Interview with PLAAF LGen Liu Yazhou

[Officer of Engineers]

Agreed, with the Colonel's permission, I'd be glad to facilitate that. :)

It's a go then.

[Ray]

It's a good read in more ways than one. It allows me to see what the Chinese general is seeing. Is he reading the situation right? Is he reading it wrong? Does he have some insight? One of the most profound revelations that came to me was watching a Chinese Senior Colonel commenting on the Fedayeen Saddam and he was very specific on what the Fedayeen was doing wrong as far as guerrilla warfare was concerned; namely they were already cornered inside a city and thus denied the room to manouver.

Then, it came to me. The years that I've been calling the Chinese stupid in their interruptations of airpower was that they were not stupid. They just didn't know any better and tried to grasp at understanding with the few facts they had at hand.

Good that you now agree with me not to think that the Chinese are stupid!

[Officer of Engineers]

Sir,

Never said that they were, just that some of their views are out of this world; especially their extremely unrealistic evaluation of American airpower as the end-all, be-all of modern warfare. Which also leads to an extremely unrealistic expectation in that all the Chinese have to do is somehow neutralize American airpower and they've won.

[Ray]

Colonel,

The more I read the Chinese, the more fascinated I become.

I find Unrestrictive Warfare interesting if you read between the lines and mull over the inputs.

Take their concept of Shi.

One can't better Mao on Guerilla Warfare!

I actually find a lot of sense in what they write........of course, I have to read the translations only!

You are lucky and you can read Chinese!

And can you beat Chinese food? Yum! ;)

[Officer of Engineers]

Sir,

On the surface, they seemed to make sense but try putting it into practise and you have big time problems. The devil is in the details. Even if you suceed, it's a one time event, never to be duplicated again. Tell me, Sir, why haven't terrorists crashed airplanes into the Taj Mahal?

[TopHatter]

Tell me, Sir, why haven't terrorists crashed airplanes into the Taj Mahal?

The terrorists admire the architecture?

[Ray]

Tell me, Sir, why haven't terrorists crashed airplanes into the Taj Mahal?

Because it enshrines the glory of Islam!

[gunnut]

Colonel,

I actually find a lot of sense in what they write........of course, I have to read the translations only!

You are lucky and you can read Chinese!

Wow, is that difficult to learn?

[Officer of Engineers]

Helps when parents can do it.

[TopHatter]

Helps when parents can do it.

Do you also speak Mandarin or Cantonese?

[Officer of Engineers]

I mangle both. I'm a CBC.

[longcat]

I mangle both. I'm a CBC.

I'm an ABC and I'm learning Mandarin at school.

I'm fluent in Cantonese though.

[Officer of Engineers]

Chinese school. That brings back some memories. Went for all of two classes and the next weekend; hockey stick and pads.

[gunnut]

Chinese school. That brings back some memories. Went for all of two classes and the next weekend; hockey stick and pads.

Glad you got your priorities straight. :)

[xinhui]

Hope this place clear up the flames.









Few things Col.

Lt Gen Liu Yazhou is a political officer, not a military one. He is well known in China for his “pro US” approach and it is Japan that he hates. He was made famous for his critical essay on the failed Jiman invasion on PLAdaily, it is the same essay I used for part of my paper. As a fly boy, he is very critical of the ground force’s upper echo, you can tell that by his interview. In another famous PLA daily OpEd, I openly call the Nanjing MR commanders for being over confident on their War planning. He was member of the PLA senior command openly called for retirement of then CMC Chairman JZM in “two-centers” speech as he long called for a institution-ized of the PLA.

Okay, back to topic.


guerrilla warfare as I know it.

Guerrilla warfare is by no mean static in the Chinese experience and there were two very dissimilar approaches:

Take the example of the period of 1938 to 1941, There were two vastly different doctrine employed by the Chinese Soviet (they were no PLA yet) The Eight Route Army in northern Yellow river commanded by Mao and the boys and the new fourth army commanded by Ye Ting near Huai area, Huai is better know today as Shanghai. IMHO, Ye Ting is one of the best field commander ever produced during the war. During the KMT northern expedition, his vanguard armored railroad troops charge all the way from Guangzhou (canton) to shanghai before joint the communist movement. He was killed during the Wannan incident January 1941. As you recall, the elite 127th Light Mech Infantry division is named after him.


Terrain.

Northern Yellow River, -- vest empty land, little population, no road, hills.
Shanghai. – advanced urban center, highways, railroad

Japanese defense.

Northern Yellow river: Garrison post of battalion or reinforced company strength. Patrol enforce.
Shanghai – Safe zone of 100 KM (the Japanese green zone if you will) pillboxes along every KM. Mechanized strike group to react to any trouble spot.


Members:

Northern Yellow River: die hard communist, rural folks, turncoat puppets troops and yes, bandits.

Shanghai: Educated idealistic youth, KMT stay behinds. (One of the unit were made up of the famed 87th division from the battle of Shanghai)

Doctrines:

Northern Yellow river: Large cavalry force (some times up to 2000) to attack strong points and ambush reinforcements. Targets were offer puppet troops with agent already working from inside.

Shanghai. Roadside bombs, (IED, if you will) platoon size ambush against soft skin supply trucks, radio communications. Civilian clothes. Hit and run. IJA managed to response to an attack within 4 hours any where outside the 100 KM zone due to the high readiness of the mechanized strike force.

Task:

Northern Yellow river: Military production (read capture weapons), training for conventional warfare.
Shanghai: Recruit technical personal, buy communication equipments, medical supply etc. Consolidate tax base. Sadly, many local folks had to pay tax twice or three times, one to the IJA and other KMT troops or the new fourth army. They have to hit the IJA once a while to keep up the pressures; however, killing the IJA was not the major goal. Money and recruitment were. However, they do have to show military success to gain new recruits. They did managed to suck in 10 divisions of IJA troops around Shanghai.