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Interview with PLAAF LGen Liu Yazhou

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  • #46
    Originally posted by xinhui View Post
    Yup, he is a China hater.
    Anytime a politican says making too much money is a bad thing, alarm bells ought to go off.

    Clearly to have less corruption, there must be less money going around


    Originally posted by xinhui View Post
    Liu Yazhou, a 53 year-old PLA general, erstwhile novelist, and rising political star, has published a series of frequent and provocative essays in China over the last few years to considerable acclaim—and controversy. In a regime where political expression is strictly limited, and where discussion of political issues may be construed as “revealing state secrets,” for someone to speak with establishment credentials and without censorship can be a startling indication of policy discussion and change..
    And we wonder why Liu Xiaobo got banged up for doing similar. No guanxi ?

    Originally posted by xinhui View Post
    Liu’s essays violate many taboos and restrictions, covering a wide range of topics such as strategy, geopolitics, the nature of war and conflict, and China’s relations with Taiwan, Japan, and the United States. His underlying theme is unvarnished distress with corruption and conformity, and a plea for accelerated political reform to remedy China’s ills. While laced with reverent quotations from top Chinese leaders, Liu’s writings can be construed as indirect and direct criticisms of their policies. These arguments have dazzled as well as upset his readers; supporters praise his boldness and insight, and detractors condemn his alleged militarism and demagoguery.
    So what are we to make of this General Liu then ?

    He's not talking about his individual views (non-defense related) here is he. He's seems to be letting on what his peers are thinking. That nothing adverse has happened to him personally, indeed quite the contrary he got promoted then....

    Are his views a sign of things to come in China ?
    Last edited by Double Edge; 09 Oct 10,, 22:20.

    Comment


    • #47
      Originally posted by Double Edge View Post


      So what are we to make of this General Liu then ?

      He's not talking about his individual views (non-defense related) here is he. He's seems to be letting on what his peers are thinking. That nothing adverse has happened to him personally, indeed quite the contrary he got promoted then....

      Are his views a sign of things to come in China ?
      the two part I put in to bold are important. Communist or non-communist generals who begin trumpeting themselves get sacked.

      The second part is part of a military tradition that also seems to supersede political systems. Its OK in general to express concern at the failure of lower ranks to achieve the vision of the higher ups. This works to re-affirm the rightness of the vision, and shift blame. More importantly, carefully couched suggestions made at this level can trickle upward as a reform pressure. The only thing that seems to change is how many levels above you can complain about. For example, almost no system lets privates complain about generals. But most systems let generals complain about other generals especially if in the past tense.

      Also, the more behind the scenes political backing, the more can be said. In the context of China, a general on the side of the up and coming politicians can tackle older policies the new generation doesn't like by taking on a general's writings who supported them.

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      • #48
        Clearly to have less corruption, there must be less money going around
        Only when corruption is geared to growing the size of the pie instead of a getting a greater percentage of an existing pie. It can be a powerful driving force

        And we wonder why Liu Xiaobo got banged up for doing similar. No guanxi ?
        Sure, insider vs outsider.

        So what are we to make of this General Liu then ?
        In my book, just another general trying to get attention. Political reform is OUTSIDE of the realm of the military. He knows that too.


        Are his views a sign of things to come in China ?
        Can't predict the China...not even going to try. I'd like the stock market, but that is completely different.
        Last edited by xinhui; 10 Oct 10,, 05:33.
        “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

        Comment


        • #49
          This

          Originally posted by zraver View Post
          The second part is part of a military tradition that also seems to supersede political systems. Its OK in general to express concern at the failure of lower ranks to achieve the vision of the higher ups. This works to re-affirm the rightness of the vision, and shift blame. More importantly, carefully couched suggestions made at this level can trickle upward as a reform pressure. The only thing that seems to change is how many levels above you can complain about. For example, almost no system lets privates complain about generals. But most systems let generals complain about other generals especially if in the past tense.
          and this

          Originally posted by xinhui View Post
          In my book, just another general trying to get attention. Political reform is OUTSIDE of the realm of the military. He knows that too.
          and finally this

          Originally posted by xinhui View Post
          A son-in-law of the late Chinese president Li Xiannian, Liu is a “princeling” (privileged offspring of a high official) who was promoted quickly and is now Deputy Political Commissar and a Lieutenant General in the PLA Air Force. He has traveled extensively overseas, including a term as a visiting professor at Stanford University, and is one of the few PLA officials to have visited Taiwan.

          ...

          Indeed, as a Lieutenant General with a primarily civilian background, Liu emphasizes the important role of the military.
          Is Gen Liu more political than military and therefore allowed more leeway ?



          Originally posted by zraver View Post
          Also, the more behind the scenes political backing, the more can be said. In the context of China, a general on the side of the up and coming politicians can tackle older policies the new generation doesn't like by taking on a general's writings who supported them.
          This is why i was asking whether its a sign of things to come. In particular wrt to the eelctions in 2012. He must be part of a clique that is trying to get their person into place. Is the successor to Hu Jintao already decided yet ?

          Originally posted by xinhui View Post
          Only when corruption is geared to growing the size of the pie instead of a getting a greater percentage of an existing pie. It can be a powerful driving force
          When the tide rises all boats rise.

          The pie has got bigger for everybody so everybody is getting a bigger amount than before. Whether they are getting a bigger % is a red herring i think because that would be the struggle no matter the size of the pie.

          Makes me wonder whether China has any freedom of information legislation already or on the books. This should help to tackle this problem.

          Comment


          • #50
            Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
            This is why i was asking whether its a sign of things to come. In particular wrt to the eelctions in 2012. He must be part of a clique that is trying to get their person into place. Is the successor to Hu Jintao already decided yet ?
            No way to tell, writings are less about people, than about policies. If the CCP let generals no matte rhow well connected offer up criticism about the civilian leadership it sets up a dangeorus situation. Old generals are safe targets, they can have polcies pinned on them and thus discussed at a fair remove from the political class.

            Comment


            • #51
              debates within the high echo of the Chinese leadership can get heated especially in the realm of economic and geopolitics. Each group has their own thank-tank and publications to advance their point. I would be very careful reading them as "official policies". After saying that, China is authoritarian and anyone who step out of the boundary can himself in great deal of trouble. However, as an economic powerhouse, the Chinese leadership draws ideas from lower echo and other unlikely places.


              Take the case of Justin Yifu Lin, the current Chief Economist and Senior Vice President of the World Bank. who is credited for mapping China's economic reform in the mid 1990s, especially in the rural area. received his PhD in economics from the University of Chicago in 1986.

              Career and education

              He is the founder and director of the China Center for Economic Research, former professor of economics at Peking University, and at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. He received an MBA degree from National Chengchi University in 1978, a Master's degree in Marxist political economy from Peking University in 1982, and a PhD in economics from the University of Chicago in 1986.

              He was one of the first PRC citizens to receive a PhD in economics from The UC,[1] and is a leading Chinese economist; he serves as a consultant to major international organizations and is on the editorial board of several international academic economics journals.
              [edit] Defection

              As a captain in the Republic of China Army (the army had already paid for his MBA) in Taiwan, he defected to Mainland China on May 17, 1979, reportedly by swimming from the island of Kinmen, in Fujian Province (Chinese: 福建省) under the control of the Republic of China (Taiwan), to the nearby island of Xiamen in the Fujian Province (Chinese: 福建省) of the People's Republic of China (Mainland China). He left behind his pregnant wife and his three-year-old child who were living in Taiwan; a year after he defected, he was declared "missing" by the Taiwanese Army and his wife claimed the equivalent of US$ 31,000 from the government.[2] She and their children re-joined him years later when both of them went to study in the United States.[3] While an officer in the ROC Army, Lin was held up as a model soldier for choosing to be in the army. Lin was considered a "superstar" officer. The ROC originally listed him as missing but in 2000 issued an order for his arrest on charges of desertion.[4] Lin's brother confirmed that the reason for Lin's desertion and defection was that he "just wanted to pursue his ambitions".[3] He received an Honorary Doctorate from Fordham University in 2009.
              China's center bankers are drawn from Goldman Sachs


              March 25, 2010, 10:10 p.m. EDT · Recommend · Post:
              Goldman Sachs' Hu may join China central bank

              By China Bureau

              SHANGHAI (MarketWatch) -- Fred Hu, an investment banker with Goldman Sachs Group Inc. /quotes/comstock/13*!gs/quotes/nls/gs (GS 174.75, -0.15, -0.09%) is likely to take up a senior post at China's central bank after formally stepping down from the Wall Street firm in April, the state-run China Daily said Friday, citing people familiar with the matter.

              Hu, Goldman Sachs' Greater China chairman, is seen as the right candidate for the post of vice-governor of the People's Bank of China, the paper said, without citing sources.

              Policy makers are also evaluating Hu as a candidate for a crucial position at one of the country's state-run lenders, the paper cited the sources as saying.

              Hu's appointment is still under final review by top policy makers, and a decision will be made in the next few months, the sources said, according to the report.
              Last edited by xinhui; 10 Oct 10,, 21:06.
              “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

              Comment


              • #52
                Makes me wonder whether China has any freedom of information legislation already or on the books. This should help to tackle this problem.
                they have that in the book but like many laws in China, it is not being enforced. Sometimes it is for window dressing.
                “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

                Comment


                • #53
                  This is why i was asking whether its a sign of things to come. In particular wrt to the eelctions in 2012. He must be part of a clique that is trying to get their person into place. Is the successor to Hu Jintao already decided yet ?
                  I would say 80% and we have a good idea who he is..... not impressed with him. Wife is an Opera star and that is about it.

                  Instead of thinking HJT's replacement, look at PM Wen's.
                  “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

                  Comment


                  • #54
                    Originally posted by xinhui View Post
                    I would say 80% and we have a good idea who he is..... not impressed with him. Wife is an Opera star and that is about it.
                    And his father, though the elder Xi wasn't exactly very high on the pecking order of the CCP's first generation.

                    Comment


                    • #55
                      PM Wen's likely replacement (he is ugly)


                      The 2009 TIME 100

                      In our annual TIME 100 issue, we do the impossible: name the people who most affect our world


                      Wang Qishan
                      By Henry M. Paulson Jr. Thursday, Apr. 30, 2009

                      Wang Qishan - The 2009 TIME 100 - TIME

                      Wang Qishan recognizes that China has a vital role not only as a beneficiary of the global economy but also as a driver of that economy's success. He is the man China's leaders look to for an understanding of the markets and the global economy. As a result, China has been supportive of U.S. actions to stabilize our capital markets and has not given in to those who advocate reversing economic reform to insulate China from the world.

                      I know Vice Premier Wang, 60, to be decisive and inquisitive. He is an avid historian, enjoys philosophical debates and has a wicked sense of humor. He is a Chinese patriot, but he understands the U.S. and knows that each of our two countries benefits from the other's economic success. And he is bold — he takes on challenges, does things that have never been done before and succeeds. Wang managed the largest bankruptcy restructuring in China's history in 1998 and thereby prevented a banking crisis that could have crippled the country's growth.

                      Wang was my partner in leading the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue. Together we moved the U.S.-China relationship to a new level of stability. We made progress on vital economic issues: appreciation of the Chinese currency, more air flights between our nations, greater food- and product-safety coordination. Then we launched cooperation on one of the most important issues of our lifetime: climate change. Wang Qishan thinks globally — and because of that, China and the world are better off.

                      Paulson was until January the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury


                      Read more: Wang Qishan - The 2009 TIME 100 - TIME
                      “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

                      Comment


                      • #56
                        Originally posted by xinhui View Post
                        PM Wen's likely replacement (he is ugly)

                        Wang Qishan
                        More likely to be him.
                        Li Keqiang - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
                        夫唯不爭,故天下莫能與之爭。

                        Comment


                        • #57
                          might be, but his involvement with Commie Youth League will count against him. I have a feeling that the Shanghai boys will want "half-the pie" during the horse trading.
                          “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

                          Comment


                          • #58
                            Back to topic-- latest write-up by Dr Zhang, associate professor in the Department of Leadership and Strategy at the Air War College (USAF)


                            if his prediction is correct, Liu Yazhou will become the PC for the entire PLAAF.



                            General Deng Changyou’s replacement as political commissar will most likely be Lt General Liu Yazhou, who is currently political commissar of the PLA NDU



                            Striving for an Independent Air Force

                            As early as 2000, Lt General Liu Yazhou proposed that Chinese military authorities consider reorganizing the PLAAF into functional air commands by separating the air force from the PLA military region (MR) system to become a true independent service. Ostensibly to make the PLAAF a more offensively oriented air force, he further recommended the use of the U.S. Air Force’s “expeditionary force” model to organize air force units into air strike groups with a mix of fighters, bombers, and early warning aircraft [14]. His advocacy for eliminating the ground force dominated military system, however, has received little support from the PLA military establishment.




                            The Jamestown Foundation: single[tt_news]=38015&tx_ttnews[backPid]=517

                            The Leadership of the PLAAF after 2012
                            Publication: China Brief Volume: 11 Issue: 10
                            June 3, 2011 04:29 PM Age: 1 hrs
                            By: Xiaoming Zhang

                            PLAAF Commander Xu Qiliang

                            The major change in leadership at the 18th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in 2012 will be Vice-President Xi Jinping replacing President Hu Jintao as the Party secretary-general, and eventually as chairman of the all powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) [1]. This transition period will also be highlighted by a significant turnover in the composition of the CMC leadership. The majority of the ten-member CMC panel will retire—except for General Chang Wanquan, director of the General Armament Department (GAD), Admiral Wu Shengli, commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAAN), and General Xu Qiliang, commander of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). From this group, two members will be promoted to the positions of CMC vice-chair [2]. If General Xu is selected, his ascendance will represent the first time in the PLA's history that an air force general serves as a CMC vice-chair. This will also lead to changes in the PLAAF’s leadership. When and if this happens, it will be a milestone in the PLAAF’s evolving influence within the PLA and in national policymaking.

                            A “Fifth Generation” Military Leader

                            Since its creation in 1949, the PLAAF has had ten commanders. Major General Ma Ning (1973-1977) was the first pilot commander with more than 1,000 flying hours in the Tu-2 bomber before 1985 [3]. Since then, all PLAAF commanders have been pilots, Xu is the first aviator who was born and grew up under the flag of the PRC (born after October 1949). As a “fifth generation” cadre, Xu is Xi Jinping's contemporary. Born in 1950, Xu is the youngest member of the CMC, and also the first air force leader with a pilot background to serve as a deputy chief of the PLA General Staff Headquarters (2004-2007) with joint experience. After three years at the General Staff, Xu became one of four deputy chiefs at the General Staff in charge of military training and education of the entire PLA [4]. His joint experience culminated in the command of the PLA joint force in “Peace Mission 2007” (Chelyabinsk, Russia) exercise with various member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Xu became the PLAAF commander shortly after he returned from Russia, and could continue to serve as commander until at least the 19th Party Congress in 2017.

                            General Xu as a New CMC Vice-chair?

                            The age of senior members has been an observable and nonnegotiable criterion for whether members will continue to stay in or retire from the CMC and the commander positions of each service. The mandatory retirement age for a CMC member is 70 [5]. Those who are able to retain their membership at the new Party Congress will be subject to the age-based principle whether they are at the age of 67 or younger. During the change of the CMC leadership in 2002, General Xu Caihou was first selected as a member of the CMC in charge of the GPD and rose to vice-chair of the CMC in 2004 when General Cao Gangchuan reached the retirement age [6]. Even though there is a possibility that General Xu will not become vice-chair of the CMC in 2012, he could gain that position in 2015 when Admiral Wu reaches the age of 70.

                            New PLAAF Leadership

                            In addition to General Xu’s possible promotion, the current political commissar of the PLAAF, General Deng Changyou, will have to retire at age 65 in 2012. The question then becomes: who will make up the new leadership of the PLAAF? Since 2004, all service chiefs (including the second artillery) have gained a seat in the powerful CMC, concurrently with an air force general and a navy admiral appointed as a deputy chief of the General Staff. This arrangement reflects increasing joint-ness in the make-up of the PLA’s leadership at the national level than what it was in the past. Also, generals with blue (PLAAF) and white (PLAN) uniforms serving as a deputy chief of the General Staff would possibly be designated as the future chief of the air force and navy.

                            Currently, Air Force General Ma Xiaotian serves as the deputy chief of the General Staff. He joined the PLAAF in 1965 at age 16 as a pilot cadet, and then moved up his officer career from a flight leader in 1972 to vice commander of the PLAAF in 2003. In 2006, he became the first air force officer appointed as commandant of the PLA National Defense University (NDU), and a year later replaced General Xu as the deputy chief of the General Staff in charge of the PLA’s intelligence and foreign affairs [7]. If he becomes the commander of the PLAAF and a member of the CMC in 2012, Ma could continue to serve in that position until 2017 and possible beyond.

                            General Deng Changyou’s replacement as political commissar will most likely be Lt General Liu Yazhou, who is currently political commissar of the PLA NDU [8]. He was one of the PLAAF deputy political commissars from 2003 until he was appointed to the current position in 2009. As one of the few PLA generals who have had Western experience, Liu spent one and half years at Stanford University as a visiting scholar in 1986 and 1987. He has written extensively about PLAAF strategy, having been recognized by many Chinese analysts as the “Douhet of China” because of “his reputation as a daring forward thinker of air power theory” against the PLAAF’s traditional mindset [9].

                            The prospect of General Ma and Lt General Liu becoming the new air force leadership, concurrently with General Xu as a CMC vice-chair, will have a significant influence on the PLAAF’s role in the PLA, especially its bargaining position in negotiating budgetary allocations, force restructuring, senior personnel appointment, and weapon acquisition.

                            The PLA has traditionally been dominated by the “land army” and, to a large extent, it still is. The four general departments—the GSD, GPD, GLD, and GAD—serve concurrently as the PLA’s joint staff and as the headquarters for all services: ground force, navy, air force and second artillery force, which are still staffed primarily by army officers. Since there are no general headquarters for ground forces, the GSD is essentially assigned to perform the functions of ground force headquarters. The structural bias in favor of the army has been inevitable in all military aspects from force size, structure, and command and control to logistics, equipment, R&D and procurement [10].

                            Remaining an Army-centric Military

                            Since 2000, an increasing number of personnel from other services have steadily been assigned to “joint” positions at headquarters department levels as well as at military region headquarters levels [11]. This change enables the expertise and knowledge of other services to be brought to high operational apparatuses. While wearing the uniform of their own services, they are no longer in the personnel system of their own services. This separation keeps their representation of parochial interests in these headquarters departments at a minimal level.

                            Beginning in 2002, researchers from the PLAAF Command College in Beijing published several articles in the February issue of the Air Force Military Journal, arguing that the army dominance in the PLA has been the obstacle for its joint-ness [12]. Currently, the PLAAF enjoys the benefits of a favorable military spending policy. Yet, Air Force officers often complain that as long as the GLD continues to control military finance, an unsatisfactory funding for the air force is expected [13].

                            Striving for an Independent Air Force

                            As early as 2000, Lt General Liu Yazhou proposed that Chinese military authorities consider reorganizing the PLAAF into functional air commands by separating the air force from the PLA military region (MR) system to become a true independent service. Ostensibly to make the PLAAF a more offensively oriented air force, he further recommended the use of the U.S. Air Force’s “expeditionary force” model to organize air force units into air strike groups with a mix of fighters, bombers, and early warning aircraft [14]. His advocacy for eliminating the ground force dominated military system, however, has received little support from the PLA military establishment.

                            This situation could change under a new PLAAF leadership in the CMC. During his ten years (1987-1997) as vice-chair of the CMC, Navy Admiral Liu Huaqing never stopped pushing forward what he had advocated for the PLA Navy to be a force capable of operating in near seas when he served as its commander (1982-1987) [15]. The PLAAF did not adopt a service-specific aerospace strategy known as “integrated air and space operations, being prepared for simultaneous offensive and defensive operations” until 2004. It remains in a disadvantageous position to achieve this strategic objective. Unlike the U.S. Air Force, the PLAAF does not control space assets, which are controlled by the GSD and GAD. The PLAAF has been contending that it should be in control of space operations, based on the assertion that air and space are a single integrated medium [16]. It has not been successful in winning the argument. The outcome of this bureaucratic infighting is difficult to predict, but the promotion of an air force general to vice-chair of the CMC and the adding of another PLAAF’s memberships in the CMC will create a favorable environment for the air force.

                            Conclusion

                            The PRC adopted a three-step strategy for the PLA’s modernization in China’s 2008 defense white paper, laying the foundation for the development of the PLA into a more high-tech, network-centric, balanced and joint force by 2010, allowing it to accomplish mechanization and make major progress in informatization by 2020 [17]. The current and forthcoming leadership of the PLAAF has played and will continue to play a key role in guaranteeing the success of this three-step strategy to make the PLAAF a strategic air force with long-range capabilities and the active involvement of "integrated air and space operations" (kongtian yiti) with “fire and information systems” (xinxi huoli yiti). The increasing of PLAAF’s membership in the CMC would ensure its influence over policymaking, funding priorities, and procurement of weapon systems and equipment in the years ahead.

                            Notes:

                            1. It is not for certain yet if Hu will give up his seat as chairman of the CMC at 2012.
                            2. In 2002, the 16th CCP Congress retired all members over the age of 70 with retention of three officers—General Cao Gangchuan (67), Guo Boxiong (59), and Xu Caihou (59), of whom Cao and Guo rose to CMC Vice-Chair. James C. Mulvenon, “Party-Army Relations since the 16th Party Congress the Battle of the ‘Two Centers’?” in Civil-Military change in china: Elites, Institutes, and Ideas after the 16th Party Congress,” edited by Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 17
                            3. Western literature generally claims that Wang Hai was the first pilot to serve as the commander of the PLAAF in 1985. See Kenneth W. Allen, “The PLA Air Force: 1949-2002 Overview and Lessons Learned,” in The Lessons of History: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army at 75, edited by Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry M. Wortzel, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 92. For Ma Ning’s biography, see club.xilu.com/zgjsyj/msgview-819697-7608.html.
                            4. Since 2004, the Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff have been divided in charge of operations, administration, training, and intelligence.
                            5. While whether mandatory retirement ages for CMC members and heads of four general departments remain debatable, since the 16th Party Congress in 2002 CMC members appear required to retire at age 70. At the time, if the member has not reached 70, the rule will be that he will continue to be the member at age 67, but must retire at age 68 and older. See “Predicting PLA Leader Promotions,” in Civil-Military change in china: Elites, Institutes, and Ideas after the 16th Party Congress,” edited by Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel, 261.
                            6. C. Mulvenon, “Party-Army Relations since the 16th Party Congress,” 17.
                            7. “Brief Biography of Ma Xiaotian,” tieba.baidu.com/f.
                            8. Another speculation is that Liu will become one of deputy directors of the General Political Department. Fang Jianguo, political commissar of the Langzhou Military Region Air Force, will rise to commissar of the PLAAF.
                            9. Guocheng Jiang, “Building an Offensive and Decisive PLAAF A Critical Review of Lt Gen Liu Yazhou’s The Centenary of the Air Force,” Air & Space Power Journal, Vol. 24, No.2 (Summer 2010), 85.
                            10. For example, the air force and navy have long experienced the technological generation gap, but it is not the case for the army, which has been close to the top level of the world except for army aviation.
                            11. Kevin M. Lanzit and Kenneth Allen, “Right-Sizing the PLA Air Force: New Operational Concepts Define a Smaller, More Capable Force,” in Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, edited by Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 461.
                            12. Dong Wenxian, Xiandai kongjun lun (xupian)[On the Modern Air Force (continuation)] (Beijing: Lantian Press, 2005), 260-83.
                            13. Ren Lijun, Wang Deshun, and Wang Yehong, “Identify the Major Strategic Direction, Strengthen Air Force Finance Development,” Junshi jinji yanjiu [Military Economic Study], No. 7 (2008): 52–53.
                            14. Liu Yazhou, “Essences for an Offensive and Defensive Chinese Air Force,” in Liu Yazhou zhanlue wenji [A Collection of Liu Yzhou’s Papers on Strategy] (n. p.: n. p., n. d.), 394-97.
                            15. See Liu Huaqing, Liu Huaqing Memoirs, (Beijing: PLA Press, 2004).
                            16. Dong Wenxian, Xiandai kongjun lun, 327-28, 373, 389.
                            17. “China’s National Defense Paper in 2008,” http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2...nt_1210227.htm.
                            “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

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                            • #59
                              andy,

                              do you talk to xiaoming at all? glad to see he finished his article-- we were discussing it when i went over to AWC to give a lecture to his class.

                              his big interest is the '79 war, though.
                              There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

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                              • #60
                                not recently. Maybe I should drop him a line or two.
                                “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

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