to much advantage. General Francis Marion of South Carolina, who often attacked the British at unexpected places, then would fade into the swamps by the time the British were able to get organized enough to return fire, was named by them The Swamp Fox. However, even in the south, most of the major engagements were set-piece battles of conventional warfare.

    Guerrillas in the American Civil War
    John Singleton Mosby formed a guerrilla unit during the American Civil War, which Mosby called his "Partisan Rangers". In the western fringes of the War's main theatres of war, there was a great deal of guerrilla warfare. Along the border between Missouri and Kansas irregular troops on both sides (pro-slavery "Border Ruffians" and abolitionist "Redlegs") fought a bloody and bitter guerrilla campaign against each other before and during the Civil War. After Missouri's occupation by regular Union forces, Confederate guerrillas known as "Bushwhackers" carried on a campaign of ambushes, raids and assassinations against Federal troops and Union supporters. The bushwhackers were usually mounted and armed with revolvers, which gave them advantages of mobility and firepower at short ranges.The largest of these bands was known as Quantrill's Raiders, led by William Quantrill who were accused of many attrocities against the civilian populations of Missouri and Kansas. At the end of formal hostilities, the Confederate guerrillas in Missouri surrendered in small batches. Some however, never returned to civilian life, becoming outlaws after the war was over. Jesse James and his brothers are the most famous example of this.

    In the late 20th century several historians have focused on the non-use of guerrilla warfare to prolong the war. Near the end of the war, there were those in the Confederate government, namely Jefferson Davis who advocated continuing the southern fight as a guerrilla conflict. He was opposed by generals such as Robert E. Lee who ultimately believed that surrender was better than guerrilla warfare.

    Guerrillas in Latin America
    In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, Latin America had a number of urban guerrilla movements whose strategy was to destabilize regimes and provoke a counter-reaction by the military. The theory was that a harsh military regime would oppress the middle classes who would then support the guerrillas and create a popular uprising.

    While these movements did destabilize governments, such as Argentina, Uruguay, Guatemala, and Peru to the point of military intervention, the military generally proceeded to completely wipe out the guerrilla movements, usually committing several atrocities among both civilians and armed insurgents in the process.

    Several other Cuban-backed Marxist guerrilla movements attempted to overthrow US-backed right-wing dictatorships, whilst US-backed Contra guerrillas attempted to overthrow the left-wing democratic Sandinista government of Nicaragua.

    Guerrillas and the Vietnam War
    Within the United States, the Vietnam War is commonly thought of as a guerrilla war. However this is a simplification of a much more complex situation which followed the pattern outlined by Maoist theory.

    The National Liberation Front (NLF), drawing its ranks from the South Vietnamese peasantry and working class, used guerrilla tactics in the early phases of the war. However, by 1965 when U.S. involvement escalated, the National Liberation Front was in the process of being supplanted by regular units of the North Vietnamese Army.

    The NVA regiments organized along traditional military lines, were supplied via the Ho Chi Minh trail rather than living off the land, and had access to weapons such as tanks and artillery which are not normally used by guerrilla forces.

    Over time, more of the fighting was conducted by the North Vietnamese Army and the character of the war become increasingly conventional. The final offensive into South Vietnam in 1975 was a completely conventional military operation with no elements of guerrilla warfare.

    By the end of the Vietnam War, U.S.-led forces had killed or incapacitated a large share of the NLF's guerrilla fighters.

    Guerrilla warfare in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Kurdish Northern Iraq
    Guerrilla warfare formed an integral part of the campaigns in Kosovo in the late 1990s and Afghanistan in 2001, which created a unique style of warfare which combined low technology guerrilla warfare with high technology air power. In these campaigns, guerrilla fighters with coordination from special forces would engage the enemy forcing them to move out into the open where they could be destroyed using air power supplied by the United States. In both cases, the guerrillas were able to take advantage of their local knowledge and willingness to take casualties to great effect when supplemented by outside air power. In Kosovo the Kosovo Liberation Army, a separatist paramilitary, was aided by the NATO air forces. In Afghanistan numerous anti-Taliban militias (consisting of regular soldiers and guerrillas) were aided by US air power. This formula was used again, in War on Iraq, against the Iraqi Army by Kurdish Peshmerga guerrillas with the aid of U.S. special forces and the U.S. Air Force.

    --

    http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Guerrilla

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    GUERILLA WARFARE
    by Che Guevara
    Chapter I: General Principles of Guerrilla Warfare


    1. Essence of Guerrilla Warfare
    The armed victory of the Cuban people over the Batista dictatorship was not only the triumph of heroism as reported by the newspapers of the world; it also forced a change in the old dogmas concerning the conduct of the popular masses of Latin America. It showed plainly the capacity of the people to free themselves by means of guerrilla warfare from a government that oppresses them.

    We consider that the Cuban Revolution contributed three fundamental lessons to the conduct of revolutionary movements in America. They are:

    1. Popular forces can win a war against the army.
    2. It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.
    3. In underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting.

    Of these three propositions the first two contradict the defeatist attitude of revolutionaries or pseudo-revolutionaries who remain inactive and take refuge in the pretext that against a professional army nothing can be done, who sit down to wait until in some mechanical way all necessary objective and subjective conditions are given without working to accelerate them. As these problems were formerly a subject of discussion in Cuba, until facts settled the question, they are probably still much discussed in America.

    Naturally, it is not to be thought that all conditions for revolution are going to be created through the impulse given to them by guerrilla activity. It must always be kept in mind that there is a necessary minimum without which the establishment and consolidation of the first center is not practicable. People must see clearly the futility of maintaining the fight for social goals within the framework of civil debate. When the forces of oppression come to maintain themselves in power against established law, peace is considered already broken.

    In these conditions popular discontent expresses itself in more active forms. An attitude of resistance finally crystallizes in an outbreak of fighting, provoked initially by the conduct of the authorities.

    Where a government has come into power through some form of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted.

    The third proposition is a fundamental of strategy. It ought to be noted by those who maintain dogmatically that the struggle of the masses is centered in city movements, entirely forgetting the immense participation of the country people in the life of all the underdeveloped parts of America. Of course, the struggles of the city masses of organized workers should not be underrated; but their real possibilities of engaging in armed struggle must be carefully analyzed where the guarantees which customarily adorn our constitutions are suspended or ignored. In these conditions the illegal workers' movements face enormous dangers. They must function secretly without arms. The situation in the open country is not so difficult. There, in places beyond the reach of the repressive forces, the inhabitants can be supported by the armed guerrillas.

    We will later make a careful analysis of these three conclusions that stand out in the Cuban revolutionary experience. We empha- size them now at the beginning of this work as our fundamental contribution.

    Guerrilla warfare, the basis of the struggle of a people to redeem itself, has diverse characteristics, different facets, even though the essential will for liberation remains the same. It is obvious-and writers on the theme have said it many times-that war responds to a certain series of scientific laws; whoever ignores them will go down to defeat. Guerrilla warfare as a phase of war must be ruled by all of these; but besides, because of its special aspects, a series of corollary laws must also be recognized in order to carry it forward. Though geographical and social conditions in each country determine the mode and particular forms that guerrilla warfare will take, there are general laws that hold for all fighting of this type.

    Our task at the moment is to find the basic principles of this kind of fighting and the rules to be followed by peoples seeking liberation; to develop theory from facts; to generalize and give structure to our experience for the profit of others.

    Let us first consider the question: Who are the combatants in guerrilla warfare? On one side we have a group composed of the oppressor and his agents, the professional army, well armed and disciplined, in many cases receiving foreign help as well as the help of the bureaucracy in the employ of the oppressor. On the other side are the people of the nation or region involved. It is important to emphasize that guerrilla warfare is a war of the masses, a war of the people. The guerrilla band is an armed nucleus, the fighting vanguard of the people. It draws its great force from the mass of the people themselves. The guerrilla band is not to be considered inferior to the army against which it fights simply because it is inferior in firepower. Guerrilla warfare is used by the side which is supported by a majority but which possesses a much smaller number of arms for use in defense against oppression.

    The guerrilla fighter needs full help from the people of the area. This is an indispensable condition. This is clearly seen by considering the case of bandit gangs that operate in a region. They have all the characteristics of a guerrilla army: homogeneity, respect for the leader, valor, knowledge of the ground, and, often, even good understanding of the tactics to be employed. The only thing missing is support of the people; and, inevitably, these gangs are captured and exterminated by the public force.

    Analyzing the mode of operation of the guerrilla band, seeing its form of struggle, and understanding its base in the masses, we can answer the question: Why does the guerrilla fighter fight? We must come to the inevitable conclusion that the guerrilla fighter is a social reformer, that he takes up arms responding to the angry protest of the people against their oppressors, and that he fights in order to change the social system that keeps all his unarmed brothers in ignominy and misery. He launches himself against the conditions of the reigning institutions at a particular moment and dedicates himself with all the vigor that circumstances permit to breaking the mold of these institutions.

    When we analyze more fully the tactic of guerrilla warfare, we will see that the guerrilla fighter needs to have a good knowledge of the surrounding countryside, the paths of entry and escape, the possibilities of speedy maneuver, good hiding places; naturally, also, he must count on the support of the people. All this indicates that the guerrilla fighter will carry out his action in wild places of small population. Since in these places the struggle of the people for reforms is aimed primarily and almost exclusively at changing the social form of land ownership, the guerrilla fighter is above all an agrarian revolutionary. He interprets the desires of the great peasant mass to be owners of land, owners of their means of production, of their animals, of all that which they have long yearned to call their own, of that which constitutes their life and will also serve as their cemetery.

    It should be noted that in current interpretations there are two different types of guerrilla warfare, one of which-a struggle complementing great regular armies such as was the case of the Ukrainian fighters in the Soviet Union-does not enter into this analysis. We are interested in the other type, the case of an armed group engaged in struggle against the constituted power, whether colonial or not, which establishes itself as the only base and which builds itself up in rural areas. In all such cases, whatever the ideological aims that may inspire the fight, the economic aim is determined by the aspiration toward ownership of land.

    The China of Mao begins as an outbreak of worker groups in the South, which is defeated and almost annihilated. It succeeds in establishing itself and begins its advance only when, after the long march from Yenan, it takes up its base in rural territories and makes agrarian reform its fundamental goal. The struggle of Ho Chi Minh is based in the rice-growing peasants, who are oppressed by the French colonial yoke; with this force it is going forward to the defeat of the colonialists. In both cases there is a framework of patriotic war against the Japanese invader, but the economic basis of a fight for the land has not disappeared. In the case of Algeria, the grand idea of Arab nationalism has its economic counterpart in the fact that nearly all of the arable land of Algeria is utilized by a million French settlers. In some countries, such as Puerto Rico, where the special conditions of the island have not permitted a guerrilla outbreak, the nationalist spirit, deeply wounded by the discrimination that is daily practiced, has as its basis the aspiration of the peasants (even though many of them are already a proletariat) to recover the land that the Yankee invader seized from them. This same central idea, though in different forms, inspired the small farmers, peasants, and slaves of the eastern estates of Cuba to close ranks and defend together the right to possess land during the thirty-year war of liberation.

    Taking account of the possibilities of development of guerrilla warfare, which is transformed with the increase in the operating potential of the guerrilla band into a war of positions, this type of warfare, despite its special character, is to be considered as an embryo, a prelude, of the other. The possibilities of growth of the guerrilla band and of changes in the mode of fight, until conventional warfare is reached, are as great as the possibilities of defeating the enemy in each of the different battles, combats, or skirmishes that take place. Therefore, the fundamental principle is that no battle, combat, or skirmish is to be fought unless it will be won. There is a malevolent definition that says: "The guerrilla fighter is the Jesuit of warfare." By this is indicated a quality of secretiveness, of treachery, of surprise that is obviously an essential element of guerrilla warfare. It is a special kind of Jesuitism, naturally prompted by circumstances, which necessitates acting at certain moments in ways different from the romantic and sporting conceptions with which we are taught to believe war is fought.

    War is always a struggle in which each contender tries to annihilate the other. Besides using force, they will have recourse to all possible tricks and stratagems in order to achieve the goal. Military strategy and tactics are a representation by analysis of the objectives of the groups and of the means of achieving these objectives. These means contemplate taking advantage of all the weak points of the enemy. The fighting action of each individual platoon in a large army in a war of positions will present the same characteristics as those of the guerrilla band. It uses secretiveness, treachery, and surprise; and when these are not present, it is because vigilance on the other side prevents surprise. But since the guerrilla band is a division unto itself, and since there are large zones of territory not controlled by the enemy, it is always possible to carry out guerrilla attacks in such a way as to assure surprise; and it is the duty of the guerrilla fighter to do so.

    "Hit and run," some call this scornfully, and this is accurate. Hit and run, wait, lie in ambush, again hit and run, and thus repeatedly, without giving any rest to the enemy.
    There is in all this, it would appear, a negative quality, an attitude of retreat, of avoiding frontal fights. However, this is consequent upon the general strategy of guerrilla warfare, which is the same in its ultimate end as is any warfare: to win, to annihilate the enemy. Thus, it is clear that guerrilla warfare is a phase that does not afford in itself opportunities to arrive at complete victory. It is one of the initial phases of warfare and will develop continuously until the guerrilla army in its steady growth acquires the characteristics of a regular army.

    At that moment it will be ready to deal final blows to the enemy and to achieve victory. Triumph will always be the product of a regular army, even though its origins are in a guerrilla army. Just as the general of a division in a modern war does not have to die in front of his soldiers, the guerrilla fighter, who is general of himself, need not die in every battle. He is ready to give his life, but the positive quality of this guerrilla warfare is precisely that each one of the guerrilla fighters is ready to die, not to defend an ideal, but rather to convert it into reality. This is the basis, the essence of guerrilla fighting. Miraculously, a small band of men, the armed vanguard of the great popular force that supports them, goes beyond the immediate tactical objective, goes on decisively to achieve an ideal, to establish a new society, to break the old molds of the outdated, and to achieve, finally, the social justice for which they fight.

    Considered thus, all these disparaged qualities acquire a true nobility, the nobility of the end at which they aim; and it becomes clear that we are not speaking of distorted means of reaching an end. This fighting attitude, this attitude of not being dismayed at any time, this inflexibility when confronting the great problems in the final objective is also the nobility of the guerrilla fighter.

    2. Guerrilla Strategy
    In guerrilla terminology, strategy is understood as the analysis of the objectives to be achieved in light of the total military situation and the overall ways of reaching these objectives.

    To have a correct strategic appreciation from the point of view of the guerrilla band, it is necessary to analyze fundamentally what will be the enemy's mode of action. If the final objective is always the complete destruction of the opposite force, the enemy is confronted in the case of a civil war of this kind with the standard task: he will have to achieve the total destruction of each one of the components of the guerrilla band. The guerrilla fighter, on the other hand, must analyze the resources which the enemy has for trying to achieve that outcome: the means in men, in mobility, in popular support, in armaments, in capacity of leadership on which he can count. We must make our own strategy adequate on the basis of these studies, keeping in mind always the final objective of defeating the enemy army.

    There are fundamental aspects to be studied: the armament, for example, and the manner of using this armament. The value of a tank, of an airplane, in a fight of this type must be weighed. The arms of the enemy, his ammunition, his habits must be considered; because the principal source of provision for the guerrilla force is precisely in enemy armaments. If there is a possibility of choice, we should prefer the same type as that used by the enemy, since the greatest problem of the guerrilla band is the lack of ammunition, which the opponent must provide.

    After the objectives have been fixed and analyzed, it is necessary to study the order of the steps leading to the achievement of the final objective. This should be planned in advance, even though it will be modified and adjusted as the fighting develops and unforeseen circumstances arise.

    At the outset, the essential task of the guerrilla fighter is to keep himself from being destroyed. Little by little it will be easier for the members of the guerrilla band or bands to adapt themselves to their form of life and to make flight and escape from the forces that are on the offensive an easy task, because it is performed daily. When this condition is reached, the guerrilla, having taken up inaccessible positions out of reach of the enemy, or having assembled forces that deter the enemy from attacking, ought to proceed to the gradual weakening of the enemy. This will be carried out at first at those points nearest to the points of active warfare against the guerrilla band and later will be taken deeper into enemy territory, attacking his communications, later attacking or harassing his bases of operations and his central bases, tormenting him on all sides to the full extent of the capabilities of the guerrilla forces.

    The blows should be continuous. The enemy soldier in a zone of operations ought not to be allowed to sleep; his outposts ought to be attacked and liquidated systematically. At every moment the impression ought to be created that he is surrounded by a complete circle. In wooded and broken areas this effort should be maintained both day and night; in open zones that are easily penetrated by enemy patrols, at night only. In order to do all this the absolute cooperation of the people and a perfect knowledge of the ground are necessary. These two necessities affect every minute of the life of the guerrilla fighter. Therefore, along with centers for study of present and future zones of operations, intensive popular work must be undertaken to explain the motives of the revolution, its ends, and to spread the incontrovertible truth that victory of the enemy against the people is finally impossible. Whoever does not feel this undoubted truth cannot be a guerrilla fighter.

    This popular work should at first be aimed at securing secrecy; that is, each peasant, each member of the society in which action is taking place, will be asked not to mention what he sees and hears; later, help will be sought from inhabitants whose loyalty to the revolution offers greater guarantees; still later, use will be made of these persons in missions of contact, for transporting goods or arms, as guides in the zones familiar to them; still later, it is possible to arrive at organized mass action in the centers of work, of which the final result will be the general strike.

    The strike is a most important factor in civil war, but in order to reach it a series of complementary conditions are necessary which do not always exist and which very rarely come to exist spontaneously. It is necessary to create these essential conditions, basically by explaining the purposes of the revolution and by demonstrating the forces of the people and their possibilities.

    It is also possible to have recourse to certain very homogeneous groups, which must have shown their efficacy previously in less dangerous tasks, in order to make use of another of the terrible arms of the guerrilla band, sabotage. It is possible to paralyze entire armies, to suspend the industrial life of a zone, leaving the inhabitants of a city without factories, without light, without water, without communications of any kind, without being able to risk travel by highway except at certain hours. If all this is achieved, the morale of the enemy falls, the morale of his combatant units weakens, and the fruit ripens for plucking at a precise moment.

    All this presupposes an increase in the territory included within the guerrilla action, but an excessive increase of this territory is to be avoided. It is essential always to preserve a strong base of operations and to continue strengthening it during the course of the war. Within this territory, measures of indoctrination of the inhabitants of the zone should be utilized; measures of quarantine should be taken against the irreconcilable enemies of the revolution; all the purely defensive measures, such as trenches, mines, and communications, should be perfected.

    When the guerrilla band has reached a respectable power in arms and in number of combatants, it ought to proceed to the formation of new columns. This is an act similar to that of the beehive when at a given moment it releases a new queen, who goes to another region with a part of the swarm. The mother hive with the most notable guerrilla chief will stay in the less dangerous places, while the new columns will penetrate other enemy territories following the cycle already described.

    A moment will arrive in which the territory occupied by the columns is too small for them; and in the advance toward regions solidly defended by the enemy, it will be necessary to confront powerful forces. At that instant the columns join, they offer a compact fighting front, and a war of positions is reached, a war carried on by regular armies. However, the former guerrilla army cannot cut itself off from its base, and it should create new guerrilla bands behind the enemy acting in the same way as the original bands operated earlier, proceeding thus to penetrate enemy territory until it is dominated.

    It is thus that guerrillas reach the stage of attack, of the encirclement of fortified bases, of the defeat of reinforcements, of mass action, ever more ardent, in the whole national territory, arriving finally at the objective of the war: victory.

    3. Guerrilla Tactics
    In military language, tactics are the practical methods of achieving the grand strategic objectives.
    In one sense they complement strategy and in another they are more specific rules within it. As means, tactics are much more variable, much more flexible than the final objectives, and they should be adjusted continually during the struggle. There are tactical objectives that remain constant throughout a war and others that vary. The first thing to be considered is the adjusting of guerrilla action to the action of the enemy.

    The fundamental characteristic of a guerrilla band is mobility. This permits it in a few minutes to move far from a specific theatre and in a few hours far even from the region, if that becomes necessary; permits it constantly to change front and avoid any type of encirclement. As the circumstances of the war require, the guerrilla band can dedicate itself exclusively to fleeing from an encirclement which is the enemy's only way of forcing the band into a decisive fight that could be unfavorable; it can also change the battle into a counter- encirclement (small bands of men are presumably surrounded by the enemy when suddenly the enemy is surrounded by stronger contingents; or men located in a safe place serve as a lure, leading to the encirclement and annihilation of the entire troops and supply of an attacking force). Characteristic of this war of mobility is the so-called minuet, named from the analogy with the dance: the guerrilla bands encircle an enemy position, an advancing column, for example; they encircle it completely from the four points of the compass, with five or six men in each place, far enough away to avoid being encircled themselves; the fight is started at any one of the points, and the army moves toward it; the guerrilla band then retreats, always maintaining visual contact, and initiates its attack from another point. The army will repeat its action and the guerrilla band, the same. Thus, successively, it is possible to keep an enemy column immobilized, forcing it to expend large quantities of ammunition and weakening the morale of its troops without incurring great dangers.

    This same tactic can be applied at nighttime, closing in more and showing greater aggressiveness, because in these conditions counter- encirclement is much more difficult. Movement by night is another important characteristic of the guerrilla band, enabling it to advance into position for an attack and, where the danger of betrayal exists, to mobilize in new territory. The numerical inferiority of the guerrilla makes it necessary that attacks always be carried out by surprise; this great advantage is what permits the guerrilla fighter to inflict losses on the enemy without suffering losses. In a fight between a hundred men on one side and ten on the other, losses are not equal where there is one casualty on each side. The enemy loss is always reparable; it amounts to only one percent of his effectives. The loss of the guerrilla band requires more time to be repaired because it involves a soldier of high specialization and is ten percent of the operating forces.

    A dead soldier of the guerrillas ought never to be left with his arms and his ammunition. The duty of every guerrilla soldier whenever a companion falls is to recover immediately these extremely precious elements of the fight. In fact, the care which must be taken of ammunition and the method of using it are further characteristics of guerrilla warfare. In any combat between a regular force and a guerrilla band it is always possible to know one from the other by their different manner of fire: a great amount of firing on the part of the regular army, sporadic and accurate shots on the part of the guerrillas.

    Once one of our heroes, now dead, had to employ his machine guns for nearly five minutes, burst after burst, in order to slow up the advance of enemy soldiers. This fact caused considerable confusion in our forces, because they assumed from the rhythm of fire that that key position must have been taken by the enemy, since this was one of the rare occasions where departure from the rule of saving fire had been called for because of the importance of the point being defended.

    Another fundamental characteristic of the guerrilla soldier is his flexibility, his ability to adapt himself to all circumstances, and to convert to his service all of the accidents of the action. Against the rigidity of classical methods of fighting, the guerrilla fighter invents his own tactics at every minute of the fight and constanly surprises the enemy. In the first place, there are only elastic positions, specific places that the enemy cannot pass, and places of diverting him. Frequently, the enemy, after easily overcoming difficulties in a gradual advance, is surprised to find himself suddenly and solidly detained without possibilities of moving forward. This is due to the fact that the guerrilla-defended positions, when they have been selected on the basis of a careful study of the ground, are invulnerable. It is not the number of attacking soldiers that counts, but the number of defending soldiers. Once that number has been placed there, it can nearly always hold off a battalion with success. It is a major task of the chiefs to choose well the moment and the place for defending a position without retreat.

    The form of attack of a guerrilla army is also different; starting with surprise and fury, irresistible, it suddenly converts itself into total passivity.

    The surviving enemy, resting, believes that the attacker has departed; he begins to relax, to return to the routine life of the camp or of the fortress, when suddenly a new attack bursts forth in another place, with the same characteristics, while the main body of the guerrilla band lies in wait to intercept reinforcements. At other times an outpost defending the camp will be suddenly attacked by the guerrilla, dominated, and captured. The fundamental thing is surprise and rapidity of attack.

    Acts of sabotage are very important. It is necessary to distinguish clearly between sabotage, a revolutionary and highly effective method of warfare, and terrorism, a measure that is generally ineffective and indiscriminate in its results, since it often makes victims of innocent people and destroys a large number of lives that would be valuable to the revolution. Terrorism should be considered a valuable tactic when it is used to put to death some noted leader of the oppressing forces well known for his cruelty, his efficiency in repression, or other quality that makes his elimination useful. But the killing of persons of small importance is never advisable, since it brings on an increase of reprisals, including deaths.

    There is one point very much in controversy in opinions about terrorism. Many consider that its use, by provoking police oppression, hinders all more or less legal or semiclandestine contact with the masses and makes impossible unification for actions that will be necessary at a critical moment. This is correct; but it also happens that in a civil war the repression by the governmental power in certain towns is already so great that, in fact, every type of legal action is suppressed already, and any action of the masses that is not supported by arms is impossible. It is therefore necessary to be circumspect in adopting methods of this type and to consider the consequences that they may bring for the revolution. At any rate, well-managed sabotage is always a very effective arm, though it should not be employed to put means of production out of action, leaving a sector of the population paralyzed (and thus without work) unless this paralysis affects the normal life of the society. It is ridiculous to carry out sabotage against a soft-drink factory, but it is absolutely correct and advisable to carry out sabotage against a power plant. In the first case, a certain number of workers are put out of a job but nothing is done to modify the rhythm of industrial life; in the second case, there will again be displaced workers, but this is entirely justified by the paralysis of the life of the region. We will return to the technique of sabotage later.

    One of the favorite arms of the enemy army, supposed to be decisive in modern times, is aviation. Nevertheless, this has no use whatsoever during the period that guerrilla warfare is in its first stages, with small concentrations of men in rugged places. The utility of aviation lies in the systematic destruction of visible and organized defenses; and for this there must be large concentrations of men who construct these defenses, something that does not exist in this type of warfare. Planes are also potent against marches by columns through level places or places without cover; however, this latter danger is easily avoided by carrying out the marches at night.

    One of the weakest points of the enemy is transportation by road and railroad. It is virtually impossible to maintain a vigil yard by yard over a transport line, a road, or a railroad. At any point a considerable amount of explosive charge can be planted that will make the road impassable; or by exploding it at the moment that a vehicle passes, a considerable loss in lives and materiel to the enemy is caused at the same time that the road is cut.

    The sources of explosives are varied. They can be brought from other zones; or use can be made of bombs seized from the dictatorship, though these do not always work; or they can be manufactured in secret laboratories within the guerrilla zone. The technique of setting them off is quite varied; their manufacture also depends upon the conditions of the guerrilla band.

    In our laboratory we made powder which we used as a cap, and we invented various devices for exploding the mines at the desired moment. The ones that gave the best results were electric. The first mine that we exploded was a bomb dropped from an aircraft of the dictatorship. We adapted it by inserting various caps and adding a gun with the trigger pulled by a cord. At the moment that an enemy truck passed, the weapon was fired to set off the explosion.

    These techniques can be developed to a high degree. We have information that in Algeria, for example, tele-explosive mines, that is, mines exploded by radio at great distances from the point where they are located, are being used today against the French colonial power.

    The technique of lying in ambush along roads in order to explode mines and annihilate survivors is one of the most remunerative in point of ammunition and arms. The surprised enemy does not use his ammunition and has no time to flee, so with a small expenditure of ammunition large results are achieved.

    As blows are dealt the enemy, he also changes his tactics, and in place of isolated trucks, veritable motorized columns move. However, by choosing the ground well, the same result can be produced by breaking the column and concentrating forces on one vehicle. In these cases the essential elements of guerrilla tactics must always be kept in mind. These are: perfect knowledge of the ground; surveillance and foresight as to the lines of escape; vigilance over all the secondary roads that can bring support to the point of attack; intimacy with people in the zone so as to have sure help from them in respect to supplies, transport, and temporary or permanent hiding places if it becomes necessary to leave wounded companions behind; numerical superiority at a chosen point of action; total mobility; and the possibility of counting on reserves.

    If all these tactical requisites are fulfilled, surprise attack along the lines of communication of the enemy yields notable dividends.

    A fundamental part of guerrilla tactics is the treatment accorded the people of the zone. Even the treatment accorded the enemy is important; the norm to be followed should be an absolute inflexibility at the time of attack, an absolute inflexibility toward all the despicable elements that resort to informing and assassination, and clemency as absolute as possible toward the enemy soldiers who go into the fight performing or believing that they perform a military duty. It is a good policy, so long as there are no considerable bases of operations and invulnerable places, to take no prisoners. Survivors ought to be set free. The wounded should be cared for with all possible resources at the time of the action. Conduct toward the civil population ought to be regulated by a large respect for all the rules and traditions of the people of the zone, in order to demonstrate effectively, with deeds, the moral superiority of the guerrilla fighter over the oppressing soldier. Except in special situations, there ought to be no execution of justice without giving the criminal an opportunity to clear himself.

    4. Warfare on Favorable Ground
    As we have already said, guerrilla fighting will not always take place in country most favorable to the employment of its tactics; but when it does, that is, when the guerrilla band is located in zones difficult to reach, either because of dense forests, steep mountains, impassable deserts or marshes, the general tactics, based on the fundamental postulates of guerrilla warfare, must always be the same.

    An important point to consider is the moment for making contact with the enemy. If the zone is so thick, so difficult that an organized army can never reach it, the guerrilla band should advance to the regions where the army can arrive and where there will be a possibility of combat.

    As soon as the survival of the guerrilla band has been assured, it should fight; it must constantly go out from its refuge to fight. Its mobility does not have to be as great as in those cases where the ground is unfavorable; it must adjust itself to the capabilities of the enemy, but it is not necessary to be able to move as quickly as in places where the enemy can concentrate a large number of men in a few minutes. Neither is the nocturnal character of this warfare so important; it will be possible in many cases to carry out daytime operations, especially mobilizations by day, though subjected to enemy observation by land and air. It is also possible to persist in a military action for a much longer time, above all in the mountains; it is possible to undertake battles of long duration with very few men, and it is very probable that the arrival of enemy reinforcements at the scene of the fight can be prevented.

    A close watch over the points of access is, however, an axiom never to be forgotten by the guerrilla fighter. His aggressiveness (on account of the difficulties that the enemy faces in bringing up reinforcements) can be greater, he can approach the enemy more closely, fight much more directly, more frontally, and for a longer time, though these rules may be qualified by various circumstances, such, for example, as the amount of ammunition.

    Fighting on favorable ground and particularly in the mountains presents many advantages but also the inconvenience that it is difficult to capture in a single operation a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition, owing to the precautions that the enemy takes in these regions. (The guerrilla soldier must never forget the fact that it is the enemy that must serve as his source of supply of ammunition and arms.) But much more rapidly than in unfavorable ground the guerrilla band will here be able to "dig in," that is, to form a base capable of engaging in a war of positions, where small industries may be installed as they are needed, as well as hospitals, centers for education and training, storage facilities, organs of propaganda, etc., adequately protected from aviation or from long-range artillery.

    The guerrilla band in these conditions can number many more personnel; there will be noncombatants and perhaps even a system of training in the use of the arms that eventually are to fall into the power of the guerrilla army.

    The number of men that a guerrilla band can have is a matter of extremely flexible calculation adapted to the territory, to the means available of acquiring supplies, to the mass flights of oppressed people from other zones, to the arms available, to the necessities of organization. But, in any case, it is much more practicable to establish a base and expand with the support of new combatant elements.

    The radius of action of a guerrilla band of this type can be as wide as conditions or the operations of other bands in adjacent territory permit. The range will be limited by the time that it takes to arrive at a zone of security from the zone of operation; assuming that marches must be made at night, it will not be possible to operate more than five or six hours away from a point of maximum security. Small guerrilla bands that work constantly at weakening a territory can go farther away from the zone of security.

    The arms preferable for this type of warfare are long-range weapons requiring a small expenditure of bullets, supported by a group of automatic or semiautomatic arms. Of the rifles and machine guns that exist in the markets of the United States, one of the best is the M-1 rifle, called the Garand. However, this should be used only by people with some experience, since it has the disadvantage of expending too much ammunition. Medium-heavy arms, such as tripod machine guns, can be used on favorable ground, affording a greater margin of security for the weapon and its personnel, but they ought always to be a means of repelling an enemy and not for attack.

    An ideal composition for a guerrilla band of 25 men would be: 10 to 15 single-shot rifles and about 10 automatic arms between Garands and hand machine guns, including light and easily portable automatic arms, such as the Browning or the more modern Belgian FAL and M-14 automatic rifles. Among the hand machine guns the best are those of nine millimeters, which permit a larger transport of ammunition. The simpler its construction the better, because this increases the ease of switching parts. All this must be adjusted to the armament that the enemy uses, since the ammunition that he employs is what we are going to use when his arms fall into our hands. It is practically impossible for heavy arms to be used. Aircraft cannot see anything and cease to operate; tanks and cannons cannot do much owing to the difficulties of advancing in these zones.

    A very important consideration is supply. In general, the zones of difficult access for this very reason present special problems, since there are few peasants, and therefore animal and food supplies are scarce. It is necessary to maintain stable lines of communication in order to be able always to count on a minimum of food, stockpiled, in the event of any disagreeable development.

    In this kind of zone of operations the possibilities of sabotage on a large scale are generally not present; with the inaccessibility goes a lack of constructions, telephone lines, aqueducts, etc., that could be damaged by direct action.

    For supply purposes it is important to have animals, among which the mule is the best in rough country. Adequate pasturage permitting good nutrition is essential. The mule can pass through extremely hilly country impossible for other animals. In the most difficult situations it is necessary to resort to transport by men. Each individual can carry twenty-five kilograms for many hours daily and for many days.

    The lines of communication with the exterior should include a series of intermediate points manned by people of complete reliability, where products can be stored and where contacts can go to hide themselves at critical times. Internal lines of communication can also be created. Their extension will be determined by the stage of development reached by the guerrilla band. In some zones of operations in the recent Cuban war, telephone lines of many kilometers of length were established, roads were built, and a messenger service maintained sufficient to cover all zones in a minimum of time.

    There are also other possible means of communication, not used in the Cuban war but perfectly applicable, such as smoke signals, signals with sunshine reflected by mirrors, and carrier pigeons.

    The vital necessities of the guerrillas are to maintain their arms in good condition, to capture ammunition, and, above everything else, to have adequate shoes. The first manufacturing efforts should therefore be directed toward these objectives. Shoe factories can initially be cobbler installations that replace half soles on old shoes, expanding afterwards into a series of organized factories with a good average daily production of shoes. The manufacture of powder is fairly simple; and much can be accomplished by having a small laboratory and bringing in the necessary materials from outside. Mined areas constitute a grave danger for the enemy; large areas can be mined for simultaneous explosion, destroying up to hundreds of men.

    5. Warfare on Unfavorable Ground
    In order to carry on warfare in country that is not very hilly, lacks forests, and has many roads, all the fundamental requisites of guerrilla warfare must be observed; only the forms will be altered. The quantity, not the quality, of guerrilla warfare will change. For example, following the same order as before, the mobility of this type of guerrilla should be extraordinary; strikes should be made preferably at night; they should be extremely rapid, but the guerrilla should move to places different from the starting point, the farthest possible from the scene of action, assuming that there is no place secure from the repressive forces that the guerrilla can use as its garrison.

    A man can walk between 30 and 50 kilometers during the night hours; it is possible also to march during the first hours of daylight, unless the zones of operation are closely watched or there is danger that people in the vicinity, seeing the passing troops, will notify the pursuing army of the location of the guerrilla band and its route. It is always preferable in these cases to operate at night with the greatest possible silence both before and after the action; the first hours of night are best. Here, too, there are exceptions to the general rule, since at times the dawn hours will be preferable. It is never wise to habituate the enemy to a certain form of warfare; it is necessary to vary constantly the places, the hours, and the forms of operation.

    We have already said that the action cannot endure for long, but must be rapid; it must be of a high degree of effectiveness, last a few minutes, and be followed by an immediate withdrawal. The arms employed here will not be the same as in the case of actions on favorable ground; a large quantity of automatic weapons is to be preferred. In night attacks, marksmanship is not the determining factor, but rather concentration of fire; the more automatic arms firing at short distance, the more possibilities there are of annihilating the enemy.

    Also, the use of mines in roads and the destruction of bridges are tactics of great importance. Attacks by the guerrilla will be less aggressive so far as the persistence and continuation are concerned, but they can be very violent, and they can utilize different arms, such as mines and the shotgun. Against open vehicles heavily loaded with men, which is the usual method of transporting troops, and even against closed vehicles that do not have special defenses-against buses, for example-the shotgun is a tremendous weapon. A shotgun loaded with large shot is the most effective. This is not a secret of guerrilla fighters; it is used also in big wars. The Americans used shotgun platoons armed with high-quality weapons and bayonets for assaulting machine-gun nests.

    There is an important problem to explain, that of ammunition; this will almost always be taken from the enemy. It is therefore necessary to strike blows where there will be the absolute assurance of restoring the ammunition expended, unless there are large reserves in secure places. In other words, an annihilating attack against a group of men is not to be undertaken at the risk of expending all the ammunition without being able to replace it. Always in guerrilla tactics it is necessary to keep in mind the grave problem of procuring the war materiel necessary for continuing the fight. For this reason, guerrilla arms ought to be the same as those used by the enemy, except for weapons such as revolvers and shotguns, for which the ammunition can be obtained in the zone itself or in the cities.

    The number of men that a guerrilla band of this type should include does not exceed ten to fifteen. In forming a single combat unit it is of great importance always to consider the limitations on numbers: ten, twelve, fifteen men can hide anywhere and at the same time can help each other in putting up a powerful resistance to the enemy. Four or five would perhaps be too small a number, but when the number exceeds ten, the possibility that the enemy will discover them in their camp or on the march is much greater.

    Remember that the velocity of the guerrilla band on the march is equal to the velocity of its slowest man. It is more difficult to find uniformity of marching speed with twenty, thirty, or forty men than with ten. And the guerrilla fighter on the plain must be fundamentally a runner. Here the practice of hitting and running acquires its maximum use. The guerrilla bands on the plain suffer the enormous inconvenience of being subject to a rapid encirclement and of not having sure places where they can set up a firm resistance; therefore, they must live in conditions of absolute secrecy for a long time, since it would be dangerous to trust any neighbor whose fidelity is not perfectly established. The reprisals of the enemy are so violent, usually so brutal, inflicted not only on the head of the family but frequently on the women and children as well, that pressure on individuals lacking firmness may result at any moment in their giving way and revealing information as to where the guerrilla band is located and how it is operating. This would immediately produce an encirclement with consequences always disagreeable, although not necessarily fatal. When conditions, the quantity of arms, and the state of insurrection of the people call for an increase in the number of men, the guerrilla band should be divided. If it is necessary, all can rejoin at a given moment to deal a blow, but in such a way that immediately afterwards they can disperse toward separate zones, again divided into small groups of ten, twelve, or fifteen men.

    It is entirely feasible to organize whole armies under a single command and to assure respect and obedience to this command without the necessity of being in a single group. Therefore, the election of the guerrilla chiefs and the certainty that they coordinate ideologically and personally with the overall chief of the zone are very important.

    The bazooka is a heavy weapon that can be used by the guerrilla band because of its easy portability and operation. Today the rifle- fired anti-tank grenade can replace it. Naturally, it will be a weapon taken from the enemy. The bazooka is ideal for firing on armored vehicles, and even on unarmored vehicles that are loaded with troops, and for taking small military bases of few men in a short time; but it is important to point out that not more than three shells per man can be carried, and this only with considerable exertion.

    As for the utilization of heavy arms taken from the enemy, naturally, nothing is to be scorned. But there are weapons such as the tripod machine gun, the heavy fifty-millimeter machine gun, etc., that, when captured, can be utilized with a willingness to lose them again. In other words, in the unfavorable conditions that we are now analyzing, a battle to defend a heavy machine gun or other weapon of this type cannot be allowed; they are simply to be used until the tactical moment when they must be abandoned. In our Cuban war of liberation, to abandon a weapon constituted a grave offense, and there was never any case where the necessity arose. Nevertheless, we mention this case in order to explain clearly the only situation in which abandonment would not constitute an occasion for reproaches. On unfavorable ground, the guerrilla weapon is the personal weapon of rapid fire.

    Easy access to the zone usually means that it will be habitable and that there will be a peasant population in these places. This facilitates supply enormously. Having trustworthy people and making contact with establishments that provide supplies to the population, it is possible to maintain a guerrilla band perfectly well without having to devote time or money to long and dangerous lines of communication. Also, it is well to reiterate that the smaller the number of men, the easier it will be to procure food for them. Essential supplies such as bedding, waterproof material, mosquito netting, shoes, medicines, and food will be found directly in the zone, since they are things of daily use by its inhabitants.

    Communications will be much easier in the sense of being able to count on a larger number of men and more roads; but they will be more difficult as a problem of security for messages between distant points, since it will be necessary to rely on a series of contacts that have to be trusted. There will be the danger of an eventual capture of one of the messengers, who are constantly crossing enemy zones. If the messages are of small importance, they should be oral; if of great importance, code writing should be used. Experience shows that transmission by word of mouth greatly distorts any communication.

    For these same reasons, manufacture will have much less importance, at the same time that it would be much more difficult to carry it out. It will not be possible to have factories making shoes or arms. Practically speaking, manufacture will have to be limited to small shops, carefully hidden, where shotgun shells can be recharged and mines, simple grenades, and other minimum necessities of the moment manufactured. On the other hand, it is possible to make use of all the friendly shops of the zone for such work as is necessary.

    This brings us to two consequences that flow logically from what has been said. One of them is that the favorable conditions for establishing a permanent camp in guerrilla warfare are inverse to the degree of productive development of a place. All favorable conditions, all facilities of life normally induce men to settle; but for the guerrilla band the opposite is the case. The more facilities there are for social life, the more nomadic, the more uncertain the life of the guerrilla fighter. These really are the results of one and the same principle. The title of this section is "Warfare on Unfavorable Ground," because everything that is favorable to human life, communications, urban and semiurban concentrations of large numbers of people, land easily worked by machine: all these place the guerrilla fighter in a disadvantageous situation.

    The second conclusion is that if guerrilla fighting must include the extremely important factor of work on the masses, this work is even more important in the unfavorable zones, where a single enemy attack can produce a catastrophe. Indoctrination should be continuous, and so should be the struggle for unity of the workers, of the peasants, and of other social classes that live in the zone, in order to achieve toward the guerrilla fighters a maximum homogeneity of attitude. This task with the masses, this constant work at the huge problem of relations of the guerrilla band with the inhabitants of the zone, must also govern the attitude to be taken toward the case of an individual recalcitrant enemy soldier: he should be eliminated without hesitation when he is dangerous. In this respect the guerrilla band must be drastic. Enemies cannot be permitted to exist within the zone of operations in places that offer no security.

    6. Suburban Warfare
    If during the war the guerrilla bands close in on cities and penetrate the surrounding country in such a way as to be able to esta-blish themselves in conditions of some security, it will be necessary to give these suburban bands a special education, or rather, a special organization.

    It is fundamental to recognize that a suburban guerrilla band can never spring up of its own accord. It will be born only after certain conditions necessary for its survival have been created. Therefore, the suburban guerrilla will always be under the direct orders of chiefs located in another zone. The function of this guerrilla band will not be to carry out independent actions but to coordinate its activities with overall strategic plans in such a way as to support the action of larger groups situated in another area, contributing specifically to the success of a fixed tactical objective, without the operational freedom of guerrilla bands of the other types. For example, a suburban band will not be able to choose among the operations of destroying telephone lines, moving to make attacks in another locality, and surprising a patrol of soldiers on a distant road; it will do exactly what it is told. If its function is to cut down telephone poles or electric wires, to destroy sewers, railroads, or water mains, it will limit itself to carrying out these tasks efficiently.

    It ought not to number more than four or five men. The limitation on numbers is important, because the suburban guerrilla must be considered as situated in exceptionally unfavorable ground, where the vigilance of the enemy will be much greater and the possibilities of reprisals as well as of betrayal are increased enormously. Another aggravating circumstance is that the suburban guerrilla band cannot depart far from the places where it is going to operate. To speed of action and withdrawal there must be added a limitation on the distance of withdrawal from the scene of action and the need to remain totally hidden during the daytime. This is a nocturnal guerrilla band in the extreme, without possibilities of changing its manner of operating until the insurrection is so far advanced that it can take part as an active combatant in the siege of the city.

    The essential qualities of the guerrilla fighter in this situation are discipline (perhaps in the highest degree of all) and discretion. He cannot count on more than two or three friendly houses that will provide food; it is almost certain that an encirclement in these conditions will be equivalent to death. Weapons, furthermore, will not be of the same kind as those of the other groups. They will be for personal defense, of the type that do not hinder a rapid flight or betray a secure hiding place. As their armament the band ought to have not more than one carbine or one sawed-off shotgun, or perhaps two, with pistols for the other members.

    They will concentrate their action on prescribed sabotage and never carry out armed attacks, except by surprising one or two members or agents of the enemy troops.

    For sabotage they need a full set of instruments. The guerrilla fighter must have good saws, large quantities of dynamite, picks and shovels, apparatus for lifting rails, and, in general, adequate mechanical equipment for the work to be carried out. This should be hidden in places that are secure but easily accessible to the hands that will need to use it.

    If there is more than one guerrilla band, they will all be under a single chief who will give orders as to the necessary tasks through contacts of proven trustworthiness who live openly as ordinary citizens. In certain cases the guerrilla fighter will be able to maintain his peacetime work, but this is very difficult. Practically speaking, the suburban guerrilla band is a group of men who are already outside the law, in a condition of war, situated as unfavorably as we have described.

    The importance of a suburban struggle has usually been under-estimated; it is really very great. A good operation of this type extended over a wide area paralyzes almost completely the commercial and industrial life of the sector and places the entire population in a situation of unrest, of anguish, almost of impatience for the development of violent events that will relieve the period of suspense. If, from the first moment of the war, thought is taken for the future possibility of this type of fight and an organization of specialists started, a much more rapid action will be assured, and with it a saving of lives and of the priceless time of the nation.
    Last edited by troung; 23 Nov 05, at 01:11.

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    "ON GUERILLA WARFARE "

    by: Mao Tse Tung

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    Written by Mao in 1937, when Japanese imperialists occupied all of China, this book served as an instruction manual for guerrilla fighting, written based on more than a decade of personal experience by Mao. Based on the basic strategy and tactics of warfare as described by Sun-tzu, Mao stresses the importance of guerrilla warfare tactics in a revolutionary war, emphasizing that they must be combined in conjunction with conventional warfare tactics.
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    1. What Is Guerrilla Warfare?
    In a war of revolutionary character, guerrilla operations are a necessary part. This is particularly true in war waged for the emancipation of a people who inhabit a vast nation. China is such a nation, a nation whose techniques are undeveloped and whose communications are poor. She finds herself confronted with a strong and victorious Japanese imperialism. Under these circumstances, the development of the type of guerrilla warfare characterized by the quality of mass is both necessary and natural. This warfare must be developed to an unprecedented degree and it must co-ordinate with the operations of our regular armies. If we fail to do this, we will find it difficult to defeat the enemy.
    These guerrilla operations must not be considered as an independent form of warfare. They are but one step in the total war, one aspect of the revolutionary struggle. They are the inevitable result of the clash between oppressor and oppressed when the latter reach the limits of their endurance. In our case, these hostilities began at a time when the people were unable to endure any more from the Japanese imperialists. Lenin, in People and Revolution,[A] said: 'A people's insurrection and a people's revolution are not only natural but inevitable.' We consider guerrilla operations as but one aspect of our total or mass war because they, lacking the quality of independence, are of themselves incapable of providing a solution to the struggle.

    Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation. When the invader pierces deep into the heart of the weaker country and occupies her territory in a cruel and oppressive manner, there is no doubt that conditions of terrain, climate, and society in general offer obstacles to his progress and may be used to advantage by those who oppose him. In guerrilla warfare we turn these advantages to the purpose of resisting and defeating the enemy.

    During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army. Thus the regularly organized troops, those guerrillas who have attained that status, and those who have not reached that level of development combine to form the military power of a national revolutionary war. There can be no doubt that the ultimate result of this will be victory.

    Both in its development and in its method of application, guerrilla warfare has certain distinctive characteristics. We first will discuss the relationship of guerrilla warfare to national policy. Because ours is the resistance of a semi colonial country against an imperialism, our hostilities must have a clearly defined political goal and firmly established political responsibilities. Our basic policy is the creation of a national united anti-Japanese front. This policy we pursue in order to gain our political goal, which is the complete emancipation of the Chinese people. There are certain fundamental steps necessary in the realization of this policy, to wit:

    1. Arousing and organizing the people.
    2. Achieving internal unification politically.
    3. Establishing bases.
    4. Equipping forces.
    5. Recovering national strength.
    6. Destroying enemy's national strength.
    7. Regaining lost territories.

    There is no reason to consider guerrilla warfare separately from national policy. On the contrary, it must be organized and conducted in complete accord with national anti-Japanese policy. It is only who misinterpret guerrilla action who say, as does Jen Ch'i Shan, "The question of guerrilla hostilities is purely a military matter and not a political one." Those who maintain this simple point of view have lost sight of the political goal and the political effects of guerrilla action. Such a simple point of view will cause the people to lose confidence and will result in our defeat.

    What is the relationship of guerrilla warfare to the people? Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must, if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, co-operation, and assistance cannot be gained. The essence of guerrilla warfare is thus revolutionary in character. On the other hand, in a war of counter-revolutionary nature, there is no place for guerrilla hostilities. Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and co-operation. There are those who do not comprehend guerrilla action, and who therefore do not understand the distinguishing qualities of a people's guerrilla war, who say: 'Only regular troops can carry on guerrilla operations.' There are others who, because they do not believe in the ultimate success of guerilla action, mistakenly say: 'Guerrilla warfare is an insignificant and highly specialized typ e of operation in which there is no place for the masses of the people' (Jen Ch'i Shan). Then there are those who ridicule the masses and undermine resistance by wildly asserting that the people have no understanding of the war of resistance (Yeh Ch'ing, for one). The moment that this war of resistance dissociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment that it dissociates itself from hope of ultimate victory over the Japanese.

    What is the organization for guerrilla warfare? Though all guerrilla bands that spring from the masses of the people suffer from lack of organization at the time of their formation, they all have in common a basic quality that makes organization possible. All guerrilla units must have political and military leadership. This is true regardless of the source or size of such units. Such units may originate locally, in the masses of the people; they may be formed from an admixture of regular troops with groups of the people, or they may consist of regular army units intact. And mere quantity does not affect this matter. Such units may consist of a squad of a few men, a battalion of several hundred men, or a regiment of several thousand men.

    All these must have leaders who are unyielding in their policies—resolute, loyal, sincere, and robust. These men must be well-educated in revolutionary technique, self confident, able to establish severe discipline, and able to cope with counter-propaganda. In short, these leaders must be models for the people. As the war progresses, such leaders lack of discipline which at first will gradually overcome the lack of discipline which at first prevails; they will establish discipline in their forces, strengthening them and increasing their combat efficiency. Thus eventual victory will be attained.

    Unorganized guerrilla warfare cannot contribute to victory and those who attack the movement as a combination of banditry and anarchism do not understand the nature of guerrilla action. They say, 'This movement is a haven for disappointed militarists, vagabonds, and bandits' (Jen Ch'i Shan), hoping thus to bring the movement into disrepute. We do not deny that there are corrupt guerrillas, nor that there are people who under the guise of guerrillas indulge in unlawful activities. Neither do we deny that the movement has at the present time symptoms of a lack of organization, symptoms that might indeed be serious were we to judge guerrilla warfare solely by the corrupt and temporary phenomena we have mentioned. We should study the corrupt phenomena and attempt to eradicate them in order to encourage guerilla warfare, and to increase its military efficiency. 'This is hard work, there is no help for it, and the problem cannot be solved immediately. The whole people must try to reform themselves during the cours e of the war. We must educate them and reform them in the light of past experience. Evil does not exist in guerrilla warfare but only in the unorganized and undisciplined activities that are anarchism,' said Lenin, in On Guerrilla Warfare.[B]

    What is basic guerrilla strategy? Guerrilla strategy must be based primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack. It must be adjusted to the enemy situation, the terrain, the existing lines of communication, the relative strengths, the weather and the situation of the people.

    In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerilla strategy, the enemy's rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated. Only in this way can guerrillas carry out their mission of independent guerrilla action and coordination with the effort of the regular armies. But, in spite of the most complete preparation, there can be no victory if mistakes are made in the matter of command. Guerilla warfare based on the principles we have mentioned and carried out over a vast extent of territory in which communications are inconvenient will contribute tremendously towards ultimate defeat of the Japanese and consequent emancipation of the Chinese people.

    A careful distinction must be made between two types of guerrilla warfare. The fact that revolutionary guerrilla warfare is based on the masses of the people does not in itself mean that the organization of guerrilla units is impossible in a war of counter-revolutionary character. As examples of the former type we may cite Red guerilla hostilities during the Russian Revolution; those of the Reds China; of the Abyssinians against the Italians for the past three years; those of the last seven years in Manchuria, and the vast anti-Japanese guerrilla war that is carried on in China today. All these struggles have been carried on in the interest of the whole people or the greater part of them; all had a broad basis in the national manpower and all have been in accord with the laws of historical development. They have existed and will continue to exist, flourish, and develop as long as they are not contrary to national policy.

    The second type of guerrilla warfare directly contradicts the law of historical development. Of this type, we may cite the examples furnished by the White Russian guerrilla units organized by Denikin and Kolchak; those organized by the Japanese; those organized by the Italians in Abyssinia; those supported by the puppet governments in Manchuria and Mongolia, and those that will be organized here by Chinese traitors. All such have oppressed the masses and have been contrary to the true interests of the people. They must be firmly opposed. They are easy to destroy because they lack a broad foundation in the people.

    If we fail to differentiate between the two types of guerrilla hostilities mentioned, it is likely that we will exaggerate their effect when applied by an invader. We might arrive at the conclusion that 'the invader can organize guerrilla units from among the people'. Such a conclusion might well diminish our confidence in guerrilla warfare. As far as this matter is concerned, we have but to remember the historical experience of revolutionary struggles.

    Further, we must distinguish general revolutionary wars from those of a purely 'class' type. In the former case, the whole people of a nation, without regard to class or party, carry on a guerrilla struggle that is an instrument of the national policy. Its basis is, therefore, much broader than is the basis of a struggle of class type. Of a general guerrilla war, it has been said: 'When a nation is invaded, the people become sympathetic to one another and all aid in organizing guerrilla units. In civil war, no matter to what extent guerrillas are developed, they do not produce the same results as when they are formed to resist an invasion by foreigners' (Civil War in Russia). The one strong feature of guerrilla warfare in a civil struggle is its quality of internal purity. One class may be easily united and perhaps fight with great effect, whereas in a national revolutionary war, guerrilla units are faced with the problem of internal unification of different class groups. This necessitates the use of propaga nda. Both types of guerrilla war are, however, similar in that they both employ the same military methods.

    National guerrilla warfare, though historically of the same consistency, has employed varying implements as times, peoples, and conditions differ. The guerrilla aspects of the Opium War, those of the fighting in Manchuria since the Mukden incident, and those employed in China today are all slightly different. The guerrilla warfare conducted by the Moroccans against the French and the Spanish was not exactly similar to that which we conduct today in China. These differences express the characteristics of different peoples in different periods. Although there is a general similarity in the quality of all these struggles, there are dissimilarities in form. This fact we must recognize. Clausewitz wrote, in On War: 'Wars in every period have independent forms and independent conditions, and, therefore, every period must have its independent theory of war.' Lenin, in On Guerrilla Warfare said: 'As regards the form of fighting, it is unconditionally requisite that history be investigated in order to discover the co nditions of environment, the state of economic progress and the political ideas that obtained, the national characteristics, customs, and degree of civilization.' Again: 'It is necessary to be completely unsympathetic to abstract formulas and rules and to study with sympathy the conditions of the actual fighting, for these will change in accordance with the political and economic situations and the realization of the people's aspirations. These progressive changes in conditions create new methods.'

    If, in today's struggle, we fail to apply the historical truths of revolutionary guerrilla war, we will fall into the error of believing with T'ou Hsi Sheng that under the impact of Japan's mechanized army, 'the guerrilla unit has lost its historical function'. Jen Ch'i Shan writes: 'In olden days guerrilla warfare was part of regular strategy but there is almost no chance that it can be applied today.' These opinions are harmful. If we do not make an estimate of the characteristics peculiar to our anti-Japanese guerrilla war, but insist on applying to it mechanical formulas derived from past history, we are making the mistake of placing our hostilities in the same category as all other national guerrilla struggles. If we hold this view, we will simply be beating our heads against a stone wall and we will be unable to profit from guerrilla hostilities.

    To summarize: What is the guerrilla war of resistance against Japan? It is one aspect of the entire war, which, although alone incapable of producing the decision, attacks the enemy in every quarter, diminishes the extent of area under his control, increases our national strength, and assists our regular armies. It is one of the strategic instruments used to inflict defeat on our enemy. It is the one pure expression of anti-Japanese policy, that is to say, it is military strength organized by the active people and inseparable from them. It is a powerful special weapon with which we resist the Japanese and without which we cannot defeat them.


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    2. The Relation Of Guerrilla Hostilitiesto Regular Operations
    The general features of orthodox hostilities, that is, the war of position and the war of movement, differ fundamentally from guerrilla warfare. There are other readily apparent differences such as those in organization, armament, equipment supply, tactics, command; in conception of the terms 'front' and 'rear'; in the matter of military responsibilities.
    When considered from the point of view of total numbers, guerrilla units are many, as individual combat units, they may vary in size from the smallest, of several score or several hundred men, to the battalion or the regiment, of several thousand. This is not the case in regularly organized units. A primary feature of guerrilla operations is their dependence upon the people themselves to organize battalions and other units. As a result of this, organization depends largely upon local circumstances. In the case of guerrilla groups, the standard of equipment is of a low order and they must depend for their sustenance primarily upon what the locality affords.

    The strategy of guerrilla warfare is manifestly unlike that employed in orthodox operations, as the basic tactic of the former is constant activity and movement. There is in guerrilla warfare no such thing as a decisive battle; there is nothing comparable to the fixed, passive defence that characterizes orthodox war. In guerrilla warfare, the transformation of a moving situation into a positional defensive situation never arises. The general features of reconnaissance, partial deployment, general deployment, and development of the attack that are usual in mobile warfare are not common in guerrilla war.

    There are differences also in the matter of leadership and command. In guerrilla warfare, small units acting independently play the principal role and there must be no excessive interference with their activities. In orthodox warfare particularly in a moving situation, a certain degree of initiative is accorded subordinates, but in principle, command is centralized. This is done because all units and all supporting arms in all districts must co-ordinate to the highest degree. In the case of guerrilla warfare, this is not only undesirable but impossible. Only adjacent guerrilla units can coordinate their activities to any degree. Strategically, their activities can be roughly correlated with those of the regular forces, and tactically, they must co-operate with adjacent units of the regular army. But there are no strictures on the extent of guerrilla activity nor is it primarily characterized by the quality of co-operation of many units.

    When we discuss the terms 'front' and 'rear' it must be remembered, that while guerrillas do have bases, their primary field of activity is in the enemy's rear areas. They themselves have no rear. Because an orthodox army has rear installations (except in some special cases as during the 10,000-mile Long march of the Red Army or as in the case of certain units operating in Shansi Province), it cannot operate as guerrillas can.

    As to the matter of military responsibilities, those of the guerrillas are to exterminate small forces of the enemy; to harass and weaken large forces; to attack enemy lines of communications; to establish bases capable of supporting independent operations in the enemy's rear, to force the enemy to disperse his strength; and to co-ordinate all these activities with those of the regular armies on distant battle fronts.

    From the foregoing summary of differences that exist between guerrilla warfare and orthodox warfare, it can be seen that it is improper to compare the two. Further distinction must be made in order to clarify this matter. While the Eighth Route Army is a regular army, its North China campaign is essentially guerrilla in nature, for it operates in enemy's rear. On occasion, however, Eighth Route Army commanders have concentrated powerful forces to strike an enemy in motion and the characteristics of orthodox mobile warfare were evident in the battle at P'ing Hsing Kuan and in other engagements.

    On the other hand, after the fall of Feng Ling Tu, the operations of Central Shansi, and Suiyuan, troops were more guerrilla than orthodox in nature. In this connection the precise character of Generalissimo Chiang's instructions to the effect that independent brigades would carry out guerrilla operations should be recalled. In spite of such temporary activities these orthodox units retained their identity and after the fall of Feng Line Tu, they were not only able to fight along orthodox lines but often found it necessary to do so. This is an example of the fact that orthodox armies may, due to changes in the situation, temporarily function as guerrillas.

    Likewise, guerrilla units formed from the people may gradually develop into regular units and, when operating as such, employ the tactics of orthodox mobile war. While these units function as guerrillas, they may be compared to innumerable gnats, which, by biting a giant both in front and in rear, ultimately exhaust him. They make themselves as unendurable as a group of cruel and hateful devils, and as they grow and attain gigantic proportions, they will find that their victim is not only exhausted but practically perishing. It is for this very reason that our guerrilla activities are a source of constant mental worry to Imperial Japan.

    While it is improper to confuse orthodox with guerrilla operations, it is equally improper to consider that there is a chasm between the two. While differences do exist, similarities appear under certain conditions and this fact must be appreciated if we wish to establish clearly the relationship between the two. If we consider both types of warfare as a single subject, or if we confuse guerrilla warfare with the mobile operations of orthodox war, we fall into this error : We exaggerate the function of guerrillas and minimize that of the regular armies. If we agree with Chang Tso Hua, who says - 'Guerrilla warfare is the primary war strategy of a people seeking to emancipate itself,' or with Kao Kang, who believes that 'Guerrilla strategy is the only strategy possible for oppressed people', we are exaggerating the importance of guerrilla hostilities. What these zealous friends I have just quoted do not realize is this: If we do not fit guerrilla operations into their proper niche, we cannot promote them real istically. Then, not only would those who oppose take advantage of our varying opinions to turn them to the own uses to undermine us, but guerrillas would be led assume responsibilities they could not successfully discharge and that should properly be carried out by orthodox force. In the meantime, the important guerrilla function of co-ordinating activities with the regular forces would be neglected.

    Furthermore, if the theory that guerrilla warfare is our only strategy were actually applied, the regular forces would be weakened, we would be divided in purpose, and guerrilla hostilities would decline. If we say, ' Let us transform the regular forces into guerrillas', and do not place our first reliance on a victory to be gained by the regular armies over the enemy, we may certainly expect to see as a result the failure of the anti-Japanese war of resistance. The concept that guerrilla warfare is an end in itself and that guerrilla activities can be divorced from those of the regular forces is incorrect. If we assume that guerrilla warfare does not progress from beginning to end beyond its elementary forms, we have failed to recognize the fact that guerrilla hostilities can, under specific conditions, develop and assume orthodox characteristics. An opinion that admits the existence of guerrilla war, but isolates it, is one that does not properly estimate the potentialities of such war.

    Equally dangerous is the concept that condemns guerrilla war on the ground that war has no other aspects than the purely orthodox. This opinion is often expressed by those who have seen the corrupt phenomena of some guerrilla regimes, observed their lack of discipline, and have seen them used as a screen behind which certain persons have indulged in bribery and other corrupt practices. These people will not admit the fundamental necessity for guerrilla bands that spring from the armed people. They say, 'Only the regular forces are capable of conducting guerrilla operations.' This theory is a mistaken one and would lead to the abolition of the people's guerrilla war.

    A proper conception of the relationship that exists between guerrilla effort and that of the regular forces is essential. We believe it can be stated this way: 'Guerrilla operations during the anti-Japanese war may for certain time and temporarily become its paramount feature, particularly insofar as the enemy's rear is concerned. However, if we view the war as a whole, there can be no doubt that our regular forces are of primary importance, because it is they who are alone capable of producing the decision. Guerrilla warfare assists them in producing this favourable decision. Orthodox forces may under certain conditions operate as guerrillas, and the latter may, under certain conditions, develop to the status of the former. However, both guerrilla forces and regular forces have their own respective development and their proper combinations.'

    To clarify the relationship between the mobile aspect of orthodox war and guerrilla war, we may say that general agreement exists that the principal element of our strategy must be mobility. With the war of movement, we may at times combine the war of position. Both of these are assisted by general guerrilla hostilities. It is true that on the battlefield mobile war often becomes positional; it is true that this situation may be reversed; it is equally true that each form may combine with the other. The possibility of such combination will become more evident after the prevailing standards of equipment have been raised. For example, in a general strategical counter-attack to recapture key cities and lines of communication, it would be normal to use both mobile and positional methods. However, the point must again be made that our fundamental strategical form must be the war of movement. If we deny this, we cannot arrive at the victorious solution of the war. In sum, while we must promote guerrilla warfare as a necessary strategical auxiliary to orthodox operations, we must neither assign it the primary position in our war strategy nor substitute it for mobile and positional warfare as conducted by orthodox forces.


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    3. Guerrilla Warfare In History
    Guerrilla warfare is neither a product of China nor peculiar to the present day. From the earliest historical days, it has been a feature of wars fought by every class of men against invaders and oppressors. Under suitable conditions, it has great possibilities. The many guerrilla wars in history have their points of difference, their peculiar characteristics, their varying processes and conclusions, and we must respect and profit by the experience of those whose blood was shed in them. What a pity it is that the priceless experience gained during the several hundred wars waged by the peasants of China cannot be marshaled today to guide us. Our only experience in guerrilla hostilities has been that gained from the several conflicts that have been carried on against us by foreign imperialists. But that experience should help the fighting Chinese recognize the necessity for guerrilla warfare and should confirm them in confidence of ultimate victory.
    In September 1812, Napoleon, in the course of swallowing all of Europe, invaded Russia at the head of a great army totaling several hundred thousand infantry, cavalry, and artillery. At that time, Russia was weak and her ill-prepared army was not concentrated. The most important phase of her strategy was the use made of Cossack cavalry and detachments of peasants to carry on guerrilla operations. After giving up Moscow, the Russians formed nine guerrilla divisions of about five hundred men each. These, and vast groups of organized peasants, carried on partisan warfare and continually harassed the French Army. When the French Army was withdrawing, cold and starving, Russian guerrillas blocked the way and, in combination with regular troops, carried out counterattacks on the French rear, pursuing and defeating them. The army of the heroic Napoleon was almost entirely annihilated, and the guerrillas captured many officers, men, cannon, and rifles. Though the victory was the result of various factors and depende d largely on the activities of the regular army the function of the partisan groups was extremely important. The corrupt and poorly organized country that was Russia defeated and destroyed an army led by the most famous soldier of Europe and won the war in spite of the fact that her ability to organize guerrilla regimes was not fully developed. At times, guerrilla groups were hindered in their operations and the supply of equipment and arms was insufficient. If we use the Russian saying, it was a case of a battle between "the fist and the axe" [Ivanov ].

    From 1918 to 1920, the Russian Soviets, because of the opposition and intervention of foreign imperialists and the internal disturbances of White Russian groups, were forced to organize themselves in occupied territories and fight a real war. In Siberia and Alashan, in the rear of the army of the traitor Denikin and in the rear of the Poles, there were many Red Russian guerrillas. These not only disrupted and destroyed the communications in the enemy's rear but also frequently prevented his advance. On one occasion, the guerrillas completely destroyed a retreating White Army that had previously been defeated by regular Red forces. Kolchak, Denikin, the Japanese, and the Poles, owing to the necessity of staving off the attacks of guerrillas, were forced to withdraw regular troops from the front. 'Thus not only was the enemy's manpower impoverished but he found himself unable to cope with the ever-moving guerrilla' [The Nature of Guerrilla Action].

    The development of guerrillas at that time had only reached the stage where there were detached groups of several thousands in strength, old, middle-aged, and young. The old men organized themselves into propaganda groups known as 'silver-haired units'; there was a suitable guerrilla activity for the middle-aged; the young men formed combat units, and there were even groups for the children. Among the leaders were determined Communists who carried on general political work among the people. These, although they opposed the doctrine of extreme guerrilla warfare, were quick to oppose those who condemned it. Experience tells us that 'Orthodox armies are the fundamental and principal power, guerrilla units are secondary to them and assist in the accomplishment of the mission assigned the regular forces [Gusev, Lessons of Civil War.]. Many of the guerrilla regimes in Russia gradually developed until in battle they were able to discharge functions of organized regulars. The army of the famous General Galen was ent irely derived from guerrillas.

    During seven months in 1935 and 1936, the Abyssinians lost their war against Italy. The cause of defeat — aside from the most important political reasons that there were dissentient political groups, no strong government party, and unstable policy—was the failure to adopt a positive policy of mobile warfare. There was never a combination of the war of movement with large-scale guerrilla operations. Ultimately, the Abyssinians adopted a purely passive defence, with the result that they were unable to defeat the Italians. In addition to this, the fact that Abyssinia is a relatively small and sparsely populated country was contributory. Even in spite of the fact that the Abyssinian Army and its equipment were not modern, she was able to withstand a mechanized Italian force of 400,000 for seven months. During that period, there were several occasions when a war of movement was combined with large-scale guerrilla operations to strike the Italians heavy blows. Moreover, several cities were retaken and casualties t otaling 140,000 were inflicted. Had this policy been steadfastly continued, it would have been difficult to have named the ultimate winner. At the present time, guerrilla activities continue in Abyssinia, and if the internal political questions can be solved, an extension of such activities is probable.

    In 1841 and 1842, when brave people from San Yuan Li fought the English; again from 1850 to 1864, during the Taiping War, and for a third time in 1899 in the Boxer Uprising, guerrilla tactics were employed to a remarkable degree. Particularly was this so during the Taiping War, when guerrilla operations were most extensive and the Ch'ing troops were often completely exhausted and forced to flee for their lives.

    In these wars, there were no guiding principles of guerrilla action. Perhaps these guerrilla hostilities were not carried out in conjunction with regular operations, or perhaps there was a lack of co-ordination. But the fact that victory was not gained was not because of any lack in guerrilla activity but rather because of the interference of politics in military affairs. Experience shows that if precedence is not given to the question of conquering the enemy in both political and military affairs, and if regular hostilities are not conducted with tenacity, guerrilla operations alone cannot produce final victory.

    From 1927 to 1936, the Chinese Red Army fought almost continually and employed guerrilla tactics contently. At the very beginning, a positive policy was adopted. Many bases were established, and from guerrilla bands, the Reds were able to develop into regular armies. As these armies fought, new guerrilla regimes were developed over a wide area. These regimes co-ordinated their efforts with those of the regular forces This policy accounted for the many victories gained by the guerrilla troops relatively few in number, who were armed with weapons inferior to those of their opponents. The leaders of that period properly combined guerrilla operations with a war of movement both strategically and tactically. They depended primarily upon alertness. They stressed the correct basis for both political affaires and military operations. They developed their guerrilla bands into trained units. They then determined upon a ten year period of resistance during which time they overcame innumerable difficulties and have only lately reached their goal of direct participation in the anti-Japanese war. There is no doubt that the internal unification of China is now a permanent and definite fact, and that the experience gained during our internal struggles has proved to be both necessary and advantageous to us in the struggle against Japanese imperialism. There are many valuable lessons we can learn from the experience of those years. Principle among them is the fact that guerrilla success largely depend upon powerful political leaders who work unceasingly to bring about internal unification. Such leaders must work with the people; they must have a correct conception of the policy to be adopted as regards both the people and the enemy.

    After 18 September 1931, strong anti-Japanese guerrilla campaigns were opened in each of the three north-east provinces. Guerrilla activity persists there in spite of the cruelties and deceits practiced by the Japanese at the expense of the people, and in spite of the fact that her armies have occupied the land and oppressed the people for the last seven years. The struggle can be divided into two periods . During the first, which extended from 18 September 1931 to January 1933, anti-Japanese guerrilla activity exploded constantly in all three provinces. Ma Chan Shan and Su Ping Wei established an anti-Japanese regime in Heilungkiang. In Chi Lin. the National Salvation Army and the Self-Defence Army were led by Wang Te Lin and Li Tu respectively. In Feng T'ien, Chu Lu and others commanded guerrilla units The influence of these forces was great. They harassed the Japanese unceasingly, but because there was an indefinite political goal, improper leadership, failure to co ordinate military command and operation s and to work with the people, and, finally, failure to delegate proper political functions to the army, the whole organization was feeble, and its strength was not unified. As a direct result of these conditions, the campaigns failed and the troops were finally defeated by our enemy.

    During the second period, which has extended from January 1933 to the present time, the situation has greatly improved, This has come about because great numbers of people who have been oppressed by the enemy have decided to resist him, because of the participation of the Chinese Communists in the anti-Japanese warm and because of the fine work of the volunteer units. The guerrillas have finally educated the people to the meaning of guerrilla warfare, and in the north-east, it has again become an important and powerful influence. Already seven or eight guerrilla regiments and a number of independent platoons have been formed, and their activities make it necessary for the Japanese to send troops after them month after month. These units hamper the Japanese and undermine their control in the north-east, while, at the same time they inspire a Nationalist revolution in Korea. Such activities are not merely of transient and local importance but directly contribute to our ultimate victory.

    However, there are still some weak points. For instance: National defence policy has not been sufficiently developed; participation of the people is not general; internal political organization is still in its primary stages, and the force used to attack the Japanese and the puppet governments is not yet sufficient. But if present policy is continued tenaciously, all these weaknesses will be overcome. Experience proves that guerrilla war will develop to even greater proportions and that, in spite of the cruelty o the Japanese and the many methods they have device to cheat the people, they cannot extinguish guerrilla activities extinguish guerrilla activities in the three north-eastern provinces.

    The guerrilla experiences of China and of other countries that have been outlined; prove that in a war of revolutionary nature such hostilities are possible, natural and necessary. They prove that if the present anti-Japanese war for the emancipation of the masses of the Chinese people is to gain ultimate victory, such hostilities must expand tremendously.

    Historical experience is written in iron and blood. We must point out that the guerrilla campaigns being waged in China today are a page in history that has no precedent. Their influence will not be confined solely to China in her present anti-Japanese war but will be world-wide.


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    4. Can Victory Be Attained By Guerrilla Operations?
    Guerrilla hostilities are but one phase of the war of resistance against Japan and the answer to the question of whether or not they can produce ultimate victory can be given only after investigation and comparison of all elements of our own strength with those of the enemy. The particulars of such a comparison are several. First, the strong Japanese bandit nation is an absolute monarchy. During the course of her invasion of China, she had made comparative progress in the techniques of industrial production and in the development of excellence and skill in her army, navy, and airforce. But in spite of this industrial progress, she remains an absolute monarchy of inferior physical endowments. Her manpower, her raw materials, and her financial resources are all inadequate and insufficient to maintain her in protracted warfare or to meet the situation presented by a war prosecuted over a vast area. Added to this is the anti-war feeling now manifested by the Japanese people, a feeling that is shared by the junio r officers and, more extensively, by the soldiers of the invading army. Furthermore, China is not Japan's only enemy. Japan is unable to employ her entire strength in the attack on China; she cannot, at most, spare more than a million men for this purpose, as she must hold any in excess of that number for use against other possible opponents. Because of these important primary considerations, the invading Japanese bandits can hope neither to be victorious in a protracted struggle nor to conquer a vast area. Their strategy must be one of lightning war and speedy decision. If we can hold out for three or more years, it will be most difficult for Japan to bear up under the strain.
    In the war, the Japanese brigands must depend upon lines of communication linking the principal cities as routes for the transport of war materials. The most important considerations for her are that her rear be stable and peaceful and that her lines of communication be intact. It is not to her an advantage to wage war over a vast area with disrupted lines of communication. She cannot disperse her strength and fight in a number of places, and her greatest fears are these eruptions in her rear and disruption of her lines of communication. If she can maintain communications, she will be able at will to concentrate powerful forces speedily at strategic points to engage our organized units in decisive battle. Another important Japanese objective is to profit from the industries, finances, and manpower in captured areas and with them to augment her own insufficient strength. Certainly, it is not to her advantage to forgo these benefits, not to be forced to dissipate her energies in a type of warfare in which the gains will not compensate for the losses. It is for these reasons that guerrilla warfare conducted in each bit of conquered territory over a wide area will be a heavy blow struck at the Japanese bandits. Experience in the five northern provinces as well as in Kiangsu, Chekiang and Anhwei has absolutely established the truth of this assertion.

    China is a country half colonial and half feudal; it is a country that is politically, militarily, and economically backward. This is an inescapable conclusion. It is a vast country with great resources and tremendous population, a country in which the terrain is complicated and the facilities for communication are poor. All theses factors favour a protracted war, they all favour the application of mobile warfare and guerilla operations. The establishment of innumerable anti-Japanese bases behind the enemy's lines will force him to fight unceasingly in many places at once, both to his front and his rear. He thus endlessly expends his resources.

    We must unite the strength of the army with that of the people, we must strike the weak spots in the enemy's flanks, in his front, in his rear. We must make war everywhere and cause dispersal of his forces and dissipation of his strength. Thus the time will come when a gradual change will become evident in the relative position of ourselves and our enemy, and when that day comes, it will be the beginning of our ultimate victory over the Japanese.

    Although China's population is great, it is unorganized. This is a weakness which must be then into account.

    The Japanese bandits have merely to conquer territory but rapacious, and murderous policy of the extinction of the Chinese race. We must unite the nation without regard to parties and follow our policy of resistance to the end. China today is not the China of old. It is not like Abyssinia. China today is at the point of her greatest historical progress. The standards of literacy among the masses have been raised; the rapprochement of Communists and Nationalists has laid the foundation for an anti-Japanese war front that is constantly being strengthened and expanded; government, army and people are all working with great energy; the raw material resources and the economic strength of the nation are waiting to be used; the unorganized people are becoming an organized nation.

    These energies must be directed toward the goal of protracted war so that should the Japanese occupy much of our territory or even most of it, we shall still gain final victory. Not only must those behind our lines organize for resistance but also those who live in Japanese-occupied territory in every part of the country. The traitors who accept the Japanese as fathers are few in number, and those who have taken oath that they would prefer death to abject slavery are many. If we resist with this spirit, what enemy can we not conquer and who can say that ultimate victory will not be ours?

    The Japanese are waging a barbaric war along uncivilized lines. For that reason, Japanese of all classes oppose the policies of their government, as do vast international groups. On the other hand, because China's cause is righteous, our countrymen of all classes and parties are united to oppose the invader; we have sympathy in many foreign countries including even Japan itself. This is perhaps the most important reason why Japan will lose and China will win.

    The progress of the war for the emancipation of the Chinese people will be in accord with these facts. The guerrilla war of resistance will be in accord with these facts, and that guerrilla operations correlated with those of our regular forces will produce victory is the conviction of the many patriots who devote their entire strength to guerrilla hostilities.


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    5. Organization For Guerilla Warfare
    Four points must be considered under this subject. These are:
    How are guerrilla bands formed?
    How are guerrilla bands organized?
    What are the methods of arming guerrilla bands?
    What elements constitute a guerrilla band?
    These are all questions pertaining to the organization armed guerrilla units; they are questions which those who had no experience in guerilla hostilities do not understand and on which they can arrive at no sound decisions; indeed, they would not know in what manner to begin.

    How Guerrilla Units Are Originally Formed? The unit may originate in any one of the following ways:

    a) From the masses of the people.
    b) From regular army units temporarily detailed for the purpose.
    c) From regular army units permanently detailed.
    d) From the combination of a regular army unit and a unit recruited from the people.
    e) From the local militia.
    f) From deserters from the ranks of the enemy.
    g) From former bandits and bandit groups.

    In the present hostilities, no doubt, all these sources will be employed.

    In the first case above, the guerrilla unit is formed from the people. This is the fundamental type. Upon the arrival of the enemy army to oppress and slaughter the people, their leaders call upon them to resist. They assemble the most valorous elements, arm them with old rifles or whatever firearms they can, and thus a guerrilla unit begins. Orders have already been issued throughout the nation that call upon the people to form guerrilla units both for local defense and for other combat. If the local governments approve and aid such movements, they cannot fail to prosper. In some places, where the local government is not determined or where its officers have all fled, the leaders among the masses (relying on the sympathy of the people and their sincere desire to resist Japan and succor the country ) call upon the people to resist, and they respond. Thus, many guerrilla units are organized. In circumstances of this kind, the duties of leadership usually fall upon the shoulders of young students, teachers, pr ofessors, other educators, local soldiery, professional men, artisans, and those without a fixed profession, who are willing to exert themselves to the last drop of their blood. Recently, in Shansi, Hopeh, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shantung, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsu, and other provinces, extensive guerrilla hostilities have broken out. All these are organized and led by patriots. The amount of such activity is the best proof of the foregoing statement. The more such bands there are, the better will the situation be. Each district, each county, should be able to organize a great number of guerrilla squads, which, when assembled, form a guerrilla company.

    There are those who say: 'I am a farmer', or, 'I am a student'; 'I can discuss literature but not military arts.' This is incorrect. There is no profound difference between the farmer and the soldier. You must have courage. You simply leave your farms and become soldiers. That you are farmers is of no difference, and if you have education, that is so much the better. When you take your arms in hand, you become soldiers; when you are organized, you become military units.

    Guerrilla hostilities are the university of war, and after you have fought several times valiantly and aggressively, you may become a leader of troops and there will be many well-known regular soldiers who will not be your peers. Without question, the fountainhead of guerrilla warfare is in the masses of the people, who organize guerrilla units directly from themselves.

    The second type of guerrilla unit is that which is organized from small units of the regular forces temporarily detached for the purpose. For example, since hostilities commenced, many groups have been temporarily detached from armies, divisions, and brigades and have been assigned guerrilla duties. A regiment of the regular army may, if circumstances warrant, be dispersed into groups for the purpose of carrying on guerrilla operations. As an example of this, there is the Eighth Route Army, in North China. Excluding the periods when it carries on mobile operations as an army, it is divided into its elements and these carry on guerrilla hostilities. This type of guerrilla unit is essential for two reasons. First, in mobile-warfare situations, the co-ordination of guerrilla activities with regular operations is necessary. Second, until guerrilla hostilities can be developed on a grand scale, there is no one to carry out guerrilla missions but regulars. Historical experience shows us that regular army units are not able to undergo the hardships of guerrilla campaigning over long periods. The leaders of regular units engaged in guerrilla operations must be extremely adaptable. They must study the methods of guerrilla war. They must understand that initiative, discipline, and the employment of stratagems are all of the utmost importance. As the guerrilla status of regular units is but temporary, their leaders must lend all possible support to the organization of guerrilla units from among the people. These units must be so disciplined that they hold together after the departure of the regulars.

    The third type of unit consists of a detachment of regulars who are permanently assigned guerrilla duties. This type of small detachment does not have to be prepared to rejoin the regular forces. Its post is somewhere in the rear of the enemy, and there it becomes the backbone of guerrilla organization. As an example of this type of organization we may take the Wu Tat Shan district in the heart of the Hopeh-Chahar-Shansi area. Along the borders of these provinces, units from the Eighth Route Army have established a framework or guerrilla operations. Around these small cores, many detachments have been organized and the area of guerrilla activity greatly expanded. In areas in which there is a possibility of cutting the enemy's lines of supply, this system should be used. Severing enemy, supply routes destroys his lifeline; this is one feature that cannot be neglected. If, at the time the regular forces withdraw from a certain area, some units left behind, these should conduct guerrilla operations in the enemy 's rear. As an example of this, we have the guerrilla bands now continuing their independent operations in the Shanghai- Woosung area in spite of the withdrawal of regular forces.

    The fourth type of organization is the result of a merger between small regular detachments and local guerrilla units. The regular forces may dispatch a squad, a platoon, or a company, which is placed at the disposal of the local guerrilla commander. If a small group experienced in military and political affairs is sent, it becomes the core of the local guerrilla unit. These several methods are all excellent, and if properly applied, the intensity of guerilla warfare can be extended. In the Wu Tat Shan area, each of these methods has been used.

    The fifth type mentioned above is from the local militia, from police and home guards. In every North China province, there are now many of these groups, and they should be formed in every locality. The government has issued mandate to the effect that the people are not to depart from war areas. The officer in command of the county, the commander of the peace-preservation unit, the chief of police are all required to obey this mandate. They cannot retreat with their forces but must remain at their stations and resist.

    The sixth type of unit is that organized from troops that come over from the enemy—the Chinese 'traitor' troops employed by the Japanese. It is always possible to produce disaffection in their ranks, and we must increase our propaganda efforts and foment mutinies among such troops. Immediately after mutinying, they must be received into our ranks and organized. The concord of the leaders and the assent of the men must be gained, and the units rebuilt politically and reorganized militarily. Once this has been accomplished, they become successful guerrilla units. In regard to this type of unit, it may be said that political work among them is of utmost importance.

    The seventh type of guerrilla organization is that formed from bands of bandits and brigands. This, although difficult, must be carried out with utmost vigour lest the enemy use such bands to his own advantages. Many bandit groups pose as anti-Japanese guerrillas, and it is only necessary to correct their political beliefs to convert them.

    In spite of inescapable differences in the fundamental types of guerrilla bands, it is possible to unite them to form a vast sea of guerrillas. The ancients said, 'Tai Shan is a great mountain because it does not scorn the merest handful of dirt; the rivers and seas are deep because they absorb the waters of small streams.' Attention paid to the enlistment and organization of guerrillas of every type and from every source will increase the potentialities of guerrilla action in the anti-Japanese war. This is something that patriots will not neglect.

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    THE METHOD OF ORGANIZING GUERRILLA REGIMES

    Many of those who decide to participate in guerrilla activities do not know the methods of organization. For such people, as well as for students who have no knowledge of military affairs, the matter of organization is a problem that requires solution. Even among those who have military knowledge, there are some who know nothing of guerrilla regimes use they are lacking in that particular type of experience. The subject of the organization of such regimes is not confined to the organization of specific units but includes all guerrilla activities within the area where the regime functions.

    As an example of such organization, we may take a geographical area in the enemy's rear. This area may comprise many counties. It must be sub-divided and individual companies or battalions formed to accord with the sub-divisions. To this 'military area', a military commander and political commissioners are appointed. Under these, the necessary officers both military and political, are appointed. In the military headquarters, there will be the staff, the aides, the supply officers, and the medical personnel. These are controlled by the chief of staff, who acts in accordance with orders from the commander. In the political headquarters, there are bureaus of propaganda organization, people's mass movements, and miscellaneous affairs. Control of these is vested in the political chairman.

    The military areas are sub-divided into smaller districts in accordance with local geography, the enemy situation locally, and the state of guerrilla development. Each of these smaller divisions within the area is a district, each of which may consist of from two to six counties. To each district, a military commander and several political commissioners are appointed. Under their direction, military and political headquarters are organized. Tasks are assigned in accordance with the number of guerrilla troops available. Although the names of the officers in the 'district' correspond to those in the larger 'area', the number of the functionaries assigned in the former case should be reduced to the least possible. In order to unify control, to handle guerrilla troops that come from different sources, and to harmonize military operations and local political affairs, a committee of from seven to nine members should be organized in each area and district. This committee, the members of which are selected by the tr oops and the local political officers, should function as a forum for the discussion of both military and political matters.

    All the people in an area should arm themselves and be organized into two groups. One of these groups is a combat group, the other a self-defence unit with but limited military quality. Regular combatant guerrillas are organized into one of three general types of units. The first of these is the small unit, the platoon or company. In each county, three to six units may be organized. The second type is the battalion of from two to four companies. One such unit should be organized in each county. While the unit fundamentally belongs to the county in it was organized, it may operate in other counties. While in areas other than its own, it must operate in conjunction with local units in order to take advantage of their manpower, their knowledge of local terrain and local customs, and their information of the enemy.

    The third type is the guerrilla regiment, which consists of from two to four of the above-mentioned battalion units. If sufficient manpower is available, a guerrilla a brigade of from two to four regiments may be formed.

    Each of the units has its own peculiarities of organization. A squad, the smallest unit, has a strength of from nine to eleven men, including the leader and the assistant leader. Its arms may be from two to five Western-style rifles, with the remaining men armed with rifles of local manufacture, fowling-pieces, etc., spears, or big swords. Two to four such squads form a platoon. This too has a leader and an assistant leader, and when acting independently, it is assigned a political officer to carry on political propaganda work. The platoon may have about ten rifles, with the remainder of its four of such units from a company, which, like the platoon, has a leader, an assistant leader, and a political officer. All these units are under the direct supervision of the military commanders of the areas in which they operate.

    The battalion unit must be more thoroughly organized and better equipped than the smaller units. Its discipline and its personnel should be superior. If a battalion is formed from company units, it should not deprive subordinate units entirely of their manpower and their arms. If in a small area, there is a peace-preservation corps, a branch of the militia, or police, regular guerrilla units should not be dispersed over it.

    The guerrilla unit next in size to the battalion is the regiment. This must be under more severe discipline than the battalion. In an independent guerrilla regiment, there may be ten men per squad, three squad per platoon, three platoons per company, three companies per battalion, and three battalions to the regiment. Two of such regiments form a brigade. Each of these units has a commander, a vice-commander, and a political officer.

    In North China, guerrilla cavalry units should be established. These may be regiments of from two to four companies, or battalions.

    All these units from the lowest to the highest are combatant guerrilla units and receive their supplies from the central government. Details of their organization are shown in the tables.

    All the people of both sexes from the ages of sixteen to forty-five must be organized into anti-Japanese self-defence units, the basis of which is voluntary service. As a first step, they must procure arms, then they must be given both military and political training. Their responsibilities are : local sentry duties, securing information of the enemy, arresting traitors, and preventing the dissemination of enemy propaganda. When the enemy launches a guerrilla-suppression drive, these units, armed with what weapons there are, are assigned to certain areas to deceive, hinder, and harass him. Thus, the defence units assist the combatant guerrillas. They have other functions. They furnish stretcher-bearers to transport the wounded , carriers to take food to the troops, and comfort missions to provide the troops with tea and rice. If a locality can organize such a self-defence unit as we have described, the traitors cannot hide nor can bandits and robbers disturb the peace of the people. Thus the people will cont inue to assist the guerrilla and supply manpower to our regular armies. 'The organization of self-defence units is a transitional step in the development of universal conscription. Such units are reservoirs of manpower for the orthodox forces.'

    There have been such organizations for some time in Shansi, Shensi, Honan, and Suiyuan. The youth organizations in different provinces were formed for the purpose of educating the young. They have been of some help. However, they were not voluntary, and confidence of the people was thus not gained. These organizations were not widespread, and their effect was almost negligible. This system was, therefore, supplanted by the new-type organizations,. Which are organized on the principles of voluntary co-operation and non-separation of the members from their native localities. When the members of these organizations are in their native towns, they support themselves . Only in case of military necessity are they ordered to remote places, and when this is done, the government must support them. Each member of these groups must have a weapon even if the weapon is only a knife, a pistol, a lance, or a spear.

    In all places where the enemy operates, these self-defence units should organize within themselves a small guerrilla group of perhaps from three to ten men armed with pistols or revolvers. This group is not required to leave its native locality.

    The organization of these self-defence units is mentioned in this book because such units are useful for the purposes of inculcating the people with military and political knowledge, keeping order in the rear, and replenishing the ranks of the regulars. These groups should be organized not only in the active war zones but in every province in China. 'The people must be inspired to co-operate voluntarily. We must not force them, for if we do, it will be ineffectual.' This is extremely important.

    In order to control anti-Japanese military organization as a whole, it is necessary to establish a system of military areas and districts along the lines we have indicated.

    EQUIPMENT OF GUERRILLAS

    In regard to the problem of guerrilla equipment, it must be understood that guerrillas are lightly-armed attack groups, which require simple equipment. The standard of equipment is based upon the nature of duties assigned; the equipment of low-class guerrilla units is not as good as that of higher-class units. For example, those who are assigned the task of destroying rail communications are better equipped than those who do not have that task. The equipment of guerrillas cannot be based on what the guerrillas want, to even what they need, but must be based on what is available for their use. Equipment cannot be furnished immediately but must be acquired gradually. These are points to be kept in mind .

    The question of equipment includes the collection, supply, distribution, and replacement of weapons, ammunition, blankets, communication materials, transport, and facilities for propaganda work. The supply of weapons and ammunition is most difficult, particularly at the time the unit is established, but this problem can always be solved eventually. Guerrilla bands that originate in the people are furnished with revolvers, pistols, rifles, spears, big swords, and land mines and mortars of local manufacture. Other elementary weapons are added and as many new-type rifles as are available are distributed. After a period of resistance, it is possible to increase the supply of equipment by capturing it from the enemy. In this respect, the transport companies are the easiest to equip, for in any successful attack, we will capture the enemy's transport.

    An armory should be established in each guerrilla district for the manufacture and repair of rifles and for the production of cartridge, hand grenades and bayonets. Guerrillas must not depend to much on an armory. The enemy is the principal source of their supply.

    For destruction of railway tracks, bridges, and stations in enemy-controlled territory, it is necessary to gather together demolition materials. Troops must be trained in the preparation and use of demolitions, and a demolition unit must be organized in each regiment.

    As for minimum clothing requirements, these are that each man shall have at least two summer-weight uniforms, one suit of winter clothing, two hats, a pair of wrap puttees, and blanket. Each man must have a pack or a bag for food. In the north, each man must have an overcoat. In acquiring this clothing, we cannot depend on captures made by the enemy, for it is forbidden for captors to take clothing from their prisoners. In order to maintain high morale in guerrilla forces, all the clothing and equipment mentioned should be furnished by the representatives of the government in each guerrilla district. These men may confiscate clothing from traitors or ask contributions from those best able to afford them. In subordinate groups, uniforms are unnecessary.

    Telephone and radio equipment is not necessary in lower groups, but all units from regiment up are equipped with both. This material can be obtained by contributions from the regular forces and by capture from the enemy.

    In the guerrilla army in general, and at bases in particular, there must be a high standard of medical equipment. Besides the services of the doctors, medicines must be procured. Although guerrillas can depend on the enemy for some portion of their medical supplies, they must, in general, depend upon contributions. If Western medicines are not available, local medicines must be made to suffice.

    The problem of transport is more vital in North-China than in the south, for in the south all that are necessary are mules and horses. Small guerrilla units need no animals, but regiments and brigades will find them necessary. Commanders and staffs of units from companies up should be furnished a riding animal each. At times, two officers will have to share a horse. Officers whose duties are of minor nature do not have to be mounted.

    Propaganda materials are very important. Every large guerrilla unit should have a printing press and a mimeograph stone. They must also have paper on which to print propaganda leaflets and notices. They must be supplied with large brushes. In guerrilla areas, there should be a printing press or a lead-type press.

    For the purpose of printing training instructions, this material is of the greatest importance.

    In addition to the equipment listed above, it is necessary to have field-glasses, compasses, and military maps. An accomplished guerrilla group will acquire these things.

    Because of the proved importance of guerrilla hostilities in the anti-Japanese war, the headquarters of the Nationalist Government and the commanding officers of the various war zones should do their best to supply the guerrillas with what they actually need and are unable to get for themselves. However, it must be repeated that guerrilla equipment will in the main depend on the efforts of the guerrillas themselves. If they depend on higher officers too much, the psychological effect will be to weaken the guerrilla spirit of resistance.

    ELEMENTS OF THE GUERRILLA ARMY

    The term 'element' as used in the title to this section refers to the personnel, both officers and men, of the guerrilla army. Since each guerrilla group fights in a protracted war, its officers must be brave and positive men whose entire loyalty is dedicated to the cause of emancipation of the people. An officer should have the following qualities: great powers of endurance so that in spite of any hardship he sets an example to his men and be a model for them; he must be able to mix easily with the people; his spirit and that of the men must be one in strengthening the policy of resistance to the Japanese. If he wishes to gain victories, he must study tactics. A guerrilla group with officers of this calibre would be unbeatable. I do not mean that every guerrilla group can have, at its inception, officers of such qualities. The officers must be men naturally endowed with good qualities which can be developed during the course of campaigning. The most important natural quality is that of complete loyalty to t he idea of people's emancipation. If this is present, the others will develop; if it is not present, nothing can be done. When officers are first selected from a group, it is this quality that should receive particular attention. The officers in a group should be inhabitants of the locality in which the group is organized, as this will facilitate relations between them and the local civilians. In addition, officers so chosen would be familiar with conditions. If in any locality there are not enough men of sufficiently high qualifications to become officers, an effort must be made to train and educate the people so these qualities may be developed and the potential officer material increased. There can be no disagreements between officers native to one place and those from other localities.

    A guerrilla group ought to operate on the principle that only volunteers are acceptable for service. It is a mistake to impress people into service. As long as a person is willing to fight, his social condition or position is no consideration, but only men who are courageous and determined can bear the hardships of guerrilla campaigning in a protracted war.

    A soldier who habitually breaks regulations must be dismissed from the army. Vagabonds and vicious people must not be accepted for service. The opium habit must be forbidden, and a soldier who cannot break himself of the habit should be dismissed. Victory in guerrilla war is conditioned upon keeping the membership pure and clean.

    It is a fact that during the war the enemy may take advantage of certain people who are lacking in conscience and patriotism and induce them to join the guerrillas for the purpose of betraying them. Officers must, therefore, continually educate the soldiers and inculcate patriotism in them. This will prevent the success of traitors. The traitors who are in the ranks must be discovered and expelled, and punishment and expulsion meted out to those who have been influenced by them. In all such cases, the officers should summon the soldiers and relate the facts to them, thus arousing their hatred and detestation for traitors. This procedure will serve as well as a warning to the other soldiers. If an officer is discovered to be a traitor, some prudence must be used in the punishment adjudged. However, the work of eliminating traitors in the army begins with their elimination from among the people.

    Chinese soldiers who have served under puppet governments and bandits who have been converted should be welcomed as individuals or as groups. They should be well-treated and repatriated. But care should be used during their reorientation to distinguish those whose idea is to fight the Japanese from those who may be present for other reasons.


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    6. The Political Problems Of Guerrilla Warfare
    In Chapter 1, I mentioned the fact that guerrilla troops should have a precise conception of the political goal of the struggle and the political organization to be used in attaining that goal. This means that both organization and discipline of guerrilla troops must be at a high level so that they can carry out the political activities that are the life of both the guerilla armies and of revolutionary warfare.
    First of all, political activities depend upon the indoctrination of both military and political leaders with the idea of anti-Japanism. Through them, the idea is transmitted to the troops. One must not feel that he is anti-Japanese merely because he is a member of a guerrilla unit. The anti-Japanese idea must be an ever-present conviction, and if it is forgotten, we may succumb to the temptations of the enemy or be overcome with discouragement. In a war of long duration, those whose conviction that the people must be emancipated is not deep rooted are likely to become shaken in their faith or actually revolt. Without the general education that enables everyone to understand our goal of driving out Japanese imperialism and establishing a free and happy China, the soldiers fight without conviction and lose their determination.

    The political goal must be clearly and precisely indicated to inhabitants of guerrilla zones and their national consciousness awakened. Hence, a concrete explanation of the political systems used is important not only to guerrilla troops but to all those who are concerned with the realization of our political goal. The Kuomintang has issued a pamphlet entitled System of National Organization for War, which should be widely distributed throughout guerrilla zones. If we lack national organization, we will lack the essential unity that should exist between the soldiers and the people.

    A study and comprehension of the political objectives of this war and of the anti-Japanese front is particularly important for officers of guerrilla troops. There are some militarists who say: 'We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms.' It is vital that these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.

    It is to be hoped that the world is in the last era of strife. The vast majority of human beings have already prepared or are preparing to fight a war that will bring justice to the oppressed peopled of the world. No matter how long this war may last, there is no doubt that it will be followed by an unprecedented epoch of peace The war that we are fighting today for the freedom of all human beings, and the independent, happy, and liberal China that we are fighting to establish will be a part of that new world order. A conception like this is difficult for the simple-minded militarist to grasp and it must therefore be carefully explained to him.

    There are three additional matters that must be considered under the broad question of political activities. These are political activities, first, as applied to the troops; second, as applied to the people; and, third, as applied to the enemy. The fundamental problems are: first, spiritual unification of officers and men within the army; second spiritual unification of the army and the people; of the army and the people; and, last, destruction of the unity of the enemy. The concrete methods for achieving these unities are discussed in detail in pamphlet Number 4 of this series, entitled Political Activities in Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare.

    A revolutionary army must have discipline that is established on a limited democratic basis. In all armies, obedience the subordinates to their superiors must be exacted. This is true in the case of guerrilla discipline, but the basis for guerrilla discipline must be the individual conscience. With guerrillas, a discipline of compulsion is ineffective. In any revolutionary army, there is unity of purpose as far as both officers and men are concerned, and, therefore, within such an army, discipline is self-imposed. Although discipline in guerrilla ranks is not as severe as in the ranks of orthodox forces, the necessity for discipline exists. This must be self-imposed, because only when it is, is the soldier able to understand completely, why he fights and why he must obey. This type of discipline becomes a tower of strength within the army, and it is the only type that can truly harmonize the relationship that exists between officers and soldiers.

    In any system where discipline is externally imposed, the relationship that exists between officer and man is characterized by indifference of the one to the other. The idea that officers can physically beat or severely tongue-lash their men is a feudal one and is not in accord with the conception of self-imposed discipline. Discipline of the feudal type will destroy internal unity and fighting strength. A discipline self-imposed is the primary characteristic of a democratic system in the army .

    A secondary characteristic is found in the degree of liberties accorded officers and soldiers. In a revolutionary army, all individuals enjoy political liberty and the question, for example, of the emancipation of the people must not only be tolerated but discussed, and propaganda must encouraged. Further, in such an army, the mode of living of the officers and the soldiers must not differ too much, and this is particularly true in the case of guerilla troops. Officers should live under the same conditions as their men, for that is the only way in which they can gain from their men the admiration and confidence so vital in war. It is incorrect to hold to a theory of equality in all things. But there must be equality of existence in accepting the hardships and dangers of war, thus we may attain to the unification of the officer and soldier groups a unity both horizontal within the group itself, and vertical, that is, from lower to higher echelons. It is only when such unity is present that units can be said t o be powerful combat factors.

    There is also a unity of spirit that should exist between troops and local inhabitants. The Eighth Route Army put into practice a code known as 'Three Rules and the Eight Remarks', which we list here:

    Rules:

    All actions are subject to command.
    Do not steal from the people.
    Be neither selfish nor unjust.

    Remarks:

    Replace the door when you leave the house.
    Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.
    Be courteous.
    Be honest in your transactions.
    Return what you borrow.
    Replace what you break.
    Do not bathe in the presence of women.
    Do not without authority search those you arrest.

    The Red Army adhered to this code for ten years and the Eighth Route Army and other units have since adopted it.

    Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element cannot live.

    We further our mission of destroying the enemy by propagandizing his troops, by treating his captured soldiers with consideration, and by caring for those of his wounded who fall into our hands. If we fail in these respects, we strengthen the solidarity of our enemy.



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    7. The Strategy Of Guerrilla Resistance Against Japan
    It has been definitely decided that in the strategy of our war against Japan, guerrilla strategy must be auxiliary to fundamental orthodox methods. If this were a small country, guerrilla activities could be carried out close to the scene of operations of the regular army and directly complementary to them. In such a case, there would be no question of guerrilla strategy as such. Nor would the question arise if our country were as strong as Russia, for example, and able speedily to eject an invader. The question exists because China, a weak country of vast size, has today progressed to the point where it has become possible to adopt the policy of a protracted war characterized by guerrilla operations. Although these may at first glance seem to be abnormal or heterodox, such is not actually the case.
    Because Japanese military power is inadequate, much of the territory her armies have overrun is without sufficient garrison troops. Under such circumstances the primary functions of guerrillas are three: first, to conduct a war on exterior lines, that is, in the rear of the enemy; second, to establish bases, and, last, to extend the war areas. Thus, guerrilla participation in the war is not merely a matter of purely local guerrilla tactics but involves strategical considerations.

    Such war, with its vast time and space factors, establishes a new military process, the focal point of which is China today. The Japanese are apparently attempting to recall a past that saw the Yuan extinguish the Sung and the Ch'ing conquer the Ming; that witnessed the extension of the British Empire to North America and India; that saw the Latins overrun Central and South America. As far as China today is concerned, such dreams of conquest are fantastic and without reality. Today's China is better equipped than was the China of yesterday, and a new type of guerrilla hostilities is a part of that equipment. If our enemy fails to take these facts into consideration and makes too optimistic an estimate of the situation, he courts disaster.

    Though the strategy of guerrillas is inseparable from war strategy as a whole, the actual conduct of these hostilities differs from the conduct of orthodox operations. Each type of warfare has methods peculiar to itself, and methods suitable to regular warfare cannot be applied with success to the special situations that confront guerrillas.

    Before we treat the practical aspects of guerrilla war, it might be well to recall the fundamental axiom of combat on which all military action is based. This can be stated: 'Conservation of one's own strength; destruction of enemy strength.' A military policy based on this axiom is consonant with a national policy directed towards the building of a free and prosperous Chinese state and the destruction of Japanese imperialism. It is in furtherance of this policy that government applies in military strength. Is the sacrifice demanded by war in conflict with the idea of self-preservation? Not at all. The sacrifices demanded are necessary both to destroy the enemy and to preserve ourselves; the sacrifice of a part of the people is necessary to preserve the whole. All the considerations of military action are derived from this axiom. Its application is as apparent in all tactical and strategical conceptions as it is in the simple case of the soldier who shoots at his enemy from a covered position.

    All guerrilla units start from nothing and grow. What methods should we select to ensure the conservation and development of our own strength and the destruction of that of the enemy? The essential requirements are the six listed below:

    Retention of the initiative; alertness; carefully planned tactical attacks in a war of strategical defence; tactical speed in a war strategically protracted, tactical operations on exterior lines in a war conducts strategically on interior lines.

    Conduct of operations to complement those of the regular army.
    The establishment of bases.
    A clear understanding of the relationship that exits between the attack and the defence.
    The development of mobile operations.
    Correct command.

    The enemy, though numerically weak, is strong in the quality of his troops and their equipment; we, on the other hand, are strong numerically but weak as to quality. These considerations have been taken into account in the development of the policy of tactical offence, tactical speed, and tactical operations on exterior lines in a war that, strategically speaking, is defensive in character, protracted in nature, and conducted along interior lines. Our strategy is based on these conceptions. They must be kept in mind in the conduct of all operations.

    Although the element of surprise is not absent in orthodox warfare, there are fewer opportunities to apply it than there are during guerrilla hostilities. In the latter, speed is essential. The movements of guerrilla troops must be secret and of supernatural rapidity; the enemy must be taken unaware, and the action entered speedily. There can be no procrastination in the execution of plans; no assumption of a negative or passive defence; no great dispersion of forces in many local engagements. The basic method is the attack in a violent and deceptive form.

    While there may be cases where the attack will extend over a period of several days ( if that length of time in necessary to annihilate an enemy group ), it is more profitable to launch and push an attack with maximum speed. The tactics of defence have no place in the realm of guerrilla warfare. If a delaying action is necessary, such places as defiles, river crossings, and villages offer the most suitable conditions, for it is in such places that the enemy's arrangements may be disrupted and he may be annihilated.

    The enemy is much stronger than we are, and it is true that we can hinder, distract, disperse, and destroy him only if we disperse our own forces. Although guerrilla warfare is the warfare of such dispersed units, it is sometimes desirable to concentrate in order to destroy an enemy. Thus, the principle of concentration of force against a relatively weaker enemy is applicable to guerrilla warfare.

    We can prolong this struggle and make of it a protracted war only by gaining positive and lightning-like tactical decisions; by employing our manpower in proper concentrations and dispersions; and by operation on exterior lines in order to surround and destroy our enemy. If we cannot surround whole armies, we can at least partially destroy them, if we cannot kill the Japanese, we can capture them. The total effect of many local successes will be to change the relative strengths of the opposing forces. The destruction of Japan's military power, combined with the international sympathy for China's cause and the revolutionary tendencies evident in Japan, will be sufficient to destroy Japanese imperialism.

    We will next discuss initiative, alertness, and the matter of careful planning. What is meant by initiative in warfare? In all battles and wars, a struggle to gain and retain the initiative goes on between the opposing sides, for it is the side that holds the initiative that has liberty of action. When an army loses the initiative, it loses its liberty; its role becomes passive; it faces the danger of defeat and destruction.

    It is more difficult to obtain the initiative when defending on interior lines than it is while attacking on exterior lines. This is what Japan is doing. There are, however, several weak points as far as Japan is concerned. One of these is lack of sufficient manpower for the task; another is her cruelty to the inhabitants of conquered areas; a third is the underestimation of Chinese strength, which has resulted in the differences between military cliques, which, in turn, have been productive of many mistakes in the direction of her military forces. For instance, she has been gradually compelled to increase her manpower in China while, at the same time. the many arguments over plans of operations and disposition of troops have resulted in the loss of good opportunities for improvement of her strategical position. This explains the fact that although the Japanese are frequently able to surround large bodies of Chinese troops, they have never yet been able to capture more than a few. The Japanese military machi ne is thus being weakened by insufficiency of manpower, inadequacy of resources, the barbarism of her troops, and the general stupidity that has characterized the conduct of operations. Her offensive continues unabated, but because of the weaknesses pointed out, her attack must be limited in extent. She can never conquer China. The day will come — indeed already has in some areas — when she will be forced into a passive role. When hostilities commenced, China was passive, but as we enter the second phase of the war we find ourselves pursuing a strategy of mobile warfare, with both guerrillas and regulars operating on exterior lines. Thus, with each passing day, we seize some degree of initiative from the Japanese.

    The matter of initiative is especially serious for guerrilla forces, who must face critical situations unknown to regular troops. The superiority of the enemy and the lack of unity and experience within our own ranks may be cited. Guerrillas can, however, gain the initiative if they keep in mind the weak points of the enemy. Because of the enemy's insufficient manpower, guerrillas can operate over vast territories, because he is a foreigner and a barbarian, guerrillas can gain the confidence of millions of their countrymen; because of the stupidity of enemy commanders, guerrillas can make full use of their own cleverness. Both guerrillas and regulars must exploit these enemy weaknesses while, at the same time, our own are remedied. Some of our weaknesses are apparent only and are, in actuality, sources of strength. For example, the very fact that most guerrilla groups are small makes it desirable and advantageous for them to appear and disappear in the enemy's rear. With such activities, the enemy is simply unable to cope. A similar liberty of action can rarely be obtained by regular forces.

    When the enemy attacks the guerrillas with more than one column, it is difficult for the latter to retain the initiative. Any error, no matter how slight, in the estimation of the situation is likely to result in forcing the guerrillas into a passive role. They will then find themselves unable to beat oft the attacks of the enemy.

    It is apparent that we can gain and retain the initiative only by a correct estimation of the situation and a proper arrangement of all military and political factors. A too pessimistic estimate will operate to force us into a passive position, with consequent loss of initiative; an overly optimistic estimate, with its rash ordering of factors, will produce the same result.

    No military leader is endowed by heaven with an ability to seize the initiative. It is the intelligent leader who does so after a careful study and estimate of the situation and arrangement of the military and political factors involved. When a guerrilla unit, through either a poor estimate on the part of its leader or pressure from the enemy, is forced into a passive position, its first duty is to extricate itself. No method can be prescribed for this, as the method to be employed will, in every case, depend on the situation. One can, if necessary, run away. But there are times when the situation seems hopeless and, in reality, is not so at all. It is at such times that the good leader recognizes and seizes the moment when he can regain the lost initiative.

    Let us revert to alertness. To conduct one's troops with alertness is an essential of guerrilla command. Leaders must realize that to operate alertly is the most important factor in gaining the initiative and vital in its effect of the relative situation that exists between our forces and those of the enemy. Guerrilla commanders adjust their operations to the enemy situation, to the terrain, and to prevailing local conditions. Leaders must be alert to sense changes in these factors and make necessary modifications in troop dispositions to accord with them. The leader must be like a fisherman, who, with his nets, is able both to cast them and to pull them out in awareness of the depth of the water, the strength of the current or the presence of any obstructions that may foul them. As the fisherman controls his nets through the lead ropes, so the guerrilla leader maintains contact with control over his units. As the fisherman must change his position, so must the guerrilla commander. Dispersion, concentration, constant change of position—it is in these ways that guerrillas employ, their strength.

    In general, guerrilla units disperse to operate:

    When the enemy is in over-extended defence, and sufficient force cannot be concentrated against him, guerrillas must disperse, harass him, and demoralize him.
    When encircled by the enemy, guerrillas disperse to withdraw.
    When the nature of the ground limits action, guerrillas disperse.
    When the availability of supplies limits action, they disperse.
    Guerrillas disperse in order to promote mass movements over a wide area.

    Regardless of the circumstances that prevail at the time of dispersal, caution must be exercised in certain matters:

    A relatively large group should be retained as a central force. The remainder of the troops should not be divided into groups of absolutely equal size. In this way, the leader is in a position to deal with any circumstances that may arise. Each dispersed unit should have clear and definite responsibilities. Orders should specify a place to which to proceed, the time of proceeding, and the place, time, and method of assembly.

    Guerrillas concentrate when the enemy is advancing upon them, and there is opportunity to fall upon him and destroy him. Concentration may be desirable when the enemy is on the defensive and guerrillas wish to destroy isolated detachments in particular localities. By the term 'concentrate', we do not mean the assembly of all manpower but rather of only that necessary for the task. The remaining guerrillas are assigned missions of hindering and delaying the enemy, of destroys isolated groups, or of conducting mass propaganda.

    In addition to the dispersion and concentration of forces, the leader must understand what is termed 'alert shifting'. When the enemy feels the danger of guerrillas, he will generally send troops out to attack them. The guerrillas must consider the situation and decide at what time and at what place they wish to fight. If they find that they cannot fight, they must immediately shift. Then the enemy may be destroyed piecemeal. For example; after a guerrilla group has destroyed an enemy detachment at one place, it may be shifted to another area to attack and destroy a second detachment. Sometimes, it will not be profitable for a unit to become engaged in a certain area, and in that case, it must move immediately.

    When the situation is serious, the guerrilla must move with the fluidity of water and the ease of the blowing wind. Their tactics must deceive, tempt, and confuse the enemy. They must lead the enemy to believe that they will attack him from the east and north, and they must then strike him from the west and the south. They must strike, then rapidly disperse. They must move at night.

    Guerrilla initiative is expressed in dispersion, concentration, and the alert shifting of forces. If guerrillas are stupid and obstinate, they will be led to passive positions and severely damaged. Skill in conducting guerrilla operations, however, lies not in merely understanding the things we have discussed but rather in their actual application on the field of battle. The quick intelligence that constantly watches the ever-changing situation and is able to seize on the right moment for decisive action is found only in keen and thoughtful observers.

    Careful planning is necessary if victory is to be won in guerrilla war, and those who fight without method do not understand the nature of guerrilla action. A plan is necessary regardless of the size of the unit involved; a prudent plan is as necessary in the case of the squad as in the case of the regiment. The situation must be carefully studied, then an assignment of duties made. Plans must include both political and military instruction; the matter of supply and equipment, and the matter of co-operation with local civilians. Without study of these factors, it is impossible either to seize the initiative or to operate alertly. It is true that guerrillas can make only limited plans, but even so, the factors we have mentioned must be considered.

    The initiative can be secured and retained only following a positive victory that results from attack. The attack must be made on guerrilla initiative; that is, guerrillas must not permit themselves to be maneuvered into a position where they are robbed of initiative and where the decision to attack is forced upon them. Any victory will result from careful planning and alert control. Even in defence, all our efforts must be directed toward a resumption of the attack, for it is only by attack that we can extinguish our enemies an preserve ourselves. A defence or a withdrawal is entirely useless as far as extinguishing our enemies is concerned and of only temporary value. as far as the conservation of our forces is concerned. This principle is valid both for guerrillas and regular troops. The differences are of degree only; that is to say, in the manner of execution.

    The relationship that exists between guerrilla and the orthodox forces is important and must be appreciated. Generally speaking, there are types of co-operation between guerrillas and orthodox groups. These are:

    Strategical co-operation.
    Tactical co-operation.
    Battle co-operation.

    Guerrillas who harass the enemy's rear installations and hinder his transport are weakening him and encouraging the national spirit of resistance. They are co-operating strategically. For example, the guerrillas in Manchuria had no functions of strategical co-operation with orthodox forces until the war in China started. Since that time, their faction of strategical co-operation is evident, for if they can kill one enemy, make the enemy expend one round of ammunition, or hinder one enemy group in its advance southward, our powers of resistance here are proportionately increased. Such guerrilla action has a positive action on the enemy nation and on its troops, while, at the same time, it encourages our own countrymen. Another example of strategical co-operation is furnished by the guerrillas who operate along the P'ing-Sui, P'ing-Han, Chin-P'u, T'ung-Pu, and Cheng-T'ai railways. This co-operation began when the invader attacked, continued during the period when he held garrisoned cities in the areas, and was intensified when our regular forces counter-attacked, in an effort to restore the lost territories.

    As an example of tactical co-operation, we may cite the operations at Hsing-K'ou, when guerrillas both north and south of Yeh Men destroyed the T'ung-P'u railway and the motor roads near P'ing Hosing Pass and Yang Fang K'ou. A number of small operating base were established, and organized guerrilla action in Shansi complemented the activities of the regular forces both there and in the defence of Honan. similarly, during the south Shantung campaign, guerrillas in the five northern provinces co-operated with the army's operation on the Hsuchow front.

    Guerrilla commanders in rear areas and those in command of regiments assigned to operate with orthodox units must co-operate in accordance with the situation. It is their function to determine weak points in the enemy dispositions, harass them, to disrupt their transport, and to undermine their morale, If guerrilla action were independent, the results to be obtained from tactical co-operation would be lost and those that result from strategical co-operation greatly diminished. In order to accomplish their mission and improve the degree of co-operation, guerrilla units must be equipped with some means of rapid communication. For this purpose, two way radio sets are recommended.

    Guerrilla forces in the immediate battle area are responsible for close co-operation with regular forces, Their principal functions are to hinder enemy transport to gather information, and to act as outposts and sentinels. Even without precise instructions from the commander of the regular forces, these missions, as well as any others that contribute to the general success, should be assumed.

    The problem of establishment of bases is of particular importance. This is so because this war is a cruel and protracted struggle. The lost territories can be restored only by a strategical counter-attack and this we cannot carry out until the enemy is well into China. Consequently, some part of our country — or, indeed, most of it — may be captured by the enemy and become his rear area. It is our task to develop intensive guerrilla warfare over this vast area and convert the enemy's rear into an additional front. Thus the enemy will never be able to stop fighting. In order to subdue the occupied territory, the enemy will have to become increasingly severe and oppressive.

    A guerrilla base may be defined as an area, strategically located, in which the guerrillas can carry out their duties of training, self-preservation and development. Ability to fight a war without a rear area is a fundamental characteristic of guerrilla action, but this does not mean that guerrilla can exist and function over a long period of time without the development of base areas. History shows us many example of peasant revolts that were unsuccessful, and it is fanciful to believe that such movements, characterized by banditry and brigandage, could succeed in this era of improved communications and military equipment. Some guerrilla leaders seem to think that those qualities are present in today's movement, and before such leaders can comprehend the importance of base areas in the long-term war, their mind must be disabused of this idea.

    The subject of bases may be better understood if we consider:

    The various categories of bases.
    Guerrilla areas and base areas.
    The establishment of bases.
    The development of bases.

    Guerrilla bases may be classified according to their location as: first, mountain bases; second, plains bases; and last, river, lake, and bay bases. The advantages of bases in mountainous areas are evident. Those which are now established are at Ch'ang P'o Chan, Wu Tai Shan, Taiheng Shan, Tai Shan, Yen Shan, and Mao Shan. These bases are strongly protected. Similar bases should be established in all enemy rear areas.

    Plains country is generally not satisfactory for guerrilla operating bases, but this does not mean that guerrilla warfare cannot flourish in such country or that bases cannot be established there. The extent of guerrilla development in Hopeh and west Shantung proves the opposite to be the case Whether we can count on the use of these bases over long periods of time is questionable. We can, however, establish small bases of a seasonal or temporary nature. This we can do because our barbaric enemy simply does not have the manpower to occupy all the areas he has overrun and because the population of China is so numerous that a base can established anywhere. Seasonal bases in plains country may be established in the winter when the rivers are frozen over, and in the summer when the crops are growing. Temporary bases may be established when the enemy is otherwise occupied. When the enemy advances, the guerrillas who have established bases in the plains area are the first to engage him. Upon their withdrawal into mountainous country, they should leave behind them guerrilla groups dispersed over the entire area. Guerrillas shift from base to base on the theory that they must be in one place one day and another place the next.

    There are many historical examples of the establishment of bases in river, bay, and lake country, and this is one aspect of our activity that has so far received little attention. Red guerrillas held out for many years in the Hungtze Lake region. We should establish bases in the Hungtze and Tai areas and along rivers and watercourses in territory controlled by the enemy so as to deny him access to, and free use of, the water routes.

    There is a difference between the terms base area and guerrilla area. An area completely surrounded by territory occupied by the enemy is a 'base area'. Wu Tai Shan, and Taiheng Shan are examples of base areas. On the other hand, the area east and north of Wu Tai Shan (the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar border zone) is a guerrilla area. Such areas can be controlled by guerrillas only while they actually physically occupy them. Upon their departure, control reverts to a puppet pro-Japanese government. East Hopeh. for example, was at first a guerrilla area rather than a base area. A puppet government functioned there. Eventually, the people, organized and inspired by guerrillas from the Wu Tai mountains, assisted in the transformation of this guerrilla area into a real base area. Such a task is extremely difficult, for it is largely dependent upon the degree to which the people can be inspired. In certain garrisoned areas, such as the cities and zones contiguous to the railways, the guerrillas see unable to drive the *** anese and puppets out. These areas remain guerrilla areas. At other times, base areas might become guerrilla areas due either to our own mistakes or to the activities of the enemy.

    Obviously, in any given area in the war zone, any one or three situations may develop: The area may remain in Chinese hands; it may be lost to the Japanese and puppets or it may be divided between the combatants. Guerrilla leaders should endeavour to see that either the first or the last of these situations is assured.

    Another point essential in the establishment of bases is the co-operation that must exist between the armed guerrilla bands and the people. All our strength must be used to spread the doctrine of armed resistance to Japan, to arm the people, to organize self-defence units, and to train guerrilla bands. This doctrine must be spread among the people, who must be organized into anti-Japanese groups. Their political instincts must be sharpened and their martial ardour increased If the workers, the farmers, the lovers of liberty, the young men, the women, and the children are not organized, they will never realize their own anti-Japanese power. Only the united strength of the people can eliminate traitors, recover the measure of political power that has been lost, and conserve and improve what we still retain.

    We have already touched on geographic factors in our discussion of bases, and we must also mention the economic aspects of the problem. What economic policy should be adopted? Any such policy must offer reasonable protection to commerce and business. We interpret 'reasonable protection' to mean the people must contribute money in proportion to the money they have. Farmers will be required to furnish a certain share of their crops to guerrilla troops. Confiscation, except in the case of business run by traitors, is prohibited .

    Our activities must be extended over the entire periphery of the base area if we wish to attack the enemy's bases and thus strengthen and develop our own. This will afford us opportunity to organize, equip, and train the people, thus furthering guerrilla policy as well as the national policy of protected war. At times, we must emphasize the development and extension of base areas; at other times, the organization, training, or equipment of the people.

    Each guerrilla base will have its own peculiar problems of attack and defence. In general, the enemy, in an endeavour to consolidate his gains, will attempt to extinguish guerrilla bases by dispatching numerous bodies of troops over a number of different routes. This must be anticipated and the encirclement broken by counter-attacks As such enemy columns are without reserves, we should plan on using our main forces to attack one of them by surprise and devote our secondary effort to continual hindrance and harassment. At the same time, other forces should isolate enemy garrison troops and operate on their lines of supply and communication. When one column has been disposed of, we may turn our attention to one of the others. In a base area as large as Wu Tat Shan, for example, there are four or five military sub-divisions. Guerrillas in these sub-divisions must co-operate to form a primary force to counterattack the enemy, or the area from which he came, while a secondary force harasses and hinders him.

    After defeating the enemy in any area, we must take advantage of the period he requires for reorganization to press home our attacks. we must not attack an objective we are not certain of winning. We must confine our operations to relatively small areas and destroy the enemy and traitors in those places.

    When the inhabitants have been inspired, new volunteers accepted trained, equipped, and organized, our operations may be extended to include cities and lines of communication not strongly held. We may hold these at least for temporary (if not for permanent ) periods. All these are our duties in offensive strategy. Their object is to lengthen the period that the enemy must remain on the defensive. Then our military activities and our organization work among the masses of the people must be zealously expanded; and with equal zeal, the strength of the enemy attacked and diminished. It is of great importance that guerrilla units be rested and instructed. During such times as the enemy is on the defensive, the troops may get some rest and instruction may be carried out.

    The development of mobile warfare is not only possible but essential. This is the case because our current war is a desperate and protracted struggle. If China were able to conquer the Japanese bandits speedily and to recover her lost territories, there would there would be no question of long-term war on a national scale. Hence there would no question of the relation of guerrilla hostilities into mobile warfare of an orthodox nature, both the quantity and quality of guerrilla must be improved. Primarily, more men must join the armies; then the quality of equipment and standards of training must be improved. Political training must be emphasized and our organization, the technique of handling our weapons, our tactics — all must be improved. Our internal discipline must be strengthened. The soldiers must be educated politically. There must be a gradual change from guerrilla formations to orthodox regimental organization. The necessary bureaus and staffs, both political and military, must be provided. At the s ame time, attention must be paid to the creation of suitable supply, medical, and hygiene units. The standards of equipment must be raised and types of weapons increased. Communication equipment must not be forgotten. Orthodox standards of discipline must be established.

    Because guerrilla formations act independently and because they are the most elementary of armed formations, command cannot be too highly centralized. If it were, guerilla action would be too limited in scope. At the same time, guerrilla activities, to be most effective, must be co-ordinated, not only in so far as they themselves are concerned, but additionally with regular troops operating in the same areas. This co-ordination is a function of the war zone commander and his staff.

    In guerrilla base areas, the command must be centralized for strategical purposes and decentralized for tactical purposes. Centralized strategical command takes care of the general management of all guerrilla units, their co-ordination within war zones, and the general policy regarding guerrilla base areas. Beyond this, centralization of command will result in interference with subordinate units, as, naturally, the tactics to apply to concrete situations can be determined only as these various situations arise. This is true in orthodox warfare when communications between lower and higher echelons break down. In a word, proper guerrilla policy will provide for unified strategy and independent activity.

    Each guerrilla area is divided into districts and these in turn are divided into sub-districts. Each sub-division has its appointed commander, and while general plans are made by higher commanders, the nature of actions is determined by inferior commanders. The former may suggest the nature of the action to be taken but cannot define it. Thus inferior groups heave more or less complete local control.



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    APENDIX
    Last edited by troung; 23 Nov 05, at 01:21.

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    `White Tigers' prowled North Korea: during the Korean War, U.S. Army advisers helped North Korean guerrillas strike the Communists behind enemy lines. Until the 1990s, these missions remained largely unknown. Their members' sacrifices deserve to be widely publicized - Korean War
    VFW Magazine, May, 2002 by Ben S. Malcom

    Perhaps the least-known aspect of the Korean War were the top-secret guerrilla operations conducted in North Korea. For more than 40 years, these missions involving North Korean guerrillas and American advisers deep inside enemy territory remained highly classified.

    By the time the war ended in 1953, more than 22,000 guerrillas were fighting the Chinese and North Korean armed forces in a variety of covert actions. They were so secret that few military personnel in Korea knew about them. Even after the war, the missions remained unknown until 1990 when unit records were finally declassified.

    Anti-Communist North Korean refugees were formed under the banner of the United Nations Partisan Infantry Forces. They called themselves "donkeys" and were organized into battalions. One of the better known--the 4th Guerrilla Battalion--was nicknamed the "White Tigers." During their existence (January 1951-July 1953), an average of 200 Americans directed the forces from island strongholds. Some of the advisers actually went on raids.

    Unconventional warfare operations began Jan. 8, 1951, with a South Korean navy ship patrolling near the Yalu River. The ship discovered more than 10,000 North Korean guerrillas fighting the North Korean People's Army in Hwanghae Province.

    Guerrillas were taking over some of the North Korean islands near the river, but they only had about one weapon per 10 men (Japanese and Russian rifles, and U.S. carbines.) They eagerly requested more weapons, ammunition, food and American advisers to lead and train them.

    The U.S. 8th Army immediately recognized that a guerrilla force could wreak havoc on North Korean supply and communication lines. So Col. John McGee was given this responsibility and on Feb. 15, 1951, he slipped into North Korea and met with the guerrilla leaders.

    McGee was a veteran of guerrilla operations in the Philippines and knew how to organize this newfound force. He quickly issued weapons and rice to the leaders. McGee later recalled, "They were a colorful group of fighters ranging in age from youths to elderly men, and were pleased with the supplies. They left rapidly for North Korea in small boats."

    A supply base was established on Paengnyong-Do Island, 125 miles behind enemy lines on North Korea's west coast. It had a lengthy beach of hard-packed sand that could accommodate large aircraft up to the size of a C-47. Planes shot up over North Korea could make emergency landings there.

    These island bases were used to train guerrillas in intelligence-gathering, demolitions and basic infantry tactics. "Mobile units" went back to the mainland of North Korea, with "base units" conducting amphibious operations.

    `ARMY UNITS' CALL THE SHOTS

    These special operations were hidden under the umbrella of the 8086th Army Unit. On Dec. 10, 1951, it was absorbed by the 8240th Army Unit. The Far East Command then assumed operational control over the 8240th.

    Another theater-level agency also was set up to coordinate behind-the-lines activities in Korea. It was known as the Combined Command, Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK), better known as the 8242nd Army Unit. Lt. Col. Jay Vanderpool, an OSS/CIA vet, took command of the Guerrilla Division, 8240th A.U. in July 1951. These units conducted five separate activities:

    * Leopard Base--The control headquarters for 11 guerrilla units operating from the Yalu River south to the Ongin Peninsula. The west coast of North Korea had more than 400 islands used as springboards into the North. A guerrilla force of 10,000 men controlled about 70% of those islands.

    * Wolfpack--The control headquarters for 10 units of some 10,000 guerrillas operating from Leopard Base south to Inchon.

    * Kirkland--Controlled two east coast islands near the mainland of North Korea with about 300 guerrillas.

    * Baker Section--An airborne operation that trained North Korean guerrillas to jump behind lines into North Korea to collect intelligence and conduct operations. Since there were not enough C-47s available for even one practice jump, the first drop was a combat jump; more than 1,000 paratroopers were dropped into North Korea.

    * Tactical Liaison Office--This was a cover name for the North Korean "line crossers." There were approximately 25 guerrillas assigned to each U.S. infantry division. They were trained by special forces, and on a given night seven to nine guerrillas put on North Korean uniforms, complete with weapons and ID cards, and secretly went into North Korea.

    They gathered intelligence and slipped back through the lines. They told North Korean soldiers they were long-range patrols. Giving the enemy cigarettes, lighters and jewelry supplied by special forces lessened suspicions, too. This operation was very successful, running two years without being compromised.

    One U.S. study of partisans concluded: "In battle, they exerted every effort to bring out their wounded ... Capture by the enemy is a fate to be avoided at all costs. Three instances were cited of officers committing suicide rather than being taken ..."

    Heroism was never in short supply. A "donkey" commander reported of adviser Master Sgt. Roy E. Meeks and his rescue of fellow squad members: "He was completely surrounded by the enemy. [Yet] he threw hand grenades and fought until he could get out of there."

    ENTER THE 10TH SFG

    The 10th Special Forces Group (SFG), in March 1953, sent 75 officers and NCOs to Korea to reinforce the 8240th. However, they were broken up and assigned as individual replacements.

    Special Forces teams, eager to engage in direct combat with the enemy, were sorely disappointed. Assigned to static partisan training positions, their skills were never really put to the test. An additional 126 men arrived after the war ended in the fall of 1953 and their A teams remained intact.

    Guerrillas played a significant role in rescuing U.S. pilots shot down over North Korea. The 5th Air Force reported that of 93 pilots shot down between July 1950 and January 1952 who managed to evade capture, 29 were rescued by guerrillas.

    Col. Albert Schinz, for example, was shot down on May 1, 1952, in a raid over MIG Alley. He bailed out and survived on a deserted island for 37 days before being rescued. His story was covered in Life magazine in the July 28, 1952, issue.

    Guerrillas conducted 4,445 actions in North Korea, inflicting 69,000 casualties (dead and wounded). They captured 950 prisoners and 5,000 weapons, destroyed 2,700 vehicles, 80 bridges and 3,800 tons of food. But this was not without cost. Guerrilla dead totaled 3,189, and at least four American advisers were KIA.

    RELATED ARTICLE: Airborne rangers set the standard.

    BY ROBERT W. BLACK

    Army special operations units were not the only elite outfits in Korea. During the war, 18 Ranger companies were formed, 17 of which were airborne. The 8213th Army Unit (8th Army Ranger Company) was created with volunteers from units in the Far East. It fought in the drive to the Yalu.

    Airborne Ranger companies, numbered 1 to 8, were the select few that remained of the thousands of volunteers from the 11th and 82nd Airborne divisions.

    Companies numbered 9 to 15 and A and B were the pick of the various infantry divisions. These men were four-time volunteers (the Army, the airborne, the Rangers and combat). They were America's original Airborne Rangers--the first men to wear the black and gold Ranger tab. Assigned at Army level, they were attached on the basis of one 112-man Ranger company per infantry division.

    Seven Ranger companies fought in Korea: the 1st through 5th and 8th Airborne Rangers and the 8213th A.U. (8th Army Rangers). At a time when United Nations forces numbered more than 500,000, fewer than 700 of these Rangers were fighting to the front of every American Army division engaged in the war.

    They participated in the first defeat of Chinese forces; they raided and destroyed a North Korean division headquarters; and they made the first combat jump by Ranger units. In the Eastern sector, they were first across the 38th Parallel on the second drive north. One 33-man Ranger platoon fought a between-the-lines battle with two Chinese reconnaissance companies, and 70 Chinese were killed. The Rangers lost two killed and three wounded, all of whom were brought back to friendly lines.

    Wherever they went throughout the Army, the Rangers of the Korean War set the standard for excellence. From their example came the desire to spread Ranger leadership throughout the Army and the continuation of the Ranger tradition. These Rangers contributed six campaign streamers and two Presidential Unit Citations to Ranger honors.

    The Ranger companies were deactivated in Korea by Aug. 1, 1951, with most members reassigned to the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team. Some 137 Rangers were killed in combat in Korea.

    ROBERT BLACK is author of Rangers in Korea (1989).

  6. #6
    A Self Important Senior Contributor troung's Avatar
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    Afghanistan Revisited
    LAWRENCE G. KELLEY
    © 2000 Lawrence G. Kelley
    Is valor an acceptable substitute for tactical proficiency? The school solution is an emphatic "No!" but in fact the answer to this awkward question depends, at least in part, upon how forgiving the situation is. During its nine-year involvement in Afghanistan, Moscow awarded the title "Hero of the Soviet Union" to 86 of its "Internationalists,"[1] in 25 cases posthumously. Yet in 1989 it was the Soviets with their overwhelming technical superiority, firepower, codified teachings on military art, and vastly more experienced and professional army who withdrew, humiliated. Rhetoric about a 20th-century version of "The Great Game" notwithstanding, few had predicted that outcome, least of all their enemy, the mujahideen.

    The mujahideen were united by a common foe but not a common command, vision, or goals, save for ejecting the atheistic, communist, expansionist invader from the north. Their resistance, more visceral than systematized from the outset, represented a triumph of endurance, ingenuity, and the exploitation of enemy weakness over logic. Their strategy, to the extent that it can be termed one, amounted to attrition warfare: a largely uncoordinated attempt to inflict "death by a thousand cuts," or to die in the attempt. The part-time, unpaid, all-volunteer mujahideen force lacked even a formal rank structure, much less standardized training; only 15 percent of its commanders had a military background. Command selection depended as much on family ties and theological purity as military competence. The mujahideen's often meager weaponry reflected the random diversity of cross-border arms bazaars, as well as the scavenging of ambushed Soviet and Afghan government (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, DRA) columns. Once Moscow began destroying the rural Afghan infrastructure and precipitated the mass refugee movements that characterized the war, the mujahideen's improvised logistics system--and sometimes their skins--depended directly on proximity to the Iranian and Pakistani borders, where foreign sponsors maintained stockpiles and harried bands could find sanctuary. Blood and parochial feuds rent the rebel movement. Yet despite all this they prevailed, turning what the Soviets called "the correlation of forces" on its head.

    The mujahideen were willing to make up for their shortcomings by enduring hardship, accepting casualties, displaying determination, exuding esprit, learning quickly, and fighting to the last. To determine the reasons for their success more meaningfully than by simple reference to Napoleon's dictum on the relationship of the spiritual to the material, one needs to examine their practices in detail. This is the point of Lester W. Grau's combat-savvy, solidly researched studies titled The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan and The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War.

    The Bear Went Over the Mountain provides the Soviet side of the story. It takes its genesis from a 1991 lessons-learned volume compiled and published by the Frunze Academy, Moscow's combined arms academy for captains-majors, based on the combat experiences of its students. (One wonders how the Frunze work compares to the official lessons learned, which the GRU [military intelligence] systematically derived and then allegedly classified. A pointed criticism in the volume, written in characteristically veiled Soviet style, refers to a disconnect between efforts in military history and operational-tactical training.) Grau translated, edited, and added to the book, providing US perspectives and an analysis of the Frunze comments as well as vivid insights into Soviet troop practice. Some of those insights (e.g., the poor state of hygiene and the debilitating effect of infectious disease on Soviet combat readiness) will surprise US officers. Others (e.g., that the mujahideen's primary source of gasoline was Soviet soldiers, who frequently sold their equipment and supplies to buy food or hashish) will positively flabbergast them.

    Grau's second volume, The Other Side of the Mountain, provides the mirror image of the account: mujahideen tactics in the war, based on 1996 interviews with surviving participants. Both Grau and his coauthor for the second volume, Ali Ahmad Jalali, have credentials that generate credibility. Grau, an analyst at Ft. Leavenworth's Foreign Military Studies Office, is a retired US Army lieutenant colonel (infantry, Russian Foreign Area Officer) with Vietnam experience; Jalali is a former Afghan army colonel, mujahideen planner, and widely published journalist specializing in the area.

    The two books have a parallel structure, but with distinctions. While the "Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan," as the Soviet presence was officially termed, consistently fought the war using comparatively large-scale actions, the mujahideen generally relied on guerrilla tactics. Consequently, The Bear Went Over the Mountain encompasses the actions of units from platoon to army level, though its 49 vignettes focus on battalion, regiment, and brigade combat. The contributing officers served principally in company-grade command and staff billets in motor rifle, air assault, or airborne units (exceptionally, some commanded battalions at very junior rank) and typically returned home with decorations like the Red Star (roughly equivalent to the Bronze Star with combat V). The Other Side of the Mountain, at double the length and with double the number of vignettes, is the more expansive and detailed book, but it stresses the small-unit actions typical of partisan warfare. Given the immense casualties that the mujahideen sustained during the Soviet-Afghan War and in the vicious, protracted fighting that followed the Taliban takeover of the country, it is perhaps surprising that the authors could even locate sufficient veterans to provide these accounts, but they did.

    The vignettes can profitably be read as single episodes, but doing so risks focusing on the trees at the expense of the forest. Larger issues are at play here than the success or failure of individual battles, however significant their outcomes. In this connection the introductory and concluding essays by Grau, Jalali, and the dean of US experts on the Soviet army, Colonel David M. Glantz, USA Ret., were for this reviewer the most valuable parts of both books, tying ends together and putting disparate detail into perspective. The authors deserve an award for truth in packaging for their up-front declaration that the books are designed "for the combat arms company and field grade officer and NCO," but I dissent somewhat from this assessment. The aforementioned essays offer as fine an analytic summary of the Soviets' star-crossed military involvement in Afghanistan as I have seen and fully justify the expenditure by senior leaders of the hour it takes to read them. Additional noteworthy features of the books include an informative glossary, a listing of Soviet map symbols, and both large- and small-scale maps, most of which are in color in The Bear Went Over the Mountain.

    The maps contribute mightily to the value of these books. Without them, orientation would be difficult and much of the impact would be lost. The reader would not notice, for instance, that the geographic distribution of vignettes in both studies centers on the eastern third of Afghanistan, closer to both Kabul and the mujahideen's Pakistani lifeline. Similarly, one needs to take the broad view to notice that the distribution of vignettes over time differs dramatically between the two volumes in the middle years of the conflict, 1983-85. The numerical high point for the mujahideen occurs in 1983, with 22 times the Soviet total of vignettes. The Soviet apex occurs in 1985, corresponding to the year in which Gorbachev precipitously (and unsuccessfully) ordered the Ministry of Defense to win the war on the battlefield. While various interpretations may exist for these differences, taken together with the admission by B. V. Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army, that by 1985 Soviet commanders had recommended withdrawing from Afghanistan, the pattern suggests that the mujahideen's learning curve was substantially steeper than Moscow anticipated, and that their successes came more rapidly.

    The approach used in the two books has inherent drawbacks, but the authors' comments and multisource verification significantly offset them. First, reliance on vignettes provided by participants well after the fact invites selective memory and self-serving, purposeful packaging. A comparison of the respective Soviet and mujahideen versions of the air assault on Maro stronghold, one of the few battles for which veterans of both sides relate their experiences, graphically illustrates the point. The Frunze editors crafted their account to underscore tactical lessons and portray Soviet performance in the best possible light. They neglected to mention, however, that while resting on its laurels, the temporarily victorious Soviet force was nearly decimated by the Afghans, who regrouped and reinforced in Pakistan, then returned with a vengeance. Despite careful reading of all the vignettes in both volumes, I would not have recognized the Soviet and mujahideen descriptions of the battle as the same action had Grau not pointed it out. (Notably, Grau and Jalali plan to analyze 17 key battles from the perspectives of both sides in a future work.) Second, while recognizing that small-unit combat determined the tactical outcome of the Soviet-Afghan War, these infantry-centered books address important lessons learned by other branch arms only peripherally. The reader needs to look elsewhere for detailed insights in those areas. Fortunately, he will not need to look far. Grau's next book, tentatively titled The Bear Looks Back: A Russian General Staff Retrospective on the War in Afghanistan (forthcoming), delves into the perspectives of the logistician, engineer, artilleryman, tanker, pilot, chemical officer, and physician, all of which deserve attention.

    The Soviets attempted to apply in Afghanistan the practices and large-formation tactics developed for war on the north German plain but discovered in short order how inappropriate they were. Thus, over time the General Staff switched its reliance from traditionally configured motor rifle units to the lighter, elite, better trained, and more professional airborne, air assault, reconnaissance, and spetsnaz (special purpose) forces. They also introduced new types of formations (mountain motor rifle battalions, material support battalions/brigades) and training specifically geared to in-theater combat requirements. The shift in stress somewhat mitigated the long-standing Soviet problem with low-level initiative, a quality which small-unit counterinsurgency warfare demands, and the absence of an effective NCO corps. However, it did nothing to eliminate one of the salient problems of the Soviets' involvement in the country, their failure (or inability) to commit enough infantry to win.

    Soviet manpower and personnel problems severely affected operations. In all, 620,000 Soviets served in the conflict. In nine years only about 15,000 (2.4 percent of the force) died there, but fully 470,000 (73 percent) became casualties, of which an astonishing 416,000 fell victim to infectious disease (hepatitis, typhoid fever, meningitis, malaria, dysentery). Medical conditions routinely incapacitated 30 percent of unit strength. Given the fact that three-fourths of the combat units in the 40th Army were involved in providing convoy and other types of security, and considering the noncombat missions (e.g., guard duty) that the units also performed, Soviet commanders had to contend with serious availability problems. The unimpressive quality of Soviet conscripts in the 1980s, who suffered from severe morale problems, exacerbated the situation. Large-scale draft-dodging, de facto lowering of standards to make quotas, the rising proportion of non-Slavs with rudimentary knowledge of Russian in the draft-age population, widespread passive resistance to the Afghan war which grew as casualties and disenchantment mounted, dedovshchina (hazing), drug involvement, and the unwillingness of a dispirited force to run lethal risks in the name of an increasingly questionable cause typified the period. The desperate courage and selfless commitment that had distinguished the Red Army in World War II more accurately characterized the actions of the mujahideen than those of the Limited Contingent. Units of the latter preferred to entrench themselves in bastions surrounded by mines and preregistered artillery fires, and to venture forth only in numbers, normally during the day. The mujahideen owned the night, and the Soviets rarely contested their claim. As a prominent mujahideen commander put it, "The enemy infantry was the weakest part of their armies--DRA and Soviet. . . . We intended to fight to the last man and they didn't." Tactically the Soviets may well have understood what was required, but they did not, or could not, execute it.

    Moscow's strategy envisioned buying time to consolidate and stabilize its client in Kabul. It called for holding urban areas while pushing the DRA army out to fight in the countryside, no more than 15 percent of which the government ever controlled. Grau writes, "The DRA [did] most of the attacking and dying." The Soviet army viewed the DRA as cannon fodder and scarcely held a higher opinion of the Afghans as a whole, which created a fundamental, if familiar, contradiction for counterinsurgency warfare. In Grau's words, "Soviet policy seems to have been to terrorize the population, not to win them over to the government's side." Soviet commanders had massive amounts of supporting arms at their disposal and, to minimize casualties, routinely substituted firepower for the commitment of infantry. Such practices as the use of unannounced artillery barrages to initiate sweeps, indiscriminate bombing of infrastructure, defoliation of crops, and destruction of herds (orchestrated in part by none other than Dzhokhar M. Dudayev, then a senior officer in Soviet strategic aviation and later the renegade first President of Chechnya, whose nation endured the brunt of similar tactics) caused 1.3 million deaths and the displacement of one third of the 17 million population of Afghanistan. The Soviet-Afghan War also served as the test-bed for an array of new hardware, including the BMP-2, BTR-80, Vasilek 82mm automatic mortar, AGS-17 grenade launcher, 9P140 Uragan multiple rocket launcher, several models of the Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunship, and the Su-25 Frogfoot attack aircraft, all of which, along with other systems, were widely employed.

    Nonbelligerents suffered greatly from atrocities committed by Soviet forces (and avidly documented by the newly unleashed Soviet press) in retaliation for mujahideen actions on this frustrating, nonlinear battlefield. It is little wonder that rural Afghans considered the Soviets and their DRA allies oppressors, not liberators, and that the mujahideen enjoyed willing, generous popular support. The sources of that support included surprising numbers of Afghans in official DRA structures and army units, which were pervasively penetrated by mujahideen sympathizers, collaborators, and agents.

    Geography dictated tactics in this war, as it had in previous Afghan conflicts, and the mujahideen held the home-court advantage. Acclimatized, tough, traditional warriors, they knew the terrain, could dictate the terms of most engagements, and normally wielded the initiative. They preferred to prey on soft DRA targets but would brazenly hit the Soviets in their own backyard, immediately outside 40th Army headquarters, as well. Jalali terms mujahideen tactics "short-hit and long-run" in a conflict that rewarded endurance and survival. Although the rebels still died in massive numbers, they knew that no single battle would turn the tide and fought appropriately. Following an attack on a column they would take the spoils and depart quickly, preempting reaction. When surrounded, they often succeeded in exfiltrating through enemy lines, at times with the tacit connivance of Soviet forces, who preferred a kind of conditional modus vivendi with the dushmany (as the Russians called the mujahideen) to aggressive, costly close combat.

    To offset the Soviets' superiority in firepower the mujahideen attacked shortly before dark and hugged their enemy, undermining the 40th Army's ability to counter with effective artillery fire and airstrikes. They employed their weapon of choice, the versatile, low-tech RPG-7, with skill and ingenuity against armor, personnel, structures, and, in barrages, even helicopters. True, Stingers and Oerlikon cannons supplied by the United States starting in late 1986 acted as a kind of force multiplier, permitting the rebels to wreak havoc on Soviet aviation assets, where Blowpipe and SA-7 Grail missiles had earlier proven inadequate to the task. These new capabilities forced the Soviets to begin resupplying remote outposts only at night and, after development of the Stinger night sight, to substantially increase flight altitudes. Additionally, success in this area inspired the mujahideen to undertake even more aggressive actions in others. But the rebels' favored weaponry embodied simplicity itself: long-range Enfield rifles designed a century ago and antivehicle mines. (The Soviets themselves preferred antipersonnel models, of which they left an estimated 13 million behind.) Thus, technology influenced but did not did not dictate the outcome of this conflict. The mujahideen's ancestors would easily have recognized their tactics.

    Many operational generalizations apply to the Soviet-Afghan War. The tactics used were essentially timeless, dictated by channelization, choke points, and terrain restrictions (e.g., in the green zones). In this backward country with primitive roads and no rail network, the battle for control of the lines of communications assumed immense importance. Deceit, deception, and surprise affected the fortunes of the sides enormously. Both belligerents repeatedly committed what should have been lethal errors involving predictability and complacency, yet did so with impunity because the other side failed to learn or apply key lessons. The mujahideen routinely reused ambush sites and observed inadequate security in local areas. They often organized deficiently for combat; their warriors, hungry for battle and spoils, scorned support functions. Without warning or coordination, mercurial rebel detachments would depart the battlefield, leaving yawning gaps in the lines. The Soviets, for their part, often reused helicopter landing zones, ignored proper reconnaissance, and littered or smoked in battle positions. Understrength, unmotivated, risk-averse, and intimidated by the prospect of ambushes, not to mention capture and its all too probable consequences[2], they suffered from a siege mentality and conceded the initiative to the enemy. The DRA army was even worse. Its conscripts not only ran at the first sign of serious combat, but entire units--officers and conscripts alike--defected to the mujahideen. Frequently, out of some combination of sympathy and fear, DRA soldiers would betray their units to the rebels, a practice that often explained mujahideen successes. The reader will be indebted to Grau and Jalali for their detailed insights into all of these areas.

    A legitimate question arises as to whether, or to what extent, Moscow actually learned the lessons of Afghanistan. In this connection evidence from the First and Second Chechen Wars (1994-96, 1999-?) suggests that the Russian High Command may have understood and recorded those lessons but has not consistently applied them. These conflicts have similarities, among them the central role of geography (particularly the mountains) in determining the character of warfare, the internally splintered nature of the Moslem partisan force opposing Moscow, and the role of international aid in fostering the rebels' campaign. Other similarities include the hodgepodge task organization of the Russian joint command, enormous and lopsided use of firepower to minimize attrition despite the foreseeable political consequences, generation of mass refugee movements and civilian casualties, reliance on experienced and elite formations for small-unit conflict, unimpressive performance by conscripts, thankless treatment of returning veterans, and widespread disregard by both sides of the law of war. But those are topics for another essay. At this point, whether valor and endurance will suffice to carry the day in Chechnya remains to be seen. What is clear is that absent a devastating Russian strike with chemical weapons and fuel-air-explosive (about which Zbigniew Brzezinski recently sounded the alarm), the victor will require no small amount of both the aforementioned qualities.

    NOTES

    1. Recipients included such subsequently prominent, and occasionally notorious, figures as P. S. Grachev (Russian Defense Minister), B. V. Gromov (Deputy Defense Minister), A. V. Rutskoi (Vice President of Russia and an instigator of the abortive October 1993 mutiny), and V. I. Varennikov (CINC, Ground Forces).

    2. The mujahideen's nonchalant admissions of law of war violations (summary executions of DRA officers, burying Soviet advisors alive, decapitation of the corpse of a Soviet pilot as a commander's trophy) in The Other Side of the Mountain are remarkable for their naïve candor. Needless to say, the well-edited Frunze volume contains no mention of Soviet excesses.

    BIBLIOGRAPHY

    Grau, Lester W., ed. The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. Washington: NDU Press, 1996. (Also released with minor changes under the same title, London and Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 1998.)

    ________, ed. The Bear Looks Back: A Russian General Staff Retrospective on the War in Afghanistan, forthcoming.

    Jalali, Ali Ahmad, and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War. Quantico, Va.: US Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1998 (SCN: DM-980701). Although this volume is not yet commercially available, copies of this limited-distribution study have been provided to a number of university and service school libraries.

    Secondary Sources

    Gareyev, Makhmut Akhmetovich. Moya poslednyaya voyna: Afganistan bez sovetskikh voysk (My Last War: Afghanistan Without Soviet Forces). Moscow: Insan, 1996.

    Gates, Robert M. From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War. New York: Touchstone Books, 1996.

    Gromov, Boris Vsevolodovich. Ogranichennyy kontingent (Limited Contingent). Moscow: Progress, Kul'tura publishing group, 1994.

    The Reviewer: Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley (USMC, Ret.) is a former A-4 pilot and Russian Foreign Area Officer (FAO) with extensive experience in the former Soviet Union, German Democratic Republic, and Eastern and Western Europe. A graduate of Princeton (A.B., Russian) and Georgetown University (M.A., government), he flew close air support in Vietnam in 1972. Colonel Kelley served nine FAO assignments, including tours with the US Military Liaison Mission to CINC, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany; the On-Site Inspection Agency (twice); Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Navy Staff; NATO, and elsewhere.

  7. #7
    A Self Important Senior Contributor troung's Avatar
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    A little on Massoud one of the most famous Mujahideen leaders...

    A somewhat biased source...

    http://www.massoudhero.com/English/biography.html

    Being warned by his uncle, military commander Abdul-Razaq Khan, a high-ranking official in Daoud’s government, about his impending arrest, Massoud left the Polytechnic Institute an, together with Engineer Jaan Mohammad, went to Pakistan for the first time in 1353 (1974). After some time, Massoud was ordered to resume his political activities in Kabul. These activities, i.e. trying to win over the government forces for the cause, took him until 1354 (1974), when the first armed rebellion in Panjsher took place. The Hezb-e Jamiat, led by the then 22-year-old Massoud, was able to conquest the whole Panjsher – with some casualties – and disarm the government forces.

    Hekmatyar had promised Massoud that as soon as some terrain outside Kabul had been conquered, the army would march out and a military coup d’état would happen. Massoud and his troops had been betrayed, though, since this information was wrong and therefore the resistance forces in Panjsher had to give up. Only a handful of men could escape. Massoud went back to Kabul after a month and from there he went to Peshawar in Pakistan where he had to lie low as well, since he was also observed by the Pakistani secret service.

    After the failed insurrection, the party’s mood changed. Some members had backed the insurrection; others thought it had been a mistake since it was uncoordinated. Finally this dispute led to a split of the Jamiat into two groups. Those who opposed the insurrection – among them Massoud – stayed with Rabani. The others joined Hekmatyar.

    The two groups sometimes became reconciled then drifted apart again, until they finally reunited and declared Qaazi Amin e Waqa‘ as leader of both groups. Hekmatyar disclosed all his enemies to the Pakistani government; he had them arrested and murdered. Eng. Jaan Mohammad was one of those who where among the betrayed. Hekmatyar and his Pakistani mentors, Kelo and Babor, also had Massoud, who stayed at Hekmatyar’s home at that time, arrested. When Massoud realized how dangerous the situation was, he threatened the Pakistani guards using two pistols he always carried with him and managed to get away; officially, he stayed in Pakistan until Zia Ullhaq seized power.

    After these incidents, the Hezb-e Jamiat decided to act independently. Massoud was again sent into action in Kabul until the communist insurrection in 1357 (1978). His closest confidants only knew the fact that Massoud did not exclusively stay in Pakistan. According to one of his closest friends, he also spent some time in Afghanistan’s eastern provinces in order to escape the Kabul police’s attention.

    Massoud went to Nooristan and other areas where the war had just started. He wanted to find out about the Afghans’ opinion regarding the war against the Communists. As soon as he was sure about their determination he departed with a group of 20 young men to Panjsher in 1358 (1979 - Soviet invasion in Afghanistan). In Konar, where their comrades had already begun resistance, they were welcomed heartily. Since Massoud’s men only were scarcely armed, they were given some weapons, which their comrades in Konar had captured, from the Soviet soldiers.
    Still not sufficiently armed Massoud and his troop marched on to Panjsher, Massoud’s home. Eyewitnesses report that Massoud contacted all the elders of the villages in the region to gain information about the willingness of people to fight, the weapons they had and how many volunteers there were. For Massoud and his fight to free his country and people from tyranny, the inhabitants of Panjsher were determined to do everything.

    Despite everyone, whether old or young, man or woman being convinced that armed resistance was necessary and being therefore ready to fight, Massoud made sure that it was not the sole breadwinner of a family who was called to duty. He told to those who had volunteered that providing for their families was also an essential part of the resistance. Their enemy was a superpower and those who were weak or required help had to be protected; especially one’s own family.

    Again, an armed insurrection in Panjsher took place, this time under Massoud’s leadership. The fight lasted 40 days, during which the whole Panjsher, Salang, and Bola Ghain could be freed from enemy troops. After these 40 days Massoud`s leg was injured and the fighters had no more weapons and ammunition. Despite 600 relief fighters from Nooristan, who came to help them, the enemy finally defeated them. Massoud went back to Panjsher with “Kaakaa” (uncle) Tajuddin. On pondering the outcome of the fight, Massoud decided to opt for a new tactic, guerrilla war. Massoud became the world’s best guerrilla warrior.

    Robert D. Kaplan wrote in his book “The Soldiers of God” 1991: “Ahmad Shah Massoud has to be considered one of the greatest leaders of guerrilla movements in the 20th century. He defeated his enemy just like Marshall Tito, Hu Chi Minh and Che Guevara did. Massoud controlled a bigger terrain that was much more difficult to defend militarily and was under constant attack from the enemy. His territory suffered much more attacks from enemy forces than those areas which were under the control of the resistance movements of Tito, Hu Chi Minh, or Guevara.”

    From that time on Massoud's name was inseparably connected with the Panjsher, he proved to be the greatest resistance fighter in history against the Red Army, since Massoud caused 60 % of all damages and casualties of the Red Army according to international observers. He became the “Lion of Panjsher” and ruined the reputation of the “Invincible Red Army” as it was called. Many people simply called him “Amer Sahib” (commander) to express their affection as well as their respect[13].

    Sebastian Junger writes[14]: “I found it impossible not to listen to Massoud when he spoke, even though I didn't understand a word. I watched everything he did, because I had the sense that somehow-in the way he poured his tea, in the way his hands carved the air as he talked - there was some secret to be learned.”

    His military success and the love of his people caused a lot of hatred and envy in others; especially Gulbuddin Hekmatyar became Massouds most hostile enemy.

    Every one of those enemies made attempts on his life and tried everything to reach and kill him. Soviet officials had offered money for his capture, but because of his well functioning intelligence service all these attempts were thwarted.

    1358 (1979), when his leg was severely wounded, Massoud’s resistance fighters were sieged by government troops, but he managed a narrow escape.

    1359 (1980), a young soldier took advantage of the darkness and shot at Massoud’s car from a 3m distance. Massoud told him: “Friend, your hands are trembling and you are not used to shoot Anyone,” and let the attacker go.

    1361 (1983) Soviet special troops had blocked the way out of the mountain tunnel near Malaspa in Panjsher. However, Massoud and his men managed a breakthrough and could slip away without attracting the Soviets attention.

    1361 / 1362 (1983 / 84) – the year of truce between Massoud and the Red Army – the Soviets tried to murder Massoud employing two different tactics:

    First, they tried to lure him into one of their camps in Onaba - a part of Panjsher - with promises of talks and negotiations, and then have him arrested. A Tajik interpreter thwarted this try. The second strategy was to have him assassinated by his own men. The Russians had bribed a mujahid named Abdul-Qader Naachaar, who was in charge of the Muajhideen’s food. He was told to poison Massoud, but could be apprehended in time.

    Dr. Najibullah, later President and at that time chief of the Afghan government’s intelligence service, tried to murder Massoud with the help of a former classmate, Kamran. Dr. Najibullah knew Massoud since his youth in Kabul, he also knew how friendly, complaisant Massoud was, and how unceremoniously he welcomed friends. Kamran then was captain of the Afghan national soccer team. He went to Panjsher and spent a few days together with Massoud. Kamran finally understood Massoud’s reason to fight and handed over the specially ****led weapon he was given by the Afghan government to carry out the planned assassination. Kamran then took refuge in Germany and asked for political asylum.

    1368 (1989), after a meeting of the commanders of the Shoraa-ye Nezaar in Farkhar Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami trapped the members of the Shoraa and and drew them into an ambush. Dozens of them were killed, among them several close friends and confidants of Massoud. Though Hekmatyar was able to stop the major offensive planned by the assembly, Massoud, who had been the main target of the ambush, could escape.

    1372 (1993) when there was growing discord between him and Shoraa-ye Hamahangi, under the leadership of Hekmatyar, his helicopter was shot at by enemy jets (under the command of Shoraa-ye Hamahangi), but the helicopter’s pilot managed an emergency landing. After this attempt, Massoud decided to learn how to fly a helicopter. That same year he was ambushed in the region of Wazir Akbar Khan in Kabul and came under heavy fire, caused by Dostum’s militia.

    1361 (1983), after two defeats of the whole Soviet military forces the then commander-in-chief of the Soviets agreed to negotiate with Massoud about a truce. Because of this move the Soviet Union officially recognized for the first time that the Mujaheddin[15], especially Massoud, were serious political opponents. The truce was considered by all experts to be one of the greatest triumphs of the Afghan resistance. It lasted one year.

    Massoud made the most out of his success and was able to make a long journey around the northern regions of Afghanistan for the first time. This journey was very successful and therefore in winter 1362 (1984) Massoud was able to unite all resistance commanders, who were members of different parties, in a council, the so-called “Shoraa-ye-Nezaar” (Controlling Council). His goal was to build a united Afghan political strategy and united military forces that would not be guided by the parties, which were created in the neighbouring countries. The members of the Shoraa-ye-Nezaar fought for the common goal of a free Afghanistan.

    Despite the fact that the Soviet attacks on Panjsher had resumed Massoud was convinced that Panjsher could offer resistance under the leadership of other commanders without his presence. He left the command of Panjsher to the former district attorney Abdul-Mahmood Daqiq. Furthermore, the regions Andaraab, Khost-e Fereng, Eshkamesh, Nahrin, and Keshm had been turned into strongholds by Massoud. They were now known as “Panj Sher” (Five Lions).

    1366 (1987) the provinces Parwan and Kapisa could also be handed over to the command of Azimi, since Massoud had created an autonomous democratically structured administration, information and organisation system in those regions under his command. This was different from how the so-called “warlords” used to control their territory. It enabled Massoud to concentrate on the unification of all resistance forces, but his system also allowed the inhabitants of the different regions complete self-determination.

    Massoud: “The future government should be formed through elections by the people. Men and women should take part. The only form of government, which can balance the different ethnicities, is democracy.”

    Massoud had created an administration and legal system, which was unique in Afghanistan’s history. In the regions, he controlled the import and the use of any drugs or tobacco products – including cigarettes – were strictly forbidden. The prohibition was supported by the region’s inhabitants and lasted firstly until the entry into Kabul in 1992 and again from 1996 on until Massouds death. It also included the cultivation and manufacturing of these substances. The ban applied even to commanders and other high-ranking officials.

    Massoud[16]: “Cigarettes have been banned since the beginning of the resistance against the Russians - for economic reasons. People smoke too much. The region spends too much money on cigarettes, and they don't eat as much as they should.”

    Eugen Sorg[17]:“In the areas you control, Opium is grown as well. We saw the fields in the villages.”

    Massoud: “There are some cultures in Badakhshan province. Ismailites are living there, an islamic cult whose followers are addicted since centuries. They are planting drugs for their own use. But if you go to Chay Ab to the local jail, you will find Ghollam Salim there, a drug tycoon. In one raid we seized half a ton of Opium on his estate. Now he is in jail for the third year. Despite all his money and influence.”

    1367 (1988), at the age of 35, Massoud married the daughter of his comrade Kaakaa Tajuddin. This fact was kept secret for security reasons. Even his longtime companions were not informed for several years.

    Since Massoud did not want to tolerate the meddling of the Pakistani secret service ISI, he had to fight on different fronts. On one side, he had to put up resistance against the Soviet Union and the Afghan government, which depended on the Soviets, on the other side he had to fight Pakistan and their puppet Hekmatyar.

    Massoud[18]: “Our policy was always to have good and friendly relations with everyone. But we never have accepted being oppressed and we will never accept it.”

    In winter 1362 (1983/84), the communist Afghan regime brought about a trial “in absence”[19] in which Massoud was charged with high treason. The court found him guilty and sentenced him to Death. Even before their major attack on Panjsher, the government gave out information that “the court’s judgement had been executed,” meaning Massoud had been killed, and that “his group has been eradicated.” That strategy was meant to lower the morale among Massouds followers outside of Panjsher, especially in Kabul. It was also a tactic to outlaw Massoud.
    Massoud anticipated that these actions would bring about heavy attacks on Panjsher.
    After exhaustive conferences with representatives of every region of Panjsher, he decided that a total evacuation of Panjsher within a short time would be the best solution to avoid a massacre among the civilian population.
    While in spring 1363 (1984) the Soviet Union planned their big attack on Panjsher. Therefore Massoud asked the inhabitants to evacuate the valley completely.
    The people’s love for Massoud and their devotion to the resistance was infinite and therefore they were willing to make this enormous sacrifice for the cause. On Massoud‘s request up to 130.000 people, which was actually the whole civilian population of Panjsher, left their homes within two weeks. They left behind everything they had built up with great efforts during generations. It was not only one of the greatest sacrifices of the Afghan people but also passive resistance against the “almighty” Red Army and one of the reasons for the latter is defeat.

    The Red Army was vanquished in Panjsher eight times between 1358 -1367 (1979 – 1988). The Soviet Union’s defeat was not only a defeat in Afghanistan, but led to the collapse of the Soviet system and was followed by the liberation of the Central Asian and Eastern European countries from Moscow’s control.

    This caused international authors, e.g. Robert Kaplan in his book “Soldiers of God” to declare Massoud as the “Victor of the Cold War.”
    Kaplan writes: “Until he is not forced to do so, Massoud does not decide to start battle. That was his strategy during the 14 years of resistance. With his victory over the Najibullah regime Massoud proved how much the planners and strategists of the American policy regarding Jihad[20] (generally) and the distribution of their help (to the parties involved) were wrong. Massoud’s genius and experience and the devoted support of his people enabled him to become the victor of the Cold War.” This also attributes the fall of the Berlin wall to Massoud.


    After the last Soviet soldier had left Afghanistan on 25.11. 1368 (14.02.1989)[21], the”Shoraa-ye ?Aali-ye Farmaandehan-e Arshad-e Jahadi Afghanistan” (High Council of the Commanders of Islamic resistance forces of Afghanistan), which had been summoned by Massoud, met to decide on future proceedings in Afghanistan. This council took place on 17.07.1369 (09.10.1990) in Shah-Salim in the province of Badakhshan. From there Massoud went on a short, but at that time desicive journey to Pakistan to talk about the future government with the so-called “Shoraa-ye Rahbari” (Leading Council)[22], which had been formed to establish a new government in Afghanistan.

    Despite being only scarcely equipped, never really sufficiently supplied on weapons and ammunition and of only limited financial means, he was able to win people’s hearts, to expand his radius of action, to inflict destructive blows on the communist regime until 1371 (1992) and finally free Kabul because of his moderate politics, which were not determined by fundamentalism. He succeeded in doing that without any help from the neighbouring countries. This was one reason why he became the “Hero of the Afghan resistance.”
    In one of his last speeches as president Dr. Najibullah acknowledged that and declared that he would cede power to Massoud, although he was convinced that Massoud would not have a chance to build an efficient government, since Hekmatyar and the ISI would not allow that to happen.

    In 1371 (1992) Massoud considered the Mujahedin forces to be unable to govern. However, after an exhaustive meeting of the Mujahedin leadership in Daalaan Sang / Panjsher he decided that the overthrow of the Kabul communist government was inevitable but should not be carried out immediately. Despite everyone agreeing with this plan, Hekmatyar objected and wanted to invade Kabul at once. In a recorded conversation[23], Massoud tried to convince Hekmatyar not to attack Kabul, since the government was ready to surrender, but Hekmatyar would not listen.
    Before Massoud’s Mujahedin marched towards Kabul, he gave them distinct orders regarding their behaviour once they were in Kabul. He reminded them of their duties as protectors of Kabul’s population. It was especially important to him that his soldiers would treat people respectfully and that the Mujahedin would not be diverted from their tasks by living in Kabul.
    After the last of the government’s positions in Bagram had been captured, Massoud’s troops marched into Kabul on late afternoon of 04.02.1371 (24.04.1992). This action had been forced; the attack was only conducted to prevent Hekmatyar’s men from entering the capital and cause danger for the population. The Hezb-e Islami followers could nevertheless enter the city. They broke up all prison doors, freeing even dangerous criminals. Ministries and their archives were pillaged; every file they could find was destroyed. Because of that, the new government was already in a bad starting position since important documents were missing.
    In addition, there were now more than ten thousand heavily armed criminals in Kabul; the released prisoners had robbed the military depots. There was no army, no police, no intelligence service, not even intact buildings, and structures.
    Dr. Najibullah, the former president, had asked for asylum in the Kabul UN office. Massoud had the building guarded by his own troops in order to prevent encroachments on Najibullah.

    Friends of Massoud, who knew about his popularity among the population, asked him to form the new government and lead it himself. Although Kabul was surrounded by Massoud’s forces he handed over the responsibility to the political leaders and withdrew himself in order to give nobody reason to continue the war.
    The leading council - before its arrival in Kabul - proclaimed Massoud president of the High Council of Commanders “Shoraa-ye Farmaandehan” and Defence Secretary via a radio message, on 05.02.1371 (25.04.1992). The new president, Mujadedi, and the cabinet, arrived in Kabul on 08.02.1371 (28.04.1992).
    This represented not only a victory over the Soviet Union, but also over the secret service of Pakistan, the ISI. The Mujaheddin’s victory was a political defeat for the government of Pakistan, because it had always pinned its hopes on Hekmatyar and had supported him against Massoud.
    This compelled Iran, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan to call for more power in the government for their respective party. With the interferences of these countries the war in Kabul started.
    The respective governments exaggerated this war as "civil war,” in order to camouflage their interferences in Afghanistan. This had already been handled similarly by the Soviet Union.

    Pakistan changed its tactics of influence and control with the help of different Arab states. The ISI created the Taliban[24] and equipped it with the entire power of the army of Pakistan. Exactly like the international terrorists, the troops of the Taliban were shifted over the border to Afghanistan into the southern provinces. The triangle of Taliban, Pakistan and international terrorists wanted to make Afghanistan a safe haven for their sinister machinations and just one man opposed them: Ahmad Shah Massoud. Even Bin Laden had to admit that and said that as long as this man alive was, no victory was possible.

    Massoud’s family had also attracted the attention of the communist regime: his parent’s home had been seized and converted into a school. Now that Massoud was back in Kabul, he decided that the school should keep the house[25].
    In 1372 (1993) Massoud created the "Bonyad-e Farhangi wa Ta'wani Mohammad-e Ghazali" (The cooperative Mohammad Ghazali culture foundation[26]). Massoud called all scientists, scholars, authors, and artists without consideration of their respective ideology to participate in this foundation. The commission for women made it possible for female Afghan artists - above all widows - to make a living through arts and crafts.
    The department of family consultation was a free advisory board, which was accessible seven days a week for the indigent. The foundation’s department for distribution of auxiliary goods was the first partner of the Red Cross.
    During the practice of their honorary activity two members died being hit by rockets of the Hezb-e Islami. The physicians of this foundation treated twice a week half-daily all those patients free of charge, who could not afford a physician‘s attendance. They also got the necessary medicines for a very small compensation or sometimes free of charge from the associated pharmacies.
    After "Matbo'a ye Dawlatti" (the state publishing house) was burned down by Hezb-e Islami, all newspapers, magazines and weekly papers were printed by the printing-house of the Ghazali foundation. Massoud wanted to make sure that the freedom of press was ensured despite the difficult conditions. Although Massoud was responsible for the financing of the foundation, he did not interfere into its work. A council consisting of Gol Mohammd Yama, Dr. Mahdi, Haidari Wojoodi, Azizullah Ima, Engineer Said Yaqoob Nawid, Rahim Rafat and Sher Mohammad Khara in cooperation with the internationally well-known Afghan author Wasef Bakhtari led the foundation. The Ghazali foundation enabled Afghan artists to exhibit their works at different places in Kabul. Numerous artists and authors were honoured for their works; among others also Ustad Zabardast and Aziullah Ahmadi for best painting and Is'haaq Nangyaal for best poetry in Pashto.
    Nangyaal was neither a proponent of Massoud nor the government. The jury however consisted of impartial university lecturers, who had made the quality of the works the center of their attention. That was exactly what Massoud wanted for the Afghan artists.

    Establishing this foundation was one of Massoud's most important achievements in the cultural field. He wanted cultural institutions to create a common ground for mutual understanding, far off from political ideologies.

    The opponents of a sovereign Afghan government were now united in the "Shoraa ye Hamaahangi" (Council of Harmony), which had been forged by Iran, Pakistan and Uzbekistan. On 11.10.1372 (01.01.1993), they tried an insurrection against the new Afghan government. Massoud, then Afghan Secretary of Defence, could strike down this insurrection, which was supported by substantial military force.

    Hekmatyar, on behalf of the government of Pakistan, wanted to proclaim a “Confederation Pakistan – Afghanistan” under guidance of Pakistan. Thus, Afghanistan would have become a part of Pakistan and its independence would have been lost. Hekmatyar fought for this goal trying everything he could. The Pakistani government assigned Hekmatyar to take the city Kabul under rocket bombardment. This vigorous military support and influence by Pakistan went so far that daily up to 3.000 rockets were shot on Kabul, ten thousands civilians were murdered, and the city was nearly completely destroyed.
    Meanwhile there were still Massoud‘s innumerable conferences, negotiations, discussions and agreements with the diverse parties, groups and alliances, which were patched together by neighbour states depending upon those countries’ interests. Against so many enemies, who constantly brought up new points, like ethnical affiliation, language, race or regional special rights, but under the cloak of making their demands and claims to power against the government had only one goal in mind - the destabilization of the government - even Massoud was powerless. Still he did not give up his efforts to find a peaceful solution. Massoud’s opponents conducted great military offensives, massive missile attacks and hidden psycho terror against the civilian population. Hekmatyar, whose own representative was acting as Prime Minister in Kabul, blocked all roads to Kabul and thus cut off the city from any supplies. Such extortionate measures served his own position since he hoped for support from the population.
    By officially blaming Massoud for their dirty war, Hekmatyar and his followers effectively achieved character assassination, which resulted in Massoud continuously losing support among the population. The population of Kabul was now besieged, starved out, bombed, had rockets fired at them and lived like in a cage full of armed criminals. In this chaos, Massoud was expected and demanded to be fully in control.
    Massoud tried everything to get Hekmatyar not to shoot on the civilian population of the city but only on military positions. However, since Pakistan knew that Massoud was not to be defeated militarily, its government continued with its inhumane policy. One year later Hekmatyar made Massoud‘s resignation the condition for the end of the war. Massoud consented, which did not entail however under any circumstances an end of the attacks on the part of the Hezb-e Islami, Hekmatyar’s party.
    After Massoud had resigned from the office of Secretary of Defence, he assumed the command of the armed forces against the invasion from the neighbour states. The efforts of Pakistan to destroy the troops of Massoud had failed.
    Pakistan could win members of the different parties for her cause by bribery and promises, which equalled a character assassination of the entire Afghan resistance among the population. Since every armed person in Kabul was considered to be Massoud‘s follower and whatever he did was regarded as Massoud’s responsibility. Forgotten was the political affiliation of those who had been bought by the Pakistanis to different parties and leaders.

    In spring 1373 (1994) a conference in three parts was arranged. In the first meeting representatives from 15 different Afghan provinces met, in the second meeting there were already 25 provinces participating. From 29.04.-03.05.1373 (20.07.-25.07.1994) the conference of the High Islamic Council “Shoraa ye Aali Islami” was held as closing round of these three meetings.

    Massoud had united political and cultural personalities, governors, commanders, clergymen and representatives of the Mujaheddin in this council, in order to deliberate about the future president and his tasks and to reach a personnel agreement. Massoud, like most people in Afghanistan, saw this conference as a small hope for democracy and for free elections. His favourite for candidacy to the presidency was Dr. Yosuf, the first democratic Prime Minister under Zahir Shah, the former king. To avoid any influence on the council it was decided that acting President Prof. Rabani should not appear at the conference. Rabani did not stick to this decision and participated nevertheless in the conference.This led to the fact that the influence of the president and his fundamentalist followers grew to such a substantial extent that no decision about the future presidency could be reached.

    Meanwhile the Taliban conquered and acquired one area after another, until they finally stood at the gates of Kabul. They also conquered the terrain of Hekmatyar, Pakistan’s former favourite. Although Massoud enjoyed a high reputation within the Leading Council and his negative attitude for Hekmatyars opinions was well known, he had to accept Hekmatyar‘s entry in Kabul silently, since there were a lot of fundamentalists within the government, which endorsed Hekmatyar‘s politics. These fundamentalists had invited Hekmatyar to Kabul, who otherwise had lost everything, so he could take over his office as Prime Minister, despite the fact that he had tried his utmost within the last years to destroy that very government. Therefore, Massoud had enemies within his own camp that he could not subdue.

    At the beginning of 1375, (1996) Massoud went without company[27] to Maydan Shahr, Hekmatyar’s former stronghold, in order to induce the Taliban, which were represented by Mullah Rabani, to end the war. It was decided there, that the representatives of the Taliban should come to Kabul, to confer about the differences between the government and the Taliban and to find a possible solution. That happened and the decision was made those 40 representatives of the clergy, who should represent the government, should again meet with 40 representatives of the Taliban for further and more comprehensive consultation. The government expressed its readiness repeatedly, but without any reaction from the Taliban. Instead, they started their massive offensive against the government and against Kabul. The fact that Massoud had been able to leave their camp alive was very much regretted by the Taliban’s leadership. Mullah Rabani paid with his life for this lost opportunity to eliminate Massoud.

    When on 04.07.1375 (26.09.1996) the city of Kabul came under solid bombardment from the Taliban, Al Qaida[28] and Pakistan, Massoud ordered the retreat of the entire armed forces from Kabul, although he would have militarily been able to hold the city by street fights for an infinite time. For the protection of the civilian population of Kabul however, he preferred a retreat to Panjsher.

    Hekmatyar, who now had no more support from the ISI and who still was the official Prime Minister of the Afghan government, had no other option than to seek protection in Panjsher under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Massoud. Massoud gave him, like all other ministers and government members, safe-conduct abroad. Hekmatyar flew to Iran and stated then, Massoud had intended to have him assassinated in Panjsher through a terrorist attack.
    At a time where everyone friend or foe regarded that retreat as the irrevocable victory of the Taliban and the end of the Afghan resistance, that resistance started anew. When all other leaders already were abroad, the Afghan people, regardless of political, ethnical, ideological pr religious ties, fought for their freedom under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Massoud.
    When Massoud was asked by his brother Ahmad Wali in a telephone conversation to leave the country, something the political leadership insisted upon, he said: “Is it just that when we were in Kabul leading the country, when we had the people’s consent, we promised to protect them, to defend our independence and to take care of Afghanistan and its people and now that these people are in great danger we would leave them? Is this really justice? I do not think it is justified. I will stay in this country until my last breath and resist. I am convinced that, God willing, Afghanistan one day will be free.”

    The five-year resistance under Massoud against the Taliban, Bin Laden and Pakistan was one of the most impressive fights of the Afghan history.
    Massoud’s unparalleled skills in commanding an army, his tactical and strategical superiority, and his political ability earned him the nickname “Eagle of the Hindu Kush.”

    In winter 1375 (1996) Massoud was in a position to unite all opponents of the Taliban under his guidance in the first so-called "Jab-e Nejaat-e Melli bara-ye Aazaadi Afghanistan" (Front of National Rescue for the liberation of Afghanistan) and "Jabh-e Motahed-e Melli" (National United Front). This union did not consist, as spread in the Pakistani media and later in the West, of a “Northern Alliance,” thus only the “northern states” of Afghanistan, but included resistance forces from all parts of the country. The best-known members of the United Front were:
    From the Northern provinces were Haji Rahim, Commander Piram Qol, Haji Mohammad Mohaqeq, General Dostum, Qazi Kabir Marzban, Commander Ata Mohammad and General Malek. From the east were Haji Abdul Qadir, Commander Hazrat Ali, Commander Jaan Daad Khan and Abdullah Wahedi. From the northeast areas, Commander Qatrah and Commander Najmuddin participated. From the southern provinces, there were Commander Qari Baba, Noorzai, and Hotak. From the western and southwest provinces came General Ismail Khan, Doctor Ibrahim, and Fazlkarim Aimaq. From central Afghanistan Commander Anwari, Said Hussein Aalemi Balkhi, Said Mustafa Kazemi, Akbari, Mohammad Ali Jawed, Karim Khaili, Commander Sher Alam, and Professor Rassul Sayaf were members of this union.
    Therefore, there never existed an alliance that was only composed of leaders coming from the north, which would justify the name “Northern Alliance.” By using such propaganda, the claim of the Afghan resistance to represent the whole of Afghanistan was questioned and discredited.

    During all the years of resistance against the Soviet Union and later the Taliban and Al Qaeda, Massoud was well known for his benevolent treatment of prisoners. They were given the same food like the Mujahedin, were allowed to move freely within Panjsher and to see visitors as well as write and send letters.
    Mullah Yar Mohammad, a Taliban leader, said after being released from imprisonment by Massoud’s troops: “Massoud really is the son of the Afghan nation. He already fought once and now again he fights a foreign invader.”

    1376 (1997) Massoud summoned again a conference under his leadership to decide on the future Prime Minister. Abdul Rahim Ghafoorzai, who was not affiliated with any party, was the candidate at that time and without dissenting votes was elected as new Prime Minister. The new official and his political program were introduced via TV in Balkh. His program was cordially received by wide sections of the population. After the failed conference in Herat 1373 (1993), this was again a first step towards a new popular government.
    Massoud had the Afghan army equipped with newly acquired military uniforms and advanced after a few large offensive to the gates of Kabul. However, exactly at that time the new Prime Minister’s airplane crashed over Bamiyan. By Ghafoorzai‘s death, Massoud lost his hope for a stable government in Kabul.

    After awhile Massoud withdrew his troops from the north of Kabul again to Panjsher, since he did not intend to march into Kabul this time without having formed a government before which would be acceptable for all especially for the civilian population.

    After the retreat from Kabul and the following stream of refugees, which had multiplied the number of inhabitants in Panjsher, with the help of international organizations Massoud could build several schools in Panjsher, among them also some girlschools. His means were very scarce and the accommodation provisional, however this was his only possibility to ensure education for the children.

    When Massoud spoke about international terrorism, Al Qaida and Bin Laden, almost nobody in the West could envision what that meant[29].

    In the year 1377 (1998) Olivier Roy and Christoph De Ponfilly wrote in an essay: “Massoud never understood why CIA and Pentagon decided to support his enemy Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in the fight against him. Massoud always dreamed of a united and equal people in Afghanistan and also of free elections in this country.”

    On the insistence of delegates who had the opportunity to meet Massoud, and who were convinced by his opinion and the proof for foreign interference, Massoud was invited by the European Parliament in April 2001 to come to Paris and draw attention to his fight in Afghanistan. For his long standing efforts – especially for womens’ rights – the president of the European Parliament, Nicole Fontaine, called Massoud the “pole of freedom”.

    Roy & Ponfilly: “Ahmad Shah Massoud is, contrary to today's political personalities, in no case on the search for a task to which he is not up to. It is correct that Massoud talks to those who visit him; he does however not do anything that would cause them to visit him. It is difficult to make Massoud talk to the media. He permits filming him since he has nothing to hide.”

    Massoud appealed to all nations not to leave the Afghan people alone in their resistance, for if Afghanistan would lose against terrorism the whole world would lose. Only a few months later it turned out clearly that Massoud had been right.

    Changiz Palewan: “Afghanistan is grateful for this resistance. The international community is grateful for this resistance. In fact, the whole region is grateful for this resistance. For centuries, there was no leader in the region, who brought unity. There was no one, not in Iran nor anywhere else. Afghanistan gave us this leader.”

    Two foreign suicide assassins, who had camouflaged themselves as journalists murdered Ahmad Shah Masood on the 18.06.1380 (09.09.2001) in Khoaja Bahauddin in the Takhar province. On 24.06.1380 (15.09.2001), he was buried on the hill of Saricha in Panjsher. He himself had selected this place for his burial place before. Altogether, he spent 31 of 48 years of his life serving his country and his people and he knew that he would also lose his life in that service.

    Sebastian Junger remarks”: Despite him not being able to see the defeat of the Taliban, his war is finally won.”

    A wife and six children survive Massoud.

    Posthumously the Afghan Interim Government under president Karzai awarded him the title of “Hero of the Afghan Nation.”

    Reza: “Life is beautiful, my friend. I strongly believe this. One can kill a man, destroy his body, eradicate his flesh and blood, but not extinguish his thoughts.”


    Farzana

    www.afgha.com


    [1] The name has different forms of spelling; all combinations are used from the following options: Ahmad / Ahmed / Akhmad / Achmad, Shah / Schah / Chah, Massoud / Massud / Massood / Mas’ud.

    [2] According to the calendar “The Lion of Afghanistan“ published by the office of culture and education of the Shaid Ahmad Shah Massoud Foundation “Daftar-e Farhangi wa Amozeshi Bonyad-e Shahid Ahmad Shah Massoud“ for the year 1382 (2003/2004)

    [3] Also, found in several different spellings like Jungalak.

    [4] Also written as Panjshir.

    [5] Also found written as “Jami.”

    [6] From an extensive interview with authors Farzan and Ghiasi; published under the title “Marde Ostuwaar wa Omedwaar ba Ofoq haaye dur” ( A resolute man, hoping for far horizons)

    [7] Comparable to Highschool; as first foreign language French was taught at that school.

    [8] Also known as Mowlaanaa Jalaluddin-e Balkhi Rumi since he lived in Turkey for several years.

    [9] From the interview with Farzan / Ghiasi.

    [10] First president of Afghanistan 1351 – 1357, abolished the monarchy through an insurrection; he was the cousin of the then king Zahir Shah. His name also exists in various spellings as Dawood, Daood oder Dawud.

    [11] From an interview with Brigitte Sommer, the full text can be found on www.afgha.com

    [12] It should not be overlooked that this title had been invented by the people and was only later used by the media and by several authors.

    [13] From an interview with an engl. newspaper.

    [14] This is the plural of the word Mujahed: Also written as Mujahedin, Mujahideen, Mujahiddeen, Mudschahedin, Mudschaheddin, Mudschahidin, Mujahidin. The dictionary translates as follows: effort, exertion, struggle for faith, self- control, and castigation.

    [15] From an interview with Pepe Escobar

    [16] The complete interview was published in “Frankfurter Rundschau“ under the title “Das Vermächtnis des Löwen“

    [17] From an interview with Payame Mujahid

    [18] The trial was broadcast in Kabul evening TV. It was less a trial but more a sentencing with the outcome already decided.

    [19] Written also as Jehad or Jahad; for its meaning see Mujahideen.

    [20] To let the goodbye ceremonies for the Soviet soldiers happen in their full glory, the communist regime declared that the Islamic celebration after the Fasting Month of Ramadan, which was due the exact same day, had moved one day further.

    [21] In this council, all seven groups, including Hezb-e Islami and Hezb-e Jamiat-e Islami, participated. It was decided that after a 3-month term of office by Mujadedi Prof. Rabani would take over the presidency and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar would become Prime Minister.

    [22] The conversation was broadcast several times on Afghan TV.

    [23] “Taleb” means a student who strives for Islamic religious education; the plural is “Taliban”; the terms are also written “Talib” and “Taliban.”

    [24] In this school children from first to eighth grade were taught in two shifts; its name was “Maktab-e Ebteda’yi Amir Scher Ali Khan”.

    [25] Mohammad Ghazali 450 – 505 (1058 – 1111), author, theologian, philosopher and Sufi; his most famous work is “Kimiya-ye Sa’adat” (The Elixir of Bliss).

    [26] This was a request by the Taleban. Massoud agreed to it to demonstrate his peaceful and cooperative intentions.

    [27] Al Qaeda is a terror network, founded by Osama bin Laden (also Usama bin Ladin). Al Qaeda means “the base”.

    [28] In contrast to that, countries like Pakistan and the USA tried very hard to have Massoud surrender his weapons to the Taleban and cease resistance. Unlike the invasion by the Soviet Union, the Pakistani invasion was not even recognized in western media.

  8. #8
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    In Long Fight With Israel, Hezbollah Tactics Evolved
    By JOHN KIFNER
    http://www.library.cornell.edu/colld...east/hizbz.htm

    TYRE, Lebanon, July 14 -- Hezbollah, the Shiite Muslim guerrilla organization that forced Israel from the slice of southern Lebanon it had occupied for 22 years, grew from a small band of amateurish gunmen to a highly sophisticated tactical operation savvy enough to exploit a new weapon of modern warfare -- television.
    "The use of media as a weapon had an effect parallel to a battle," the top Hezbollah commander in southern Lebanon, Sheik Nabil Qaouk, said in a rare interview with a Western journalist. He discussed in unusual detail how Hezbollah learned to improve its effectiveness, strategy and weaponry, and how to videotape its successes for distribution to the media.

    "By the use of these films, we were able to control from a long distance the morale of a lot of Israelis," he said, underscoring how demoralization as much as defeat helped to drive the Israelis from southern Lebanon.

    From once relying on teenage suicide bombers to crash cars into Israeli installations in the mid-1980's, Hezbollah tactics -- primarily ambushes, assassinations and roadside bombs -- became increasingly well planned and executed, military observers in the region say.

    A turning point came three years ago this month with the ambush of a raid by elite Israeli naval commandos in which a dozen were killed.

    The Israelis halted such raids for more than a year, trying to find out what went wrong, and then Hezbollah put out word that it had penetrated Israeli intelligence, the sheik and Western military observers said, further halting Israeli counterinsurgency operations.

    The effect was to drive the Israelis into bunkers, conceding land and initiative to Hezbollah.

    And the impact of their strikes was amplified by the fact that they were videotaped by hidden Hezbollah cameramen and that the tape quickly found its way onto Israeli television, sometimes even as the Israeli Defense Forces spokesman denied the incident had taken place.

    The effect was what the military calls a "force multiplier," greatly undermining Israeli will.

    "Seventy-five percent of Hezbollah's war was the videotapes," said an experienced official with the United Nations peacekeeping troops in the area.

    The videotapes were rushed to Beirut, where copies were delivered to Lebanese television and Western news agencies like The Associated Press and Reuters, which made them widely available. They were, however, first shown on Hezbollah's own television station.

    The videos were often shown on the nightly television news in Israel, helping bring home the cost of the occupation. They were a stark contrast to the standard fare served up by Israeli military reporters, whose coverage was severely restricted and censored by the army. Blurred and grainy as they sometimes were, the Hezbollah videos contributed to the rising public pressure in Israel to bring the troops home.

    But the tape would not have been taken at all without the improved intelligence gathering and combat skills Hezbollah developed over the years.

    "When they first started, they thought they could do it with a bunch of people on a hill yelling 'Allah-u akbar,' " a United Nations official in the area said of the Hezbollah fighters. "They would lose 40 in an operation. Now they are very sophisticated, very disciplined."

    In the interview, Sheik Qauok said the guerrillas had been able to improve their effectiveness by studying each operation, learning from their mistakes and developing new uses for weaponry. He also outlined their reliance on sometimes stunningly low-tech methods to thwart Israel's more numerous and more sophisticated forces.

    "The resistance always focused on the weak points of the enemy," he said as he outlined a classic theory and practice of guerrilla warfare.

    Military experts say that at any one time Hezbollah maintained only about 500 full-time fighters, although it could mobilize many more supporters. The Israeli troops in southern Lebanon usually numbered about 1,500, backed up by 2,500 more troops in their proxy Lebanese militia, which collapsed and fled when the Israelis abruptly pulled out of southern Lebanon on May 24.

    Hezbollah officials say they lost

    1,200 fighters over the years, and yellow roadside markers are being put up at the spots where they fell. Hundreds of Israeli soldiers were also killed.

    There were two kinds of wars, Sheik Qaouk said, guerrilla war and conventional war. By alternating tactics, he went on, Hezbollah was able to maintain the initiative and, after a clash, melt away into a largely sympathetic populace.

    "By limiting the firing, we were able to keep the cards in our hands," the sheik said. "We were able to do small, little battles where we had the advantage.

    "Even the rockets the resistance used had to be used intelligently.

    We would do an action only in the time and place where it had an impact."

    The sheik and other military observers cited a number of Hezbollah innovations. These ranged from roadside bombs made of fake plastic rocks, which could be bought in Beirut garden stores for $15, to running farm animals across areas monitored by Israeli motion sensors. At the same time, Hezbollah had the ability to jam Israeli radar and closed-circuit television monitors.

    Since it was never driven and did not show up on Israeli heat sensors, an old Soviet T-55 tank hidden in a cave and fired sporadically took the Israelis months to find, the sheik said. Hezbollah fighters discovered that wire-guided antitank rockets, which can, in effect, be steered in flight, could be directed into small openings in concrete bunkers.

    "Even the man who invented these rockets did not know this," Sheik Qaouk bragged. The sheik smilingly refused to say if they had American-made TOW missles, more accurate than the old Saggars they had been using.

    Word on the street, when the tactics changed early this year, was that the TOW missles were given to Hezbollah from Iran, which got them from Israel as part of President Reagan's Iran-Contra-hostage deal.

    Above all, the sheik said, he and his fighters "were always ready for martyrdom," but the Israeli soldier "probably wasn't ready to die for this."

    "More important than everything," he said, "is that the Israeli soldier didn't believe in the war."

    He also stressed the importance of a good intelligence network. The effectiveness of that network was demonstrated with the assassination on Feb. 28 last year of Brig. Gen. Eretz Gerstien, the top Israeli Army liaison officer to the proxy militia, known as the South Lebanon Army, by a roadside bomb as his car passed in a military convoy. He was the highest-ranking Israeli officer killed during the occupation.

    Similarly, last Jan. 30, the militia's second-ranking commander, Col. Akl Hashem, was killed by a bomb at his house in Merj 'Uyun, a mainly Christian community.


    http://www.meib.org/articles/0003_l2.htm

    The Secrets behind Hezbollah's Recent Military Successes
    MEIB Staff

    After a relative lull in fighting during the last several months of 1999, seven IDF soldiers and twelve SLA soldiers were killed in south Lebanon during the months of January and February. According to information obtained by MEIB military analysts, the series of successful attacks by Hezbollah guerrillas over the last month and a half are attributable in large part to the recent influx of improved weaponry.

    Prior to the recent spate of attacks, Hezbollah commandos relied primarily on relatively outdated Soviet-built AT-3 'Sagger' and AT-4 'Spigot' missiles to attack Israeli tanks and armored personnel carriers in the security zone. By the end of last year, however, the IDF had severely curtailed the effectiveness of such close-range attacks by discontinuing tank patrols near the front lines and reinforcing the fortifications of its outposts. In addition, Israeli troops were concentrated in seven outposts deemed to be less vulnerable to attack, leaving the SLA to defend the other eighteen major positions in the security zone.

    Over the last few months, however, Damascus decided to permit shipments of more advanced weapons from Hezbollah's Iranian suppliers, including American-made wire-guided TOW anti-tank missiles, which have a longer range and more powerful payload--ironically these weapons had been delivered to Iran by Israel itself during the so-called Irangate scandal in the 1980's.1 At least two attacks since late January involved the use of TOW anti-tank missiles--one against the IDF outpost at Ezziyeh overlooking the Litani river, which killed three Israeli soldiers, and a second at Dabche a few days later, which killed another Israeli soldier. In one attack, Hezbollah guerrillas managed to fire a TOW anti-tank missile through a small slit in a reinforced bunker. Israel has recently attempted to minimize the TOW threat by erecting towers holding 15 meter high mesh nets around IDF and SLA positions.

    In addition, Hezbollah reportedly has received shipments of upgraded Katyusha missiles with a 20 km range and al-Fajr missiles with a 70 km range.2 The al-Fajr missiles pose a significantly greater threat than the Katyushas because their extended range enables them to strike major population centers, such as the Mediterranean port of Haifa, Israel's third largest city. However, Hezbollah's commander in south Lebanon, Sheik Nabil Kaouk, cannot order the use of the al-Fajr missiles without authorization from Syrian officials--they are being held as a "strategic reserve" in the event that Damascus chooses to escalate the conflict with Israel to serve its strategic objectives. Although Syria has longer-range missiles that can strike further into Israel, ordering Hezbollah to fire al-Fajr missiles into Israel allows Damascus to claim "plausible deniability" and thus avoid Israeli retaliation against Syrian targets.

    In an apparent effort to deprive Syria of "plausible deniability," Israel threatened late last month to target Syrian "interests" in Lebanon if attacks by Hezbollah continue to escalate. "In the ladder of response, there is one step which may bear results -- to take Syrian interests in Lebanon and put them at risk, as they put ours at risk," said Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh. "I profoundly hope we would not be obliged to hit Syrian targets, because our policy is to make peace with Syria, not to wage war," he added.3

    1 "Inside south Lebanon," Foreign Report, February 2000.
    2 "Hezbollah's Aims in Lebanon," Intelligence Newsletter, 2 March 2000.
    3 "Israel Threatens Syrian Interests in Lebanon," Reuters, 29 February 2000.


    © 2000 Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. All rights reserved.



    http://www.meforum.org/article/806

    Hezbollah's Strategic Threat to Israel
    by Patrick Devenny

    In May 2005, as international pressure increased for Hezbollah's disarmament,[1] the group's spiritual leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, announced, "They say [we have] 12,000 rockets ... I say more than 12,000 rockets."[2] It was the first time Nasrallah had ever publicly quantified Hezbollah's arsenal. The risk of escalation has increased in recent years as internal events in Lebanon become less predictable and as Iranian and Hezbollah activities and interests have come into greater conflict with U.S. and Israeli security concerns. A number of scenarios exist in which Hezbollah might order a missile strike against Israel. As the Iranian government works to develop nuclear weapons, both the U.S. and Israeli leadership may consider a military strike to delay achievement of that capability. Hezbollah may also be tempted to apply its deterrent to Israeli actions in any renewed conflict with Palestinian groups or strike at Israel as it lays a claim to a greater regional role or to Jerusalem.

    The Threat
    The Hezbollah missile threat to Israel has expanded not only in quantity but also in quality. In recent years, the group's operational artillery reach has grown. Experts and analysts generally put the Hezbollah rocket force somewhere between 10,000 and 12,000 missiles.[3] The heart of this arsenal remains rooted in Hezbollah's massive stocks—perhaps 7,000 to 8,000—of 107mm and 122mm Katyusha rockets, virtually all of which were supplied directly from existing Iranian army stocks.[4]

    In the past, these were used to attack Israeli border towns and settlements. Hezbollah wields two variations of the 107mm rocket, one man-held while the other is fired from the approximately 144 Haseb-type multi-barrel rocket launcher mobile systems provided to Hezbollah by Iran. The 107mm has a small payload and an effective range of just over 5 miles. Most of Hezbollah's more deadly 122mm rockets are man-portable, but the organization does field over 70 mobile Noor, Hadid, and Awash multi-barrel rocket launcher systems which fire heavier rounds with warheads weighing over 100 pounds capable of reaching targets up to 20 miles away.[5]

    Of far greater concern to Israel than these antiquated and relatively short-range projectiles are Hezbollah's growing stocks of Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets. Iran began large-scale delivery of the Fajr-3 in 2000 and the Fajr-5 in 2002, with the approval of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.[6] Iranian cargo and passenger jets transport the weaponry from Iran to Damascus International Airport where they can be off-loaded by Hezbollah agents and members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The weapons are then trucked to the Bekaa Valley. Other reports suggest some Iranian cargo flights land at Beirut International Airport, providing Hezbollah with a more direct supply route although this process may have changed with the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and the change in Lebanese government.[7]

    The Fajr-type rocket represents a significant upgrade to any threat assessment of Hezbollah. Designed by Iran with aid from China and North Korea, both classes of weapons are fired from mobile launchers, including customized Japanese trucks, and carry 200 pound high-explosive payloads. The Fajr-3 has a range of 25 miles while its more powerful upgrade, the Fajr-5, has a range of 45 miles. Accordingly, the Fajr extends Hezbollah's strike range well beyond Haifa. While the number of Fajr missiles in Hezbollah's possession is unclear, Israeli estimates suggest an arsenal of at least several hundred.[8] In addition, Hezbollah has an unknown number of other missiles such as Syrian reproductions of Soviet BM-27 220mm rocket systems, which also can carry a warhead of 220 pounds to a range between 30-45 miles.

    How Would Hezbollah Attack Israel?
    Hezbollah's augmented arsenal has transformed it, from an Israeli perspective, from a manageable border menace to a strategic threat. Traditionally, Israel's northern administrative region has borne the brunt of rocket attacks across the Lebanese frontier. First, Palestinian terrorists and, later, Hezbollah have launched shells and rockets into the towns and kibbutzim (collective farms and settlements) near the border. While disruptive, civilians living in Israel's northern regions have adjusted to the threat, keeping shelters well stocked and accessible. A concentrated barrage of 122mm rockets further south, for example, on a town like Safed, could be far more destructive and render the town unable to function. Heavy damage would lead to breakdowns in regional power supply, communication, and transportation.

    Adding the Fajr rockets to the mix, however, raises the threat. Haifa, Israel's third largest city with a population of some 270,000 people, now lies within Hezbollah range. Even a modest barrage of 75 Fajr-5 rockets hitting the city would represent 15,000 pounds of high explosives detonating in the midst of a densely populated cosmopolitan area. The coastal cities of Acre and Nahariya—with populations of 55,000 and 41,000 respectively—might expect an even heavier assault due to Hezbollah's ability to target them with both the Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 models. While the Fajrs are not very precise—the sheer number of rockets at Hezbollah's disposal makes Israel vulnerable.

    Any Hezbollah barrage will not likely be random, however. The group's external intelligence service has concentrated recently on targets and trajectory algorithm selection. In January 2005, Israeli security detained Danish citizen Iyad ash-Shua after he was caught filming northern Israeli military installations on behalf of Hezbollah.[9] The arrests of other Hezbollah agents have indicated the group's special interest in fuel refineries and military bases around Haifa.

    Moreover, Hezbollah no longer depends exclusively on human intelligence. The group now has access to Iranian-designed and controlled Mirsad One unmanned aerial vehicles. While crude and rudimentary, the Mirsad is able to transmit live video footage, a capability instrumental in scouting targets that were previously inaccessible to Hezbollah human intelligence agents.[10] In addition to the Mirsad, Hezbollah planners now have access to commercially available, high-resolution satellite photographs and open-source geographical imagery offered by companies such as GlobeXplorer and Google. These may enhance Hezbollah's targeting ability.

    While Hezbollah would launch its rockets with the goal of causing mass casualties to shock and demoralize the Israeli population, they would also likely attempt smaller but more devastating infrastructure assaults. High-value targets would include the industrial section of Haifa, whose sprawling petrochemical plants and oil refinery would be vulnerable to bombardment. The loss of the Haifa refinery, one of only two such installations in Israel, would threaten Israel's economic security. Hezbollah could also launch rockets against the city's port and Matam Park, a hub of Israeli high-tech development. Even minor damage could lead to serious disruptions in Israel's delicate economic framework. The vulnerability of the Israeli economy to a Hezbollah rocket attack was demonstrated by events in 1996 when the group fired over 500 Katyushas into northern Israel; Israeli officials placed the cost of the relatively minor two-week assault at approximately US$100 million.[11]

    Credible Defense?
    Discovering the missile positions has been a challenge for the Israeli military. While the bulk of the short-range Katyushas are situated in the southern border region of Lebanon controlled by Hezbollah since the Israeli withdrawal of May 2000, the Fajrs are more elusive. Hezbollah has likely pre-selected a network of firing positions close to the Israeli-Lebanese border that would enable rapid launch procedures and accurate targeting measurements. Truck-mounted launchers, though, can be disguised to travel on civilian roads without attracting attention.

    Facing such a threat, Israel has worked to develop advanced anti-rocket systems. The centerpiece of this effort is the Tactical High-Energy Laser program (THEL). The development of the THEL began in 1996 and represents a joint effort between Northrop Grumman and several other smaller Israeli and U.S. subcontractors, all working on behalf of the U.S. Space and Missile Defense Command and the Israeli Ministry of Defense. The device was first tested successfully in 2000, leading three years later to the development of the Mobile THEL (MTHEL), which represents a more flexible wartime defensive response. Further controlled tests have been relatively successful with the THEL destroying numerous incoming rockets and artillery shells. The first operational versions of THEL/MTHEL are not expected to be fielded by the Israel Defense Forces until 2008 at the earliest, at a procurement cost of $25 million per unit.[12]

    THEL could negate much of Hezbollah's lower-grade missile threat. The THEL has proven its effectiveness against Katyusha-style rockets in particular, destroying numerous short-range weapons even when they are fired in mass volleys. However, preliminary indications suggest that the THEL will be unable to engage the Fajr series and will not be able to shield Israel for several more years, during which time crises involving the Iranian nuclear program and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict could escalate.[13]

    Denied an effective defense against incoming projectiles, the Israeli government would have little choice but to mitigate Hezbollah's new capability with a preemptive attack, much as the Israeli air force negated the Egyptian air force in the first hours of the 1967 Six-Day war. The responsibility for preemptive or reactive strikes would fall primarily to the Israeli air force fleet of fighter-attack aircraft, such as the F-16 Falcon, along with helicopter gunships such as the AH-64 Apache.

    Only if Israel launched a preemptive strike would it have sufficient time to prepare the battlefield. Such a process would include active reconnaissance followed by air strikes intended to degrade Hezbollah's rocket force before it could be deployed. Hezbollah does enjoy some air-to-surface missile capability, but the Israeli air force could overwhelm it. Nevertheless, because so many Hezbollah rockets are mobile and man-portable—and because the Fajr-5 requires little time to launch—Hezbollah could still fire a significant salvo, even under omnipresent air cover.

    A better option would be a preemptive Israeli ground incursion into southern Lebanon negating the ability of the group to fire mass numbers of Katyushas into Israel proper. The Fajr missiles could still deploy, but their range umbrella would be limited by the ongoing operation. The greatest benefit of a rapid Israeli ground offensive would be the destabilization effect it would create with regard to Hezbollah operations. Their orderly positioning scheme would be disrupted as would their ability to travel freely the roads of southern Lebanon. Such an Israeli effort would rely on speed in order to punch through Hezbollah defenses and engage the rocket launchers. Hezbollah, wary of a future Israeli incursion, has laid minefields and constructed artillery positions.[14] These preparations will do little to stop an Israeli offensive but would buy the organization time to retreat.

    Even if Israeli ground forces did drive into southern Lebanon, the defensive advantage would be temporary. While Hezbollah positions, equipment, and manpower would be degraded by an Israeli assault, these components are replaceable. Hezbollah, after all, has faced concentrated artillery and air attacks from Israel before and has had little difficulty in further expanding its power and strategic reach.

    Is a New Conflict on the Horizon?
    Former Israel Defense Forces officer and military expert Moshe Marzuk expressed Israeli unease when he said, "The purpose of the [Hezbollah] rockets is not to decorate south Lebanon."[15] Hezbollah is both a creation and client of Iran and, more specifically, of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Its ideology mimics the twin pillars of religious rule and export of revolution that is the basis of the Iranian theocracy.[16] The Iranian government may consider the Hezbollah arsenal as a forward deployment of its own capability, just as the Soviet Union once stationed its missiles in Cuba.

    The Hezbollah leadership maintains tight contacts with Iran's leadership and security apparatus. Nasrallah is a frequent visitor to Iran, as is Imad Mugniyah,[17] Hezbollah's operations chief and a suspect in a number of anti-U.S. and anti-Israel terrorist attacks. Hezbollah religious leaders such as Ayatollah Fadlallah have trained in Iranian seminaries and maintain close connections with the ruling Iranian clerics. While the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah is, in many ways, an outgrowth of this more informal connection, the Iranian government has also instituted a bureaucratic mechanism to maintain their interests within the organization. Iran has tasked the Ministry of Information and Security and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps to guide the actions of their surrogates. To cement the connection at lower levels, promising Hezbollah recruits are sent to Iran for training and indoctrination, including time at the Iranian intelligence academy.[18] This institutional bond is bolstered by the material and financial connection, which has increased following the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 to the tune of an estimated $100 million a year.[19]

    An ancillary component of the Iranian ability to order a Hezbollah rocket attack is the question of who has physical control of the ordinance. While such a question may seem superfluous given the considerable, even if remote influence wielded by the Iranian leadership over the command structure of Hezbollah, it is, nonetheless, relevant. Considering the importance of the rocket arsenal and the relative ease in launching the units, the Iranian leadership may not have entrusted fire control to the Hezbollah leaders. Iran's mechanism of control in Lebanon is embodied in Revolutionary Guard forces stationed in Hezbollah-held areas since the Lebanese civil war. The Revolutionary Guards have been involved in supply, training, and construction of several secured storage sites. The pace of their efforts has increased over the past few years, matching the rise in associated diplomatic tensions resulting from Iran's pursuit of nuclear capability. Until earlier this year, the rockets were apparently kept under the shared control of both the Syrian military and the in-country Revolutionary Guards. While Iranian deployments in Lebanon have shifted in recent years for cosmetic political reasons, there is no indication that their presence has declined.[20]

    The withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in April 2005 may have worsened the security situation in southern Lebanon with regard to Israel. Damascus long exerted a brake on Hezbollah's actions for fear that Israel would hold it as suzerain responsible for terrorism emanating from Lebanon. The Syrian government invoked this controlling interest in 2001 when Israeli warplanes destroyed Syrian radar sites in Lebanon in retaliation for a Hezbollah rocket attack. Following the destruction of the radar sites, Damascus restricted further Hezbollah attacks.[21] Likewise, in October 2003, the Israeli air force attacked a Syrian-run terrorist training camp located ten miles from Damascus in response to the terrorist bombing of a Haifa seaside resort that resulted in nineteen Israeli deaths.[22] But with the Syrian military gone from southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, Damascus no longer needs to restrain Hezbollah. Tehran, meanwhile, may feel that its distance from Israel insulates it from retaliation.

    Will Hezbollah Launch the Rockets?
    The augmentation and modernization of the Hezbollah rocket capability poses a significant threat to Israel. Opposition to Israel's right to exist lies at the heart of the Islamic Republic's ideology. On December 31, 1999, before tens of thousands at a Jerusalem Day rally in Tehran, Iranian supreme leader ‘Ali Khamene'i declared, "There is only one solution to the Middle East problem, namely the annihilation and destruction of the Zionist state."[23] Israel's ability to deter an attack depends upon the retaliatory threat Israel poses to Iran. Should Tehran acquire nuclear weapons, the Iranian government's fear of Israeli retaliations would dissipate. On December 14, 2001, then-Iranian president ‘Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani said, "The use of an atomic bomb against Israel would totally destroy Israel, while [the same] against the Islamic world would only cause damage. Such a scenario is not inconceivable."[24]

    Assuming—as many analysts do—that the Islamic Republic will acquire nuclear capability, Israel's window of opportunity to deter Iran is limited. In order to prevent or delay such capability, Israel may seek to strike Iranian nuclear facilities in a fashion similar to the 1981 Israeli air force attacks on the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor. Israel itself has done little to deflect such speculation, with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon saying, "Israel will not allow Iran to be equipped with a nuclear weapon."[25] Vice President Dick Cheney suggested in a January 2005 interview that Israel might attack the Iranian reactors were it to feel sufficiently threatened.[26] While the White House had welcomed the opportunity for the EU-3 to try diplomacy,[27] President Bush has made the U.S. position clear. In June 2003, he declared that the United States "will not tolerate the construction of a nuclear weapon."[28]

    As Israel and its closest ally—the United States—consider some form of confrontation with Iran, Tehran's Hezbollah card raises many questions: would an Israeli government be willing to risk a high level of damage in order to accomplish the goal of crippling Iran's nuclear infrastructure? Conversely, if Iran were to acquire a nuclear strike capability, would Hezbollah consider itself shielded and be emboldened to augment its involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict? Might the group even launch a first strike for its own ideological reasons?

    A targeted Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities would prove difficult logistically. Iran is both farther away from Israel than was Iraq, and its nuclear sites are dispersed over a wide area. Iran would likely respond to any Israeli strike on its nuclear facilities with a Hezbollah missile barrage, thereby exacting revenge while maintaining its own distance. The aggregate Israeli conventional threat against the Iranian nuclear program is minor in comparison to a potential Hezbollah response targeting Israel and its economy.[29]

    Hezbollah itself would have little to fear from the international community. While the United Nations Security Council has demonstrated a willingness to condemn Hezbollah and call for its disarmament,[30] after any missile launch, a U.N. condemnation would be immaterial. The damage would be done. Should the Israeli military enter southern Lebanon in retaliation, the international community would likely dilute its condemnation of Hezbollah.

    The scenario is far from academic. The continuing diplomatic impasse between Iran and the West brings military action into the realm of reality. On September 24, 2005, the International Atomic Energy Agency found Iran "non-compliant" with its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and recommended referral to the U.N. Security Council.[31] The Iranian government rejected the finding with bluster. "There is no legal reason for such a measure but if the West intends to adopt bullying attitude, it can do so and see which sides will incur damage most," Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid-Reza Asefi said.[32]

    In the wake of the IAEA ruling, several Israeli officials restated their unwillingness to tolerate a nuclear Iran. On September 29, Yuval Steinitz, chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, suggested that U.S. and European officials should make clear to their Iranian counterparts there would be "no chance [Iran] will ever see the fruits of a nuclear program."[33] Yosef Lapid, leader of Israel's centrist Shinui Party, said Israel "will not live under the threat of an Iranian nuclear bomb."[34]

    Should the impasse continue and a military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities be considered, Washington and Jerusalem may not be able to limit the conflict to the Iranian theater. Because Tehran may consider Hezbollah to be its best avenue to either deter or retaliate for a U.S. or Israeli attack, any U.S. or Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would likely be accompanied by an Israeli ground assault into Lebanon, an event with serious diplomatic and military implications. Israeli raids into Lebanon could serve as an excuse for opponents of the peace process to augment their terror sponsorship. A populist backlash might undercut Lebanon's fragile political stability. Anti-Israel and anti-American sentiment would skyrocket across not only the Middle East but Europe as well.

    Iranian ideologues, Hezbollah leaders, and their sympathizers may find such a backlash to their advantage. Some may calculate it to their interest to instigate conflict, even prior to any strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Hezbollah's ideology attracts such diehard opponents of both Israel's right to exist and Western liberalism. In an August 2000 video broadcast on the group's Al-Manar satellite channel, Nasrallah declared, "Israel is utterly null and void, and it's a raping, deviant, occupying, terrorist, cancerous entity that has no legitimacy or legality at all, and never will" while a chorus sang, "From the land of angry Jerusalem, drive out the raping occupier … Strike them with the stone, slingshot, and knife."[35]

    While many Western analysts may consider the possibility remote, there is nevertheless a chance that Hezbollah or a constituent faction might launch a barrage against Israel for strategic or ideological reasons. For example, the group might threaten a missile strike to pressure Israel to deter a military operation against Palestinian terrorists in Gaza or the West Bank. Such a move might both deter Israel and augment Hezbollah's position in the eyes of ordinary Palestinians, especially when juxtaposed to a weak Palestinian Authority. While such a scenario would suggest a level of Hezbollah autonomy vis-à-vis Iran and Syria unexpressed during the first two Palestinian uprisings, terrorists groups and militias have over time grown more willing to engage in violence. A number of Palestinian factions and terrorists groups participated in the second intifada in order to claim the same legitimacy through bloodshed claimed by those Palestinians who led the first intifada.[36]

    Conclusion
    Hezbollah will maintain its rocket arsenal as long as Iran continues its violent opposition to Israel's right to exist, the Assad regime retains control in Syria, and Hezbollah continues to leverage its militia for political power inside Lebanon. Hezbollah may find the threat of its arsenal outweighs its use.

    The deployment of more than 10,000 missiles, in combination with international tension over the Iranian nuclear program and growing discord in Gaza, undercuts U.S. interests in the region and complicates or curtails policy options in Washington's battle against proliferation and the global war on terror. There is a tendency for diplomats to compromise, consider, and delay. In southern Lebanon, the failure to address Hezbollah's arsenal today may escalate future violence in an already volatile region.

    Patrick Devenny is the Henry M. Jackson National Security Fellow at the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C.

    [1] U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, S/RES/1559 (2004), Sept. 2, 2004.
    [2] Associated Press, May 25, 2005.
    [3] The Jerusalem Post, June 7, 2004.
    [4] Calgary Herald, Sept. 28, 2002.
    [5] All technical military information, unless otherwise noted, comes from the following sources: "Iranian Artillery Rockets," Global Security, Washington, D.C., accessed Sept. 28, 2005; Gary C. Gambill, "Hezbollah's Strategic Rocket Arsenal," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Nov.-Dec. 2002; Defense News, Dec. 13, 2004.
    [6] The Miami Herald, Apr. 12, 2002.
    [7] Yedi'ot Aharonot (Tel Aviv), Oct. 7, 1999.
    [8] The New York Times, Sept. 27, 2002.
    [9] Agence France-Presse, Jan. 26, 2005.
    [10] Agence France-Presse, Dec. 12, 2002; Associated Press, Feb. 2, 2005; The New York Times, Apr. 12, 2005.
    [11] Agence France-Presse, Apr. 22, 1996.
    [12] Associated Press, May 7, 2004.
    [13] Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 1, 2002.
    [14] The Daily Star (Beirut), Mar. 20, 2003.
    [15] "Sparks of War Reach Lebanon," Global Information Network, Aug. 16, 2003.
    [16] Ahmad Hamzeh, In the Path of Hezbollah (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), p. 109.
    [17] Ukaz (Riyadh), Oct. 13, 2001.
    [18] Kathryn Haahr-Escolano, "Iran's Changing Relationship with Hezbollah," Terrorism Monitor, Oct. 2004, pp. 6-8.
    [19] Daniel Byman, "Should Hezbollah Be Next?" Foreign Affairs, Nov.-Dec. 2003, pp. 54-63.
    [20] Gambill, "Hezbollah's Strategic Rocket Arsenal"; Canadian Jewish News, Mar. 10, 2005; The New Yorker, Oct. 14, 2002.
    [21] Associated Press, July 8, 2001. For the Syrian response, see Flynt Leverett, Inheriting Syria: Bashar's Trial by Fire (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), p. 263.
    [22] The Chicago Tribune, Oct. 6, 2003.
    [23] Daily Telegraph (London), Jan. 1, 2000.
    [24] Agence France-Presse, Dec. 14, 2001.
    [25] Sunday Times (London), July 18, 2004.
    [26] Sunday Times (London), July 18, 2004; The Washington Post, Jan. 21, 2005.
    [27] Condoleezza Rice, "U.S. Support for the EU3," Washington, D.C., Mar. 11, 2005.
    [28] News release, White House, June 18, 2003.
    [29] Ehsaneh Sadr, "The Impact of Iran's Nuclearization on Israel," Middle East Policy, Summer 2005, p. 58.
    [30] U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559.
    [31] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency, Board of
    Governors, Sept. 24, 2005, GOV/2005/77.
    [32] Islamic Republic News Agency, Sept. 27, 2005.
    [33] The Washington Times, Sept. 30, 2005.
    [34] Ibid.
    [35] Avi Jorisch, Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballah's Al-Manar Television (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004), pp. 62-3.
    [36] See, for example, Reuven Paz, "Force-17: The Renewal of Old Competition Motivates Violence," PeaceWatch, no. 316, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Apr. 5, 2001.
    Last edited by troung; 10 Feb 06, at 06:02.

  9. #9
    A Self Important Senior Contributor troung's Avatar
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    Counter Insurgency in various countries:

    Feb, 2006
    By: Dr Thomas A. Marks Posted on: 3/12/2006

    Everyone except Nepal has them

    By Dr. Thomas A. Marks

    Local forces are an absolute requirement in restoration of legitimate government writ. This is true, as explained decades ago by T E Lawrence (he “of Arabia”), from the insurgent standpoint, in Chapter XXXIII of Seven Pillars of Wisdom. It all boiled down to numbers, time and space.

    Put in simplest terms: The insurgents can choose the time and place to strike. The state can never field adequate numbers of full-time personnel to provide adequate security for the population. This can only be done by involving the population in their own defense.

    All states involved in situations such as now afflict Nepal have been forced to use temporary, variously armed and equipped, local forces. They are nothing more than what in many Western countries is called “neighborhood watch.” (My neighborhood has one!)

    It is significant that international critics of local defense as a concept, human rights groups in particular, have gone to extreme lengths to portray it as vigilante or death squad activity. To this end, reports issued routinely distort historical reality in an effort to mobilize donor and government opposition to victims’ efforts to defend themselves.

    This new colonialism necessarily preys upon the weak, since it is non-Western states lacking capacity that find themselves facing the sort of challenge where local defense is necessary. Part and parcel of the human rights campaign is a systematic effort to portray security forces as abusers, the insurgents or terrorists as a necessary consequence, a legitimate consequence even, of state brutality and insensitivity.

    Colombian Example

    No state has suffered more abuse in this regard than Colombia. Yet it has, under its present democratic government, the administration of President Alvaro Uribe (2002-06), made significant strides. Through its “Democratic Security” strategy, it has been able to return to Colombians a measure of personal and institutional security. Local forces have been an important part of the campaign.

    Colombian Army (COLAR) units (as well as the far fewer Marine units) are deployed throughout the country in a national grid, supported by the air force (FAC) and navy (ARC). The country is covered by seven COLAR divisions comprising 18 maneuver brigades of varying numbers of battalions of all arms (an eighth, division-sized force is the national reaction force, FUDRA; a further division-sized Joint Task Force is deployed in operations southeast of Bogota). These units conduct continuous operations within their assigned sectors.

    Immediate reaction capabilities are organic to every division and brigade, because each has assigned to it one or more counter-guerrilla battalions (BCG, effectively light infantry brigades). Additionally, divisions have organic Mobile Brigades (BRIM) comprised of 4 x BCG each. BCG are approximately 40% the strength of a normal battalion and are organized and equipped to be self-sustaining.

    Other formations complement the actions of the divisions and brigades. Each division, for example, has assigned to it urban commando units, as well as elite urban reaction strike teams. Likewise, a task-organized “Plan Meteor” is in reality an armored brigade specifically responsible for clearing the transportation network nationwide; though a CG COLAR asset, its units are OPCON (i.e., under operational control) to the divisions.

    Also OPCON are special units (PEEV) to safeguard critical infrastructure (they are identical to regular COLAR units, in the fashion of units of India’s Central Industrial Security Force, CISF, but unlike CISF are actual army units with a specialized mission).

    Until recently, the key missing component was local defense. This shortcoming has been rectified during the past two years by use of a 1940s law that allows draftees, who comprise approximately two-thirds of COLAR, to be assigned to local defense units permanently assigned in towns and villages. The units themselves--more than 600 platoons (~40 men each) have been fielded, with more being stood up--are part of the regular forces, either COLAR or Marines (police are not at present involved).

    Key personnel are regulars, and each platoon is a part of the structure of a COLAR/Marine battalion. Platoons are armed, equipped, and run as a battalion asset.

    Two names are presently in use for these formations, the most widespread being “Peasant Platoons,” the other “Home Guards” (or, literally translated, “soldiers of the village”). They were stood up very rapidly, with localities required to furnish temporary housing while the particulars were sorted out.

    Members, being a part of the security forces, receive the same training and weapons/equipment, and are under the same regulations. Their primary duty is to be back-up for the local police and to conduct local security operations, especially of point targets and the transportation network. They live in barracks but remain in their local area. Plans are afoot to augment them with regional forces; i.e., platoons that serve within an entire county (municipio) or larger area.

    Allowing for the usual problems inherent to any such effort, the program has been very successful. Aside from the mundane (e.g. obtaining adequate barracks), the most pressing concern has not been the expected – i.e., developing principles for employment – rather finding sufficient numbers from the regular forces to fill the numerous leadership positions. Since abbreviated Officer Candidate School (OCS) programs have historically not worked well in Colombia (in contrast to the experience of the American armed forces), the immediate solution has been to shorten time spent at the military academy, with cadets graduating early to become platoon leaders.

    Teething issues aside, the result has been to give the security forces local presence within a disciplined framework. All platoons are fielded as components of regular forces, so they are integrated into normal planning considerations (e.g. of reinforcement). To date, none have been overrun or even severely tested.

    Neither have there been any serious problems of discipline or adherence to human rights standards. What they have done is to boost local security and become important generators of intelligence.

    Comparisons with selected foreign experiences

    ● United Kingdom – Northern Ireland (Ulster)

    In its particulars, the Colombian use of local forces is closest to that of the United Kingdom as practiced in Northern Ireland (i.e. Ulster). There, the British position was built upon local capacity in a manner that was ill-understood by observers in general and the media.

    In the 1990s (e.g. 1991), there were just 10 regular army battalions deployed to Ulster in three brigades: 39 Brigade, with responsibility for the Greater Belfast area; 8 Brigade, in the north and southwest near Londonderry; and 3 Brigade, in the southeast in Armagh. Their TAOR (Tactical Area of Responsibility) embraced 20-25% of Ulster. The remainder, three-quarters of the whole, was charged to the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR), later (in a name change), the Royal Irish Regiment (RIR). At nine battalions, it was the largest regiment in the British army and, in reality, local forces.

    Created to deal with the security situation in Ulster, the UDR’s units performed virtually all the roles that were expected of regular battalions. Each battalion was built around a cadre of some 120 regular army officers and soldiers. All battalion commanders, for instance, were initially posted to their assignments from regular units (with the assignment much sought after, because it counted as an operational command).

    Aside from this small cadre, though, UDR personnel were recruited locally and worked as part-timers, they received standard army training, equipment, and pay and allowances. Their service was such that there was roughly a 50-50 mix of full-time and part-time personnel present in any particular battalion.

    All UDR members lived at home – there were no UDR barracks – which made them vulnerable but was one of the program’s attractions. Of the 191 UDR soldiers who had been killed during “the Troubles” as of mid-1991, 82 percent had been assassinated whole off-duty (the regular army had suffered an additional 428 killed, the police, 277).

    In effect, the UDR proved that local forces are indispensable to a successful counterinsurgency campaign. Many, particularly among the full-timers, were former army personnel. Knowing well their home turf, they made a formidable addition to the British ranks.

    Further refinement came when the single “Irish” battalion in the regular force structure was combined with the UDR to make the “Royal Irish Regiment.” It offered enhanced options for all personnel, to include the majority “local manpower,” through further inclusion in opportunities afforded regular units: e.g. career broadening tours (i.e. outside Ulster) and greater access to career enhancement (i.e. enhanced opportunities to command).

    Being a part of the regular force structure, RIR could use the mechanisms of the regimental system to field as many battalions as were called for by the security situation – or to demobilize them. As a practical matter, RIR, as local forces, allowed the British to withdraw regular units needed elsewhere and yet maintain the security force “grid” intact.

    Relations between locally recruited army forces and the police, also overwhelmingly locally recruited, were close throughout the campaign. Though accusations surfaced upon occasion of local forces personnel abusing their positions to pass information to Protestant paramilitary forces, these cases were few, involved few individuals, and were handled through the normal mechanisms.

    ● India – Jammu & Kashmir (J&K)

    A hybrid of these two examples, in a sense, is presented by the Village Defence Committees (VDC) fielded by India in its troubled Muslim-majority state, Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). There, local forces are also incorporated into the regular structure and are officered by “regulars.” It is the police, however, who run the units in most instances; the army only when absolutely necessary according to the situation.

    Police officers (PO) are augmented in time of emergency by Special Police Officers (SPO), who receive lower pay as per contract (30 percent of a PO’s base salary) and shorter-but-equivalent training. SPOs are normally deployed in areas where they are recruited (i.e., where they live) and may be sent as small units on area domination operations within police jurisdictions. But they also are assigned as the principal element of command and control (C2)–and heavy weapons--for the VDC, which are comprised of local people.

    VDC members are part-time but paid (a minimal amount but significant enough to be attractive; approximately 8 percent of a PO’s base salary). The result is that any VDC is a mix of full-time and part-time personnel, with the full-timers themselves mainly “temporary hires” (though in some cases POs may be deployed with a VDC). They share being normally from the local area in which they operate.

    This combination of local officers and local home guards produces a local defense capacity limited only by factors of legitimacy (i.e., whether citizens will join) and resources (i.e., funding, availability of arms and ammunition). In a single district of the Jammu region, Doda, in mid-2003, the normal police complement of 686 POs, upon finding itself faced with virtually an equal number of “militants” using terror as their principal approach, had mobilized 7,400 SPOs and 9,545 VDC members. So great was the desire to join the VDC that it had outstripped available funding and weapons (for the VDCs, the Lee Enfield as issued to Nepali police).


    Inherent to the notion of building into the system a “surge” capacity is the expectation that one day what has been built will be dismantled. Manpower (SPOs, VDC members) is under no illusion that employment is anything but temporary.

    As matters have worked out, though, participation has normally been an appropriate step. SPOs, for instance, are granted a preference chit (similar to “points” given to veterans who apply for US government jobs) when applying for vacancies in the regular police force. VDC members earn extra income that otherwise would be unavailable.

    Both SPOs and VDC members, particularly the former, have been known to find permanent employment in the hundreds of battalions of paramilitary forces that are kept in being on the order of a national “internal warfare” reaction force. The Central Reserve Police Force, or CRPF, for example, had 137 battalions in existence in mid-2003 and plans in the works to expand to 200 battalions; the Border Security Force, or BSF, was even larger, with 157 battalions and 176,000 personnel.

    In aggregate, sources have put the manpower employed in paramilitary forces at a million men. There is also an extensive private network of security personnel that readily absorbs trained, motivated manpower.

    ● Philippines

    Likewise, in the Philippines, the Central Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU) functioned very much like the Colombian local forces template. Philippine battalions entered contested areas, chased away major insurgent units of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP, the Philippine Maoists), and then stood up CAFGU units led, in the first instance, by NCOs and officers of the battalion, later by a mix of regulars and local people. In effect, each battalion of the Philippine Army, used popular support to clone itself (in some cases, several times over).

    For example, in the so-called “banner of the revolution,” Negros island (3 million population living in an area the size of Ulster), the Maoist insurgents found themselves, in 1988-89, facing besides the regular 6 x battalions of the army, 22 x battalions of local forces, all integrated into the military scheme of maneuver but performing local security tasks.

    Ultimately, regional CAFGU also entered the order-of-battle, with highly motivated local people serving beyond their own villages and drawing augmented pay.

    Important elements of the CAFGU program’s success were: leadership positions filled by regulars; local people were trained (in the same or shortened versions of the military’s courses); keeping ultimate authority was in the hands of regulars; issuing of identifiable garb to be worn while on duty; payment for duty time; and, all CAFGU members were subject to military justice while actually on duty (and thus legally fielded as military forces).

    Following “victory” in the second round of communist insurgency – by 1992, the CPP’s New People’s Army (NPA) was fielding as few as 4,000 combatants – Manila disbanded a proportion of its CAFGU units, but it transitioned many of them to a local defense structure designed to augment regular defenses, very much in the manner of “people’s war” as advanced by Mao, once in power, as defense in depth of the homeland.

    When a third CPP uprising became a reality in the years after 1998, the CAFGU structure and body of law/regulations remained intact and was used to again mobilize local forces.

    ● Thailand

    In Thailand, the equivalent of CAFGU was the “Rangers” (Tahan Pran). They were so successful that a large proportion of the apparatus, following the complete collapse of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT; the Thai Maoists) insurgency by 1983, was integrated into the force structure, as a permanent territorial national guard.

    The Thai case was noteworthy in that much of the heaviest fighting was carried out not only by the “Rangers” but also by contract units stood up to guard infrastructure development projects. These contained a large number of men who had served as contract soldiers in special light infantry and artillery battalions (approximately 22 in toto) that had been stood up for the Thai clandestine campaign in Laos against Lao insurgents and their North Vietnamese patrons. Officers and NCOs were regulars who returned to the force structure when the units were stood down, but the manpower, on short-term contracts, largely returned to civilian life.

    Most Tahan Pran units were not paid anything more than operational funds. Serious strategic and operational mistakes by the CPT inspired ever increasing numbers of Thai to join local forces units, creating a mushroom effect, whereby the movement soon found itself quite overwhelmed by the sheer numbers. Tahan Pran had older weapons, but the road crews were armed and equipped much as was the RTA (Royal Thai Army), which provided training teams and C2 personnel.

    ● Peru
    Peru is a unique case (at least as compared to those above) in that Maoist insurgent conduct had become so egregious that villagers demanded a self-defense capacity even as Alberto Fujimori took office as president in 1990. The military had not been able to convince all its officers to back arming the populace -- out of concern lest weapons be lost or indiscipline exacerbate already difficult local circumstances – so a Fujimori order was necessary.

    Military objections were overridden, and in 1991, 10,000 Winchester Model 1300 shotguns were distributed. Officials conducted ceremonies where priests blessed the arms, and a 1992 change in law recognized the people’s right to self-defense. In summer 1993, a massive parade of local forces – rondas campesinas – was held in Lima. Units came from throughout the country.

    Critics charged that it was all a smokescreen for abuse, but in the event, fears proved misplaced, abuses were minimal, and an aroused and mobilized population swept Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) from its historic hill bastions.

    In Ayacucho alone, the half-million population department that gave birth to the insurgency, the 2,500-army regulars were augmented by more than 250,000 ronderos, the members of the rondas campesinas. Command and control was vested in the first instance in the hands of elected local authorities, with the military exercising oversight.

    Ironically, it was the organizational capacity engendered that made the greatest difference, not provision of weapons per se. Indeed, the number of weapons distributed was relatively low, as was their lethality (shotguns remained the most substantial firearm provided). The low numbers were sufficient, because the local forces worked in shifts.

    For instance, Sarhua district, 31,113 people living southeast of Ayacucho in late 1998, had 16 groups of 10-20 men each, but just 15 weapons passed from shift to shift. It was the ability of all the groups to rush to the support of the armed main force, using agricultural implements principally, that gave the mobilized area its self-defense capacity as opposed to weapons alone.

    As Sendero Luminoso was swept from the hills in the 1990s, rondas campensinas gradually transitioned to more traditional forms as effective neighborhood watch. Others became advocacy, public service, and single-issue groups. Significantly, their presence, in whatever form, enhanced voting levels and the practice of local democracy.

    Efforts by security forces to collect weapons met with such a level of obfuscation (as opposed to outright resistance) that the authorities finally conceded it was best to allow the arms to remain for neighborhood watch functions (traditionally, “nigh****ch” had been practiced in Peruvian rural communities, especially in the north, for protection against robbery and stock rustling. Since the rondas campesinas were overwhelmingly run by the leadership of the traditional Indian communities where they were based, command and control remained quite good, abuses minimal (research offers little to support the current human rights effort to paint a negative picture of the Peruvian local defense campaign).

    Conclusions and Post-Conflict Incorporation

    The Colombian experience with local forces contains elements of the cases above. It has the added advantage of neutralizing the inevitable human rights/activist attacks that are characteristic of the present world-environment.

    Ironically, all local defense in whatever form, appear to be opposed by human rights groups. The line of attack cites the possibility of abuse, more than the event, though it must be noted that “possibilities” are inherent in any situation of combat.

    Indeed, indiscipline will gut any self-defense program, but proper command and control worked in the cases above. The very fact that the programs were so successful against insurgents has led to a variety of efforts by human rights groups today to tar both the concept of local defense and the manner in which it worked. Peru has been a particular target, but scholars who have done research on the rondas campesinas do not agree with claims of widespread abuses.

    Issuing of arms is another thorny issue, for obvious reasons. Yet the historic results have been heartening, particularly when local defense units have been stood up in areas where the people are already seeking to resist insurgent depredations.

    The authorities have found local defense, whatever the country, to be truly effective only where the will to resist is seeking the means. There are cases on record, such as Guatemala, where the authorities finally forced all in affected areas to choose one side or the other, and then systematically eliminated the insurgents using a combination of regulars and local defense units.

    This is significant, because the alternative to mobilizing the state (even if in an imperfectly controlled fashion), hence to meet the challenge of the insurgent counter-state, has normally been “ugly.” This was seen in the two episodes of Maoist insurgency in Sri Lanka (the 1971 and the 1987-90 JVP episodes), where local forces played a minimal role because security forces simply eliminated the problem physically, and producing serious casualties.

    In terms of mechanics of armament, types and numbers of weapons distributed is driven by local circumstances. In Vietnam (not discussed, as it was such a special case) and the Philippines (and to a lesser extent, Thailand), for instance, there was little difference between the weapons possessed by the regulars and those issued to local forces. Though the emphasis was upon high-powered firearms (HPF), machineguns and grenade launchers, were also routinely provided.

    In J&K, the VDC have the vintage .303 Lee Enfield, while in Peru nothing heavier than a Remington shotgun was given out (together with many pistols). Colombia arms and equips its local forces identically to its maneuver units but with fewer support weapons.

    Colombia’s mode of deployment lends itself to post-conflict demobilization, particularly since draftees may simply be assigned elsewhere (or not drafted at all). Indeed, since COLAR is presently mid-steam in a program to convert a good proportion of its manpower to volunteer status (presently one-third), it is more likely that local units will simply be disbanded when the need for them ends.

    More desirable, of course, would be to incorporate them into mixed regular/popular forces units modeled upon the UK Royal Irish Regiment. This has the advantage of maintaining in place local security painstakingly constructed, providing a mechanism for pumping funds into cash-starved regions, and gainfully employing, even if on a part-time basis, large numbers of young people who otherwise would have to seek out options.

    Thailand, as mentioned, incorporated its “Rangers” into the force structure, as did the Philippines (though eliminating many units after the 1992 collapse of “Round II” of the communist insurgency). The temporary nature of all augmentation manpower in J&K emphasizes the plan to demobilize as appropriate by simple non-renewal of contracts – though SPOs may receive at present, for superior service, an advantage in the competition for constable vacancies in the regular police force. Provision is made, though, to assist this trained and motivated manpower in moving into logical “next steps” that facilitate local defense.

    In Peru, as already mentioned, many rondas have stayed intact as unarmed civic groups, even as their self-defense function has atrophied; but most of the manpower was not armed in the first instance, weapons being issued only as sufficient to arm “night watch” shifts.

    Peru serves to illustrate another of the most unexpected consequences of local defense: the growth of democratic capacity. As the insurgency deliberately targeted the most unincorporated areas of the country, the population had long been marginalized. Defending its own space served to heighten political consciousness – the insurgents’ goal turned on its head, particularly when local folk began to use the organizational skills learned to facilitate accountability from elected officials.

    This was a logical outgrowth, too, of the marriage of local defense with government civic action and micro-development projects. The same phenomenon has occurred elsewhere, such as in the Philippines.

    The aforementioned highlights the point raised any number of times above: the necessity of any local defense scheme to be integrated into a larger counterinsurgency campaign. The “technique” of home guards is not intended as a stand-alone exercise but as one element among many in a coherent response to insurgency.

    People defend what is theirs, what they see as worth fighting for. It is quite difficult merely to advance what they should fight against. The greatest success in counterinsurgency or counter-terrorism, then, has come in defense of democracy. There is no greater trust a state can place in its population than to incorporate citizens in its defense.

    Dr. Thomas A. Marks is a political risk consultant based in Honolulu, Hawaii and a frequent visitor to Nepal. He has authored a number of benchmark works on Maoist insurgency.

  10. #10
    A Self Important Senior Contributor troung's Avatar
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    Why are insurgencies so difficult to win but even more difficult to defeat?
    An essay by Michael Hurle, Hull University

    Spring 1999

    Introduction

    Insurgencies have been a recurrent feature of twentieth century warfare. It is no coincidence that where guerilla warfare has been adopted it has led to protracted conflicts lasting years, and sometimes decades.

    Insurgency warfare takes many forms and assumes different roles in overall strategy from one situation to the next. In Europe, North America and the Middle East, guerillas have often fought as an auxilliary to conventional forces. Where insurgency is secondary to the main campaign, or at best one branch of an overall strategy, it can still have the effect of delaying the outcome of a conventional war.

    Since a small number of guerillas can engage a much larger number of enemy troops, they can be effective in number of ways: by dispersing the enemy forces, weakening their logistical support and distracting them from events on the front line.

    In Vietnam, guerilla warfare was a significant factor and played a central role to the outcome of the war against the US. However, its importance was that much greater because of its complimentarity with the conventional war. In many respects, the Viet Cong were a partisan force who enjoyed support and supplies from the NVLA and the Soviet Union.

    In other cases, guerilla warfare has been the predominant feature of strategy. The Chinese communists did not fight alongside a conventional army, but instead transformed themselves into one. Their success became a model for other guerilla movements in Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaya. Yet the geographical, political and military conditions were not so favourable in these countries. These movements were weak, dispersed and politically isolated. As such, they never established large conventional armies and pursued different strategies instead.

    This essay will examine Mao's theories of revolutionary war, which were inherently based on the concept of protracted warfare. I will then consider their influence and relevance to the struggles fought elsewhere in Asia. The second half of the essay tackles the problem from the perspective of counter-insurgency.

    The Nature of Insurgency

    To define insurgency is to understand why it occurs. As the Indonesian general Nasution stated, "guerilla warfare is the war of the weak against the strong... Guerilla war cannot bring final victory". Therefore the first objective of the guerilla is to avoid decisive battle, and hence total defeat. This is the most obvious reason why insurgencies are difficult to win and even more difficult to defeat.

    Insurgency is the manifestation not only of an imbalance of military power between two sides, but often an asymetry of interests and motivations. In Southeast Asia the colonial powers tended to be motivated by broad economic interests and geostrategic concerns, whereas the insurgents were motivated by ideology, a desire for self determination and more narrow economic interests. Therefore, whilst one side fought a limited war using superior military force, the other side fought a total war using guerilla tactics to compensate for its technical inferiority.

    It would seem that insurgencies are difficult to resolve because of this asymetry of strengths and weaknesses. We tend to assume that the state has an advantage over the insurgents in certain areas. Besides its military superiority, it tends to control the cities, the infrastructure and the main lines of communication. It also has established financial and administrative systems which allow it to co-ordinate its efforts and generate revenue. If these systems work effectively and can be defended, the insurgent would appear to have little chance of success.

    In post-war Asia these systems worked only with varying degrees of effectiveness. The government's ability to raise revenue and implement policies was extremely limited. Insurgents were even able to introduce systems of taxation and administration in the areas under their control. Furthermore, infrastructure was poorly developed and vulnerable to attack. These weaknesses of the state reduced the loyalty of rural populations, and made them more susceptible to guerilla infiltration.

    Guerilla warfare is advantageous to the insurgent only inasmuch as there is no alternative if he wishes to avoid defeat. Since the insurgents' base of support lies in areas where government systems are weak, this primary objective can usually be attained for some length of time. The guerilla movement is militarily weak and loosely organised, but it compensates for this through mobility and flexibility. It draws on the rural population for supplies and intelligence and operates at minimal cost. It is in these links to the population that the insurgent gains most strength, but is most vulnerable, since as Mao points out, the insurgent needs the support of the population as the fish needs water.

    Therefore, the conditions faced by either side provide examples both of their strengths and their weaknesses simultaneously.

    Some features of Maoist Insurgency theory

    Where an insurgent force is militarily weak but ideologically well motivated, a protracted campaign is the likely consequence. In 1938, Mao Tse Tung wrote,

    'Since the Japanese war is a protracted one, and final victory will belong to China, it can reasonably be assumed that this protracted war will pass through three stages. The first covers the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defensive. The second stage will be the period of the enemy's strategic consolidation and our preparation for the counter-offensive. The third stage will be the period of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat.'

    In this three phase strategy, Mao paid great attention to time, men, territory and the support of the people. He considered these factors to be essential for success in a protracted campaign. To Mao, time was the most invulnerable asset of the insurgent. Hence, an insurgent could retreat in space and advance in time.

    As Mao pointed out, 'history knows many peasant wars of the "roving rebel type", but none of them ever succeeded.' In other words, time can only be an advantage to the guerilla when there is a secure base to retreat to. There is a contradiction here with Mao's preference for mobile warfare above positional warfare. This is one aspect of Mao's theories which has been reinterpreted in the different Southeast Asian contexts, either when insurgents have not enjoyed an established base area, or when it was less strategically important to have one.

    Mao saw no substitute for good soldiers, and always stressed the need to avoid losses amongst ones own troops. This is in sharp contrast to the strategy of General Giap, who sacrificed tens of thousands of North Vietnamese troops each year, but recruited even more to take their place. Giap's strategy reflected the fact that, 'the Vietnamese understanding of war goes deeper than balance sheets and kill ratios'.

    Another key concern for Mao was to foster and preserve good relations with the local population. The Red Army acted according to a strict code of respect for villagers and their property, and sought to minimise their intrusion into daily life. This helped them to claim moral superiority over the enemy, raise morale and conscript new recruits to their cause. It also assured them of support in terms of supplies and safe havens. The importance of winning over the population was understood in Vietnam and Malaya, but here the insurgents often resorted to violence, either out of desperation, or because the enemy's atrocities were equally severe, and they felt that they had the moral high ground already.

    Let us look then, at the cases of Malaya, Indonesia and Vietnam in more detail.

    The insurgents in Malaya faced some extremely difficult obstacles. Firstly, they were geographically and politically isolated. They had no direct overseas support and limited terrain in which to operate. Secondly, they were poorly armed. They had a small cache of weapons acquired during the War against the Japanese. Finally, they were predominantly Chinese and had very little support amongst the indigeneous communities.

    The insurgency was fought at a time of political strengthening and economic growth. Britain was re-establishing influence over its colony, whilst holding out the promise of independence. At the same time, there was virtually full employment as the Korean War stimulated demand for Malayan rubber. In these conditions, there was relatively little question of the government's legitimacy amongst most of the population.

    The Malayan Communist party was led by Ch'en Ping, a veteran of insurgency against the Japanese. However they did not have a strategist of the stature of Giap or Nasution. Without secure territories from which to operate, it was clear that they stood little chance in a protracted war, and instead sought a rapid victory. Attacks were initially conducted against the colonial regime both in the countryside and in the towns. Ch'en Ping renamed the MCP as the Malayan Peoples' Anti-British Army (MPABA), but this failed to resolve the Chinese bias in the movement. Although the odds were stacked against the insurgents, the British were lucky to eliminate them with such comparative ease: What was perhaps more impressive was just how few racial and political repercussions there were as the colony was granted independence in the years afterwards.

    As the MCP retreated into the countryside, it increasingly relied on support from certain segments of the population, notably the Chinese squatters living on the agricultural periphery. It tried to avoid terrorising the wider population, but as its ties to the rural Chinese were targeted by the British counter-insurgency campaign, it resorted to attacking Malay kampongs and Indian plantations for food and supplies.


    In Indonesia, the nationalist forces again faced some extreme problems. The guerilla forces were dispersed over a vast geographical area, whilst the Dutch controlled much of Java and Borneo and had greater maritime mobility. This made communication and co-ordination of strategy difficult and the prospect of forming a conventional armed force almost impossible. As in Malaya, the guerillas were poorly armed compared to the Dutch troops. However the Dutch were also militarily and politically weak and were never able to re-establish control throughout the archipelago after the Japanese withdrawal.

    Nasution rejected the three stage Maoist approach. He used guerilla warfare as a strategy to soak up and exhaust enemy resources, and thus create a strategic stalemate. In this situation, the Dutch colonial regime was forced by international pressure to negotiate with the armed forces, and eventually withdrew from Indonesia. The FLN in Algeria also succeeded in securing independence by internationalising an internal conflict and forcing the French to take harsh, unpopular measures against the people.

    The Indonesian Armed forces primarily originated from the Japanese-trained PETA. They were highly factionalised along regional lines, but nevertheless became the main force for Indonesian national unity. Their patriotic values won them a strong base of support in the countryside. Since these regional strongholds were often secure from Dutch attack, the guerillas did not need to terrorise the population as the MCP did. This point was emphasised in Nasution's writings. He saw the people's help as invaluable for storing provisions, repairing equipment and providing information about the enemy.

    In Vietnam, General Giap formulated a strategy of long term resistance reminiscent of the Maoist doctrine;

    'The long term revolutionary war must include several different stages: the stage of contention, the stage of equilibrium and the stage of counter offensive.'

    Against the French, Giap conducted a classic Maoist campaign. This began with a strategic retreat from the cities when the French authorities returned in 1946. In the following four years the Viet Minh gained recognition from the Soviet Union and China and embarked on mobile attacks along the northern border. This secured supplies for the conventional war that followed.

    The campaign against the French is hailed as a successful insurgency, which progressed through the three phases of warfare. However, despite the desperation of the French, it took another four years before they were beaten in a decisive battle at Dien Bien Phu. Even then, the Viet Minh had secured only half the country and would have to repeat their efforts and fight an even longer war before complete unification could be achieved.

    In the war against the US backed regime in South Vietnam, Giap applied the Maoist strategy more flexibly. He intentionally blurred the dichotomy between guerilla and conventional war, dictating where battle took place, and with what intensity. Conventional battles took place early in the war (for example at Ia Drang) which sought to test the resolve of the US. The complimentarity of different forces is the expression of Truong Chinh, a unique Vietnamese approach to warfare which evolved out of centuries of resistance to foreign aggression.

    Giap altered his strategy for a number of reasons. With a safe territorial base north of the seventeenth parallel, Giap could vary the scale of conflict more easily, quickly escalating or de-escalating engagements. Winning the benevolent support of the entire South Vietnamese population became less important for final success. Instead, the objective was to seize the initiative from the Americans, disperse and pin down their forces and inflict an unbearable cost in lives on the US public.

    The US war against the Vietnamese is a classic example of an asymetry of forces. Neither could achieve a military victory because neither could sufficiently weaken the other's logistical chain. In the case of the US it was air power, in the case of the Viet Cong it was the Ho Chi Minh trail. Vietnam became a contest of political willpower, one which exacted an enormous price in human life.

    Theories of Counter-Insurgency

    Insurgencies can be interpreted in a number of ways; as political, legal, racial or military problems. How you define the problem will condition your response to it. An effective counter-insurgency campaign must start by correctly defining the problem, and then reacting with an appropriate level of force. If you fail to define the problem correctly, you are also in danger of overlooking the underlying problems which may cause unrest to reoccur in the future.

    The earlier an insurgency can be eradicated, the better. Robert Thompson believed that if possible the government should defeat the insurgent in the 'subversive build-up phase', before the movement took root. However, taking repressive measures before a conflict has broken out can be counter-productive.

    Thompson's successful approach to counter-insurgency in Malaya has been held up as example to be applied elsewhere in the region. We should be wary of exaggerating the relevance of his work to Vietnam, where the conditions were very different. The Malayan emergency was isolated and treated primarily as a legal problem. The insurgency in South Vietnam was a much more serious military problem, provoked by underlying problems of political legitimacy. It is difficult to say to what extent Thompson's theories went unnoticed or were just deemed irrelevant by American planners.

    Thompson established five principles of counter insurgency. Firstly, the government must have clear political aims, for example a free, stable, united country. Secondly, the government must function in accordance with the law. Only by doing so can the government preserve its legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Thirdly, the government must have an overall plan, co-ordinating civil and military efforts. Fourthly, the priority should be to defeat political subversion, not the guerillas themselves. Finally, it must have already secured its base areas first. By working outwards from your secure areas you are more likely to have some morale-boosting success early on.

    These were all important considerations for the US in Vietnam, just as much as in Malaya. But on each of these points the US failed to some degree. Firstly, the US and the ARVN failed to establish or uphold any reasonable level of law. They applied violence far too indiscriminately to villagers, often irrespective of their political allegiance. Secondly, they failed to co-ordinate military and civilian action. In fact, one tended to undermine the other. The US saw the problem in South Vietnam as a purely military one, and failed to appreciate the social and political dimensions of the problem. Their doctrine of Search and Destroy, which was adopted between 1965 and 1968 was wholly inappropriate. Finally, the US and the ARVN paid little attention to securing territory. Apart from being bad for morale, this was not very reassuring for the villagers who were left to 'sleep through the night'. The entire strategy collapsed when they came under attack in their own safe areas during the Tet offensive.

    The blame for this failure cannot be laid solely with the US interpretation of the problem they faced. The level of violence and intimidation was extraordinarily high on both sides. The US was also constrained by organisational factors, both in terms of its control over the actions of the South Vietnamese government, and its own military structure which was more suited to conventional Clausewitzian war.

    Counter-insurgency in Malaya relied not on large numbers of infantry, but on special forces and an expanded role for the police force. These forces integrated much more successfully into village life thereby aiding rather than undermining the social and political projects which were so important to winning hearts and minds. Militarily, the British campaign was more systematic than that in Vietnam. From 1950 onwards the British slowly drove the insurgents north and reduced their territorial base to the hills on the Thai border. The Malayan scouts conducted deep penetration to drive out insurgents so that they could be eradicated in conventional engagements.

    In their previous experience of counter-insurgency in the Philippines, the US had more success, although their role was secondary and supportive to that of the Filipino government. As in Malaya, the Huk insurgency was contained using small numbers of light infantry and armed civilians. The US provided technical assistance and helped to develop education and other economic projects. It seems that the US were not unfamiliar with the Thompson's approach, but decided it could not work on its own in Vietnam.

    The British policy of relocating the population served two purposes. Firstly it allowed the British to isolate the people from the insurgents, whilst tackling the social, political and economic grievances upon which the insurgency was based. To this end, many villages were relocated and fortified to prevent infiltration. The government initiated projects to provide education, health-care and agricultural development. The increasing availability of radios also allowed the government to promote community issues and publicly denounce the insurgents as bandits and terrorists. Secondly, the removal of villagers created free-fire zones in which insurgents could be attacked more agressively.

    The US adopted similar programmes in Vietnam, but with less success. Relocations under the strategic hamlets caused cultural distress and economic misery. Villagers were not adequately compensated and the system was riddled with corruption. Social projects were undermined by Viet Cong activity and it was not long before these villages were re-infiltrated. Since the Viet Cong were not isolated, the free fire zones were less effective. It was hard for the US to resolve these failures because it had a multi-dimensional problem in Vietnam. Conventional forces were necessary to counter the threat of large scale confrontation with the NVLA, yet they undermined the efforts to tackle insurgency.

    In this situation we are left to question the efficacy of trying to win hearts and minds. After World War Two it became increasingly hard for western powers to pacify insurgents. Historically, brutality has played a 'pivotal role' in the preservation of empire, as a means of severing the links between the guerilla and society. In the twentieth century we have witnessed a growing normative gap between the actions which leaders sometimes feel are necessary and the bounds tolerable to a liberal society at home.

    The Vietnam experience reminds us that,

    'Counter insurgency is inherently degenerative... Benevolent isolation can easily give way to coercive isolation and the latter contains the seeds of anihilation. In the absence of altruistic moral restraints, brutality pays: the logistical parsimony of guerilla warfare can be met with the parsimony of uninhibited violence.'

    The Difficulties of progress

    However one translates the three-stage paradigm of revolutionary war, the biggest problem facing the insurgent is how to progress from one stage to the next, from strategic defensive to counter offensive. The practical difficulties involved in mobilising a dispersed guerilla movement and converting it into a conventional army are enormous. They are often exacerbated by factionalism and questions of leadership.

    Where a conventional force distinct from the guerilla movement already exists, this presents other obstacles to progression. In Vietnam this problem was overcome by the Tet offensive. This decimated the strength of the Viet Cong and paved the way for a conventional invasion by the NVLA.

    When its is impossible to progress onto the offensive, it may be possible to internationalise the conflict, by seeking overseas support, escalating the war accross national borders or provoking the government into taking unacceptably repressive measures. Resolution of conflict can be hindered by the reluctance of either side to recognise the legitimacy of the other.

    Conclusion: A Checklist for victory

    For either side to succeed in an insurgency war, they must have a comprehensive understanding of the political, social and military dimensions of the conflict. If the military conflict can be stalemated, it becomes a battle of wills. If territory is limited or strategically important, the allegiance of the population becomes the principal target for both sides. As Sun Tzu put it, 'know the enemy and know yourself': if you cannot generate the political will or if you don't have the inclination to address the underlying problems, you are doomed to fail.

    Insurgency warfare has certain features which make both victory and defeat extremely difficult. Even when counter insurgencies have been hailed as successful, the perceived threat lingers on, as in Malaya and the Philippines. In Africa, wars have rarely resulted in complete victory for one side, and coups and counter-coups become the norm. In East Asia, only Cambodia has followed this trend of repeated, cyclical violence. As violence escalates, the 'rules' of engagement are increasingly discarded by either side, and resources are depleted. This situation creates long term security challenges which are very difficult to resolve.

    This essay has set out the difficulties of insurgency warfare from both sides of the conflict. The most important point is that protracted warfare is an inherent feature of insurgency, and this creates difficulties for both sides. The asymetry of conflict makes it extremely difficult for either side to break the will of the other. In this predicament, operations run the risk of degenerating into mindless violence and well intentioned operations can become counter-productive. Government forces need to draw from large reserves of political will if they are to succeed: this might involve accepting the need for radical political or economic reform. For the insurgent, progress towards the end objective can be a long and arduous journey and is fraught with possible stumbling blocks.

    Bibliography

    Baddeley, A. (1994): 'Comparing the Approach of the United States and Britain to Counter-Insurgency Warfare in Vietnam and Malaya' (University of Hull Politics theses).

    Blaufarb, L. (1977): 'The Counterinsurgency Era' (MacMillan Free Press).

    Johnson, W. R. (1998): 'War, Culture and the Interpretation of History: The Vietnam War reconsidered' in Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol.9, no.2.

    Mao Tse-Tung (1966): 'Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung' (Foreign Languages Press, Peking).

    Marley, A. D (1997): 'Reflections from the Field: Problems of terminating wars in Africa', in Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol.8, no.3.

    Merom, G. (1998): 'Strong Powers in Small Wars: The unnoticed foundations of success', in Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol.9, no.2.

    Nasution, A.H. (1965): 'Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare', p.33.

    O'Neill, R. (1968): 'General Giap: Politician and Strategist' (New York)

    St. John, O. P. (1996): 'Algeria: A case study of Insurgency in the New World Order', in Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol.7, no.2.'

    Stockwell, A. J. (1987): 'Insurgency and Decolonisation in the Malayan Emergency', in Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol.25.

    Stubbs, R. (1989): 'Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960' (London).

    Sun Tzu (6th cent. BC): 'The Art of War' (New York).

    Thompson, L. (1996): 'Ragged War: The Story of Unconventional and Counter-Revolutionary Warfare' (Arms and Armour Press, London).

    Thompson, R. (1966): 'Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam' (London).

    Vo Nguyen Giap (1970 edited by Stetler, R.): 'The Military Art of People's War' (New York).

  11. #11
    Regular Trajan's Avatar
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    Guerilla Warfare, against an occupying force, only works so long as the enemy which you fight has morals.
    [Wasting Space]

  12. #12
    A Self Important Senior Contributor troung's Avatar
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    Guerilla Warfare, against an occupying force, only works so long as the enemy which you fight has morals.
    I would not bet on that. For all the examples of butchering civilians to put them down one can find people flocking towards the guerillas and stalemating or winning said conflict.

    Eritrea defeated Ethiopia and the Ethiopian government was not past using famine as a weapon. The SPLA has forced the Sudanese government out of much of the south. The Fretilin were able to keep a force in the field for over 20 years until East Timor won its freedom. Somali guerillas overthrew the Somalian government. The Afghans fought the Soviets despite Soviet brutality.

    In fact brutality can really turn people towards the guerillas. A lot depends on what the occupying force wishes to accomplish by their occupation.
    Last edited by troung; 05 Apr 06, at 06:46.

  13. #13
    Military Professional Ray's Avatar
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    On Guerrilla Warfare
    by Mao Tse-tung

    1. What Is Guerrilla Warfare?

    In a war of revolutionary character, guerrilla operations are a necessary part. This is particularly true in war waged for the emancipation of a people who inhabit a vast nation. China is such a nation, a nation whose techniques are undeveloped and whose communications are poor. She finds herself confronted with a strong and victorious Japanese imperialism. Under these circumstances, the development of the type of guerrilla warfare characterized by the quality of mass is both necessary and natural. This warfare must be developed to an unprecedented degree and it must co-ordinate with the operations of our regular armies. If we fail to do this, we will find it difficult to defeat the enemy.

    These guerrilla operations must not be considered as an independent form of warfare. They are but one step in the total war, one aspect of the revolutionary struggle. They are the inevitable result of the clash between oppressor and oppressed when the latter reach the limits of their endurance. In our case, these hostilities began at a time when the people were unable to endure any more from the Japanese imperialists. Lenin, in People and Revolution,[A] said: 'A people's insurrection and a people's revolution are not only natural but inevitable.' We consider guerrilla operations as but one aspect of our total or mass war because they, lacking the quality of independence, are of themselves incapable of providing a solution to the struggle.

    Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation. When the invader pierces deep into the heart of the weaker country and occupies her territory in a cruel and oppressive manner, there is no doubt that conditions of terrain, climate, and society in general offer obstacles to his progress and may be used to advantage by those who oppose him. In guerrilla warfare we turn these advantages to the purpose of resisting and defeating the enemy.

    During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army. Thus the regularly organized troops, those guerrillas who have attained that status, and those who have not reached that level of development combine to form the military power of a national revolutionary war. There can be no doubt that the ultimate result of this will be victory.

    Both in its development and in its method of application, guerrilla warfare has certain distinctive characteristics. We first will discuss the relationship of guerrilla warfare to national policy. Because ours is the resistance of a semi colonial country against an imperialism, our hostilities must have a clearly defined political goal and firmly established political responsibilities. Our basic policy is the creation of a national united anti-Japanese front. This policy we pursue in order to gain our political goal, which is the complete emancipation of the Chinese people. There are certain fundamental steps necessary in the realization of this policy, to wit:

    1. Arousing and organizing the people.
    2. Achieving internal unification politically.
    3. Establishing bases.
    4. Equipping forces.
    5. Recovering national strength.
    6. Destroying enemy's national strength.
    7. Regaining lost territories.

    There is no reason to consider guerrilla warfare separately from national policy. On the contrary, it must be organized and conducted in complete accord with national anti-Japanese policy. It is only who misinterpret guerrilla action who say, as does Jen Ch'i Shan, "The question of guerrilla hostilities is purely a military matter and not a political one." Those who maintain this simple point of view have lost sight of the political goal and the political effects of guerrilla action. Such a simple point of view will cause the people to lose confidence and will result in our defeat.

    What is the relationship of guerrilla warfare to the people? Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must, if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, co-operation, and assistance cannot be gained. The essence of guerrilla warfare is thus revolutionary in character. On the other hand, in a war of counter-revolutionary nature, there is no place for guerrilla hostilities. Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and co-operation. There are those who do not comprehend guerrilla action, and who therefore do not understand the distinguishing qualities of a people's guerrilla war, who say: 'Only regular troops can carry on guerrilla operations.' There are others who, because they do not believe in the ultimate success of guerilla action, mistakenly say: 'Guerrilla warfare is an insignificant and highly specialized type of operation in which there is no place for the masses of the people' (Jen Ch'i Shan). Then there are those who ridicule the masses and undermine resistance by wildly asserting that the people have no understanding of the war of resistance (Yeh Ch'ing, for one). The moment that this war of resistance dissociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment that it dissociates itself from hope of ultimate victory over the Japanese.

    What is the organization for guerrilla warfare? Though all guerrilla bands that spring from the masses of the people suffer from lack of organization at the time of their formation, they all have in common a basic quality that makes organization possible. All guerrilla units must have political and military leadership. This is true regardless of the source or size of such units. Such units may originate locally, in the masses of the people; they may be formed from an admixture of regular troops with groups of the people, or they may consist of regular army units intact. And mere quantity does not affect this matter. Such units may consist of a squad of a few men, a battalion of several hundred men, or a regiment of several thousand men.

    All these must have leaders who are unyielding in their policies—resolute, loyal, sincere, and robust. These men must be well-educated in revolutionary technique, self confident, able to establish severe discipline, and able to cope with counter-propaganda. In short, these leaders must be models for the people. As the war progresses, such leaders lack of discipline which at first will gradually overcome the lack of discipline which at first prevails; they will establish discipline in their forces, strengthening them and increasing their combat efficiency. Thus eventual victory will be attained.

    Unorganized guerrilla warfare cannot contribute to victory and those who attack the movement as a combination of banditry and anarchism do not understand the nature of guerrilla action. They say, 'This movement is a haven for disappointed militarists, vagabonds, and bandits' (Jen Ch'i Shan), hoping thus to bring the movement into disrepute. We do not deny that there are corrupt guerrillas, nor that there are people who under the guise of guerrillas indulge in unlawful activities. Neither do we deny that the movement has at the present time symptoms of a lack of organization, symptoms that might indeed be serious were we to judge guerrilla warfare solely by the corrupt and temporary phenomena we have mentioned. We should study the corrupt phenomena and attempt to eradicate them in order to encourage guerilla warfare, and to increase its military efficiency. 'This is hard work, there is no help for it, and the problem cannot be solved immediately. The whole people must try to reform themselves during the course of the war. We must educate them and reform them in the light of past experience. Evil does not exist in guerrilla warfare but only in the unorganized and undisciplined activities that are anarchism,' said Lenin, in On Guerrilla Warfare.[B]

    What is basic guerrilla strategy? Guerrilla strategy must be based primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack. It must be adjusted to the enemy situation, the terrain, the existing lines of communication, the relative strengths, the weather and the situation of the people.

    In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerilla strategy, the enemy's rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated. Only in this way can guerrillas carry out their mission of independent guerrilla action and coordination with the effort of the regular armies. But, in spite of the most complete preparation, there can be no victory if mistakes are made in the matter of command. Guerilla warfare based on the principles we have mentioned and carried out over a vast extent of territory in which communications are inconvenient will contribute tremendously towards ultimate defeat of the Japanese and consequent emancipation of the Chinese people.

    A careful distinction must be made between two types of guerrilla warfare. The fact that revolutionary guerrilla warfare is based on the masses of the people does not in itself mean that the organization of guerrilla units is impossible in a war of counter-revolutionary character. As examples of the former type we may cite Red guerilla hostilities during the Russian Revolution; those of the Reds China; of the Abyssinians against the Italians for the past three years; those of the last seven years in Manchuria, and the vast anti-Japanese guerrilla war that is carried on in China today. All these struggles have been carried on in the interest of the whole people or the greater part of them; all had a broad basis in the national manpower and all have been in accord with the laws of historical development. They have existed and will continue to exist, flourish, and develop as long as they are not contrary to national policy.

    The second type of guerrilla warfare directly contradicts the law of historical development. Of this type, we may cite the examples furnished by the White Russian guerrilla units organized by Denikin and Kolchak; those organized by the Japanese; those organized by the Italians in Abyssinia; those supported by the puppet governments in Manchuria and Mongolia, and those that will be organized here by Chinese traitors. All such have oppressed the masses and have been contrary to the true interests of the people. They must be firmly opposed. They are easy to destroy because they lack a broad foundation in the people.

    If we fail to differentiate between the two types of guerrilla hostilities mentioned, it is likely that we will exaggerate their effect when applied by an invader. We might arrive at the conclusion that 'the invader can organize guerrilla units from among the people'. Such a conclusion might well diminish our confidence in guerrilla warfare. As far as this matter is concerned, we have but to remember the historical experience of revolutionary struggles.

    Further, we must distinguish general revolutionary wars from those of a purely 'class' type. In the former case, the whole people of a nation, without regard to class or party, carry on a guerrilla struggle that is an instrument of the national policy. Its basis is, therefore, much broader than is the basis of a struggle of class type. Of a general guerrilla war, it has been said: 'When a nation is invaded, the people become sympathetic to one another and all aid in organizing guerrilla units. In civil war, no matter to what extent guerrillas are developed, they do not produce the same results as when they are formed to resist an invasion by foreigners' (Civil War in Russia). The one strong feature of guerrilla warfare in a civil struggle is its quality of internal purity. One class may be easily united and perhaps fight with great effect, whereas in a national revolutionary war, guerrilla units are faced with the problem of internal unification of different class groups. This necessitates the use of propaganda. Both types of guerrilla war are, however, similar in that they both employ the same military methods.

    National guerrilla warfare, though historically of the same consistency, has employed varying implements as times, peoples, and conditions differ. The guerrilla aspects of the Opium War, those of the fighting in Manchuria since the Mukden incident, and those employed in China today are all slightly different. The guerrilla warfare conducted by the Moroccans against the French and the Spanish was not exactly similar to that which we conduct today in China. These differences express the characteristics of different peoples in different periods. Although there is a general similarity in the quality of all these struggles, there are dissimilarities in form. This fact we must recognize. Clausewitz wrote, in On War: 'Wars in every period have independent forms and independent conditions, and, therefore, every period must have its independent theory of war.' Lenin, in On Guerrilla Warfare said: 'As regards the form of fighting, it is unconditionally requisite that history be investigated in order to discover the conditions of environment, the state of economic progress and the political ideas that obtained, the national characteristics, customs, and degree of civilization.' Again: 'It is necessary to be completely unsympathetic to abstract formulas and rules and to study with sympathy the conditions of the actual fighting, for these will change in accordance with the political and economic situations and the realization of the people's aspirations. These progressive changes in conditions create new methods.'

    If, in today's struggle, we fail to apply the historical truths of revolutionary guerrilla war, we will fall into the error of believing with T'ou Hsi Sheng that under the impact of Japan's mechanized army, 'the guerrilla unit has lost its historical function'. Jen Ch'i Shan writes: 'In olden days guerrilla warfare was part of regular strategy but there is almost no chance that it can be applied today.' These opinions are harmful. If we do not make an estimate of the characteristics peculiar to our anti-Japanese guerrilla war, but insist on applying to it mechanical formulas derived from past history, we are making the mistake of placing our hostilities in the same category as all other national guerrilla struggles. If we hold this view, we will simply be beating our heads against a stone wall and we will be unable to profit from guerrilla hostilities.

    To summarize: What is the guerrilla war of resistance against Japan? It is one aspect of the entire war, which, although alone incapable of producing the decision, attacks the enemy in every quarter, diminishes the extent of area under his control, increases our national strength, and assists our regular armies. It is one of the strategic instruments used to inflict defeat on our enemy. It is the one pure expression of anti-Japanese policy, that is to say, it is military strength organized by the active people and inseparable from them. It is a powerful special weapon with which we resist the Japanese and without which we cannot defeat them.

    2. The Relation Of Guerrilla Hostilities to Regular Operations

    The general features of orthodox hostilities, that is, the war of position and the war of movement, differ fundamentally from guerrilla warfare. There are other readily apparent differences such as those in organization, armament, equipment supply, tactics, command; in conception of the terms 'front' and 'rear'; in the matter of military responsibilities.

    When considered from the point of view of total numbers, guerrilla units are many, as individual combat units, they may vary in size from the smallest, of several score or several hundred men, to the battalion or the regiment, of several thousand. This is not the case in regularly organized units. A primary feature of guerrilla operations is their dependence upon the people themselves to organize battalions and other units. As a result of this, organization depends largely upon local circumstances. In the case of guerrilla groups, the standard of equipment is of a low order and they must depend for their sustenance primarily upon what the locality affords.

    The strategy of guerrilla warfare is manifestly unlike that employed in orthodox operations, as the basic tactic of the former is constant activity and movement. There is in guerrilla warfare no such thing as a decisive battle; there is nothing comparable to the fixed, passive defence that characterizes orthodox war. In guerrilla warfare, the transformation of a moving situation into a positional defensive situation never arises. The general features of reconnaissance, partial deployment, general deployment, and development of the attack that are usual in mobile warfare are not common in guerrilla war.

    There are differences also in the matter of leadership and command. In guerrilla warfare, small units acting independently play the principal role and there must be no excessive interference with their activities. In orthodox warfare particularly in a moving situation, a certain degree of initiative is accorded subordinates, but in principle, command is centralized. This is done because all units and all supporting arms in all districts must co-ordinate to the highest degree. In the case of guerrilla warfare, this is not only undesirable but impossible. Only adjacent guerrilla units can coordinate their activities to any degree. Strategically, their activities can be roughly correlated with those of the regular forces, and tactically, they must co-operate with adjacent units of the regular army. But there are no strictures on the extent of guerrilla activity nor is it primarily characterized by the quality of co-operation of many units.

    When we discuss the terms 'front' and 'rear' it must be remembered, that while guerrillas do have bases, their primary field ofactivity is in the enemy's rear areas. They themselves have no rear. Because an orthodox army has rear installations (except in some special cases as during the 10,000-mile Long march of the Red Army or as in the case of certain units operating in Shansi Province), it cannot operate as guerrillas can.

    As to the matter of military responsibilities, those of the guerrillas are to exterminate small forces of the enemy; to harass and weaken large forces; to attack enemy lines of communications; to establish bases capable of supporting independent operations in the enemy's rear, to force the enemy to disperse his strength; and to co-ordinate all these activities with those of the regular armies on distant battle fronts.

    From the foregoing summary of differences that exist between guerrilla warfare and orthodox warfare, it can be seen that it is improper to compare the two. Further distinction must be made in order to clarify this matter. While the Eighth Route Army is a regular army, its North China campaign is essentially guerrilla in nature, for it operates in enemy's rear. On occasion, however, Eighth Route Army commanders have concentrated powerful forces to strike an enemy in motion and the characteristics of orthodox mobile warfare were evident in the battle at P'ing Hsing Kuan and in other engagements.

    On the other hand, after the fall of Feng Ling Tu, the operations of Central Shansi, and Suiyuan, troops were more guerrilla than orthodox in nature. In this connection the precise character of Generalissimo Chiang's instructions to the effect that independent brigades would carry out guerrilla operations should be recalled. In spite of such temporary activities these orthodox units retained their identity and after the fall of Feng Line Tu, they were not only able to fight along orthodox lines but often found it necessary to do so. This is an example of the fact that orthodox armies may, due to changes in the situation, temporarily function as guerrillas.

    Likewise, guerrilla units formed from the people may gradually develop into regular units and, when operating as such, employ the tactics of orthodox mobile war. While these units function as guerrillas, they may be compared to innumerable gnats, which, by biting a giant both in front and in rear, ultimately exhaust him. They make themselves as unendurable as a group of cruel and hateful devils, and as they grow and attain gigantic proportions, they will find that their victim is not only exhausted but practically perishing. It is for this very reason that our guerrilla activities are a source of constant mental worry to Imperial Japan.

    While it is improper to confuse orthodox with guerrilla operations, it is equally improper to consider that there is a chasm between the two. While differences do exist, similarities appear under certain conditions and this fact must be appreciated if we wish to establish clearly the relationship between the two. If we consider both types of warfare as a single subject, or if we confuse guerrilla warfare with the mobile operations of orthodox war, we fall into this error : We exaggerate the function of guerrillas and minimize that of the regular armies. If we agree with Chang Tso Hua, who says - 'Guerrilla warfare is the primary war strategy of a people seeking to emancipate itself,' or with Kao Kang, who believes that 'Guerrilla strategy is the only strategy possible for oppressed people', we are exaggerating the importance of guerrilla hostilities. What these zealous friends I have just quoted do not realize is this: If we do not fit guerrilla operations into their proper niche, we cannot promote them realistically. Then, not only would those who oppose take advantage of our varying opinions to turn them to the own uses to undermine us, but guerrillas would be led assume responsibilities they could not successfully discharge and that should properly be carried out by orthodox force. In the meantime, the important guerrilla function of co-ordinating activities with the regular forces would be neglected.

    Furthermore, if the theory that guerrilla warfare is our only strategy were actually applied, the regular forces would be weakened, we would be divided in purpose, and guerrilla hostilities would decline. If we say, ' Let us transform the regular forces into guerrillas', and do not place our first reliance on a victory to be gained by the regular armies over the enemy, we may certainly expect to see as a result the failure of the anti-Japanese war of resistance. The concept that guerrilla warfare is an end in itself and that guerrilla activities can be divorced from those of the regular forces is incorrect. If we assume that guerrilla warfare does not progress from beginning to end beyond its elementary forms, we have failed to recognize the fact that guerrilla hostilities can, under specific conditions, develop and assume orthodox characteristics. An opinion that admits the existence of guerrilla war, but isolates it, is one that does not properly estimate the potentialities of such war.

    Equally dangerous is the concept that condemns guerrilla war on the ground that war has no other aspects than the purely orthodox. This opinion is often expressed by those who have seen the corrupt phenomena of some guerrilla regimes, observed their lack of discipline, and have seen them used as a screen behind which certain persons have indulged in bribery and other corrupt practices. These people will not admit the fundamental necessity for guerrilla bands that spring from the armed people. They say, 'Only the regular forces are capable of conducting guerrilla operations.' This theory is a mistaken one and would lead to the abolition of the people's guerrilla war.

    A proper conception of the relationship that exists between guerrilla effort and that of the regular forces is essential. We believe it can be stated this way: 'Guerrilla operations during the anti-Japanese war may for certain time and temporarily become its paramount feature, particularly insofar as the enemy's rear is concerned. However, if we view the war as a whole, there can be no doubt that our regular forces are of primary importance, because it is they who are alone capable of producing the decision. Guerrilla warfare assists them in producing this favourable decision. Orthodox forces may under certain conditions operate as guerrillas, and the latter may, under certain conditions, develop to the status of the former. However, both guerrilla forces and regular forces have their own respective development and their proper combinations.'

    To clarify the relationship between the mobile aspect of orthodox war and guerrilla war, we may say that general agreement exists that the principal element of our strategy must be mobility. With the war of movement, we may at times combine the war of position. Both of these are assisted by general guerrilla hostilities. It is true that on the battlefield mobile war often becomes positional; it is true that this situation may be reversed; it is equally true that each form may combine with the other. The possibility of such combination will become more evident after the prevailing standards of equipment have been raised. For example, in a general strategical counter-attack to recapture key cities and lines of communication, it would be normal to use both mobile and positional methods. However, the point must again be made that our fundamental strategical form must be the war of movement. If we deny this, we cannot arrive at the victorious solution of the war. In sum, while we must promote guerrilla warfare as a necessary strategical auxiliary to orthodox operations, we must neither assign it the primary position in our war strategy nor substitute it for mobile and positional warfare as conducted by orthodox forces.

    3. Guerrilla Warfare In History

    Guerrilla warfare is neither a product of China nor peculiar to the present day. From the earliest historical days, it has been a feature of wars fought by every class of men against invaders and oppressors. Under suitable conditions, it has great possibilities. The many guerrilla wars in history have their points of difference, their peculiar characteristics, their varying processes and conclusions, and we must respect and profit by the experience of those whose blood was shed in them. What a pity it is that the priceless experience gained during the several hundred wars waged by the peasants of China cannot be marshaled today to guide us. Our only experience in guerrilla hostilities has been that gained from the several conflicts that have been carried on against us by foreign imperialists. But that experience should help the fighting Chinese recognize the necessity for guerrilla warfare and should confirm them in confidence of ultimate victory.

    In September 1812, Napoleon, in the course of swallowing all of Europe, invaded Russia at the head of a great army totaling several hundred thousand infantry, cavalry, and artillery. At that time, Russia was weak and her ill-prepared army was not concentrated. The most important phase of her strategy was the use made of Cossack cavalry and detachments of peasants to carry on guerrilla operations. After giving up Moscow, the Russians formed nine guerrilla divisions of about five hundred men each. These, and vast groups of organized peasants, carried on partisan warfare and continually harassed the French Army. When the French Army was withdrawing, cold and starving, Russian guerrillas blocked the way and, in combination with regular troops, carried out counterattacks on the French rear, pursuing and defeating them. The army of the heroic Napoleon was almost entirely annihilated, and the guerrillas captured many officers, men, cannon, and rifles. Though the victory was the result of various factors and depended largely on the activities of the regular army the function of the partisan groups was extremely important. The corrupt and poorly organized country that was Russia defeated and destroyed an army led by the most famous soldier of Europe and won the war in spite of the fact that her ability to organize guerrilla regimes was not fully developed. At times, guerrilla groups were hindered in their operations and the supply of equipment and arms was insufficient. If we use the Russian saying, it was a case of a battle between "the fist and the axe" [Ivanov ].

    From 1918 to 1920, the Russian Soviets, because of the opposition and intervention of foreign imperialists and the internal disturbances of White Russian groups, were forced to organize themselves in occupied territories and fight a real war. In Siberia and Alashan, in the rear of the army of the traitor Denikin and in the rear of the Poles, there were many Red Russian guerrillas. These not only disrupted and destroyed the communications in the enemy's rear but also frequently prevented his advance. On one occasion, the guerrillas completely destroyed a retreating White Army that had previously been defeated by regular Red forces. Kolchak, Denikin, the Japanese, and the Poles, owing to the necessity of staving off the attacks of guerrillas, were forced to withdraw regular troops from the front. 'Thus not only was the enemy's manpower impoverished but he found himself unable to cope with the ever-moving guerrilla' [The Nature of Guerrilla Action].

    The development of guerrillas at that time had only reached the stage where there were detached groups of several thousands in strength, old, middle-aged, and young. The old men organized themselves into propaganda groups known as 'silver-haired units'; there was a suitable guerrilla activity for the middle-aged; the young men formed combat units, and there were even groups for the children. Among the leaders were determined Communists who carried on general political work among the people. These, although they opposed the doctrine of extreme guerrilla warfare, were quick to oppose those who condemned it. Experience tells us that 'Orthodox armies are the fundamental and principal power, guerrilla units are secondary to them and assist in the accomplishment of the mission assigned the regular forces [Gusev, Lessons of Civil War.]. Many of the guerrilla regimes in Russia gradually developed until in battle they were able to discharge functions of organized regulars. The army of the famous General Galen was entirely derived from guerrillas.

    During seven months in 1935 and 1936, the Abyssinians lost their war against Italy. The cause of defeat aside from the most important political reasons that there were dissentient political groups, no strong government party, and unstable policy was the failure to adopt a positive policy of mobile warfare. There was never a combination of the war of movement with large-scale guerrilla operations. Ultimately, the Abyssinians adopted a purely passive defence, with the result that they were unable to defeat the Italians. In addition to this, the fact that Abyssinia is a relatively small and sparsely populated country was contributory. Even in spite of the fact that the Abyssinian Army and its equipment were not modern, she was able to withstand a mechanized Italian force of 400,000 for seven months. During that period, there were several occasions when a war of movement was combined with large-scale guerrilla operations to strike the Italians heavy blows. Moreover, several cities were retaken and casualties totaling 140,000 were inflicted. Had this policy been steadfastly continued, it would have been difficult to have named the ultimate winner. At the present time, guerrilla activities continue in Abyssinia, and if the internal political questions can be solved, an extension of such activities is probable.

    In 1841 and 1842, when brave people from San Yuan Li fought the English; again from 1850 to 1864, during the Taiping War, and for a third time in 1899 in the Boxer Uprising, guerrilla tactics were employed to a remarkable degree. Particularly was this so during the Taiping War, when guerrilla operations were most extensive and the Ch'ing troops were often completely exhausted and forced to flee for their lives.

    In these wars, there were no guiding principles of guerrilla action. Perhaps these guerrilla hostilities were not carried out in conjunction with regular operations, or perhaps there was a lack of co-ordination. But the fact that victory was not gained was not because of any lack in guerrilla activity but rather because of the interference of politics in military affairs. Experience shows that if precedence is not given to the question of conquering the enemy in both political and military affairs, and if regular hostilities are not conducted with tenacity, guerrilla operations alone cannot produce final victory.

    From 1927 to 1936, the Chinese Red Army fought almost continually and employed guerrilla tactics contently. At the very beginning, a positive policy was adopted. Many bases were established, and from guerrilla bands, the Reds were able to develop into regular armies. As these armies fought, new guerrilla regimes were developed over a wide area. These regimes co-ordinated their efforts with those of the regular forces This policy accounted for the many victories gained by the guerrilla troops relatively few in number, who were armed with weapons inferior to those of their opponents. The leaders of that period properly combined guerrilla operations with a war of movement both strategically and tactically. They depended primarily upon alertness. They stressed the correct basis for both political affaires and military operations. They developed their guerrilla bands into trained units. They then determined upon a ten year period of resistance during which time they overcame innumerable difficulties and have only lately reached their goal of direct participation in the anti-Japanese war. There is no doubt that the internal unification of China is now a permanent and definite fact, and that the experience gained during our internal struggles has proved to be both necessary and advantageous to us in the struggle against Japanese imperialism. There are many valuable lessons we can learn from the experience of those years. Principle among them is the fact that guerrilla success largely depend upon powerful political leaders who work unceasingly to bring about internal unification. Such leaders must work with the people; they must have a correct conception of the policy to be adopted as regards both the people and the enemy.

    After 18 September 1931, strong anti-Japanese guerrilla campaigns were opened in each of the three north-east provinces. Guerrilla activity persists there in spite of the cruelties and deceits practiced by the Japanese at the expense of the people, and in spite of the fact that her armies have occupied the land and oppressed the people for the last seven years. The struggle can be divided into two periods . During the first, which extended from 18 September 1931 to January 1933, anti-Japanese guerrilla activity exploded constantly in all three provinces. Ma Chan Shan and Su Ping Wei established an anti-Japanese regime in Heilungkiang. In Chi Lin. the National Salvation Army and the Self-Defence Army were led by Wang Te Lin and Li Tu respectively. In Feng T'ien, Chu Lu and others commanded guerrilla units The influence of these forces was great. They harassed the Japanese unceasingly, but because there was an indefinite political goal, improper leadership, failure to co ordinate military command and operations and to work with the people, and, finally, failure to delegate proper political functions to the army, the whole organization was feeble, and its strength was not unified. As a direct result of these conditions, the campaigns failed and the troops were finally defeated by our enemy.

    During the second period, which has extended from January 1933 to the present time, the situation has greatly improved, This has come about because great numbers of people who have been oppressed by the enemy have decided to resist him, because of the participation of the Chinese Communists in the anti-Japanese warm and because of the fine work of the volunteer units. The guerrillas have finally educated the people to the meaning of guerrilla warfare, and in the north-east, it has again become an important and powerful influence. Already seven or eight guerrilla regiments and a number of independent platoons have been formed, and their activities make it necessary for the Japanese to send troops after them month after month. These units hamper the Japanese and undermine their control in the north-east, while, at the same time they inspire a Nationalist revolution in Korea. Such activities are not merely of transient and local importance but directly contribute to our ultimate victory.

    However, there are still some weak points. For instance: National defence policy has not been sufficiently developed; participation of the people is not general; internal political organization is still in its primary stages, and the force used to attack the Japanese and the puppet governments is not yet sufficient. But if present policy is continued tenaciously, all these weaknesses will be overcome. Experience proves that guerrilla war will develop to even greater proportions and that, in spite of the cruelty o the Japanese and the many methods they have device to cheat the people, they cannot extinguish guerrilla activities extinguish guerrilla activities in the three north-eastern provinces.

    The guerrilla experiences of China and of other countries that have been outlined; prove that in a war of revolutionary nature such hostilities are possible, natural and necessary. They prove that if the present anti-Japanese war for the emancipation of the masses of the Chinese people is to gain ultimate victory, such hostilities must expand tremendously.

    Historical experience is written in iron and blood. We must point out that the guerrilla campaigns being waged in China today are a page in history that has no precedent. Their influence will not be confined solely to China in her present anti-Japanese war but will be world-wide.

    4. Can Victory Be Attained By Guerrilla Operations?

    Guerrilla hostilities are but one phase of the war of resistance against Japan and the answer to the question of whether or not they can produce ultimate victory can be given only after investigation and comparison of all elements of our own strength with those of the enemy. The particulars of such a comparison are several. First, the strong Japanese bandit nation is an absolute monarchy. During the course of her invasion of China, she had made comparative progress in the techniques of industrial production and in the development of excellence and skill in her army, navy, and airforce. But in spite of this industrial progress, she remains an absolute monarchy of inferior physical endowments. Her manpower, her raw materials, and her financial resources are all inadequate and insufficient to maintain her in protracted warfare or to meet the situation presented by a war prosecuted over a vast area. Added to this is the anti-war feeling now manifested by the Japanese people, a feeling that is shared by the junior officers and, more extensively, by the soldiers of the invading army. Furthermore, China is not Japan's only enemy. Japan is unable to employ her entire strength in the attack on China; she cannot, at most, spare more than a million men for this purpose, as she must hold any in excess of that number for use against other possible opponents. Because of these important primary considerations, the invading Japanese bandits can hope neither to be victorious in a protracted struggle nor to conquer a vast area. Their strategy must be one of lightning war and speedy decision. If we can hold out for three or more years, it will be most difficult for Japan to bear up under the strain.

    In the war, the Japanese brigands must depend upon lines of communication linking the principal cities as routes for the transport of war materials. The most important considerations for her are that her rear be stable and peaceful and that her lines of communication be intact. It is not to her an advantage to wage war over a vast area with disrupted lines of communication. She cannot disperse her strength and fight in a number of places, and her greatest fears are these eruptions in her rear and disruption of her lines of communication. If she can maintain communications, she will be able at will to concentrate powerful forces speedily at strategic points to engage our organized units in decisive battle. Another important Japanese objective is to profit from the industries, finances, and manpower in captured areas and with them to augment her own insufficient strength. Certainly, it is not to her advantage to forgo these benefits, not to be forced to dissipate her energies in a type of warfare in which the gains will not compensate for the losses. It is for these reasons that guerrilla warfare conducted in each bit of conquered territory over a wide area will be a heavy blow struck at the Japanese bandits. Experience in the five northern provinces as well as in Kiangsu, Chekiang and Anhwei has absolutely established the truth of this assertion.

    China is a country half colonial and half feudal; it is a country that is politically, militarily, and economically backward. This is an inescapable conclusion. It is a vast country with great resources and tremendous population, a country in which the terrain is complicated and the facilities for communication are poor. All theses factors favour a protracted war, they all favour the application of mobile warfare and guerilla operations. The establishment of innumerable anti-Japanese bases behind the enemy's lines will force him to fight unceasingly in many places at once, both to his front and his rear. He thus endlessly expends his resources.

    We must unite the strength of the army with that of the people, we must strike the weak spots in the enemy's flanks, in his front, in his rear. We must make war everywhere and cause dispersal of his forces and dissipation of his strength. Thus the time will come when a gradual change will become evident in the relative position of ourselves and our enemy, and when that day comes, it will be the beginning of our ultimate victory over the Japanese.

    Although China's population is great, it is unorganized. This is a weakness which must be then into account.

    The Japanese bandits have merely to conquer territory but rapacious, and murderous policy of the extinction of the Chinese race. We must unite the nation without regard to parties and follow our policy of resistance to the end. China today is not the China of old. It is not like Abyssinia. China today is at the point of her greatest historical progress. The standards of literacy among the masses have been raised; the rapprochement of Communists and Nationalists has laid the foundation for an anti-Japanese war front that is constantly being strengthened and expanded; government, army and people are all working with great energy; the raw material resources and the economic strength of the nation are waiting to be used; the unorganized people are becoming an organized nation.

    These energies must be directed toward the goal of protracted war so that should the Japanese occupy much of our territory or even most of it, we shall still gain final victory. Not only must those behind our lines organize for resistance but also those who live in Japanese-occupied territory in every part of the country. The traitors who accept the Japanese as fathers are few in number, and those who have taken oath that they would prefer death to abject slavery are many. If we resist with this spirit, what enemy can we not conquer and who can say that ultimate victory will not be ours?

    The Japanese are waging a barbaric war along uncivilized lines. For that reason, Japanese of all classes oppose the policies of their government, as do vast international groups. On the other hand, because China's cause is righteous, our countrymen of all classes and parties are united to oppose the invader; we have sympathy in many foreign countries including even Japan itself. This is perhaps the most important reason why Japan will lose and China will win.

    The progress of the war for the emancipation of the Chinese people will be in accord with these facts. The guerrilla war of resistance will be in accord with these facts, and that guerrilla operations correlated with those of our regular forces will produce victory is the conviction of the many patriots who devote their entire strength to guerrilla hostilities.

    5. Organization For Guerilla Warfare

    Four points must be considered under this subject. These are:

    How are guerrilla bands formed?
    How are guerrilla bands organized?
    What are the methods of arming guerrilla bands?
    What elements constitute a guerrilla band?

    These are all questions pertaining to the organization armed guerrilla units; they are questions which those who had no experience in guerilla hostilities do not understand and on which they can arrive at no sound decisions; indeed, they would not know in what manner to begin.

    How Guerrilla Units Are Originally Formed

    The unit may originate in any one of the following ways:

    a) From the masses of the people.
    b) From regular army units temporarily detailed for the purpose.
    c) From regular army units permanently detailed.
    d) From the combination of a regular army unit and a unit recruited from the people.
    e) From the local militia.
    f) From deserters from the ranks of the enemy.
    g) From former bandits and bandit groups.

    In the present hostilities, no doubt, all these sources will be employed.

    In the first case above, the guerrilla unit is formed from the people. This is the fundamental type. Upon the arrival of the enemy army to oppress and slaughter the people, their leaders call upon them to resist. They assemble the most valorous elements, arm them with old rifles or whatever firearms they can, and thus a guerrilla unit begins. Orders have already been issued throughout the nation that call upon the people to form guerrilla units both for local defense and for other combat. If the local governments approve and aid such movements, they cannot fail to prosper. In some places, where the local government is not determined or where its officers have all fled, the leaders among the masses (relying on the sympathy of the people and their sincere desire to resist Japan and succor the country ) call upon the people to resist, and they respond. Thus, many guerrilla units are organized. In circumstances of this kind, the duties of leadership usually fall upon the shoulders of young students, teachers, professors, other educators, local soldiery, professional men, artisans, and those without a fixed profession, who are willing to exert themselves to the last drop of their blood. Recently, in Shansi, Hopeh, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shantung, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsu, and other provinces, extensive guerrilla hostilities have broken out. All these are organized and led by patriots. The amount of such activity is the best proof of the foregoing statement. The more such bands there are, the better will the situation be. Each district, each county, should be able to organize a great number of guerrilla squads, which, when assembled, form a guerrilla company.

    There are those who say: 'I am a farmer', or, 'I am a student'; 'I can discuss literature but not military arts.' This is incorrect. There is no profound difference between the farmer and the soldier. You must have courage. You simply leave your farms and become soldiers. That you are farmers is of no difference, and if you have education, that is so much the better. When you take your arms in hand, you become soldiers; when you are organized, you become military units.

    Guerrilla hostilities are the university of war, and after you have fought several times valiantly and aggressively, you may become a leader of troops and there will be many well-known regular soldiers who will not be your peers. Without question, the fountainhead of guerrilla warfare is in the masses of the people, who organize guerrilla units directly from themselves.

    The second type of guerrilla unit is that which is organized from small units of the regular forces temporarily detached for the purpose. For example, since hostilities commenced, many groups have been temporarily detached from armies, divisions, and brigades and have been assigned guerrilla duties. A regiment of the regular army may, if circumstances warrant, be dispersed into groups for the purpose of carrying on guerrilla operations. As an example of this, there is the Eighth Route Army, in North China. Excluding the periods when it carries on mobile operations as an army, it is divided into its elements and these carry on guerrilla hostilities. This type of guerrilla unit is essential for two reasons. First, in mobile-warfare situations, the co-ordination of guerrilla activities with regular operations is necessary. Second, until guerrilla hostilities can be developed on a grand scale, there is no one to carry out guerrilla missions but regulars. Historical experience shows us that regular army units are not able to undergo the hardships of guerrilla campaigning over long periods. The leaders of regular units engaged in guerrilla operations must be extremely adaptable. They must study the methods of guerrilla war. They must understand that initiative, discipline, and the employment of stratagems are all of the utmost importance. As the guerrilla status of regular units is but temporary, their leaders must lend all possible support to the organization of guerrilla units from among the people. These units must be so disciplined that they hold together after the departure of the regulars.

    The third type of unit consists of a detachment of regulars who are permanently assigned guerrilla duties. This type of small detachment does not have to be prepared to rejoin the regular forces. Its post is somewhere in the rear of the enemy, and there it becomes the backbone of guerrilla organization. As an example of this type of organization we may take the Wu Tat Shan district in the heart of the Hopeh-Chahar-Shansi area. Along the borders of these provinces, units from the Eighth Route Army have established a framework or guerrilla operations. Around these small cores, many detachments have been organized and the area of guerrilla activity greatly expanded. In areas in which there is a possibility of cutting the enemy's lines of supply, this system should be used. Severing enemy, supply routes destroys his lifeline; this is one feature that cannot be neglected. If, at the time the regular forces withdraw from a certain area, some units left behind, these should conduct guerrilla operations in the enemy's rear. As an example of this, we have the guerrilla bands now continuing their independent operations in the Shanghai- Woosung area in spite of the withdrawal of regular forces.

    The fourth type of organization is the result of a merger between small regular detachments and local guerrilla units. The regular forces may dispatch a squad, a platoon, or a company, which is placed at the disposal of the local guerrilla commander. If a small group experienced in military and political affairs is sent, it becomes the core of the local guerrilla unit. These several methods are all excellent, and if properly applied, the intensity of guerilla warfare can be extended. In the Wu Tat Shan area, each of these methods has been used.

    The fifth type mentioned above is from the local militia, from police and home guards. In every North China province, there are now many of these groups, and they should be formed in every locality. The government has issued mandate to the effect that the people are not to depart from war areas. The officer in command of the county, the commander of the peace-preservation unit, the chief of police are all required to obey this mandate. They cannot retreat with their forces but must remain at their stations and resist.

    The sixth type of unit is that organized from troops that come over from the enemy—the Chinese 'traitor' troops employed by the Japanese. It is always possible to produce disaffection in their ranks, and we must increase our propaganda efforts and foment mutinies among such troops. Immediately after mutinying, they must be received into our ranks and organized. The concord of the leaders and the assent of the men must be gained, and the units rebuilt politically and reorganized militarily. Once this has been accomplished, they become successful guerrilla units. In regard to this type of unit, it may be said that political work among them is of utmost importance.

    The seventh type of guerrilla organization is that formed from bands of bandits and brigands. This, although difficult, must be carried out with utmost vigour lest the enemy use such bands to his own advantages. Many bandit groups pose as anti-Japanese guerrillas, and it is only necessary to correct their political beliefs to convert them.

    In spite of inescapable differences in the fundamental types of guerrilla bands, it is possible to unite them to form a vast sea of guerrillas. The ancients said, 'Tai Shan is a great mountain because it does not scorn the merest handful of dirt; the rivers and seas are deep because they absorb the waters of small streams.' Attention paid to the enlistment and organization of guerrillas of every type and from every source will increase the potentialities of guerrilla action in the anti-Japanese war. This is something that patriots will not neglect.

    THE METHOD OF ORGANIZING GUERRILLA REGIMES

    Many of those who decide to participate in guerrilla activities do not know the methods of organization. For such people, as well as for students who have no knowledge of military affairs, the matter of organization is a problem that requires solution. Even among those who have military knowledge, there are some who know nothing of guerrilla regimes use they are lacking in that particular type of experience. The subject of the organization of such regimes is not confined to the organization of specific units but includes all guerrilla activities within the area where the regime functions.

    As an example of such organization, we may take a geographical area in the enemy's rear. This area may comprise many counties. It must be sub-divided and individual companies or battalions formed to accord with the sub-divisions. To this 'military area', a military commander and political commissioners are appointed. Under these, the necessary officers both military and political, are appointed. In the military headquarters, there will be the staff, the aides, the supply officers, and the medical personnel. These are controlled by the chief of staff, who acts in accordance with orders from the commander. In the political headquarters, there are bureaus of propaganda organization, people's mass movements, and miscellaneous affairs. Control of these is vested in the political chairman.

    The military areas are sub-divided into smaller districts in accordance with local geography, the enemy situation locally, and the state of guerrilla development. Each of these smaller divisions within the area is a district, each of which may consist of from two to six counties. To each district, a military commander and several political commissioners are appointed. Under their direction, military and political headquarters are organized. Tasks are assigned in accordance with the number of guerrilla troops available. Although the names of the officers in the 'district' correspond to those in the larger 'area', the number of the functionaries assigned in the former case should be reduced to the least possible. In order to unify control, to handle guerrilla troops that come from different sources, and to harmonize military operations and local political affairs, a committee of from seven to nine members should be organized in each area and district. This committee, the members of which are selected by the troops and the local political officers, should function as a forum for the discussion of both military and political matters.

    All the people in an area should arm themselves and be organized into two groups. One of these groups is a combat group, the other a self-defence unit with but limited military quality. Regular combatant guerrillas are organized into one of three general types of units. The first of these is the small unit, the platoon or company. In each county, three to six units may be organized. The second type is the battalion of from two to four companies. One such unit should be organized in each county. While the unit fundamentally belongs to the county in it was organized, it may operate in other counties. While in areas other than its own, it must operate in conjunction with local units in order to take advantage of their manpower, their knowledge of local terrain and local customs, and their information of the enemy.

    The third type is the guerrilla regiment, which consists of from two to four of the above-mentioned battalion units. If sufficient manpower is available, a guerrilla a brigade of from two to four regiments may be formed.

    Each of the units has its own peculiarities of organization. A squad, the smallest unit, has a strength of from nine to eleven men, including the leader and the assistant leader. Its arms may be from two to five Western-style rifles, with the remaining men armed with rifles of local manufacture, fowling-pieces, etc., spears, or big swords. Two to four such squads form a platoon. This too has a leader and an assistant leader, and when acting independently, it is assigned a political officer to carry on political propaganda work. The platoon may have about ten rifles, with the remainder of its four of such units from a company, which, like the platoon, has a leader, an assistant leader, and a political officer. All these units are under the direct supervision of the military commanders of the areas in which they operate.

    The battalion unit must be more thoroughly organized and better equipped than the smaller units. Its discipline and its personnel should be superior. If a battalion is formed from company units, it should not deprive subordinate units entirely of their manpower and their arms. If in a small area, there is a peace-preservation corps, a branch of the militia, or police, regular guerrilla units should not be dispersed over it.

    The guerrilla unit next in size to the battalion is the regiment. This must be under more severe discipline than the battalion. In an independent guerrilla regiment, there may be ten men per squad, three squad per platoon, three platoons per company, three companies per battalion, and three battalions to the regiment. Two of such regiments form a brigade. Each of these units has a commander, a vice-commander, and a political officer.

    In North China, guerrilla cavalry units should be established. These may be regiments of from two to four companies, or battalions.

    All these units from the lowest to the highest are combatant guerrilla units and receive their supplies from the central government. Details of their organization are shown in the tables.

    All the people of both sexes from the ages of sixteen to forty-five must be organized into anti-Japanese self-defence units, the basis of which is voluntary service. As a first step, they must procure arms, then they must be given both military and political training. Their responsibilities are : local sentry duties, securing information of the enemy, arresting traitors, and preventing the dissemination of enemy propaganda. When the enemy launches a guerrilla-suppression drive, these units, armed with what weapons there are, are assigned to certain areas to deceive, hinder, and harass him. Thus, the defence units assist the combatant guerrillas. They have other functions. They furnish stretcher-bearers to transport the wounded , carriers to take food to the troops, and comfort missions to provide the troops with tea and rice. If a locality can organize such a self-defence unit as we have described, the traitors cannot hide nor can bandits and robbers disturb the peace of the people. Thus the people will continue to assist the guerrilla and supply manpower to our regular armies. 'The organization of self-defence units is a transitional step in the development of universal conscription. Such units are reservoirs of manpower for the orthodox forces.'

    There have been such organizations for some time in Shansi, Shensi, Honan, and Suiyuan. The youth organizations in different provinces were formed for the purpose of educating the young. They have been of some help. However, they were not voluntary, and confidence of the people was thus not gained. These organizations were not widespread, and their effect was almost negligible. This system was, therefore, supplanted by the new-type organizations,. Which are organized on the principles of voluntary co-operation and non-separation of the members from their native localities. When the members of these organizations are in their native towns, they support themselves . Only in case of military necessity are they ordered to remote places, and when this is done, the government must support them. Each member of these groups must have a weapon even if the weapon is only a knife, a pistol, a lance, or a spear.

    In all places where the enemy operates, these self-defence units should organize within themselves a small guerrilla group of perhaps from three to ten men armed with pistols or revolvers. This group is not required to leave its native locality.

    The organization of these self-defence units is mentioned in this book because such units are useful for the purposes of inculcating the people with military and political knowledge, keeping order in the rear, and replenishing the ranks of the regulars. These groups should be organized not only in the active war zones but in every province in China. 'The people must be inspired to co-operate voluntarily. We must not force them, for if we do, it will be ineffectual.' This is extremely important.

    In order to control anti-Japanese military organization as a whole, it is necessary to establish a system of military areas and districts along the lines we have indicated.

    EQUIPMENT OF GUERRILLAS

    In regard to the problem of guerrilla equipment, it must be understood that guerrillas are lightly-armed attack groups, which require simple equipment. The standard of equipment is based upon the nature of duties assigned; the equipment of low-class guerrilla units is not as good as that of higher-class units. For example, those who are assigned the task of destroying rail communications are better equipped than those who do not have that task. The equipment of guerrillas cannot be based on what the guerrillas want, to even what they need, but must be based on what is available for their use. Equipment cannot be furnished immediately but must be acquired gradually. These are points to be kept in mind .

    The question of equipment includes the collection, supply, distribution, and replacement of weapons, ammunition, blankets, communication materials, transport, and facilities for propaganda work. The supply of weapons and ammunition is most difficult, particularly at the time the unit is established, but this problem can always be solved eventually. Guerrilla bands that originate in the people are furnished with revolvers, pistols, rifles, spears, big swords, and land mines and mortars of local manufacture. Other elementary weapons are added and as many new-type rifles as are available are distributed. After a period of resistance, it is possible to increase the supply of equipment by capturing it from the enemy. In this respect, the transport companies are the easiest to equip, for in any successful attack, we will capture the enemy's transport.

    An armory should be established in each guerrilla district for the manufacture and repair of rifles and for the production of cartridge, hand grenades and bayonets. Guerrillas must not depend to much on an armory. The enemy is the principal source of their supply.

    For destruction of railway tracks, bridges, and stations in enemy-controlled territory, it is necessary to gather together demolition materials. Troops must be trained in the preparation and use of demolitions, and a demolition unit must be organized in each regiment.

    As for minimum clothing requirements, these are that each man shall have at least two summer-weight uniforms, one suit of winter clothing, two hats, a pair of wrap puttees, and blanket. Each man must have a pack or a bag for food. In the north, each man must have an overcoat. In acquiring this clothing, we cannot depend on captures made by the enemy, for it is forbidden for captors to take clothing from their prisoners. In order to maintain high morale in guerrilla forces, all the clothing and equipment mentioned should be furnished by the representatives of the government in each guerrilla district. These men may confiscate clothing from traitors or ask contributions from those best able to afford them. In subordinate groups, uniforms are unnecessary.

    Telephone and radio equipment is not necessary in lower groups, but all units from regiment up are equipped with both. This material can be obtained by contributions from the regular forces and by capture from the enemy.

    In the guerrilla army in general, and at bases in particular, there must be a high standard of medical equipment. Besides the services of the doctors, medicines must be procured. Although guerrillas can depend on the enemy for some portion of their medical supplies, they must, in general, depend upon contributions. If Western medicines are not available, local medicines must be made to suffice.

    The problem of transport is more vital in North-China than in the south, for in the south all that are necessary are mules and horses. Small guerrilla units need no animals, but regiments and brigades will find them necessary. Commanders and staffs of units from companies up should be furnished a riding animal each. At times, two officers will have to share a horse. Officers whose duties are of minor nature do not have to be mounted.

    Propaganda materials are very important. Every large guerrilla unit should have a printing press and a mimeograph stone. They must also have paper on which to print propaganda leaflets and notices. They must be supplied with large brushes. In guerrilla areas, there should be a printing press or a lead-type press.

    For the purpose of printing training instructions, this material is of the greatest importance.

    In addition to the equipment listed above, it is necessary to have field-glasses, compasses, and military maps. An accomplished guerrilla group will acquire these things.

    Because of the proved importance of guerrilla hostilities in the anti-Japanese war, the headquarters of the Nationalist Government and the commanding officers of the various war zones should do their best to supply the guerrillas with what they actually need and are unable to get for themselves. However, it must be repeated that guerrilla equipment will in the main depend on the efforts of the guerrillas themselves. If they depend on higher officers too much, the psychological effect will be to weaken the guerrilla spirit of resistance.

    ELEMENTS OF THE GUERRILLA ARMY

    The term 'element' as used in the title to this section refers to the personnel, both officers and men, of the guerrilla army. Since each guerrilla group fights in a protracted war, its officers must be brave and positive men whose entire loyalty is dedicated to the cause of emancipation of the people. An officer should have the following qualities: great powers of endurance so that in spite of any hardship he sets an example to his men and be a model for them; he must be able to mix easily with the people; his spirit and that of the men must be one in strengthening the policy of resistance to the Japanese. If he wishes to gain victories, he must study tactics. A guerrilla group with officers of this calibre would be unbeatable. I do not mean that every guerrilla group can have, at its inception, officers of such qualities. The officers must be men naturally endowed with good qualities which can be developed during the course of campaigning. The most important natural quality is that of complete loyalty to the idea of people's emancipation. If this is present, the others will develop; if it is not present, nothing can be done. When officers are first selected from a group, it is this quality that should receive particular attention. The officers in a group should be inhabitants of the locality in which the group is organized, as this will facilitate relations between them and the local civilians. In addition, officers so chosen would be familiar with conditions. If in any locality there are not enough men of sufficiently high qualifications to become officers, an effort must be made to train and educate the people so these qualities may be developed and the potential officer material increased. There can be no disagreements between officers native to one place and those from other localities.

    A guerrilla group ought to operate on the principle that only volunteers are acceptable for service. It is a mistake to impress people into service. As long as a person is willing to fight, his social condition or position is no consideration, but only men who are courageous and determined can bear the hardships of guerrilla campaigning in a protracted war.

    A soldier who habitually breaks regulations must be dismissed from the army. Vagabonds and vicious people must not be accepted for service. The opium habit must be forbidden, and a soldier who cannot break himself of the habit should be dismissed. Victory in guerrilla war is conditioned upon keeping the membership pure and clean.


    "Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

    I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

    HAKUNA MATATA

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    It is a fact that during the war the enemy may take advantage of certain people who are lacking in conscience and patriotism and induce them to join the guerrillas for the purpose of betraying them. Officers must, therefore, continually educate the soldiers and inculcate patriotism in them. This will prevent the success of traitors. The traitors who are in the ranks must be discovered and expelled, and punishment and expulsion meted out to those who have been influenced by them. In all such cases, the officers should summon the soldiers and relate the facts to them, thus arousing their hatred and detestation for traitors. This procedure will serve as well as a warning to the other soldiers. If an officer is discovered to be a traitor, some prudence must be used in the punishment adjudged. However, the work of eliminating traitors in the army begins with their elimination from among the people.

    Chinese soldiers who have served under puppet governments and bandits who have been converted should be welcomed as individuals or as groups. They should be well-treated and repatriated. But care should be used during their reorientation to distinguish those whose idea is to fight the Japanese from those who may be present for other reasons.

    6. The Political Problems Of Guerrilla Warfare

    In Chapter 1, I mentioned the fact that guerrilla troops should have a precise conception of the political goal of the struggle and the political organization to be used in attaining that goal. This means that both organization and discipline of guerrilla troops must be at a high level so that they can carry out the political activities that are the life of both the guerilla armies and of revolutionary warfare.

    First of all, political activities depend upon the indoctrination of both military and political leaders with the idea of anti-Japanism. Through them, the idea is transmitted to the troops. One must not feel that he is anti-Japanese merely because he is a member of a guerrilla unit. The anti-Japanese idea must be an ever-present conviction, and if it isforgotten, we may succumb to the temptations of the enemy or be overcome with discouragement. In a war of long duration, those whose conviction that the people must be emancipated is not deep rooted are likely to become shaken in their faith or actually revolt. Without the general education that enables everyone to understand our goal of driving out Japanese imperialism and establishing a free and happy China, the soldiers fight without conviction and lose their determination.

    The political goal must be clearly and precisely indicated to inhabitants of guerrilla zones and their national consciousness awakened. Hence, a concrete explanation of the political systems used is important not only to guerrilla troops but to all those who are concerned with the realization of our political goal. The Kuomintang has issued a pamphlet entitled System of National Organization for War, which should be widely distributed throughout guerrilla zones. If we lack national organization, we will lack the essential unity that should exist between the soldiers and the people.

    A study and comprehension of the political objectives of this war and of the anti-Japanese front is particularly important for officers of guerrilla troops. There are some militarists who say: 'We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms.' It is vital that these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.

    It is to be hoped that the world is in the last era of strife. The vast majority of human beings have already prepared or are preparing to fight a war that will bring justice to the oppressed peopled of the world. No matter how long this war may last, there is no doubt that it will be followed by an unprecedented epoch of peace The war that we are fighting today for the freedom of all human beings, and the independent, happy, and liberal China that we are fighting to establish will be a part of that new world order. A conception like this is difficult for the simple-minded militarist to grasp and it must therefore be carefully explained to him.

    There are three additional matters that must be considered under the broad question of political activities. These are political activities, first, as applied to the troops; second, as applied to the people; and, third, as applied to the enemy. The fundamental problems are: first, spiritual unification of officers and men within the army; second spiritual unification of the army and the people; of the army and the people; and, last, destruction of the unity of the enemy. The concrete methods for achieving these unities are discussed in detail in pamphlet Number 4 of this series, entitled Political Activities in Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare.

    A revolutionary army must have discipline that is established on a limited democratic basis. In all armies, obedience the subordinates to their superiors must be exacted. This is true in the case of guerrilla discipline, but the basis for guerrilla discipline must be the individual conscience. With guerrillas, a discipline of compulsion is ineffective. In any revolutionary army, there is unity of purpose as far as both officers and men are concerned, and, therefore, within such an army, discipline is self-imposed. Although discipline in guerrilla ranks is not as severe as in the ranks of orthodox forces, the necessity for discipline exists. This must be self-imposed, because only when it is, is the soldier able to understand completely, why he fights and why he must obey. This type of discipline becomes a tower of strength within the army, and it is the only type that can truly harmonize the relationship that exists between officers and soldiers.

    In any system where discipline is externally imposed, the relationship that exists between officer and man is characterized by indifference of the one to the other. The idea that officers can physically beat or severely tongue-lash their men is a feudal one and is not in accord with the conception of self-imposed discipline. Discipline of the feudal type will destroy internal unity and fighting strength. A discipline self-imposed is the primary characteristic of a democratic system in the army .

    A secondary characteristic is found in the degree of liberties accorded officers and soldiers. In a revolutionary army, all individuals enjoy political liberty and the question, for example, of the emancipation of the people must not only be tolerated but discussed, and propaganda must encouraged. Further, in such an army, the mode of living of the officers and the soldiers must not differ too much, and this is particularly true in the case of guerilla troops. Officers should live under the same conditions as their men, for that is the only way in which they can gain from their men the admiration and confidence so vital in war. It is incorrect to hold to a theory of equality in all things. But there must be equality of existence in accepting the hardships and dangers of war, thus we may attain to the unification of the officer and soldier groups a unity both horizontal within the group itself, and vertical, that is, from lower to higher echelons. It is only when such unity is present that units can be said to be powerful combat factors.

    There is also a unity of spirit that should exist between troops and local inhabitants. The Eighth Route Army put into practice a code known as 'Three Rules and the Eight Remarks', which we list here:

    Rules:

    All actions are subject to command.
    Do not steal from the people.
    Be neither selfish nor unjust.

    Remarks:

    Replace the door when you leave the house.
    Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.
    Be courteous.
    Be honest in your transactions.
    Return what you borrow.
    Replace what you break.
    Do not bathe in the presence of women.
    Do not without authority search those you arrest.

    The Red Army adhered to this code for ten years and the Eighth Route Army and other units have since adopted it.

    Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element cannot live.

    We further our mission of destroying the enemy by propagandizing his troops, by treating his captured soldiers with consideration, and by caring for those of his wounded who fall into our hands. If we fail in these respects, we strengthen the solidarity of our enemy.

    7. The Strategy Of Guerrilla Resistance Against Japan

    It has been definitely decided that in the strategy of our war against Japan, guerrilla strategy must be auxiliary to fundamental orthodox methods. If this were a small country, guerrilla activities could be carried out close to the scene of operations of the regular army and directly complementary to them. In such a case, there would be no question of guerrilla strategy as such. Nor would the question arise if our country were as strong as Russia, for example, and able speedily to eject an invader. The question exists because China, a weak country of vast size, has today progressed to the point where it has become possible to adopt the policy of a protracted war characterized by guerrilla operations. Although these may at first glance seem to be abnormal or heterodox, such is not actually the case.

    Because Japanese military power is inadequate, much of the territory her armies have overrun is without sufficient garrison troops. Under such circumstances the primary functions of guerrillas are three: first, to conduct a war on exterior lines, that is, in the rear of the enemy; second, to establish bases, and, last, to extend the war areas. Thus, guerrilla participation in the war is not merely a matter of purely local guerrilla tactics but involves strategical considerations.

    Such war, with its vast time and space factors, establishes a new military process, the focal point of which is China today. The Japanese are apparently attempting to recall a past that saw the Yuan extinguish the Sung and the Ch'ing conquer the Ming; that witnessed the extension of the British Empire to North America and India; that saw the Latins overrun Central and South America. As far as China today is concerned, such dreams of conquest are fantastic and without reality. Today's China is better equipped than was the China of yesterday, and a new type of guerrilla hostilities is a part of that equipment. If our enemy fails to take these facts into consideration and makes too optimistic an estimate of the situation, he courts disaster.

    Though the strategy of guerrillas is inseparable from war strategy as a whole, the actual conduct of these hostilities differs from the conduct of orthodox operations. Each type of warfare has methods peculiar to itself, and methods suitable to regular warfare cannot be applied with success to the special situations that confront guerrillas.

    Before we treat the practical aspects of guerrilla war, it might be well to recall the fundamental axiom of combat on which all military action is based. This can be stated: 'Conservation of one's own strength; destruction of enemy strength.' A military policy based on this axiom is consonant with a national policy directed towards the building of a free and prosperous Chinese state and the destruction of Japanese imperialism. It is in furtherance of this policy that government applies in military strength. Is the sacrifice demanded by war in conflict with the idea of self-preservation? Not at all. The sacrifices demanded are necessary both to destroy the enemy and to preserve ourselves; the sacrifice of a part of the people is necessary to preserve the whole. All the considerations of military action are derived from this axiom. Its application is as apparent in all tactical and strategical conceptions as it is in the simple case of the soldier who shoots at his enemy from a covered position.

    All guerrilla units start from nothing and grow. What methods should we select to ensure the conservation and development of our own strength and the destruction of that of the enemy? The essential requirements are the six listed below:

    Retention of the initiative; alertness; carefully planned tactical attacks in a war of strategical defence; tactical speed in a war strategically protracted, tactical operations on exterior lines in a war conducts strategically on interior lines.
    Conduct of operations to complement those of the regular army.
    The establishment of bases.
    A clear understanding of the relationship that exits between the attack and the defence.
    The development of mobile operations.
    Correct command.

    The enemy, though numerically weak, is strong in the quality of his troops and their equipment; we, on the other hand, are strong numerically but weak as to quality. These considerations have been taken into account in the development of the policy of tactical offence, tactical speed, and tactical operations on exterior lines in a war that, strategically speaking, is defensive in character, protracted in nature, and conducted along interior lines. Our strategy is based on these conceptions. They must be kept in mind in the conduct of all operations.

    Although the element of surprise is not absent in orthodox warfare, there are fewer opportunities to apply it than there are during guerrilla hostilities. In the latter, speed is essential. The movements of guerrilla troops must be secret and of supernatural rapidity; the enemy must be taken unaware, and the action entered speedily. There can be no procrastination in the execution of plans; no assumption of a negative or passive defence; no great dispersion of forces in many local engagements. The basic method is the attack in a violent and deceptive form.

    While there may be cases where the attack will extend over a period of several days ( if that length of time in necessary to annihilate an enemy group ), it is more profitable to launch and push an attack with maximum speed. The tactics of defence have no place in the realm of guerrilla warfare. If a delaying action is necessary, such places as defiles, river crossings, and villages offer the most suitable conditions, for it is in such places that the enemy's arrangements may be disrupted and he may be annihilated.

    The enemy is much stronger than we are, and it is true that we can hinder, distract, disperse, and destroy him only if we disperse our own forces. Although guerrilla warfare is the warfare of such dispersed units, it is sometimes desirable to concentrate in order to destroy an enemy. Thus, the principle of concentration of force against a relatively weaker enemy is applicable to guerrilla warfare.

    We can prolong this struggle and make of it a protracted war only by gaining positive and lightning-like tactical decisions; by employing our manpower in proper concentrations and dispersions; and by operation on exterior lines in order to surround and destroy our enemy. If we cannot surround whole armies, we can at least partially destroy them, if we cannot kill the Japanese, we can capture them. The total effect of many local successes will be to change the relative strengths of the opposing forces. The destruction of Japan's military power, combined with the international sympathy for China's cause and the revolutionary tendencies evident in Japan, will be sufficient to destroy Japanese imperialism.

    We will next discuss initiative, alertness, and the matter of careful planning. What is meant by initiative in warfare? In all battles and wars, a struggle to gain and retain the initiative goes on between the opposing sides, for it is the side that holds the initiative that has liberty of action. When an army loses the initiative, it loses its liberty; its role becomes passive; it faces the danger of defeat and destruction.

    It is more difficult to obtain the initiative when defending on interior lines than it is while attacking on exterior lines. This is what Japan is doing. There are, however, several weak points as far as Japan is concerned. One of these is lack of sufficient manpower for the task; another is her cruelty to the inhabitants of conquered areas; a third is the underestimation of Chinese strength, which has resulted in the differences between military cliques, which, in turn, have been productive of many mistakes in the direction of her military forces. For instance, she has been gradually compelled to increase her manpower in China while, at the same time. the many arguments over plans of operations and disposition of troops have resulted in the loss of good opportunities for improvement of her strategical position. This explains the fact that although the Japanese are frequently able to surround large bodies of Chinese troops, they have never yet been able to capture more than a few. The Japanese military machine is thus being weakened by insufficiency of manpower, inadequacy of resources, the barbarism of her troops, and the general stupidity that has characterized the conduct of operations. Her offensive continues unabated, but because of the weaknesses pointed out, her attack must be limited in extent. She can never conquer China. The day will come — indeed already has in some areas — when she will be forced into a passive role. When hostilities commenced, China was passive, but as we enter the second phase of the war we find ourselves pursuing a strategy of mobile warfare, with both guerrillas and regulars operating on exterior lines. Thus, with each passing day, we seize some degree of initiative from the Japanese.

    The matter of initiative is especially serious for guerrilla forces, who must face critical situations unknown to regular troops. The superiority of the enemy and the lack of unity and experience within our own ranks may be cited. Guerrillas can, however, gain the initiative if they keep in mind the weak points of the enemy. Because of the enemy's insufficient manpower, guerrillas can operate over vast territories, because he is a foreigner and a barbarian, guerrillas can gain the confidence of millions of their countrymen; because of the stupidity of enemy commanders, guerrillas can make full use of their own cleverness. Both guerrillas and regulars must exploit these enemy weaknesses while, at the same time, our own are remedied. Some of our weaknesses are apparent only and are, in actuality, sources of strength. For example, the very fact that most guerrilla groups are small makes it desirable and advantageous for them to appear and disappear in the enemy's rear. With such activities, the enemy is simply unable to cope. A similar liberty of action can rarely be obtained by regular forces.

    When the enemy attacks the guerrillas with more than one column, it is difficult for the latter to retain the initiative. Any error, no matter how slight, in the estimation of the situation is likely to result in forcing the guerrillas into a passive role. They will then find themselves unable to beat oft the attacks of the enemy.

    It is apparent that we can gain and retain the initiative only by a correct estimation of the situation and a proper arrangement of all military and political factors. A too pessimistic estimate will operate to force us into a passive position, with consequent loss of initiative; an overly optimistic estimate, with its rash ordering of factors, will produce the same result.

    No military leader is endowed by heaven with an ability to seize the initiative. It is the intelligent leader who does so after a careful study and estimate of the situation and arrangement of the military and political factors involved. When a guerrilla unit, through either a poor estimate on the part of its leader or pressure from the enemy, is forced into a passive position, its first duty is to extricate itself. No method can be prescribed for this, as the method to be employed will, in every case, depend on the situation. One can, if necessary, run away. But there are times when the situation seems hopeless and, in reality, is not so at all. It is at such times that the good leader recognizes and seizes the moment when he can regain the lost initiative.

    Let us revert to alertness. To conduct one's troops with alertness is an essential of guerrilla command. Leaders must realize that to operate alertly is the most important factor in gaining the initiative and vital in its effect of the relative situation that exists between our forces and those of the enemy. Guerrilla commanders adjust their operations to the enemy situation, to the terrain, and to prevailing local conditions. Leaders must be alert to sense changes in these factors and make necessary modifications in troop dispositions to accord with them. The leader must be like a fisherman, who, with his nets, is able both to cast them and to pull them out in awareness of the depth of the water, the strength of the current or the presence of any obstructions that may foul them. As the fisherman controls his nets through the lead ropes, so the guerrilla leader maintains contact with control over his units. As the fisherman must change his position, so must the guerrilla commander. Dispersion, concentration, constant change of position—it is in these ways that guerrillas employ, their strength.

    In general, guerrilla units disperse to operate:

    When the enemy is in over-extended defence, and sufficient force cannot be concentrated against him, guerrillas must disperse, harass him, and demoralize him.
    When encircled by the enemy, guerrillas disperse to withdraw.
    When the nature of the ground limits action, guerrillas disperse.
    When the availability of supplies limits action, they disperse.
    Guerrillas disperse in order to promote mass movements over a wide area.Â

    Regardless of the circumstances that prevail at the time of dispersal, caution must be exercised in certain matters:

    A relatively large group should be retained as a central force. The remainder of the troops should not be divided into groups of absolutely equal size. In this way, the leader is in a position to deal with any circumstances that may arise.

    Each dispersed unit should have clear and definite responsibilities. Orders should specify a place to which to proceed, the time of proceeding, and the place, time, and method of assembly.

    Guerrillas concentrate when the enemy is advancing upon them, and there is opportunity to fall upon him and destroy him. Concentration may be desirable when the enemy is on the defensive and guerrillas wish to destroy isolated detachments in particular localities. By the term 'concentrate', we do not mean the assembly of all manpower but rather of only that necessary for the task. The remaining guerrillas are assigned missions of hindering and delaying the enemy, of destroys isolated groups, or of conducting mass propaganda.

    In addition to the dispersion and concentration of forces, the leader must understand what is termed 'alert shifting'. When the enemy feels the danger of guerrillas, he will generally send troops out to attack them. The guerrillas must consider the situation and decide at what time and at what place they wish to fight. If they find that they cannot fight, they must immediately shift. Then the enemy may be destroyed piecemeal. For example; after a guerrilla group has destroyed an enemy detachment at one place, it may be shifted to another area to attack and destroy a second detachment. Sometimes, it will not be profitable for a unit to become engaged in a certain area, and in that case, it must move immediately.

    When the situation is serious, the guerrilla must move with the fluidity of water and the ease of the blowing wind. Their tactics must deceive, tempt, and confuse the enemy. They must lead the enemy to believe that they will attack him from the east and north, and they must then strike him from the west and the south. They must strike, then rapidly disperse. They must move at night.

    Guerrilla initiative is expressed in dispersion, concentration, and the alert shifting of forces. If guerrillas are stupid and obstinate, they will be led to passive positions and severely damaged. Skill in conducting guerrilla operations, however, lies not in merely understanding the things we have discussed but rather in their actual application on the field of battle. The quick intelligence that constantly watches the ever-changing situation and is able to seize on the right moment for decisive action is found only in keen and thoughtful observers.

    Careful planning is necessary if victory is to be won in guerrilla war, and those who fight without method do not understand the nature of guerrilla action. A plan is necessary regardless of the size of the unit involved; a prudent plan is as necessary in the case of the squad as in the case of the regiment. The situation must be carefully studied, then an assignment of duties made. Plans must include both political and military instruction; the matter of supply and equipment, and the matter of co-operation with local civilians. Without study of these factors, it is impossible either to seize the initiative or to operate alertly. It is true that guerrillas can make only limited plans, but even so, the factors we have mentioned must be considered.

    The initiative can be secured and retained only following a positive victory that results from attack. The attack must be made on guerrilla initiative; that is, guerrillas must not permit themselves to be maneuvered into a position where they are robbed of initiative and where the decision to attack is forced upon them. Any victory will result from careful planning and alert control. Even in defence, all our efforts must be directed toward a resumption of the attack, for it is only by attack that we can extinguish our enemies an preserve ourselves. A defence or a withdrawal is entirely useless as far as extinguishing our enemies is concerned and of only temporary value. as far as the conservation of our forces is concerned. This principle is valid both for guerrillas and regular troops. The differences are of degree only; that is to say, in the manner of execution.

    The relationship that exists between guerrilla and the orthodox forces is important and must be appreciated. Generally speaking, there are types of co-operation between guerrillas and orthodox groups. These are:

    Strategical co-operation.
    Tactical co-operation.
    Battle co-operation.

    Guerrillas who harass the enemy's rear installations and hinder his transport are weakening him and encouraging the national spirit of resistance. They are co-operating strategically. For example, the guerrillas in Manchuria had no functions of strategical co-operation with orthodox forces until the war in China started. Since that time, their faction of strategical co-operation is evident, for if they can kill one enemy, make the enemy expend one round of ammunition, or hinder one enemy group in its advance southward, our powers of resistance here are proportionately increased. Such guerrilla action has a positive action on the enemy nation and on its troops, while, at the same time, it encourages our own countrymen. Another example of strategical co-operation is furnished by the guerrillas who operate along the P'ing-Sui, P'ing-Han, Chin-P'u, T'ung-Pu, and Cheng-T'ai railways. This co-operation began when the invader attacked, continued during the period when he held garrisoned cities in the areas, and was intensified when our regular forces counter-attacked, in an effort to restore the lost territories.

    As an example of tactical co-operation, we may cite the operations at Hsing-K'ou, when guerrillas both north and south of Yeh Men destroyed the T'ung-P'u railway and the motor roads near P'ing Hosing Pass and Yang Fang K'ou. A number of small operating base were established, and organized guerrilla action in Shansi complemented the activities of the regular forces both there and in the defence of Honan. similarly, during the south Shantung campaign, guerrillas in the five northern provinces co-operated with the army's operation on the Hsuchow front.

    Guerrilla commanders in rear areas and those in command of regiments assigned to operate with orthodox units must co-operate in accordance with the situation. It is their function to determine weak points in the enemy dispositions, harass them, to disrupt their transport, and to undermine their morale, If guerrilla action were independent, the results to be obtained from tactical co-operation would be lost and those that result from strategical co-operation greatly diminished. In order to accomplish their mission and improve the degree of co-operation, guerrilla units must be equipped with some means of rapid communication. For this purpose, two way radio sets are recommended.

    Guerrilla forces in the immediate battle area are responsible for close co-operation with regular forces, Their principal functions are to hinder enemy transport to gather information, and to act as outposts and sentinels. Even without precise instructions from the commander of the regular forces, these missions, as well as any others that contribute to the general success, should be assumed.

    The problem of establishment of bases is of particular importance. This is so because this war is a cruel and protracted struggle. The lost territories can be restored only by a strategical counter-attack and this we cannot carry out until the enemy is well into China. Consequently, some part of our country — or, indeed, most of it — may be captured by the enemy and become his rear area. It is our task to develop intensive guerrilla warfare over this vast area and convert the enemy's rear into an additional front. Thus the enemy will never be able to stop fighting. In order to subdue the occupied territory, the enemy will have to become increasingly severe and oppressive.

    A guerrilla base may be defined as an area, strategically located, in which the guerrillas can carry out their duties of training, self-preservation and development. Ability to fight a war without a rear area is a fundamental characteristic of guerrilla action, but this does not mean that guerrilla can exist and function over a long period of time without the development of base areas. History shows us many example of peasant revolts that were unsuccessful, and it is fanciful to believe that such movements, characterized by banditry and brigandage, could succeed in this era of improved communications and military equipment. Some guerrilla leaders seem to think that those qualities are present in today's movement, and before such leaders can comprehend the importance of base areas in the long-term war, their mind must be disabused of this idea.

    The subject of bases may be better understood if we consider:

    The various categories of bases.
    Guerrilla areas and base areas.
    The establishment of bases.
    The development of bases.

    Guerrilla bases may be classified according to their location as: first, mountain bases; second, plains bases; and last, river, lake, and bay bases. The advantages of bases in mountainous areas are evident. Those which are now established are at Ch'ang P'o Chan, Wu Tai Shan, Taiheng Shan, Tai Shan, Yen Shan, and Mao Shan. These bases are strongly protected. Similar bases should be established in all enemy rear areas.

    Plains country is generally not satisfactory for guerrilla operating bases, but this does not mean that guerrilla warfare cannot flourish in such country or that bases cannot be established there. The extent of guerrilla development in Hopeh and west Shantung proves the opposite to be the case Whether we can count on the use of these bases over long periods of time is questionable. We can, however, establish small bases of a seasonal or temporary nature. This we can do because our barbaric enemy simply does not have the manpower to occupy all the areas he has overrun and because the population of China is so numerous that a base can established anywhere. Seasonal bases in plains country may be established in the winter when the rivers are frozen over, and in the summer when the crops are growing. Temporary bases may be established when the enemy is otherwise occupied. When the enemy advances, the guerrillas who have established bases in the plains area are the first to engage him. Upon their withdrawal into mountainous country, they should leave behind them guerrilla groups dispersed over the entire area. Guerrillas shift from base to base on the theory that they must be in one place one day and another place the next.

    There are many historical examples of the establishment of bases in river, bay, and lake country, and this is one aspect of our activity that has so far received little attention. Red guerrillas held out for many years in the Hungtze Lake region. We should establish bases in the Hungtze and Tai areas and along rivers and watercourses in territory controlled by the enemy so as to deny him access to, and free use of, the water routes.

    There is a difference between the terms base area and guerrilla area. An area completely surrounded by territory occupied by the enemy is a 'base area'. Wu Tai Shan, and Taiheng Shan are examples of base areas. On the other hand, the area east and north of Wu Tai Shan (the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar border zone) is a guerrilla area. Such areas can be controlled by guerrillas only while they actually physically occupy them. Upon their departure, control reverts to a puppet pro-Japanese government. East Hopeh. for example, was at first a guerrilla area rather than a base area. A puppet government functioned there. Eventually, the people, organized and inspired by guerrillas from the Wu Tai mountains, assisted in the transformation of this guerrilla area into a real base area. Such a task is extremely difficult, for it is largely dependent upon the degree to which the people can be inspired. In certain garrisoned areas, such as the cities and zones contiguous to the railways, the guerrillas see unable to drive the Japanese and puppets out. These areas remain guerrilla areas. At other times, base areas might become guerrilla areas due either to our own mistakes or to the activities of the enemy.

    Obviously, in any given area in the war zone, any one or three situations may develop: The area may remain in Chinese hands; it may be lost to the Japanese and puppets or it may be divided between the combatants. Guerrilla leaders should endeavour to see that either the first or the last of these situations is assured.

    Another point essential in the establishment of bases is the co-operation that must exist between the armed guerrilla bands and the people. All our strength must be used to spread the doctrine of armed resistance to Japan, to arm the people, to organize self-defence units, and to train guerrilla bands. This doctrine must be spread among the people, who must be organized into anti-Japanese groups. Their political instincts must be sharpened and their martial ardour increased If the workers, the farmers, the lovers of liberty, the young men, the women, and the children are not organized, they will never realize their own anti-Japanese power. Only the united strength of the people can eliminate traitors, recover the measure of political power that has been lost, and conserve and improve what we still retain.

    We have already touched on geographic factors in our discussion of bases, and we must also mention the economic aspects of the problem. What economic policy should be adopted? Any such policy must offer reasonable protection to commerce and business. We interpret 'reasonable protection' to mean the people must contribute money in proportion to the money they have. Farmers will be required to furnish a certain share of their crops to guerrilla troops. Confiscation, except in the case of business run by traitors, is prohibited .

    Our activities must be extended over the entire periphery of the base area if we wish to attack the enemy's bases and thus strengthen and develop our own. This will afford us opportunity to organize, equip, and train the people, thus furthering guerrilla policy as well as the national policy of protected war. At times, we must emphasize the development and extension of base areas; at other times, the organization, training, or equipment of the people.

    Each guerrilla base will have its own peculiar problems of attack and defence. In general, the enemy, in an endeavour to consolidate his gains, will attempt to extinguish guerrilla bases by dispatching numerous bodies of troops over a number of different routes. This must be anticipated and the encirclement broken by counter-attacks As such enemy columns are without reserves, we should plan on using our main forces to attack one of them by surprise and devote our secondary effort to continual hindrance and harassment. At the same time, other forces should isolate enemy garrison troops and operate on their lines of supply and communication. When one column has been disposed of, we may turn our attention to one of the others. In a base area as large as Wu Tat Shan, for example, there are four or five military sub-divisions. Guerrillas in these sub-divisions must co-operate to form a primary force to counterattack the enemy, or the area from which he came, while a secondary force harasses and hinders him.

    After defeating the enemy in any area, we must take advantage of the period he requires for reorganization to press home our attacks. we must not attack an objective we are not certain of winning. We must confine our operations to relatively small areas and destroy the enemy and traitors in those places.

    When the inhabitants have been inspired, new volunteers accepted trained, equipped, and organized, our operations may be extended to include cities and lines of communication not strongly held. We may hold these at least for temporary (if not for permanent ) periods. All these are our duties in offensive strategy. Their object is to lengthen the period that the enemy must remain on the defensive. Then our military activities and our organization work among the masses of the people must be zealously expanded; and with equal zeal, the strength of the enemy attacked and diminished. It is of great importance that guerrilla units be rested and instructed. During such times as the enemy is on the defensive, the troops may get some rest and instruction may be carried out.

    The development of mobile warfare is not only possible but essential. This is the case because our current war is a desperate and protracted struggle. If China were able to conquer the Japanese bandits speedily and to recover her lost territories, there would there would be no question of long-term war on a national scale. Hence there would no question of the relation of guerrilla hostilities into mobile warfare of an orthodox nature, both the quantity and quality of guerrilla must be improved. Primarily, more men must join the armies; then the quality of equipment and standards of training must be improved. Political training must be emphasized and our organization, the technique of handling our weapons, our tactics — all must be improved. Our internal discipline must be strengthened. The soldiers must be educated politically. There must be a gradual change from guerrilla formations to orthodox regimental organization. The necessary bureaus and staffs, both political and military, must be provided. At the same time, attention must be paid to the creation of suitable supply, medical, and hygiene units. The standards of equipment must be raised and types of weapons increased. Communication equipment must not be forgotten. Orthodox standards of discipline must be established.

    Because guerrilla formations act independently and because they are the most elementary of armed formations, command cannot be too highly centralized. If it were, guerilla action would be too limited in scope. At the same time, guerrilla activities, to be most effective, must be co-ordinated, not only in so far as they themselves are concerned, but additionally with regular troops operating in the same areas. This co-ordination is a function of the war zone commander and his staff.

    In guerrilla base areas, the command must be centralized for strategical purposes and decentralized for tactical purposes. Centralized strategical command takes care of the general management of all guerrilla units, their co-ordination within war zones, and the general policy regarding guerrilla base areas. Beyond this, centralization of command will result in interference with subordinate units, as, naturally, the tactics to apply to concrete situations can be determined only as these various situations arise. This is true in orthodox warfare when communications between lower and higher echelons break down. In a word, proper guerrilla policy will provide for unified strategy and independent activity.

    Each guerrilla area is divided into districts and these in turn are divided into sub-districts. Each sub-division has its appointed commander, and while general plans are made by higher commanders, the nature of actions is determined by inferior commanders. The former may suggest the nature of the action to be taken but cannot define it. Thus inferior groups heave more or less complete local control.


    "Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

    I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

    HAKUNA MATATA

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