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Halseys's actions at Leyte Gulf.

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  • Halseys's actions at Leyte Gulf.

    "Bulls Run" at Leyte Gulf, i.e Halsey's decision to go after Owaza's decoy group and leave Taffy Three unguarded has been one of the most controversial decisions of the Pacific War. What are your opinions on it? Was Halsey justified? I have often read that he was itching to get his stamp on a major victory after he was beached at Midway, and his defeat at Santa Cruz Islands. Now it can be argued he was not merely seeking glory, but the carriers represented (in his mind) a real threat, and he was in no position to know of the condition of IJN Naval aviation, after the Marianas Turkey Shoot. It can also be said that Halsey should have realized his number one priority must have been to cover the landings. Opinions?
    "Any relations in a social order will endure if there is infused into them some of that spirit of human sympathy, which qualifies life for immortality." ~ George William Russell

  • #2
    Originally posted by sparten
    "Bulls Run" at Leyte Gulf, i.e Halsey's decision to go after Owaza's decoy group and leave Taffy Three unguarded has been one of the most controversial decisions of the Pacific War. What are your opinions on it? Was Halsey justified? I have often read that he was itching to get his stamp on a major victory after he was beached at Midway, and his defeat at Santa Cruz Islands. Now it can be argued he was not merely seeking glory, but the carriers represented (in his mind) a real threat, and he was in no position to know of the condition of IJN Naval aviation, after the Marianas Turkey Shoot. It can also be said that Halsey should have realized his number one priority must have been to cover the landings. Opinions?

    Ive read quite a few versions of peoples thoughts about Halsey's decisions regarding Leyte. This is my take...

    1) They praised him for QuadalCanal for showing the battleship still ruled the big engagements for that time period. (Washington defeating Kirishima)

    2) He should have had better scouting of the Japanse carriers approaching from the north. (They were empty ) Halsey wanted to have the big gun duals with the IJN once and for all and finish their flat tops that both sides unrelenlessly hunted for.

    3) Upon choosing to race north to intercept them he fell into the IJN trap and left the beach heads open for Yamato and her squad to attack the American landings that were ungarded as far as they were concerned..

    IMO Halsey took his battleships north foolishly. He should have detached the Iowas and himself and guarded the landings to begin with.This would have provided the chance of going toe to toe with Yamato and her group. And send a few heavy cruisers north after the Japanes carriers that were basically empty and nothing more then bait approaching from the north. Leaving Halsey his two Iowas and two heavy cruisers for his big gun fight with Yamatos group.

    Luckily the tenacity of the destroyer attacks on Yamatos group were sufficient enough for her captain to believe they were walking into an American trap and turned about as Halsey would have never made it back in time no matter how fast the Iowa's were once he realized his mistake.

    Halsey claimed it was the hardest decision he ever made. To live his dream and have the big gun fight as many admirals had dreamed of before him. He claimed the flat tops were within 42 miles of his guns and could have been chase down and sank using gunfire and he had to turn back realizing he just jeparodized the entire operation by leaving the beaches unprotected.

    If it wasnt for the "tin can" boys that saved his bacon by attacking attacking attacking the approaching Japanese battleships and cruisers approaching on the beaches he wouldnt have been given any credit except for the operations complete and total failure and the cost of thousands of American lives.

    Just my opinion... People say that he was smart for Guadal Canal and stupid for the Leyte malay but we and those critics were not on his bridge to make those decisions and he was. Luckily all turned out well for Leyte Gulf operation.
    I wonder how well off his critics would have performed under the very same conditions had they the very same information that he had. ;)

    Personally, I think Halsey was an excellent sailor. Ok maybe not the smartest tatically but plenty of grit to make the grade. And one would expect arrogance from Admirals with such firepower at their command given the Operations that were undertaken during the entire campaign. Must have been very nerve racking to say the least. Further my hat MUST go off to Rear Admiral Jesse B.Olendorf for having broken the IJN back with the ghost battleships of Pearl Harbor by classically "crossing the T" in Surigao Straits. Dam fine show man! And well in accordance with deep Naval tradition to match. That battleline deserved standing ovation for avenging Pearl Harbors loss when they steamed back to port for replentishing and repairs. As well as those "tin can" men that faced impossible odds with fending off the Yamatos forces with such heavy losses to thier own group.
    Last edited by Dreadnought; 27 Feb 06,, 17:08.
    Fortitude.....The strength to persist...The courage to endure.

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    • #3
      I personally think if Halsey had not really attacked the carriers, he would have been crtisized, lets give the man credit, he did accomplish his mission.
      "Any relations in a social order will endure if there is infused into them some of that spirit of human sympathy, which qualifies life for immortality." ~ George William Russell

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      • #4
        Originally posted by sparten
        I personally think if Halsey had not really attacked the carriers, he would have been crtisized, lets give the man credit, he did accomplish his mission.
        Oh absolutely. The man did win thank god but nearly made a critical mistake certainly never to be repeated again in USN history. He certainly has my admiration.
        Fortitude.....The strength to persist...The courage to endure.

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        • #5
          Halsey alsp probably thougt that the Baby carriers could take care off the invasion force. I think by that stage all were armed with fighters and dive bombers.
          "Any relations in a social order will endure if there is infused into them some of that spirit of human sympathy, which qualifies life for immortality." ~ George William Russell

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          • #6
            Originally posted by sparten
            Halsey alsp probably thougt that the Baby carriers could take care off the invasion force. I think by that stage all were armed with fighters and dive bombers.
            Those "tin can" sailors and their escorts were what really made the difference when it came to protection. If it were for them going head on with Yamato's group then the US soldiers landing on the beaches would have suffered severe losses and possibly the entire battle. Some of those destroyers and escorts continously attacked even while sinking, damaged, dead crewman strued about the decks, men in the water etc and yet kept coming at them again and again. Those men gave all for that battle because they knew we needed to take Leyte. They took on one of the biggest Japanese forces for their own size ever encountered. A true life David and Goliath if you ever get the chance read about DE 413 The Sammuel B. Roberts. Its a very good story. Cheers! ;)
            Fortitude.....The strength to persist...The courage to endure.

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            • #7
              Why is it that when ever Halsey is reviewed at Leyte no one dares to bring up the OOBs?

              TF 38 had 9 CV, 8 CVL, 6 BB, 4 CA, 10 CL, and 58 DD going in. Halsey's first mistake was to detach TG 38.1 on the eve of the Leyte landing. This put McCain's 4 CV, 1 CVL, and all supporting vessels of TG 38.1 too far out of position to respond even with the warning the USS Darter provided.

              With the loss of the USS Princeton, Halsey would still have had 5 CV, 6 CVL and supporting vessels under his command.

              Ozawa had 1 CV, 3 CVL, 2 BB, and a smattering of lesser vessels. Of the IJN only the Zuikaku could properly be called a Fleet Carrier of what remained. Junyo was more like a CVE heavy, but classed as a CV. This left the IJN with 2 CV, 6 CVL, and a smattering of CVE total at this time. Their combined carriage would have totaled under 400 if they were all present.

              Halsey's remaining carriage was 5*90+6*45=720. With proper use of economy of force even with the blunder of detaching TG 38.1 for leave on the eve of the Leyte operation Halsey possessed sufficient forces to cover TF 34, 7th Fleet, and MacArthur in addition to bringing sufficient force to defeat Ozawa in a nightmare scenario. If he had done that it would not have mattered. People instead might focus more on his blundering through two typhoons afterwards which effectively allowed the Japanese to have a repeat of their Kamikaze miracle.

              As is he effectively flipped off MacArthur, 7th Fleet, and his entire chain of command. If the threat of air power, which it was his job to neutralize, was to heavy to detach TF 34, which had the best AA on the planet, what does that leave Kinkaid and MacArthur with?

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              • #8
                In my savagely-uninformed opinion 60+ years after the fact, I think he made a big boo-boo. An understandable boo-boo, but a boo-boo nonetheless.

                -dale

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                • #9
                  A terrible mistake from the impetuous Halsey, lucky for him the timing of the Japanese operation was 'off' and the troops had already disembarked (some five days earlier) ... over the years Kurita has copped it too for failing to press home his attack.

                  Kurita wouldn't let himself be interviewed by John Toland for his 1970 Pulitzer-winner The Rising Sun, but arranged a meeting with his Chief of Staff, who said on p569:

                  "I think now we should have gone into Leyte Gulf," he said. "So does Admiral Kurita. Then we thought we were doing the best thing but now, with a cool head, I realize we were obsessed by enemy task forces. Just because we got the report - and it turned out to be false - that there was a fleet of enemy carriers nearby, we shouldn't have set out after them."

                  [Toland:] If Kurita had continued on to Leyte Gulf, he would have first encountered Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet and then undergone a series of air attacks in confined waters. There was considerable shipping in the gulf - including twenty-three LST's and twenty-eight Liberty ships - but what if all these had been sunk? Most of the supplies had been landed, as Kurita had guessed, and there was enough on shore for a month's military operations. MacArthur claimed that loss of these ships would have 'placed in jeopardy' the entire invasion. Still aboard were most of the steel landing mats for the airstrips, and without these he could have lost local air superiority temporarily. Also, a naval bombardment on American troops might have wreaked momentary havoc. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that MacArthur's advance would have been delayed more than a week.

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                  • #10
                    Originally posted by Dreadnought View Post
                    Those "tin can" sailors and their escorts were what really made the difference when it came to protection. If it were for them going head on with Yamato's group then the US soldiers landing on the beaches would have suffered severe losses and possibly the entire battle. Some of those destroyers and escorts continously attacked even while sinking, damaged, dead crewman strued about the decks, men in the water etc and yet kept coming at them again and again. Those men gave all for that battle because they knew we needed to take Leyte. They took on one of the biggest Japanese forces for their own size ever encountered. A true life David and Goliath if you ever get the chance read about DE 413 The Sammuel B. Roberts. Its a very good story. Cheers! ;)
                    twice(they are making repeats a lot) i watched it on History Channel and i think that engagement between "David" & "Goliath" played a more decisive role than that of the Halsey's later actions.
                    Last edited by Big K; 14 Aug 09,, 11:29.
                    Love all, trust a few, do wrong to none; be able for thine enemy rather in power than use; and keep thy friend under thine own life's key; be checked for silence, but never taxed for speech.

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                    • #11
                      Originally posted by Big K View Post
                      twice(they are making repeats a lot) i watched it on History Channel and i think that engagement between "David" & "Goliath" played a more decisive role than that of the Halsey's later actions.
                      *If one were to look at Halseys career from the outset there is no doubt why they picked him for COMSOPAC. Without him the Pacific battles could have turned out much much worse and we may have even lost the Pacific campaign. People tend to focus on two items to criticise him, Leyte and the Typhoon but if one were to look beyond that his accomplishments far outweigh his faults. Its a matter of collective observation. The man did what he felt he had to do and not the first nor last Admiral to sail into the teeth of bad storms.;)
                      Last edited by Dreadnought; 14 Aug 09,, 13:35.
                      Fortitude.....The strength to persist...The courage to endure.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Originally posted by Dreadnought View Post
                        *If one were to look at Halseys career from the outset there is no doubt why they picked him for COMSOPAC. Without him the Pacific battles could have turned out much much worse and we may have even lost the Pacific campaign. People tend to focus on two items to criticise him, Leyte and the Typhoon but if one were to look beyond that his accomplishments far outweigh his faults. Its a matter of collective observation. The man did what he felt he had to do and not the first nor last Admiral to sail into the teeth of bad storms.;)
                        Sir,

                        i am not that well informed about Halsey's carreer and pacific campaign in ww2,

                        i only made a statement focused on Leyte and used the backround given by History Channel
                        Love all, trust a few, do wrong to none; be able for thine enemy rather in power than use; and keep thy friend under thine own life's key; be checked for silence, but never taxed for speech.

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                        • #13
                          Originally posted by clackers View Post
                          A terrible mistake from the impetuous Halsey,
                          Was it though? The IJN carriers represented the real threat. He had no way of knowing they were virtually devoid of planes or how bad the Japanese pilot replacement was in terms of getting trained pilots to the carrier air wings fast enough to benefit them.

                          Midway and Santa Cruz a win/loss or loss/win depending on P.O.V showed that wrecking the enemy carriers, or having yours wrecked could endanger every other operation in the area. Had I been Hasley, I would have set off after the enemy carriers. I would even have taken the fast battleships for their impressive AAA capability to cover my own carriers.

                          The landing force had impressive protection of its own. 6 battle ships, 4 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers and upwards of 50 destroyers and PT boats plus 16 light/escort carriers and 400 planes. The heavy units were grouped together and with awesome results. But the lighter units had the oomph to defeat the Japanese as well. It was a failure of recon more than command that let the Japanese battleships get to within gun range. Better scouting and tracking of the center force would have caught their turn in time for the surprise to be on the Americans side, not the Japanese

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                          • #14
                            Originally posted by zraver View Post
                            Was it though? The IJN carriers represented the real threat.
                            Of course it was terrible leadership, Zraver, reacting blindly to a piece of staged Japanese theatre.

                            The 'real threat' was Kurita's Central Force making its way into San Bernadino Strait. Halsey had no confirmation that it had been destroyed by Third Fleet's carriers.

                            Instead, Task Force 34, useless in a pursuit of Ozawa's flattops but perfectly positioned to do the job against Kurita's battlewagons, was called away too - four battleships, five cruisers, fourteen destroyers.

                            If you think it wasn't a mistake, Samuel Eliot Morison, the pre-eminent American naval historian of the PTO, calls it "Halsey's Blunder", while Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy said melodramatically "We didn't lose the war for that but I don't know why we didn't".

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