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  • #76
    Originally posted by Officer of Engineers
    I do doubt this BS. What Mao did wasn't exactly world class.



    Oh, the Chinese worried. Twice from the Americans and once from the Soviets



    Red Guards



    The only thing you could say was that the country was united in anarchy. The Great Leap Forward and the Great Proliterate Cultural Revolution. Yeah, real united there.



    The Little Red Book



    No prostitutes? ROFLMAO! Mao's Widow was a big whore. And China's population explosion was all one big happy family. Get off it. The sex trade was rampant. Just never reported.



    More of a result of clean water and farmers finally having a chance to do their trade than anything Mao did. Certainly Mao's agricultural policies were disasters.



    Let see, 1980. That's Deng Xia Peng, not Mao.



    Pig Iron has alot of uses.



    The rockets and nukes are to be respected. Everything else wasn't up to par.



    1978-today again? Why that's DXP again.



    Yep, they were both poor.

    Your KMT took away all the money and so many scientists and put all of them in the tiny Taiwan. Anything else, KMT could not took away was destroyed.

    I did not say China was rich. But Chinese got richer than the era when China was leaded by KMT. China cannot become rich over night. That will be a long time effort.

    China's economy grew at the speed which is close as today.

    China is not the most advanced country even today. Let alone 30 years ago. You can deny China's SSN, N-bomb, H-bomb. No matter waht, only handful countries could make them before 1976. China was totally self-sufficent in industry and defense.

    Communists party did much better than you KMT had done in mainland China.


    Railroad was Den Xiaoping's achivement, you are kidding. China build more than 25000KM of railroad and repaired 11000KM in Mao's 27 years, another 27 years passed after the reform, China only built 25000 KM of railroad in the latter 27 years.

    Deng Xiaoping just distributed the accumulated weath to people and say: I made this for you. Nothing.

    Deng's agricultural reform got a lot criticism today. His initial reform in Anhui province was a lie. Even today, Anhui is still a poor province. Many areas that has collective econmy are really rich today. More economists in China are research on those economy models now. Those models actually follow Mao's idea. You may think it is funny, but that's true.

    I know you understad Chinese. You can google: 南街村, 洪林村, 华西村., 大邱庄...and other places, you will find how rich they are. But they did not follow Deng's reform.

    Another article published in LA times. It worth your reading.
    http://club.backchina.com/main/thread178224.html

    DO YOU GET IT?
    Last edited by oneman28; 11 Oct 05,, 05:25.

    Comment


    • #77
      You must be the first person that I've read lately that actually appreciates Mao. He is like the Chinese version of Stalin, but more stupid.

      The man was good at a few things:
      1. leading the army
      2. following the Stalin doctrines
      3. instilling national pride amongst Chinese people.
      4. swimming

      He was pretty much bad at everything else, amongst his worst crimes:
      1. cultural revolution.
      2. the great leap forward
      3. vanity - the man would sacrifice millions of his people for his self glory
      4. following Stalin doctrines with absolutely no idea why they were created. The reason why China needed the single child policy was because this guy mindlessly promoted the "more kids" doctrine for like 25 years.
      5. destroying the lives of the Chinese high level officials around him and letting "the group of 4" gain power
      6. a total womanizer

      I could list more, but the cultural revolution itself covers enough crime that should not be forgiven by any of the new generation Chinese people.

      Comment


      • #78
        I dont know whats the use of arguing with a expatriate chinese who doesnt know the actual happening of china. He is ignorant of the oppressive nature of commies & wont accept the facts.
        Hala Madrid!!

        Comment


        • #79
          Originally posted by Ray
          Colonel,

          You are what the British would say a "China hand".

          May I request an analysis from you, keeping the global issues in mind.
          Sir,

          I think a military man has better understanding than academics and reporters.



          15 September 2005

          Rear Admiral ( U.S. Navy, Retired) Eric A. McVadon

          Director of Asia-Pacific Studies, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

          Consultant on East Asia Security Affairs

          Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

          Recent Trends in China’s Military Modernization

          The focus of China’s military modernization: Taiwan scenarios. China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is in the midst of a remarkable surge of modernization of its naval, air, and ballistic missile forces. It should not be considered remarkable that emerging China is modernizing a formerly backward military. China, although facing no imminent threat from the American perspective, has normal (and arguably legitimate) concerns for its national security, protection of its sovereign territory, and security of the sea lanes that are so critical to China’s economic growth—the centerpiece of Chinese accomplishment over the last three decades. This ongoing military buildup does not ignore those security needs; however it is primarily, if not exclusively, focused on another mission: what Beijing refers to as the Taiwan problem—a military mission it does not wish to undertake but is determined to accomplish if it must.

          A legitimate mission in Chinese eyes. This mission, in essence, is to be able quickly to overwhelm Taiwan’s military, cow the Taiwan government, and deter, delay, or complicate effective and timely U.S. intervention. The mission would be undertaken only if Beijing concludes that it has no choice but to employ military forces to stop actions by Taiwan that it considers intolerable. Almost all Mainland Chinese support that mission and, contrary to the views of most Americans and Taiwan citizens, do not see either this military buildup or the use of force if Taiwan moves to independence as reprehensible actions. The Chinese leadership proclaims, as emphasized by the passage last March of the Anti-Secession Law, that it will not be deterred in the use of force in these circumstances by fears of economic harm, loss of foreign trade and investment, damage to international reputation, loss of the 2008 Olympic Games, or the risks to its infrastructure, population, and military forces.

          A preference for non-military means. Before examining the features of this PLA modernization surge, it should be noted that I do not see evidence that Beijing will use its forces in expansionist or aggressive ways beyond attempting reunification of Taiwan—which it considers an inalienable part of China. It seems, even with respect to the islands it claims in the South China Sea, to prefer non-military means to assert and consolidate the sovereignty it espouses and to look after its interests in the region. Indeed, China should, it seems to me as a retired navy officer, strive to be better able to protect the ocean commerce essential to China’s economy, especially the flow of oil by both sea and pipeline from the Middle East and elsewhere in Asia. China is likely, if it ever becomes satisfied with its ability to deter the U.S. in a Taiwan crisis, to turn to the task of deterring other countries or non-state actors from attempting to interrupt the flow into China of oil, other forms of energy, and commodities to sustain its burgeoning economy and increasingly affluent huge population. For example, China might at that time feel the need to have a navy with a measure of organic air power; so it might then finally build or procure some form of aircraft carrier to provide air cover and reach when operating naval forces beyond the range of aircraft based in China.

          What about future intentions as China grows? On the other hand, China, as could other countries, might change its intentions as its military capabilities and economic power grow. I suggest that the U.S. has the opportunity to influence how China’s intentions are shaped in the future. Possibly the best way to influence those intentions is for the U.S. to pursue a bilateral relationship that fosters the development of an open, prosperous, and progressive China—the China that, as we have long and repeatedly said, best serves U.S. interests. I rush to say that I do not underestimate the obstacles and even paradoxes to be confronted in pursuing such a complex policy. Nevertheless, because the U.S.-China relationship is arguably the most important in the world today, such effort is appropriate—indeed, even required.

          China is not itching for a fight. It must be emphasized with respect to the current impressive modernization program that the Chinese in general and the PLA in particular are not seeking a conflict with Taiwan and certainly not with the United States. There is, in my view, no expectation that the PLA could in the foreseeable future prevail in an all-out, head-to-head war against the U.S. military. The concept is instead to be able very rapidly, in a matter of days, to cause Taiwan to capitulate, with such capitulation abetted by the failure of the U.S. to respond promptly and effectively. As has been said often, Beijing’s concept is to be able to present to Washington and the world a fait accompli concerning Taiwan.

          A clearly articulated concept now being realized. I have spent much of my time since I was the defense and naval attaché at the American Embassy in Beijing in the early 1990s and during the last 13 years since retirement from the Navy dealing with the PLA (first its backwardness and now its modernization), the issue of cross-Strait conflict (preventing it, predicting its form, and coping with the consequences), and broader issues of East Asian security (including China’s relations with Japan and the two Koreas). For me, the Chinese concept for the use of force has become increasingly clear and very precisely directed: seeking a way to prevail in an attempt to regain Taiwan. The evidence for this has mounted in the form of both the force structure China has devoted so much money and effort to develop and the clear statements in Chinese policy and strategic and doctrinal writings and statements. For example, the concept of taking on a superior force and defeating it through surprise and with asymmetric means pervades Chinese military publications. The U.S. is the only such force to be contemplated, but, equally significant in my view, is that these methods are contemplated only in the situation where China is faced with U.S. forces aimed specifically at thwarting its essential (in Beijing’s view) efforts with respect to Taiwan.

          Keeping the China threat in perspective. Such ominous words are often used by those who want to emphasize some sort of broader China threat. However, those who wish to depict China primarily in that context tend to ignore that Beijing has, over the last decade, clearly demonstrated, as alluded to above, its desire to enhance its comprehensive national security by non-military means, even seeming until this recent modernization surge to recognize that its military modernization had proceeded haltingly while its use of diplomacy and growing economic power was succeeding far better comparatively—and without alarming its neighbors. In this regard, a balanced look at even the Taiwan issue should take into account the prospect that economic ties between the Mainland and Taiwan hold at least the promise at some time in the future of resolving the problem and making the current considerations of military force seem a foolish anachronism. In short, China does not seek an opportunity to use force against Taiwan, the United States, or its neighbors—even despised Japan. Beijing has, nevertheless, developed a concept to use force, if it feels it must, to defeat Taiwan, deter or delay U.S. intervention, and at least cause Japan to think twice before introducing overt military assistance in a developing crisis.

          A core feature of the concept. Let me turn now to some illustrative details of the concept that I assert has been made unmistakably clear by Beijing’s actions and words. We are all familiar with the early features of the concept. China began some years ago deploying inaccurate short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) with conventional warheads in provinces opposite Taiwan. Those CSS-6 and CSS-7 (also called Dongfeng or DF-15 and -11, or M-9 and M-11) missiles have grown, and continue to grow, in number and type, and their accuracy has been improved so that these 700 or so SRBMs, although each delivering only the explosive force of a large bomb, are now militarily useful, able through accuracy to place airfields out of commission, disrupt command and control facilities, destroy air defenses, etc.

          And now accurate MRBMs with conventional warheads. There has been an important new development with respect to conventional ballistic missiles. China has developed a new conventional-warhead version of the CSS-5 medium-range ballistic (MRBM), previously armed only with nuclear warheads. The new series is called the DF-21C. Being an MRBM with a much higher reentry velocity than SRBMs, the DF-21C is virtually invulnerable to any missile defenses Taiwan might contemplate for the foreseeable future. China’s Second Artillery or Strategic Rocket Force could employ these DF-21Cs in an initial wave to neutralize missile defenses and give the hundreds of follow-on SRBMs and new, exceedingly accurate land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) virtually guaranteed successful impacts on their targets. What I have described is a triple blow, dedicated to Taiwan, composed of very accurate MRBMs, SRBMs, and LACMs.

          Handling Taiwan’s Navy with a fraction of the available PLAN forces. Taiwan’s Navy is no longer even in the same league with the numerous new and modern classes of destroyers and frigates that have been bought from Russia and built in China—with the vigorous construction program continuing. The PLA Navy now has an arsenal of very effective shipborne anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), including a small number of Russian supersonic SS-N-22s and several classes of ships with subsonic indigenous ASCMs. Added to this is the large and growing nuclear and conventional submarine force that I will describe later. The PLA Navy is adding new, very impressive fast missile boats to its already large fleet of these smaller vessels, for use primarily against Taiwan. The PLAN, in the next few years, would be able to subdue Taiwan’s naval forces using only a few, if any, of its most capable surface combatant ships and submarines. Ships and craft with less capability than needed to cope with, and inadequate range to reach, approaching U.S. forces would serve well around Taiwan.

          Special Forces, IO, air, amphibious, and airborne forces introduced. Along with the initial MRBMs followed by hundreds of very accurate SRBMs and LACMs, China would employ Special Forces, Fifth Column cells, and information warfare to add to the paralysis and chaos in Taiwan. With air defenses largely incapacitated, China could then use to good effect its many new and old aircraft in follow-up attacks. The amphibious and airborne components of the concept, that might have been so risky up to this point, now take the form of an assault against a demoralized Taiwan with civilian and military command and control badly disrupted. The initial assaults by these ground forces need not be nearly so massive as most have envisioned them. Amphibious forces of the order of magnitude of two divisions, feasible with existing amphibious lift (after the recent surge in such construction), along with airborne forces would secure lodgments at selected beaches, ports, and airfields. These lodgments would permit the rapid essentially unopposed inflow of the additional forces necessary to consolidate the military effort.

          Complicating decisions and actions by the U.S. We must assume that the crisis which has caused China to attack Taiwan has certainly not arisen unnoticed. So what is China’s concept for dealing with the expected U.S. intervention? To begin, China’s choice of ballistic and cruise missiles as the centerpiece of the initial attack on Taiwan makes it difficult for the U.S. to act in any way to directly counter the missiles. Even if major strides had been taken in missile defenses, the Second Artillery is capable, using only SRBMs—and more so if MRBMs and LACMs are added— of saturating any defenses the U.S. and Taiwan could assemble. China, unfortunately, has sought and found a way to be able to intimidate or attack Taiwan that could not be countered effectively—unless one envisions the immediate use of something as dramatic as U.S. ICBMs against China.

          More uses of ballistic missiles with conventional warheads to gain temporary advantage against otherwise superior forces. However, China’s savvy decision to use ballistic missiles as its weapon of choice to try to overcome the disadvantage of being an inferior force does not stop here. First, there is the threat to U.S. bases in the region—and we cannot ignore that heightened antagonism between China and Japan could make it somewhat less difficult for Beijing to make a decision to attack U.S. bases in Japan, particularly if Japan already appears inexorably ready to provide expansive support or even combat forces. The threat of conventional SRBMs and LACMs in greater numbers, with longer range and better accuracy and penetration ability (including decoys, submunitions, etc.), is already placing at risk all U.S. bases in the region except Guam. Remember that these ballistic and cruise missiles are not counted on to destroy these U.S. facilities or place them permanently out of action but are rather the means to suppress air and missile defenses. This, at least conceptually, would permit follow-on attacks, in relative safety, by the several new types of Chinese aircraft using very modern cruise missiles.

          The prospect of ballistic missiles to hit ships. There is yet another exceedingly important chapter being written in the ballistic-missile saga. China is trying to move rapidly in developing ballistic missiles that could hit ships at sea at MRBM ranges—in other words, to threaten carriers beyond the range at which they could engage Chinese forces or strike China. Among its other advantages for China, this method of attack avoids altogether the daunting prospect of having to cope with the U.S. Navy submarine force—as anti-submarine warfare is a big Chinese weakness. Along with these efforts to develop ballistic missiles to hit ships, they are, of course, working diligently to perfect the means to locate and target our carrier strike groups (CSGs). In that regard, an imperfect or rudimentary (fishing boats with satellite phones) means of location and targeting might be employed even earlier than the delay of several more years likely needed to perfect more reliable and consistent targeting of ships. Chinese missile specialists are writing openly and convincingly of MaRV’d ballistic missiles (missiles with maneuverable reentry vehicles) that maneuver both to defeat defenses and to follow the commands of seekers that spot the target ships. There seems little doubt that our naval forces will face this threat long before the Taiwan issue is resolved.

          The PLA as an information warfare “wannabe.” Chinese military and strategy authors write openly about the U.S. military’s reliance on advanced technologies and the alleged vulnerability that presents for exploitation by the PLA. These writers include methods as direct as anti-satellite weapons and as murky as computer network attacks, the planting in advance of viruses to be activated in a crisis, and the use of hordes of hackers. It is not clear how effective this effort might be, but the PLA at least will, as the U.S. moves to interpose its forces to blunt an assault on Taiwan, be attempting, as an adjunct to its direct attacks, to disrupt U.S. C4ISR so that its attacks on U.S. forces might be more successful and to introduce complications to delay and make less effective any U.S. intervention. It should be remembered that this action against U.S. forces would be a supremely important undertaking for which the PLA has been planning and preparing for years. There is no reason to believe that the PLA would have qualms in pursuing aggressive information operations, possibly in Japan and even to the U.S. homeland.

          Second layer of the concept: submerged-launch, long-range, supersonic ASCMs. Although the ballistic-missile capability against ships lies a few years in the future, the PLA Navy is already receiving from Russia the wherewithal for the second major layer of the concept of being able to deter a U.S. intervention, or failing that, to have a means to confront approaching U.S. Navy forces. Eight new Kilo-class submarines are now being received from Russia with an important capability absent in the four Kilos the PLAN already possesses. These new quiet and capable diesel-electric Kilo-class submarines carry the Russian SS-N-27B Sizzler anti-ship cruise missile. This ASCM is launched while submerged and travels over 100 nautical miles to make a very low-altitude, evasive, supersonic attack intended to defeat the U.S. Aegis defense system.

          Add many other modern submarines with submerged-launch ASCMs. With respect to the tactical problem of getting one or more of these new Kilo-class submarines in the general vicinity of closing U.S. Navy strike forces, the PLA Navy now has the capability to make the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) mission very difficult for U.S. forces. With a total of more than 50 operational submarines, and with a substantial number of them new and quiet, China, quite simply, can put to sea more submarines than the U.S. Navy can locate and counter. Its older Ming and Romeo submarines are not only still lethal if ignored but also serve to disperse and dilute the efforts of the ASW forces. In other words, some, or even many, of the already large and diverse, but still rapidly growing, fleet of very capable Shang SSNs, and Kilo, Song, and Yuan SSs can reasonably expect to remain undetected as they seek to interdict the U.S. carrier strike groups. If the “shooting has started,” eventually U.S. ASW forces could take a big toll against the Chinese submarine force, but the delay in sanitizing the area before the entry of carrier strike groups is what the Chinese are counting on as adequate delay to present the world with the aforementioned fait accompli with respect to Taiwan.

          Air-launched ASCMs once air defenses are degraded. An attack by the Kilo submarines (whether preceded by ballistic missiles or not) using the very dangerous and lethal SS-N-27Bs, said by experts to be part of the best family of ASCMs in the world, would be intended to degrade air defenses (including carrier flight decks). This, if successful, would open the way to the many subsonic, but potent and sea-skimming, ASCMs carried by the described large and growing fleet of modern nuclear and diesel-electric submarines, with several classes of these submarines being built at a truly surprising rate. These missiles are also launched while submerged and have considerable range. With air defenses degraded, there is also the opportunity for the PLA Navy Air Force at distances from China of several hundred miles (or much more in the case of some aircraft) to carry out air attacks with potent air-launched ASCMs using new aircraft from Russia (the Su-30MK2) and indigenous long-range B-6s (a new version with new missiles) and FB-7 maritime interdiction aircraft, also with new ASCMs.

          Surface combatants as a final layer of diverse and redundant options. Ultimately, clean-up attacks might be envisioned using similarly capable ASCMs from the several new and upgraded classes of destroyers and frigates. These new classes of warships are headed in firepower by the Sovremennyys (soon to increase in number from two to four) from Russia with supersonic, very evasive SS-N-22s. With almost equal firepower of the subsonic sort, China has built or is building enough new and modernized destroyers and frigates to form several surface action groups (SAGs), each capable of long-range ASCM attacks and, for the first time for the PLA Navy, good fleet air defenses using surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems—with the best SAM systems coming from Russia. As I have said to many audiences, the Chinese are now building and dramatically upgrading more classes—classes of modern destroyers and frigates—than previous rates suggest they might build such ships in this decade.

          The indirect role of modernized and more numerous nuclear missiles. China is testing a new mobile, solid-fueled ICBM, the DF-31, and building a new Jin-class ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) to launch a version of that missile. These new missiles will augment the force of about 20 DF-5A ICBMs that already can reach the United States. Most observers believe China will build new forces and improve older forces to whatever degree is necessary to outpace U.S. deployments of national missile defense (NMD). Despite rash statements recently by PLA one-star general Zhu Chenghu, we should not expect China readily to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. In my view, even with the augmented nuclear arsenal, China’s minimal deterrent is useful only when unused. It is the specter of its use that has a deterrent effect. Nevertheless, China’s greatly enhanced nuclear force will serve as a backdrop for Chinese decisions to confront U.S. forces that are coming to the defense of Taiwan. Beijing will almost certainly feel a bit more confident that it can act to protect its interests, knowing that the U.S. president always has to keep in mind that he is dealing with a nuclear power—not a Yugoslavia or Iraq. So, unfortunately, China’s leaders are likely to be emboldened a bit more by having a much-improved nuclear arsenal atop the conventional forces I have described.

          The forces exist or on the way; the open question is the capability to coordinate it all. There is, in my opinion, no question that this is Beijing’s concept for overwhelming Taiwan and deterring or confronting U.S. forces. There is no question that China has achieved a remarkable leap in modernization of the forces needed for these missions and that it is urgently continuing on that path. There is question about how China is now proceeding to exercise these new assets so as to make them truly operational in a combat environment. There is considerable question about China’s capability to coordinate all these forces in two major simultaneous operations: (1) to bring Taiwan to its knees and (2) cause the U.S. to be tardy, indecisive, or ineffective in responding. There is, however, in my mind little question about Beijing’s resolve to employ this concept if it feels it must act against Taiwan. My guess is that their effort would largely succeed against Taiwan and fail against the U.S.—simply because the inexperienced Chinese military would not be able to cope with the complexities, unknowns, and countermeasures they would face. However, this is a rather thin reed to count on as we contemplate an intervention in a Taiwan crisis.

          This new PLA as analogous to newly nuclear China in 1964. With this new PLA, we face a new situation just as we did when China first became a nuclear-weapons power four decades ago. We are, now as then, facing the prospect that China could give us, or will at least try to give us, considerable pause in determining whether and how to respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan. China, very precisely and effectively in my opinion, has narrowly focused the modernization of its forces on this essential PLA mission while we have been focused on other missions around the world and particularly on the war on terrorism and the severe Iraq distraction. China will almost certainly beat us in the race between ballistic missiles to hit ships and the missile defenses to directly counter that. If we can react quickly, maybe we will come up with other less direct means to ensure their missile attacks are ineffective. However, the obvious answer, at least over the short term, is to ensure that Beijing fully understands the ultimate consequences of starting such a conflict and to hope that understanding serves as an effective deterrent. Given Beijing’s obsession over the Taiwan issue, that prospect is not, however, very reassuring.

          The factor of strategic depth. This ongoing PLA modernization surge has put a new face on the specter of cross-Strait conflict, and the solution is surely not the recently reported capability by tiny Taiwan to strike huge China with some sort of offensive counter-strike cruise missiles. To think so ignores the strategic depth of China compared to Taiwan, which may be seen as analogous to our task of reminding or convincing China that, despite China’s precisely directed asymmetric developments, the strategic depth of the United States remains a solid reason for China not to seek a military solution with respect to Taiwan.

          China’s message and our reply. Beijing has now, in this selective modernization of the PLA, sent another very strong message about how serious it is about Taiwan. Chinese leaders think that their arguments for having such a force are compelling and should be readily understood—even accepted—by all. We now, it would seem, have the difficult task of determining the nature of our response to Beijing—or at least our reaction—beyond readying our forces to cope with the specific new threats. We would be mistaken to infer that China is, as a general matter, hostile to the U.S., despite our differences on a number of issues. To do so would ignore many positive overtures and actions by Beijing over recent years, the many interests we have in common, and important areas where we agree. Moreover, as I stated at the outset, we should take fully into account that the U.S.-China relationship is arguably the most important in the world today. Perhaps our response need make only two points: (1) In principle, we persist in our long-held position against the use of military forces against Taiwan. (2) Specifically, we believe it would be highly imprudent and ultimately very harmful for China to use the PLA as described in the concept above. I do not intend to suggest how our reaction should be conveyed and, as you see, have not attempted to come up with an elegant formulation for a formal response. However, this is what I see as the essence of our response. If the day comes when China’s leaders are, indeed, making a decision on whether to attack Taiwan, the existence of these new capabilities might be a less persuasive and emboldening argument for the attack if the potential harm to China is fully appreciated.

          Comment


          • #80
            Another military man





            Mr. Dennis J. Blasko

            Independent Consultant

            September 15, 2005

            Hearing on

            “Net Assessment of Cross-Strait Military Capabilities”

            Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

            Thank you for the invitation to be here today.

            Today, I would like to address the question “how is China’s military training and operational capability developing?” and focus primarily on the nearly 70 percent of the PLA found in the ground forces.

            While now even the Chinese government officially acknowledges priority of development is given to the PLA Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery, as in the other services a comprehensive ground force and joint training regimen has been accelerated in the years since 1999. This acceleration was the result of several factors:

            1) The requirement levied upon the PLA by the civilian leadership to increase its capabilities to a) deter Taiwan from further steps toward independence and b) if necessary, to coerce Taiwan to the negotiating table or defeat it in battle, even if Taiwan were to be supported by “foreign forces,” i.e., U.S. intervention.

            2) The impact of economic development in China that a) permitted significantly more funds to be allotted to the PLA and b) greatly improved PLA command, control, communications, and computer capabilities through acquisition of mostly Chinese-manufactured communications and electronic equipment supported by an infrastructure of optical fiber, microwave, satellite, and wireless communications systems.

            3) The confidence that the international security environment had changed sufficiently to allow strategic focus to be directed toward the Taiwan Strait. In other words, Beijing was finally satisfied the former threat from the USSR/Russia no longer required a major focus by the Chinese military. This realization is mostly clearly evident in the fact that the Shenyang Military Region felt the greatest impact of force reductions since 1997. The corollary to this situation was a cash-hungry Russia was more willing to sell more advanced weaponry to a China with more money to spend (due to economic development), supercharging a trend begun in the early 1990s.

            4) The reduction in personnel strength of the PLA by approximately 23 percent with simultaneous emphasis on the development of an NCO corps and improving the educational level of the officer corps. Increased resources now available to the PLA can be focused on a considerably smaller force.

            5) Last, but certainly not least, the promulgation in 1999 of a new set of training regulations, which outline doctrine and procedures for the PLA to “prepare for military struggle.” The related, new Military Training and Evaluation Program, which became effective in 2002, sets standards for all units and is further refined by annual training guidance issued by the General Staff Department for the PLA in general and the Military Regions and services.

            My statement today is based almost exclusively on reading the Chinese press and official Chinese documents. I have used no classified U.S. material, nor have I had the opportunity to observe PLA training or interview PLA officers since 1999. Nevertheless, I believe that through close examination of open source material it is possible to understand general trends in training and much of its content. However, using only Chinese sources, it is less feasible to make definitive judgments about specific units and capabilities, especially relative to the capabilities of other armed forces. Therefore, I will not attempt to make any sort of net assessment of cross-Strait military capabilities.

            Nonetheless, based on my own personal experience both in the U.S. Army and observing the PLA a decade ago, I will provide my impressions of the state of ground force training: In short, the PLA is a good student of other militaries and understands in theory the complexities of modern war. It has developed a doctrine that integrates lessons learned from other countries’ recent military experiences and adapts these to the unique conditions in China. From what I read and see on Chinese television, at this point in time, most PLA training is still relatively rudimentary in nature, reflecting their efforts to combine optimally the new weapons and equipment, new doctrine, and the new caliber of personnel available since 1999. They realize this is a complex task and understand there are no shortcuts or “silver bullets” to achieving combat effectiveness. The PLA leadership has a two-decade plan to continue its modernization and transformation process (and I believe 15-20 years is a reasonable timeframe to approach achieving the goals the PLA has set for itself). However, if ordered by the government and party before it has completely achieved its modernization goals, the PLA will follow the commands of China’s civilian leadership and utilize its best units in the most appropriate way, supported by a large civilian effort, to achieve the political and military goals assigned.

            Though the focus of this hearing is on the Taiwan Strait, in fact, PLA ground force training emphasizes the entire array of missions it may be called upon to conduct “to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity” – this includes defense of its land borders as well as its maritime claims. I have no doubt the Chinese assume the mainland will be the target of long-range attacks in future conflicts and defending against this threat and recovering afterwards is a major theme in nearly all training. They also are aware of the need to defend against the threat of terrorism.

            In April 2000, the army paper, Jiefangjunbao, clearly highlighted recent training priorities. These priorities were then continued in exercises reported over the next five years:

            * Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions have concentrated on amphibious operations;
            * Beijing, Shenyang, and Jinan Military Regions have stepped up long-range mobility and rapid reaction; and
            * Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Regions explored cold weather operations on plateaus.
            * In general, explore and intensify training on:
            o Air defense operations
            o Information war
            o Amphibious landings
            o Joint operations, and
            o The new “three strikes, three defenses” (strike at stealth aircraft, strike at cruise missiles, strike at helicopter gunships; defend against precision strikes, defend against electronic jamming, defend against reconnaissance and surveillance)

            This list was augmented after 2001 with “anti-terrorist” training and heightened emphasis on nuclear, chemical, and biological defense. Disaster relief training has also been added to unit training programs.

            Not only have active PLA ground forces increased the intensity of training since 1999, so, too, have reserve and militia forces stepped up their training. Civilian support increasingly is integrated into PLA operations. Reserve and civilian support is often coordinated using the mechanism of the National Defense Mobilization Committee system and its expanding web of civil-military command posts. Reserve, militia, and civilian support is particularly important to PLA logistics and armament support functions. The concept of People’s War, especially the mobilization of the population and its emphasis on the use of speed, stealth, stratagem, and deception, remains relevant to future PLA campaigns. People’s War is still considered a “magic weapon” for the weak to defeat the strong.

            Before discussing some of the content of recent PLA ground force training, I would first like to highlight a few training techniques common throughout the force.

            * Experimentation is a major characteristic of PLA training activity. “Pilot” units are assigned tasks, such as night, high-altitude, or various other aspects of joint operations, to explore and report their findings. Innovation is encouraged and many units conduct experiments on their own, including modification of tactics and equipment, such as building command vans and creating computer programs to assist command and control. The results of experiments are reviewed and, if applicable, may be promulgated throughout the force. Many “good ideas” on paper do not pan out in practice and many experiments are discarded.

            * Over the past 15 years or so, opposing force training or Red versus Blue force confrontational, free-play exercises have become common in all services. Many units have created permanent Blue (or enemy) forces, which are often equipped with the most advanced weapons and attempt to emulate foreign tactics and techniques. Opposing force training is commonly used by air defense units (both in the ground and air forces) and flight units. Some units (often in different services) have established “habitual relationships” to train with each other. Like the U.S. experience at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, the “enemy” often wins these confrontations enabling the friendly force to better examine its strengths and weaknesses.

            * With the widespread introduction of computers and internet connectivity throughout the PLA, units have constructed training halls to conduct in-garrison computer and simulation training. Long-distance computerized war games are reported in addition to using computers for learning, especially for new equipment training. Driving, firing, and maintenance simulators have been developed for many types of equipment with the goal of keep training costs down and wear and tear on equipment to a minimum. Many simulators still appear to be rather basic. Sand table exercises and command post exercises by headquarters elements without troops in the field are also commonly reported.

            * In recent years large units have gone to the field for extended training, sometimes lasting two or more months. Units often conduct “progressive training,” moving from individual tasks (like swimming or marksmanship) to small unit (platoon, company, and battalion) training to larger combined arms or joint training at regiment and higher level. These training periods often culminate in individual and unit evaluations and live fire practice. During extended deployments away from home base, units learn to live in the field and sustain and maintain the force in austere conditions. Long deployments are real-world tests of logistics and armament organizations at varying levels.

            Joint and Combined Arms Training and Integrated Joint Training. Since this round of PLA modernization began in 1979, improving joint operations and combined arms capabilities has been a major training emphasis. By the middle of the first decade of the 21 st century, joint and combined arms training exercises conducted over extended periods in remote locations have become common for ground force units in all Military Regions. Rapid assembly and deployment and air defense are among the most frequently practiced tasks by all PLA units; camouflage techniques and NBC defense are also practiced frequently. As the PLA’s electronics and communications capabilities increase, information operations have been incorporated into most training scenarios. Information operations commonly reported in exercises include rapid, secure transmission of orders and data among friendly forces; intelligence collection using various technical means, such as UAVs, battlefield radars, and tactical imaging systems; protection from enemy attacks on friendly command and communications systems; use of information to influence the enemy through propaganda and psychological warfare; and the offensive and defensive employment of electronic warfare against enemy systems.

            Each Military Region has established a combined arms training center into which units at regimental level and above rotate for training and evaluation. These training centers at located at:

            * Zhaonan, Jilin for the Shenyang Military Region
            * Juhr (also known as Zhurihe), Inner Mongolia for the Beijing Military Region
            * Yongning County (Helanshan), Ningxia for the Lanzhou Military Region
            * Queshan, Henan for the Jinan Military Region
            * Sanjie, Anhui for the Nanjing Military Region
            * Luzhai in Lusai County, Guangxi for the Guangdong Military Region
            * Xichang, Sichuan for the Chengdu Military Region

            In addition to combined arms training bases, regional training areas and live fire ranges for armored and artillery training are also found throughout the country. Individual divisions, brigades, and regiments have their own local training areas and firing ranges, which often include facilities for amphibious operations even when located away from the coast. Nonetheless, as the PLA ground force modernizes, PLA commanders recognize the need for more training areas where all aspects of joint operations can be practiced.

            Chinese sources identify four major amphibious training areas at Dongshan and Pingtan islands in Fujian province, Zhoushan island in Zhejiang province, and Shanwei near Shantou in Guangdong province. PLA Navy marine brigades practice amphibious operation on the Leizhou peninsula in Guangdong near their bases at Zhanjiang. From the combined Chinese-Russian exercise “Peace Mission 2005,” we now know that Weibei in Shandong province can also be used for amphibious training.

            Joint and combined arms training certainly has become more realistic and more complex over the decades; however, PLA leaders still see a gap between their operational goals and the actual level of many training exercises. Perhaps the most striking indication of this training shortfall was the creation and widespread use of the term “integrated joint operations” in 2004. “Integrated joint operations” generally is a reminder of the necessity to incorporate all types of units (ground, naval, air, missile, logistics, and armament support) and battlefield systems (intelligence, reconnaissance, communications, electronic warfare, fire support, etc) into operations while treating each element equally in planning and execution. In other words, it means REALLY joint operations, not just exercises where different units are in the same general area conducting independent tasks at the same time. Along with the use of this term, several large areas known as “coordination zones” have been established in the various Military Regions in which forces from the various services may interact during training.

            Amphibious Training. Large-scale amphibious operations were not a major emphasis in the first decade and a half of the PLA’s modernization program. During the 500,000-man reduction from 1997 to 2000, one ground force division in the Guangzhou Military Region (the former 164 th Division) was transferred to the PLA Navy to become the second marine brigade. Starting in about the year 2000, the 1 st Motorized Infantry Division in the Nanjing Military Region and 124 th Infantry Division of the Guangzhou Military Region were issued new equipment and transformed into amphibious mechanized divisions. Since 2001, these two amphibious mechanized divisions have been given priority for training and, along with other regional units, have deployed to amphibious training areas for extended periods of time from the late spring to early fall.

            Entire brigades and divisions have deployed for up to three months to conduct training from small unit level up to joint army-navy-air force amphibious landing operations controlled by group army or Military Region headquarters. Infantry and armored brigades and divisions are often joined in training by group army and Military Region assets, such as artillery, air defense, AAA, helicopter, engineer, chemical defense, electronic warfare, logistics, and armament support units. Exercises also incorporate reserve, militia, and civilian augmentation forces and have been used to test and improve real-world logistics and armament support to deployed forces. In many cases, only elements of larger units, such as one or two regiments of a division or a single division of a group army, are involved in an exercise controlled by the higher headquarters mentioned in press accounts. In 2001 and 2002, amphibious training began in May and continued through September; in 2003, amphibious training was delayed because of the SARS problem and in 2004 and 2005 amphibious training also started later in June or July.

            Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Region units have conducted the majority of amphibious training, with a lesser amount of training conducted by units in the Jinan, Shenyang, and Beijing Military Regions. These training priorities fit with what we would expect to be the first wave of an amphibious operation against Taiwan and follow-on, exploitation forces. They also are consistent with the training outline from April 2000 mentioned earlier.

            Based on reviewing Chinese news reports of amphibious training exercises since 2001, I estimate that some 22 or more infantry and armored divisions or brigades, or about one-quarter of the 80-some PLA maneuver (infantry and armored) divisions and brigades, plus several artillery, AAA, and air defense brigades, have trained to some extent for amphibious operations. Many of these other units may not train for amphibious operations as frequently or as intensively as the 1 st and 124 th Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Divisions and the amphibious armored brigade of the 31 st Group Army in the Nanjing Military Region, but a significant portion of the ground force in north and east China has been exposed to the complexities of landing operations. These numbers do not, however, necessarily represent the size of a force the PLA could put together at one time to conduct an amphibious campaign, but individual divisions and brigades are the basic building blocks which would form a larger campaign.

            Anti-terrorist Training. After September 11, 2001, anti-terrorism training was elevated in priority for the PLA, PAP, militia, and civilian police forces. Anti-terrorism training is conducted in all parts of the country, but especially in China’s western regions and the major cities. Special training courses have been conducted to introduce commanders to terrorist techniques and countermeasures.

            All elements of the uniformed armed forces (the PLA, PAP, and militia) train with the civilian police force in anti-terrorist operations. Training scenarios frequently include hostage rescue, anti-hijack, bomb detection and disposal, and chemical, biological, and radiological (“dirty bomb”) situations. Additionally, the PLA has conducted several anti-terrorist exercises with military forces from neighboring countries.

            Airborne Training. The PLA Air Force’s 15 th Airborne Army is one of the best trained units in the PLA. Like other components of the PLA, it has benefited from new equipment and increased training opportunities made available in recent years. The size of airborne operations appears to have grown to include more battalion and regimental exercises, ranging from several hundred to well over a thousand paratroopers, in addition to the numerous company size drops of 100 to 200 personnel. Most airborne missions appear to be raids or seizure of key terrain behind enemy lines, such as ports or airfields, followed shortly by link-up with ground forces.

            Airborne training now includes the employment of the airborne’s own Special Operations, communications, and logistics forces along with its infantry and artillery units. Airborne forces also train to receive fire support from aircraft and helicopters, as well as from missile units. New equipment has been introduced to drop cargoes in containers or on pallets, along with vehicles, from multiple types of transport aircraft.

            One of the PLA’s largest and most important airborne exercises took place on July 12, 2004. The exercise was called “unprecedented in the history of airborne troops” and demonstrated the progress from several years of work. On that date, an airborne infantry battalion reinforced with artillery, air defense, engineer, chemical defense, communications, and logistics units jumped into the Gobi desert. The paratroopers used airborne assault vehicles to seize an enemy airfield and were supported by artillery, electronic jamming, a ground missile unit, and armed helicopters. They also practiced logistics support operations in this one-day exercise.

            Most airborne exercises appear, however, to be conducted on their own independently, without integration into larger joint training scenarios. A significant exception to that observation was seen in “Peace Mission 2005” when 86 PLA and 86 Russian paratroopers (a company-size unit for each country) and 24 combat vehicles were dropped to capture an airfield in support of the combined amphibious landing operation.

            Special Operations Forces and Helicopter Training. Special Operations units were established in each Military Region in the 1990s. In the first 10 years of their existence, their greatest focus was on organizing themselves and enhancing the specialized individual and team skills needed for the missions assigned. Integration of SOF units into larger joint exercises currently appears to be in the exploratory phase. Most reporting about SOF training emphasizes their physical toughness and marksmanship abilities, as well as techniques used to infiltrate behind enemy lines, live off the land in extreme conditions, and conduct strike missions. SOF missions include prisoner snatch operations; raids on enemy missile sites, command posts, and communications facilities; harassment and interdiction operations to prevent or delay enemy movements; strategic reconnaissance; and anti-terrorist operations. SOF units may also be involved in information operations. SOF troops may be inserted by parachute, sea, or landed by helicopters. Helicopter insertion seems to be a favored method.

            PLA ground force helicopter units have expanded in size since the mid-1990s, but are still relatively small in number for such a large army. The Chinese media recently has highlighted the trend for helicopter units to develop attack capabilities in addition to their more traditional transport role. PLA helicopter units mount machine guns, rockets, and anti-tank missiles on utility helicopters, such as the Mi-17-series from Russia or the domestically produced Z-9 or Z-11. Helicopters are also used in electronic warfare, mine laying, propaganda leaflet drop, medical evacuation, command and control, and reconnaissance missions. Since 2004, helicopter pilot proficiency training has emphasized night flights, low level (nap-of-the-earth) operations, over-water flights, and long-distance navigation exercises. Depending on the type of the helicopter used, most exercises probably transport a company or less of infantry soldiers in a single lift of up to about 12 helicopters, or even smaller numbers of SOF troops. Some exercises appear to be supported by helicopters in attack roles to suppress enemy defenses. The size of airmobile operations, of course, can be increased through the use of multiple lifts.

            Other Training. In addition to the operations mentioned above, units throughout the country prepared for missions appropriate to their local situations (coastal, interior, desert, mountain, etc), including border and coastal defense from external threats and disaster relief operations. Moreover, specific training supervised by the political, logistics, and armament systems was conducted to prepare these units to better integrate themselves into joint operations. Reserve and militia units also have undergone a variety of training exercises to hone their capabilities to support the active force.

            * “Three war” operations. In 2004, the General Political Department highlighted “Three war” training, i.e., media (or public opinion) war, psychological war, and legal war. These efforts fall under the rubric of information operations.
            * Logistics and armament training. Logistics and armament support units conduct an array of functional exercises on their own to perfect the skills necessary to support the combat forces. Military Region logistics subdepartments and group armies form “emergency support units” to provide forward-based, reinforcing support to lower level units. The size and composition of “emergency support units” varies according to the needs of the unit supported, the mission, and terrain. “New equipment training” is overseen by technicians in the armament system both in garrison and in the field to prepare soldiers to operate and maintain the large numbers of new weapons and equipment introduced into the force since 1999. In 2004, a PLA Daily article highlighted the significance of maintenance and equipment reliability by describing how “a tiny screw falling off a radar system brought a [brigade] field exercise to a standstill.” This modern parable taught the lesson that even “minor specialized elements,” such as a repair unit, can play a major role in overall unit capabilities.
            * Reserve and militia training. Following their own structural reforms begun around 1998, reserve and militia units have increased their training tempo to prepare for new missions assigned. In addition to conducting independent training to develop functional proficiencies, PLA reserve units and militia forces are frequently mixed into active duty field training exercises along with civilian support. Surprisingly, in September 2002 in what was called the “first drill with reservists joining active servicemen,” Xinhua reported a reserve regiment from the Beijing Military Region mobilizing to link up with an active duty unit for a “confrontation exercise” against a “Blue Army.” Since that time, more reserve units have trained with active PLA forces and “linking reserves with active units” was a training priority for 2005. In particular, the seven newly formed reserve logistics support brigades, one for each Military Region, are among the busiest units as they support both reserve and active forces. Integration of reserve, militia, and civilian support with active duty forces is often accomplished using the system of National Defense Mobilization Committees that extends from national-level to Military Region, down to every province, and theoretically to every county in the country.

            In conclusion, I must note that I read reports of PLA training in the Chinese media with caution and often view skeptically pronouncements that such and such an operation was conducted in three minutes or 45 minutes or it was “the first ever” or the “largest ever” or “all missiles hit their targets.” Still, careful reading of the Chinese press can provide reasonable insight into the content of PLA training activities and when tempered with some military experience can result in useful perspectives not frequently considered in the excitement generated by many foreign press articles about new equipment acquisition. For example, in all the reporting of air operations, I see little evidence of doctrine for or training in what we call “close air support” (CAS). Instead, most, if not all, “air support” is still conducted against preplanned targets with aircraft under the command of controllers far away from the frontlines. This situation may change as new communications equipment, that permits forward units to talk with aircraft, and laser target designators are issued to the force. Experimentation may be underway, but I’ve not seen evidence of it.

            Some recent observations found in PLA newspapers may serve to provide a Chinese perspective on the state of training activity in perhaps the two most important Military Regions.

            * In 2004, the Nanjing Military Region reported, although region units have achieved remarkable progress in building up their “Two Capabilities” (combat and technical support capabilities), they still lag behind actual war requirements. A conference on training identified the following “Matters to Be Dealt With”:

            o Some units do not train according to correct guidance, their training standards are not high, and basic training is not on solid footing;
            o There are still weak links in new equipment training;
            o Training units at various levels fall short of training tasks;
            o Some units prepare training plans roughly and the teaching force on the first line is weak;
            o Headquarters fail to provide effective training guidance;
            o Some units lack initiative in providing training support.

            * In 2003, the Nanjing Military Region reported that night training “is a weak link in current training.” (This is especially noteworthy in an army with a reputation for successful night operations in its early years.)
            * In 2004, the Guangzhou Military Region reported there is still a gap between the overall quality of region personnel and the planned target of the Central Military Commission and the requirement to fight and win information wars. Outstanding problems are:
            o Shortfall in total number of capable personnel;
            o Generally low science and technology and cultural qualities in personnel;
            o A lack of joint operations capability in commanders at all levels;
            o Lack of competent technical support personnel for new weapons and equipment of combat units resulting in actual support capability being low.
            * In 2005, command staff training was said to be “a weak link” in the Guangzhou Military Region.

            From these types of reports it is understandable why the PLA has established a two-decade long goal for improving the quality of its personnel (see China ’s National Defense in 2004 , “ Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics” for details). The amount of change and uncertainty introduced into the force due to personnel reductions, force structure changes, new doctrine, new equipment, and new personnel policies over the past six years can be disorienting and imposing for many officers and enlisted men alike. Yet, it is exactly these people who must plan new PLA operations, execute its doctrine, operate more advanced equipment, and maintain and sustain the force at tempos never before seen. Success on the modern battlefield will be much more dependent upon the quality of these personnel and the rigors of their training than on the new equipment they have acquired recently. I believe the Chinese leadership understands these challenges and is approaching the problems of modernization and transformation in a logical and methodical manner. As always, I remain open to change my conclusions based on new information and I encourage further examination into these complex topics.

            Finally, I think it is useful to quote Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov when asked what had impressed him most about the PLA during “Peace Mission 2005.” Ivanov stated it was the PLA’s “iron discipline.”

            Comment


            • #81
              Originally posted by tphuang
              You must be the first person that I've read lately that actually appreciates Mao. He is like the Chinese version of Stalin, but more stupid.

              The man was good at a few things:
              1. leading the army
              2. following the Stalin doctrines
              3. instilling national pride amongst Chinese people.
              4. swimming

              He was pretty much bad at everything else, amongst his worst crimes:
              1. cultural revolution.
              2. the great leap forward
              3. vanity - the man would sacrifice millions of his people for his self glory
              4. following Stalin doctrines with absolutely no idea why they were created. The reason why China needed the single child policy was because this guy mindlessly promoted the "more kids" doctrine for like 25 years.
              5. destroying the lives of the Chinese high level officials around him and letting "the group of 4" gain power
              6. a total womanizer

              I could list more, but the cultural revolution itself covers enough crime that should not be forgiven by any of the new generation Chinese people.
              That's because your access to information is limited. Even for the family -planning policy, it started in 1956, not after reform. Mao promoted family planning policy by education, improving publich heath system to meet the demand of family planning. Mao never ask people to have more kids. That means how eay you can be cheated by lies.
              The only difference on family planning policy after reform is that it is forced to be implemented.
              Do you go the idea?

              womanizer? Richard M. Nixon knew what kind of life Mao had.

              the man would sacrifice millions of his people for his self glory? He had enough glory after the end of the civil war.

              Mao destroyed high level officals? You are kidding again. You have no clue about cultural revolution. Liu shaoqi was died from cancer. Killing political enemy is not Mao's style, let alone Mao had absolute power at that time. In the last year of his life, he ordered to release all KMT generals who was captured in the civil war (More of them were release long time ago). Shen Zui who had boody hand for killing CCP members right before the end of civil war was also let to come US.

              You can ask OOE to translate something in the forum: http://www.qglt.com/bbs/chbrd?to=17

              This forum is more particular about research of Mao's era:
              http://club.backchina.com/main/forum59.html

              Chinese today can freely critize Mao's mistakes for example the cultural revolution. But Deng Xiaoping exaggerated it for political revenge.
              Last edited by oneman28; 11 Oct 05,, 06:01.

              Comment


              • #82
                So, let me get this straight. Mao wasn't crazy. He was just incompentent. And Tphaung can read Chinese just fine.

                Comment


                • #83
                  Originally posted by oneman28
                  As long as you agree, the color of cow is not important, the milkk is important. How about Chinese gov is doing better than yours?
                  That is the biggest BS laden statement that I have come to belive. You must have heard "Never judge a book by its cover". The Mumbai airport is not as grand as the Shanghai airport, but in Mumbai immigration is a breeze and in Shanghai even after having 36 channels it takes hours. By putting a saddle on a mule you cannot make it a horse.
                  Do you remember Mumbai wanted to be next Shanghai? Shanghai never wants to be a Mumbai.
                  After seeing the reality, we know otherwise. The latest BS order/law passed by the demented commies is that all pesants have to wear western clothes to project a better image of China during the forthcoming Olympic Games. All you worry about is image - vanity is a verture that only suits women. ;)
                  Boast about Shanghai after the poor villagers in China can move without permits and permissions (they embarress China infront of expatriates ).

                  Cheers!...on the rocks!!

                  Comment


                  • #84
                    Just ask oneman, can a forum like WAB is available in china, if not why?
                    Hala Madrid!!

                    Comment


                    • #85
                      Originally posted by lemontree
                      That is the biggest BS laden statement that I have come to belive. You must have heard "Never judge a book by its cover". The Mumbai airport is not as grand as the Shanghai airport, but in Mumbai immigration is a breeze and in Shanghai even after having 36 channels it takes hours. By putting a saddle on a mule you cannot make it a horse.

                      After seeing the reality, we know otherwise. The latest BS order/law passed by the demented commies is that all pesants have to wear western clothes to project a better image of China during the forthcoming Olympic Games. All you worry about is image - vanity is a verture that only suits women. ;)
                      Boast about Shanghai after the poor villagers in China can move without permits and permissions (they embarress China infront of expatriates ).

                      Your knoledge about China is so limited. Go to learn more. Beijing alone has more than 4 million immigrants. Shanghai has more. Shenzhen is a immigration city that was developed from a 2000-resident villidge to a 7 million modern city in 2 decades. These just show you some example. Most of the immigrants were from rural area.

                      OK, Let me tell you: Mumbai is more mordern than Shanghai. Shining shining!!! Happy?

                      Comment


                      • #86
                        Originally posted by Ray
                        Colonel,

                        You are what the British would say a "China hand".

                        May I request an analysis from you, keeping the global issues in mind.
                        Sir,

                        Yossef Bodansky's article is out of date and invalid. RAdm McVadon and Col Blasko gives a much more recent account of Chinese military activities which by their accounts and Chinese actions are not centred in the Indian Ocean.

                        This being said, one cannot forget that the PLA thinks politics 1st and military second. With that in mind, I'm thinking that it is India's neighbours and not the PRC who has an anti-India agenda. China is not in charge of anti-Indian activities but the message India's neighbours are sending is loud and clear. They have a backer.
                        Last edited by Officer of Engineers; 11 Oct 05,, 06:18.

                        Comment


                        • #87
                          Originally posted by oneman28
                          That's because your access to information is limited. Even for the family -planning policy, it started in 1956, not after reform. Mao promoted family planning policy by education, improving publich heath system to meet the demand of family planning. Mao never ask people to have more kids. That means how eay you can be cheated by lies.
                          The only difference on family planning policy after reform is that it is forced to be implemented.
                          Do you go the idea?
                          Nice, so I guess the Chinese population exploded for no reason from 400 million after the civil war to whatever it was after Mao's death that the single child policy had to be implemented, right? They followed Stalin's way. My access is limited? I grew up with my parents and relatives telling me everything that happened around them during that time. My parents still tell me how little they had to eat back in those days. As for the education reforms, he followed everything that the old soviet did (not Nikita Khrushchev, he was considered by Mao to be a traitor to the communist cause). Even Mao can figure out that universal education was a good thing. That was until (drum roll....) - Cultural revolution.

                          Mao destroyed high level officals? You are kidding again. You have no clue about cultural revolution.
                          again, read what I said above. List one high level official that he actually treated fairly (outside of the gang of 4 that is).

                          Chinese today can freely critize Mao's mistakes for example the cultural revolution. But Deng Xiaoping exaggerated it for political revenge.
                          Deng Xiaoping made a lot of mistakes too, but he did more good than bad. Most Chinese people can thank their present situations to the reforms that Deng carried out. Who knows? If Mao stayed longer, China might be like North Korea right now.

                          Comment


                          • #88
                            Originally posted by indianguy4u
                            Just ask oneman, can a forum like WAB is available in china, if not why?

                            You can go to a Chinese forum and ask a people still in China to try it.

                            Chinese gov blocked porn sites, FLG sites. Today's China is more open today. You can report corrutions, discuss policies almost freely. Some may get problem from some officials for corrution reporting. But that is not a gov policy.

                            Some people recently reported brutal method in the implementation of famlily panning, some officials were punished.
                            Two years ago, an immgrant was badly treated by polices, those cops were sent to jail and relative polices were changed.
                            These days, there is a hotspot about election rights violation in a villege.

                            These are just examples t o show you how open China is today.
                            Some examples from : http://www.qglt.com/bbs/chbrd?to=17
                            This is a forum set by People's Daily

                            I can translate some titles to you:

                            1. Leaders should not forget the harm of Boasting.
                            2. Tricks of corrupted officials how to get rich
                            3. Interest groups control China's public policies
                            4. Give back the freedom of "Not studying English" to Chinese (Students are forced to learn at least one foreign language in China)
                            5. Washing dishes to make little money or study to get tech strongth (Critize todays reform. Means today's reform is short-sighted)
                            6.Loopholes in the national security
                            7. Classes really exist?? ( CCP paid attention to the fights among classes. This article doubt about it)

                            http://top81.ws/show.php?f=1&t=301188&m=1495428
                            The title says: It was reported a leader's son will be Shanghai's mayor, is that true? (there is a rumur, Jiang zeming's son will be the mayor)
                            One replied: that's a political suicide.

                            http://comment4.news.sina.com.cn/com...969704&style=0
                            here is a erport anout the corruption in police. From the link you can see people can freely express their angry (Sorry, it is in Chinese)
                            Isn't that open?
                            Last edited by oneman28; 11 Oct 05,, 06:46.

                            Comment


                            • #89
                              Originally posted by oneman28
                              You can go to a Chinese forum and ask a people still in China to try it.

                              Chinese gov blocked porn sites, FLG sites. Today's China is more open today. You can report corrutions, discuss policies almost freely. Some may get problem from some officials for corrution reporting. But that is not a gov policy.

                              Some people recently reported brutal method in the implementation of famlily panning, some officials were punished.
                              Two years ago, an immgrant was badly treated by polices, those cops were sent to jail and relative polices were changed.
                              These days, there is a hotspot about election rights violation in a villege.

                              These are just examples t o show you how open China is today.
                              I asked a specific Q. See u post here for so many months now, why cannot china allow this as well as other international forums?
                              Hala Madrid!!

                              Comment


                              • #90
                                Originally posted by oneman28
                                Your knoledge about China is so limited. Go to learn more. Beijing alone has more than 4 million immigrants. Shanghai has more. Shenzhen is a immigration city that was developed from a 2000-resident villidge to a 7 million modern city in 2 decades. These just show you some example. Most of the immigrants were from rural area.
                                Do you understand the meaning of free movement and movement based on orders/permission from the state?....
                                I had a very high (misplaced) impression about China that it is growing into a very modern nation. But after interacting with many Indian Chinese who started visiting their home land (after restrictions were eased), and my own friends and relatives visiting China on business, my opinion has changed.
                                I am not claiming that China is a failure, but such putting some facts about the lack of detail and hollowness of all that growth, and that is because of authoritarian rule. China has a long way to go, but you have to stop pretending that a mule can be shown as a horse. ;)

                                Cheers!...on the rocks!!

                                Comment

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