Brigadier, Maruf's new BdA-InA tirade at CDF

Sir,

Maruf is at it again.

China-Defense.com Forum -> Defeating A Superior Tank Force

Have a good laugh, Sir. I am impressed by idiots who asks for expert opinions and then disregard them when it doesn't suit his rose coloured glasses.

[Ray]

Colonel,

I just cannot access Chinadef.

Can you help?

[Officer of Engineers]

Sir,

I will check your account but here is the thread






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China-Defense.com Forum > Ground Forces Discussion > Defeating A Superior Tank Force


Posted by: Maruf Aug 13 2005, 10:44 AM
I expect Col. Yu would come forward and give me a analytical reply to understand the situation below. I am looking for constructive analysis ONLY.

Bangladesh has a small tank force with 250 tanks( 1 more regiment is on order). But India has almost 500-800 tanks in its Eastern Command. We are at a disadvantageous position here. The only good thing is most of the terrain of Bangladesh is unsuitable for a tank battle. The Northern region of the country is a heaven for tank battle though. We are trying to understand, under this circumstances, what are the options available for Bangladesh to defeat a superior tank force?

The point to be remembered here is that, Bangladesh is not going to purchase so many tanks in near future. Only one regiment, 48 tanks, has been ordered and the existing tank fleet is going through an upgradation process.

Waiting for constructive replies. Thank you.

Posted by: Bryan C Aug 13 2005, 11:24 AM
Minefields, lots of them, channel the enemy tanks into prepared kill zones.

ATGM, from man portable anti-tank missiles to heavy ATGM carry on jeeps/AFVs.

Attack helo might be a good choice as flying tank killer. Each attack helo might be 4-5 times as more expensive, but this allow faster reaction time, and able to kill more tanks per sortie. Only downsize might be you need a good air force and air defense network to cover your attack helo force.

Posted by: Maruf Aug 13 2005, 01:31 PM
Thanks for your quick reply. You have made a few excellent points. Let me make your job a little harder. Bangladesh is not going to build a "good" air force in the foreseeable future due to monetary constraints. All they have is Chinese F-7s, A-5s, a few MIG-29s, and recently ordered 16 J-7G/E.

Posted by: LCol. W Yu Aug 14 2005, 03:16 PM
Forget the tanks. What's the infantry and artillery ratio?

Posted by: Maruf Aug 14 2005, 04:45 PM
It's hard to tell, Col. All I know is that Bangladesh army has 500 or so 105mm, 122mm, and 130mm field guns, 1000 or so anti tank missiles, a lots of RPG and tank busters, 3-4 battalions anti aircraft guns(low and medium altitude). Recently an expansion plan has been executed and the news item can be found here:

http://www.newstoday-bd.com/frontpag...7/26/2005#5376

I know tanks are not the only factor to win a war but tank still plays a significant role in a war. Anyways, I am here to learn from you. drink.gif

edit: the infantry/artilery ratio is no better than the tank ratio.

Posted by: Maruf Aug 14 2005, 05:12 PM
One more news item about another expansion plan:

http://www.thedailystar.net/2004/04/16/d4041601055.htm

QUOTE
Prime Minister Khaleda Zia yesterday said 12 new units -- three artillery regiments, three infantry battalions, three field ambulances and three workshops -- equipped with necessary manpower and modern machinery would be formed soon to raise the efficiency of the armed forces.

Posted by: xinhui Aug 14 2005, 06:37 PM
This is what our friend from janes has to say


Fair use








WORLD ARMIES, Bangladesh

Date Posted: 11-Jul-2005

Jane's World Armies


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bangladesh
Summary
Assessment
Current developments and recent operations
Role and Deployment
Peace Support Operations
Command and control
Command appointments
Army organisation
Concept of operations
Reserves
Operational Art and Tactical Doctrine
Army Bases
Training
Recruitment
Procurement
Land Forces Requirements
Land Forces Modernisation
Equipment in service
Armour
Artillery
Anti-Tank Weapons
Infantry Weapons
Air Defence Weapons

Summary TOP

STRENGTH
120,000
INFANTRY
Brigade × 17
Divisional headquarters × 7
ARMOUR
Brigade × 1
ARTILLERY
Brigade × 5
AIR DEFENCE
Brigade × 1
ENGINEER
Brigade x 1


Assessment TOP

The Bangladesh Army is institutionally a descendant of the British Indian Army. To this day, the principal arms - infantry, armour, and artillery - are modelled on the British pattern of the 1940s. Support services are regulation-bound and of doubtful effectiveness.

The inefficiency of the Bangladeshi army has been partially tackled at regimental and brigade levels by an increased emphasis on higher-level professional training for general staff and command positions. Key weaknesses remain at the section, platoon and company levels since non-commissioned officers are not yet able to play the important role they must if the army is to attain combat efficiency. This is being partially redressed with the opening of a non-commissioned officers' school, although the selection of candidates on the basis of seniority means that much of the potential benefit is lost.

Freedom fighters: One of the most important divisions within the post-1971 Bangladeshi military occurred as a result of the struggle between the radical, politicised freedom fighters who fought the civil war and the large professional units that had been stranded in Pakistan. Resentment between these two factions was further aggravated by the special benefits and accelerated promotions granted to freedom fighters by the Awami League.

Still dominant in the armed forces, 'freedom fighters' served during the 1971 war of independence against Pakistan. The number of 'freedom fighters' is, however, rapidly diminishing as time passes, which may be a step forward in re-establishing merit as a prime requisite in the promotion and selection process. The pre-eminence of'freedom fighters' was, to a large extent, restored at the end of 1997 when General Mahbubur Rahman was retired, to be succeeded by Lieutenant General Mustafizur Rahman, a former freedom fighter.

The almost two dozen coup attempts during the Zia years - most of them abortive - were led by the highly politicised freedom fighters, few of whom were professional soldiers. Only a small percentage of officers belonged to the 'freedom fighter' category; 25 per cent were repatriates and 60 per cent had been recruited since 1971. This trend was reinforced as Zia increased the size of the army through the late 1970s.

Most of the 400 officers above the rank of major belonged to the repatriated faction of which General H M Ershad emerged as the key leader. These officers were mostly middle or lower-middle class by background and had family ties with urban bureaucrats, business groups and professionals. They had served their early years under Generals Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan of Pakistan and were not uncomfortable with the idea of a military government, as long as their pay, privileges and prestige were not jeopardised.

Since the departure of Ershad, the military has stayed in its barracks, or at least has mostly kept out of overt politics, concentrating on professional duties. Their reputation as politicians has not recovered from the severe tarnishing it suffered during Ziaur Rahman's tenure, as well as a heightened opposition to military rule by the population of Bangladesh during the nearly nine years of Ershad's regime. There is now also greater mistrust of and opposition to military regimes in the Commonwealth and in the wider world at large and the soldiery appears to have developed other interests such as career development and lucrative UN peacekeeping missions in the world's troublespots. No major disruption to military discipline has been reported since the abortive coup by the then Chief of Army Staff General ASM Nasim in May 1996.

Factionalism born of efforts of the three main political parties to nurture a support base among specific groups of favoured officers persists and has adversely affected organisational cohesion and professional competence throughout the services, and most markedly within the army.

Current developments and recent operations TOP

Role and Deployment TOP

The army's principal roles are internal security and the preservation of territorial integrity in border areas. Following serious deterioration of the law and order situation in late 2002, Prime Minister Zia deployed 40,000 soldiers and sailors across the country in the anti-crime'Operation Clean Heart'. The troops assumed police duties, hunting and arresting suspected criminals and recovering illegal arms, ammunition and explosives. Despite criticism by the opposition on grounds of doubtful constitutional legality, and human rights groups on equally well-founded allegations of illegality and brutality, the army was able to reduce the rate of violent crime but the arrest of thousands of civilians, many of them members of the ruling party, and the death of around 40 detainees in custody, eventually led to the soldiers' withdrawal in January 2003. However, another upsurge in violent crime led to the deployment of limited contingents of infantry and support troops in the six largest cities. The deployment was an admission that the police are incapable of discouraging and dealing with criminal activities.

Border security is largely directed towards India owing to a continuing tense relationship between Dhaka and New Delhi caused by frequent cross-border clashes between the Bangladesh Rifles, Indian guerrillas and, on some occasions, the Indian border security forces. The Bangladeshi Army has no serious pretensions of being able to defend the nation against an Indian attack. This fact is reflected not only in the comparative sizes of the Bangladeshi and the Indian Armies but also in the scale and nature of the Bangladeshi Army's equipment which is mainly suitable for counter-insurgency operations.

However, steps are being taken to remedy some of these deficiencies. For over two decades until the end of 1997, the army's principal operational deployment was in counter-insurgency operations in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. A large infantry division, with four infantry brigades and an artillery brigade, along with considerable paramilitary and police forces, had been deployed to the region. Most infantry, artillery, engineers and signals units of the army were rotated through this division for combat experience, as well as for operational reasons.

The cessation of violence has forced a redeployment of units and a review of overall strength and employment of personnel. Soldiers were deployed across the country just before the October 2001 general elections to ensure security. Following its dramatic defeat at the polls, Sheikh Hasina's Awami League accused the army of having conspired with other elements of the opposition to carry out 'massive rigging' in favour of the Bangladesh National Party. This allegation was almost certainly incorrect, and did not find any sympathy among domestic or foreign observers.

Peace Support Operations TOP

Bangladeshi forces have participated in a wide range of UN peacekeeping initiatives, including:

UNAVEM III in Angola (three observers and 11 civilian police);
UNPROFOR in Bosnia (1,263 personnel, including 18 observers);
UNPROFOR in Croatia (23 observers and 33 civilian police);
UNOMIG in Georgia (11 observers);
UNMIH in Haiti (1,067 personnel and 84 civilian police);
UNIKOM in Iraq/Kuwait (775, including observers); Now temporarily in Bangladesh;
UNOMIL in Liberia (13, including six observers);
UNMOT in Tajikistan (seven observers);
MINURSO in Western Sahara (seven observers).
UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (two combined arms battalions).
Bangladesh contributed one infantry battalion group and one engineer battalion to the US-led coalition's campaign to free Kuwait from Iraqi occupation during the 1991 Gulf War. Although UN commitments were significantly reduced in the late 1990s, the Bangladeshi Army appears determined to strengthen its UN links.

A number of regional training centres (with their headquarters in Dhaka) were established in 1998 with US support under the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities Programme (EIPCP). It serves small groups of Bangladeshi military personnel preparing to embark on UN assignments.

In May 2000, a combined-arms battalion joined the UN forces in Sierra Leone. Following the withdrawal of Indian peacekeepers, Bangladesh sent out a second combined-arms battalion to Sierra Leone.

In late 2001, as plans to deploy a UN peacekeeping force to Afghanistan emerged, Bangladesh offered its troops. During a January 2002 visit by the British prime minister to Bangladesh it emerged that Dhaka was keen to deploy its soldiers only under a UN command in Afghanistan and, if that proved unrealistic, then to have its prospective peacekeepers paid from a UN peacekeeping trust fund. As of late 2004, no Bangladeshi soldier had been deployed to Afghanistan. In early 2003, the UN evacuated the 1,000-plus personnel of UNIKOM to Bangladesh for the duration of hostilities in Iraq.

Throughout 2003 and 2004, Bangladesh continued to deploy troops on peace support operations in Africa, with large numbers of army personnel sent to and rotated in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and the Cote d'Ivoire.

Active deployments (as of October 2004)
Operation Observers Troops
MINURSO (Western Sahara) 8 0
MONUC (Democratic Republic of Congo) 16 1,310
ONUB (Bosnia) 2 0
UNAMA (Afghanistan) 1 0
UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) 8 473
UNMEE (Ethiopia and Eritrea) 7 171
UNMIK (Kosovo) 1 87
UNMIL (Liberia) 17 3,195
UNMISET (East Timor) 2 34
UNOCI (Cote d'Ivoire) 10 2,829
UNOMIG (Georgia) 7 0
Total 83 8,019
Note
Bangladesh will probably commit more troops to MONUC and join any mission authorised for Sudan. It is the second largest contributor to UN peacekeeping, after Pakistan.



Command and control TOP

The army has traditionally been involved in politics, and effective rule in Bangladesh requires the support of the armed forces. Factionalism born of efforts of the three main political parties to nurture a support base among specific groups of favoured officers persists and threatens both organisational cohesion and professional competence of the service. All rulers whether elected or otherwise, have sought to maintain control over the military by various means. Their efforts to promote supportive factions have fragmented the officers corps and this became a serious problem in 2000. The apparent suicide by a senior brigadier in late 1999, and similar deaths of other soldiers, suggested serious stresses in the service.

The three services are commanded by their respective chiefs of staff who are nominally co-equal, although the Army Chief of Staff inevitably predominates because of that service's larger size. The president is the commander-in-chief and the prime minister holds the defence minister's portfolio. The Army Chief of Staff reports directly to the prime minister on behalf of the three services.

According to current authorisation, the army is commanded by a lieutenant-general, while the navy and the air force are only commanded by a rear admiral and an air vice marshal, thus placing them in a subordinate position at tri-service meetings. This is not relished by the junior services. Under successive military administrations, civilian bureaucratic control over the armed forces, exercised through the ministry of defence, was attenuated.

For the past decade or so of parliamentary governance, prime ministers have kept the defence portfolio to themselves and commanded the services through the 'armed forces division' of the prime minister's secretariat. This is a tri-service office with a major-general working as the principal staff officer to the defence/prime minister, and his staff serving as the interface between the armed services and the leadership.

Both heads of the last two elected governments, Begum Zia and Sheikh Hasina, have not only maintained a close grip on the postings and promotion of senior officers, they have also sought to identify small groups of middle-ranking officers thought to be supportive of respective administrations. This has deepened the fragmentation of the officers corps and weakened the cohesion of the service.

Command appointments TOP

On returning to power, Khaleda Zia carried out major changes. General officers commanding the 19 and 33 infantry divisions, and the director general of the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) were transferred to the foreign ministry pending assignments abroad. They were replaced with officers considered less party-politically inclined. General Mahmuduzzaman was brought back from a secondment and appointed the principal staff officer to the defence/prime minister at the armed forces division. General Jamil was appointed adjutant general; General Rezaqul Haider was brought back from a UN assignment and appointed director general, BDR. General Moyeen was brought back from Pakistan to take over as the master general of ordnance. General Akbar was appointed commandant, DSCSC. General Ekramul Haq, formerly on assignment overseas as a defence attaché, was appointed general officer commanding an infantry division. He replaced General Ashfaq who was sent abroad.

Subsequently, General Haq was appointed Chief of General Staff, replacing General N Amin who was sent abroad on a diplomatic assignment. The newly promoted General Muniruzzaman took over the infantry division vacated by General Haq. General Nazrul Islam was moved from forces intelligence to the DSCSC while General Akbar was moved from there to take command of an infantry division.

In 2002, General Haroon ur Rashid was retired early and succeeded by General Hasan Mashoud Chowdhury as Chief of Army Staff. Gen Chowdhury began his three-year tenure in June 2002. Before being appointed the Chief of Army Staff, he served as Bangladeshi ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. Chowdhury has commanded infantry battalions, brigades and a division and led the Bangladesh military contingent in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War of 1990-1991.

In early 2003, Zia made several other changes in the army's senior leadership at divisional commanders' level.



Chain of Command


Army organisation TOP

The army, which numbers approximately 120,000 personnel, is composed of:

7 × infantry divisional headquarters
17 × infantry brigades
1 × armoured brigade
5 × artillery brigades (three with three artillery regiments, two with two artillery regiments)
1 × engineer brigade
1 × air defence brigade

The Bangladesh Army's 17 infantry brigades generally contain two or three infantry battalions with obsolete equipment and inadequate soft-skinned vehicles. Transport is by truck where these are available. Generally speaking Bangladesh's army moves at the speed of marching troops. The armoured brigade, based in the northwest of the country, has armoured and mechanised infantry components. In addition, four of the infantry divisions have an armoured regiment each. At present, these units are designed to provide anti-tank defence to respective formations and there are no plans for combining them into a second armoured brigade with any offensive capability. Although such a future course cannot be discounted the raising of a further brigade HQ would strain resources.

The infantry division deployed in the Chittagong Hill Tracts region commands four infantry brigades. Five other divisions command two infantry brigades and an artillery brigade each. The independent engineer and air defence brigades operate under the army headquarters, which also commands an independent infantry brigade. Divisions are considered operationally autonomous, as it is assumed that once hostilities commence, the army headquarters might not be able to exercise full control over deployment and mission management. Each division and brigade has been assigned specific operational sectors along the borders with Myanmar and India, which it is required to defend and protect.

The Bangladesh Army is institutionally a descendant of the British Army, by way of the armies of the Raj, Pakistan and India. To this day, the principal arms - infantry, armour, artillery and engineers - are very much modelled on the British pattern.

One of the most important divisions within the post-1971 Bangladeshi military occurred as a result of the struggle between the radical, politicised freedom fighters who fought the civil war and the large professional units that had been stranded in Pakistan. Resentment between these two factions was further aggravated by the special benefits and accelerated promotions granted to freedom fighters by the Awami League.

Concept of operations TOP

Doctrinal concepts have evolved to the extent that the army is entirely defensive in organisation, equipment, training and attitude. The army will be expected to provide the primary defence against any external threat, trading limited space for time by exploiting the riverine nature of the delta country, and hoping for foreign diplomatic, and possibly more robust, intervention to crystallise before regular forces are reduced to ineffective levels.

Given the relatively small size of the country and the flat terrain, this may not be very effective, especially during the dry season when warfare in the subcontinent has traditionally been waged. The army appears to rely on over 200 wide, often unbridgeable, rivers for its advantage to enable it to occupy a series of linear defensive positions to prevent swift penetration and thereby buy time for diplomatic and possibly other forms of international intervention.

Should the stage be reached when combat and conventional operations become unsustainable, residual regular sub-units would form the nuclei of guerrilla units operating semi-independently in what is described as 'the phase-2', essentially to raise the costs of occupation beyond acceptable levels. The forested Chittagong Hill Tracts region in the country's southeastern quadrant is seen as a possible jumping off point for mounting a different form of resistance in the shape of jungle warfare.

In 2002 at least one, and possibly more, divisions experimented with 'simultaneous phases 1 and 2'. In this format infantry brigades conduct defensive operations to halt enemy ingress while paramilitary units undertake guerrilla operations against the enemy's rear in occupied territory. This is not a standard procedure across the army.

However, given the profound asymmetry in usable force between Bangladesh and its potential adversaries, the lack of a coherent strategic doctrine enjoying both governmental and popular support, and by the absence of an overarching strategic overview melding the strengths of the three armed services, such a strategy may prove to have been too optimistic.

Since the establishment of a National Defence College (NDC) in 1998, some thoughts are being given to these issues although the level of general level of awareness of the importance of a doctrinal foundation to military organisation and operations remains low.



Concept of operations


Reserves TOP

In late 1995, the Bangladesh government adopted a proposal by the then Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant-General Abu Saleh Mohammad Nasim, to form the country's first reserve force. Before his removal he mooted this plan in an effort to partly resolve the army's chronic manpower shortage. Its strength of about 101,000 should rise to 145,000 to 150,000 if all units are brought up to full strength.

The proposed reserve forces would be drawn from the 5,000 to 7,000 personnel who leave the army each year. These would remain on the reserve list for four or five years following the end of their active duty period, with an obligation to undertake regular training periods that have yet to be finalised.

Based on the lower figures, with 5,000 personnel available for a four-year period, this would produce around 20,000 troops available to supplement regular forces during conflict or emergencies. These reserves would not exist as formed elements. Rather, they are aimed to fill the ranks of under-strength regular units.

Operational Art and Tactical Doctrine TOP

The government has not developed a well-defined defence doctrine and successive administrations have left the task to the military high command. The army headquarters, with advice from the National Defence College (NDC) and respective divisional headquarters, has worked out an operational doctrine which is essentially defensive and suggests that the army trade space for time.

Given the relatively small size of the country and the flat terrain, this may not be appropriate. The army appears to count on the over 200 wide, often unbridgeable, rivers for its advantage to enable it to occupy a series of linear defensive positions to prevent swift penetration and thereby buy time for diplomatic and possibly other forms of international intervention. The likelihood of outflanking parachute and special forces' operations (as in the 1971 war, by Indian forces against the Pakistan army) nullifies this optimistic proposal.

In what is termed phase 2, when effective conventional defence has ceased, residual units are expected to form the nuclei of guerrilla forces designed to render hostile occupation extremely expensive by engaging in protracted, unconventional operations. In 2002 at least one, and possibly more, divisions experimented with 'simultaneous phases 1 and 2'. In this format infantry brigades conduct defensive operations to halt enemy ingress while paramilitary units undertake guerrilla operations against the enemy's rear in occupied territory. This is not a standard procedure across the army.

Divisions are considered operationally autonomous, as it is assumed that once hostilities commence, army headquarters is unlikely to be able to exercise command of operations. Each division and brigade has been assigned specific operational sectors along the borders with Myanmar and India which it is required to defend and protect.

The army's active role has been one of maintaining internal peace and stability, assisting the civil administration in disaster-relief management and aiding the government's fight against insurgents, especially in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. In recent years, it has become increasingly committed to UN peacekeeping operations.

Army Bases TOP

Army Headquarters is based in the capital Dhaka. Other garrisons are located in Savar, Jessore, Bogra, Rangpur, Mymensingh, Comilla and Chittagong.

Training TOP

Recruits receive basic training at regimental and service centres. Basic training lasts several months. Specialised and advanced training, with courses ranging in length from four to 10 weeks, is given at Schools of Military Instruction located at various garrisons. Officer-cadets graduate from the Bangladesh Military Academy near Chittagong. The standard course lasts two academic years, although shorter courses have been run from time to time to fill large gaps in the officers' corps. Subsequent training takes place at the School of Infantry and Tactics or at other arms and services schools. General Staff officers from all three services are trained at the DSCSC in Dhaka.

The National Defence College (NDC), which is located 12 km north of the Dhaka city centre, was initially headed by a faculty provided by a British Military Assistance Team, until Bangladeshi faculty members were trained and took over. The NDC will runs a 10 month course every year for 25 senior officers from the armed forces of the rank of brigadier or equivalent and five senior civil servants. The distribution of the services seats are army 15, navy five and air force five. The alumni of these courses are expected to take up responsible positions in the armed forces and in the civil bureaucracy. This would leave the crucial position of lieutenant-colonels commanding battalions and regiments without any specific professional training for their rank (majors need to attend the DSCSC before they can be posted to significant command or staff posts or be promoted to lieutenant-colonel).

The current thinking at Army Headquarters is to launch an Army War Course (AWC) for lieutenant-colonels to provide a bridge between the DSCSC and the NDC. However, this has not yet been finalised. For operational training, each formation runs its own annual training plan and there are regular exercises in the dry and wet seasons.

The Bangladeshi Army strengthened its officer training programme under an initiative, which includes the Military Institute of Science and Technology. The facility was opened on 31 January 1999 at Mirpur, near Dhaka, to provide training courses for captains and majors.

The Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training (BIPSOT) was established on 24 June 1999. The purpose was to prepare officers and troops to assume UN assigned responsibilities when called for. BIPSOT is based at Rajendrapur Cantonment, Gazipur. It conducts courses on peace support operations on a regular basis. BIPSOT also conducts sub-unit/unit group training exercises on peace support operations at local and multinational level.

The army remains very heavily foot-infantry dominated. However, the emphasis on higher-level professional training for general staff and command positions has contributed to the overall efficiency at regimental and brigade levels. Key weaknesses remain at the section, platoon and company levels since non-commissioned officers are not yet able to play the important role they must if the services are to attain combat efficiency. This is being partially redressed with the opening of a non-commissioned officers' school. However, the selection of candidates on the basis of seniority means that much of the potential benefit is lost.

Routine training is conducted at sub-unit level at peacetime stations throughout the year but is not considered very effective. Each infantry division has its own 'collective training' area close to the stretch of the international boundary in its operational sector. Collective training in 'phase 1', or conventional operations, at battalion, brigade and divisional levels takes place every dry season (November to February), and sometimes in the rainy season. Armoured and artillery units carry out field firing at a range near Chittagong in the southeast of the country. A smaller range has been built near the northeastern town of Bogra. Until the end of 1997, all infantry units were rotated through Chittagong Hill Tracts for counter-insurgency training as well as operations.

Staff officers and general officers are sometimes sent for higher training to the US, China, the UK and other European countries. On 3 August 2003, Bangladesh signed a military training protocol with France, similar to agreements it already had with India, Pakistan, Turkey, the UK and the US. The agreement will allow Bangladeshi military personnel to train in French military training institutes.

In early 2004 Bangladesh approved the draft of a defence agreement with Kuwait under which members of the Bangladeshi armed forces will provide vocational and technical training to the Kuwaiti armed forces. Currently, some 3,700 members of the armed forces are serving in Kuwait under two agreements, signed in May 1991 and December 1992. The provisions of the two earlier agreements have been incorporated into the new draft. The new agreement, which will initially be in effect for a three-year term and can be renewed for another six years if the two governments agree, will be formally signed soon, according to defence sources in Dhaka. In total, some 3,741 members of the armed forces will be seconded for three years to Kuwait to train the armed forces.

Bangladeshi personnel will, based on satisfactory performance and with the agreement of the Kuwaiti government, be given the option to extend their contracts. The agreement also provides for a Bangladeshi liaison headquarters in Kuwait, which will supervise, maintain and oversee appointments, secondments, extensions and other aspects of the defence agreement.

Recruitment TOP

Recruitment is by voluntary enlistment. Army recruiters can afford to be selective, as the armed forces incorporate only a very small percentage of the population and offer one of the more secure occupations in the country. Military training takes place almost entirely within Bangladesh.

Procurement TOP

Land Forces Requirements TOP

Military procurement for the army is probably centred around the creation of at least two armoured/mechanised brigades, but this will be a legthy process if it goes ahead, and is almost certain to be done on a gradual basis. There are plans to flesh out the infantry divisions, most of which have only two infantry brigades. This too will be a slow process, not only for financial reasons, but also because recruitment and training, especially of commissioned officers, cannot keep pace with normal replacement requirements and the concurrent expansion.

Land Forces Modernisation TOP

The gift of a battery of multiple rocket launchers (MRL) and the offer of a regiment of T-69 light tanks from Pakistan have had no impact on force modernisation. The MRL battery was split up with launchers being distributed to individual infantry divisions, violating the principles of employment of artillery and effectively negating their entire potential. The offer of T-69 tanks was not taken up, possibly because the platforms were obsolete and maintenance costs would have been disproportionate to their worth. During his visit to Bangladesh in late July 2002, Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf is reported to have offered to help meet certain service requirements, although details were not disclosed by either party.

The division of the infantry's East Bengal regiment to allow the creation of the new Bangladesh Infantry Regiment did not lead to any major procurement, although the army did obtain ex-Soviet wheeled infantry combat vehicles capable of carrying a battalion (minus) in 2001 as part of UN requirements for prospective peacekeeping missions.

The weaknesses of the procurement system were highlighted, with reports emerging in July 2002 that an infantry division had found the ammunition it had received from a purchase worth US$2.6 million was unusable.

In early 2003, Prime Minister Zia led a delegation to China which negotiated several military assistance agreements. Although details have not been released, Beijing is believed to have agreed to upgrade several types of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles in the Bangladeshi inventory. The chief of army staff, General Hasan Mashhud Chowdhury, visited China in September 2004, but no details were given of any proposed co-operation or procurement plans.

Equipment in service TOP

Armour TOP

Type Role Quantity
T-55/59 Main Battle Tank 105
Type 69 Main Battle Tank 100
Type 62 Light Tank 40
BTR 70 Armoured Personnel Carrier 55
Yw-531 Armoured Personnel Carrier 50
Note
Possibly 20 to 25 BTR-80 and some MTLB reported.


Artillery TOP

Type Role Quantity
105 mm Model 56 P Howitzer 30
105 mm M101 Howitzer 40
122 mm Type 54 Howitzer 20
130 mm Type 59 Medium Gun 35+
122 mm Type 83 Multiple Rocket Launcher 6
Note
Estimate.
Ex-Pakistan.


Anti-Tank Weapons TOP

Type Role Quantity
106 mm RCL M40 Recoilless Gun 25
57 mm 6 pounder Anti-Tank Gun 12
76 mm Type 54 Anti-Tank Gun 40
82 mm Type 53 Mortar 300
120 mm Type 53 Mortar 50
Note
Estimate
Probably unserviceable.


Infantry Weapons TOP

Type Role
9 mm FN 35 Pistol
9 mm Sterling L2 Sub-Machine Gun
12.7 mm DShK Heavy Machine Gun
7.62 mm RPD Machine Gun
7.62 mm HK11A1/21A1 Light Machine Gun
7.62 mm Bren L4 Light Machine Gun
7.62 mm FN-FAL Assault Rifle
7.62 mm G3A2/3 Assault Rifle
7.62 mm AK-47 Assault Rifle
7.62 mm Simonov SKS Assault Rifle

Air Defence Weapons TOP

Type Role Quantity
HN-5A Surface-to-Air Missile 12
37 mm Anti-Aircraft Gun 16
57mm Type 59 Anti-Aircraft Gun 12
20 mm HS-804 Light Anti-Aircraft Gun 15
Note
Estimate.


Posted by: xinhui Aug 14 2005, 06:50 PM
QUOTE (LCol. W Yu @ Aug 14 2005, 12:16 PM)
Forget the tanks. What's the infantry and artillery ratio?

Look'in at Janes report, it is VERY weak.


7 × infantry divisional headquarters
17 × infantry brigades
1 × armoured brigade
5 × artillery brigades (three with three artillery regiments, two with two artillery regiments)
1 × engineer brigade
1 × air defence brigade



Type Role Quantity
105 mm Model 56 P Howitzer 30
105 mm M101 Howitzer 40
122 mm Type 54 Howitzer 20
130 mm Type 59 Medium Gun 35+
122 mm Type 83 Multiple Rocket Launcher 6
Note
Estimate.
Ex-Pakistan.




Posted by: Maruf Aug 14 2005, 06:59 PM
Pretty old report reprinted without adequate update. The only update I see is the part of the current modernization plan that the magazine took right from the Bangladeshi national dailies laugh.gif

QUOTE
In early 2004 Bangladesh approved the draft of a defence agreement with Kuwait under which members of the Bangladeshi armed forces will provide vocational and technical training to the Kuwaiti armed forces. Currently, some 3,700 members of the armed forces are serving in Kuwait under two agreements, signed in May 1991 and December 1992. The provisions of the two earlier agreements have been incorporated into the new draft. The new agreement, which will initially be in effect for a three-year term and can be renewed for another six years if the two governments agree, will be formally signed soon, according to defence sources in Dhaka. In total, some 3,741 members of the armed forces will be seconded for three years to Kuwait to train the armed forces.


The information above was taken, most probably, from BDSDF. drink.gif



Posted by: Maruf Aug 14 2005, 07:02 PM
QUOTE (xinhui @ Aug 14 2005, 02:50 PM)
QUOTE (LCol. W Yu @ Aug 14 2005, 12:16 PM)
Forget the tanks. What's the infantry and artillery ratio?

Look'in at Janes report, it is VERY weak.


7 × infantry divisional headquarters
17 × infantry brigades
1 × armoured brigade
5 × artillery brigades (three with three artillery regiments, two with two artillery regiments)
1 × engineer brigade
1 × air defence brigade



Type Role Quantity
105 mm Model 56 P Howitzer 30
105 mm M101 Howitzer 40
122 mm Type 54 Howitzer 20
130 mm Type 59 Medium Gun 35+
122 mm Type 83 Multiple Rocket Launcher 6
Note
Estimate.
Ex-Pakistan.

The balance was taken from an Indian source and it's (balance) older than me. cool.gif Here is the link:

http://www.ipcs.org/Military_militar...ry2=Bangladesh

Posted by: xinhui Aug 14 2005, 08:44 PM
However, it does show the poor infantry to arty ratio.

Only one engr bgd?

Do you have a TOE per infantry bgd? does it have any engr elements?

Posted by: Maruf Aug 14 2005, 10:18 PM
xinhui,

I have never claimed Bangladesh to be a regional military power or something. Bangladesh is the newest country in South Asia....only 34 years old. We have drawbacks in every sector like any other 3rd world nation.

Having said that, the data that you have presented here is atleast 15 years old. I saw this data way back in 1997 when I was an M.B.A student in America. I saw it in SAPRA online forum. From them, IPCS guys copied the data and published it without adequate updates. They had removed the division and service commanders names to hide the age of the data. The data was extracted from the SIIPRI year book and they were showing General Abdur Rab as the QMGA of Bangladesh army. This chap was dismissed from the army in 1994 for financial irregularities while procuring 300 military version Mercedez Benz truck from Germany. So, you can guess how old the data is.

Bangladesh has Engineering elements in every division. We have 1 Engineering battalion with every division. This is not enough but hey! we have to work within the monetary constraints and implement modernization plan in phases. If you follow the news link that i have provided you will see that Bangladesh is raising 3 new artilery units, 3 new infantry units and 3 new ambulance units and 3 new workshop units with modern machineries.

http://www.thedailystar.net/2004/04/16/d4041601055.htm

It is a big boost for Bangladesh army--the youngest in the region. Even your Janes article mentions the fact that China is going to assist Bangladesh in inducting modern artilery and air defence missiles. These are no small things for a young army. You cannot have a strong army overnight. This is an incremental process.

I was looking for a strategy to counter a large army but we are discussing statistics. If statistics is the only indicator of military power then India would not modernize its army to counter China. In 80s China had the 2nd largest army(4 million) on Earth. What did India have? If India's 3000 tanks and equal number of artilery pieces are the deciding factors in Indo-Bangla conflict then why don't the Indians take into account China's 10,000 tanks and the equal, if not more, number of artilery pieces and stop modernizing their army because it's hopeless.

India has borders with other nations and a significant chunk of its military men and machines are scattered around the borders. They cannot concentrate their military in one particular point.......never. The same goes for China. Then there is a question of terrain. Bangladesh is a riverine country and hard for troops movement.

These are the points I wanted to bring into the discussion to make an analysis. With adequate anti tank missiles, RPGs, mine fields, and suport from artilery units, it is possible for Bangladesh to repulse a tank attack.

Of course, the Col. wanted to discuss the entire gamut of the war but I was looking for a particular area--tank battle.

I am still open for a discussion. I'll answer questions raised during the course of the discussion. Thank you. army.gif

Posted by: LCol. W Yu Aug 14 2005, 10:28 PM
The BdA might be able to win a few battles but the war is lost before it begins. The numbers ain't there.

You asked what are the options. There's only one - fortifications.

Posted by: Maruf Aug 14 2005, 10:40 PM
Yes, as far as number is concerned, we are not doing well. But things are changing though. We are procuring hardwares to rectify the situation. But as I have said before, we are the youngest army in the region and need more time to grow. Within 3 decades we have done not so bad, considering we are providing only 1.2% of GDP for defence.

The recent defence agreement with China, South korea, France, and Kuwait will open the door for modernization and expansion. I have provided a news link to show the ongoing modernization plan. There are other projects on the table and as soon as they are published, I'll post it here.

Posted by: LCol. W Yu Aug 14 2005, 11:14 PM
Based on what Andy has provided, hardware is the least of the problems. If you don't know how to use your current tanks, then getting new ones ain't going to help. You have natural barriers that you're doing nothing to exploit.

The easiest answer is fortifications. The best answer is to send your officers for a 10 year course on becoming officers.

Posted by: Maruf Aug 14 2005, 11:18 PM
Bangladeshi officers are regular participants in various courses in America, China, Britain, and Russia. Actually our defence services and staff college and national defence college are designed and operated by British officers. Try and visit the official army website to go through the section of different schools of Bangladesh army:

http://www.bangladesharmy.info/

Posted by: LCol. W Yu Aug 14 2005, 11:32 PM
Then you have a problem. You have no combined arms brigades. Your combined arms echelon is at the division and divisional training, even thinking is lacking. You're restricted your combat effectiveness to the battalion and company level and not even combined arms at that.

Posted by: xinhui Aug 15 2005, 12:59 AM
QUOTE
I was looking for a strategy to counter a large army but we are discussing statistics. If statistics is the only indicator of military power then India would not modernize its army to counter China


Hold on, I have to gain a good understand first. while you point out Janes is not perfect but itis a start.

There is always insurgence warfare with a strong paramilitary. it is an ugly ugly business, even some how BdA militia outlast the invasion army, there will be hell to pay later. paramilitary can easily turn on each other.


Few more things:

Correct me if I am wrong but I failed to note any major (bgd/div) RRU in BdA. RRU is not just in name, but with equipment and training to back it up. This is very worrisome in light of India's new cold start doctine, even worst, InA has more experience and training in MOUT. RAND did a good study on India's MOUT experience. Do Bda has a plan in place to mobilized enough troops in a crisis?


To follow up with Col Yu, use those rivers, create a multi layers of lines, don't hold any lines to the last man, use delay actions to buy time, in another word use fubian tactics. Make it so costly that InA would thing twice on how much they are willing to pay for a victory.

Posted by: chicket9 Aug 15 2005, 01:30 AM
To kill a modern tank force like India's...

Lets look at India's inventory first.
They got tanks like the old British ones, the Russian T55s, and T72M series. And they are developing the Arjun as well, as well as possible future purchases (correct me im wrong) of the T90.

Although a sizable tank force, if we see what happened in Bosinia and Iraq, the Russian tanks stood little chance against an onslaught of modern firepower from the skies and also from RPGs and manportable weapons.

For bangladesh, it will be a different story. In a tank to tank battle, Bangladesh is not going to survive too long.

The modern ATGM will pretty much kill anything. The HJ8 managed to penetrate T72s with ease in Bosinia. And the standard RPG and AT3 Saggar can kill most T55s and old British vehicles, and perhaps inflict moderate damage to a T72.

Mines like someone said are also pretty good against tanks. If mine fields can be cleared, at least the tank force is held up and not so mobile in battle.


But yes I agree you cannot just look at tanks. In modern war, it is unreal to send only tanks. They will be slaughtered. There will always be an addition of effective AFVs like the BMP2, infantry, and judging India's military, sizeable air support.

Posted by: troung Aug 15 2005, 01:34 AM
Sorry to jump in...

QUOTE
Then there is a question of terrain. Bangladesh is a riverine country and hard for troops movement.


Didn't India show it could jump those rivers with SOFs back in 1971?

QUOTE
Of course, the Col. wanted to discuss the entire gamut of the war but I was looking for a particular area--tank battle.


Tanks don't fight in a void... airpower, SOF, infantry of all flavors, artillery, logistics and of course engineers all play a part in victory or defeat...


Some nice qoutes from the article...

QUOTE
The MRL battery was split up with launchers being distributed to individual infantry divisions, violating the principles of employment of artillery and effectively negating their entire potential.


QUOTE
Doctrinal concepts have evolved to the extent that the army is entirely defensive in organisation, equipment, training and attitude. The army will be expected to provide the primary defence against any external threat, trading limited space for time by exploiting the riverine nature of the delta country, and hoping for foreign diplomatic, and possibly more robust, intervention to crystallise before regular forces are reduced to ineffective levels.


QUOTE
Given the relatively small size of the country and the flat terrain, this may not be appropriate. The army appears to count on the over 200 wide, often unbridgeable, rivers for its advantage to enable it to occupy a series of linear defensive positions to prevent swift penetration and thereby buy time for diplomatic and possibly other forms of international intervention. The likelihood of outflanking parachute and special forces' operations (as in the 1971 war, by Indian forces against the Pakistan army) nullifies this optimistic proposal.


QUOTE
The Bangladesh Army's 17 infantry brigades generally contain two or three infantry battalions with obsolete equipment and inadequate soft-skinned vehicles. Transport is by truck where these are available. Generally speaking Bangladesh's army moves at the speed of marching troops. The armoured brigade, based in the northwest of the country, has armoured and mechanised infantry components. In addition, four of the infantry divisions have an armoured regiment each. At present, these units are designed to provide anti-tank defence to respective formations and there are no plans for combining them into a second armoured brigade with any offensive capability. Although such a future course cannot be discounted the raising of a further brigade HQ would strain resources.


QUOTE
There are plans to flesh out the infantry divisions, most of which have only two infantry brigades. This too will be a slow process, not only for financial reasons, but also because recruitment and training, especially of commissioned officers, cannot keep pace with normal replacement requirements and the concurrent expansion.


QUOTE
Divisions are considered operationally autonomous, as it is assumed that once hostilities commence, the army headquarters might not be able to exercise full control over deployment and mission management. Each division and brigade has been assigned specific operational sectors along the borders with Myanmar and India, which it is required to defend and protect.


QUOTE
The army remains very heavily foot-infantry dominated. However, the emphasis on higher-level professional training for general staff and command positions has contributed to the overall efficiency at regimental and brigade levels. Key weaknesses remain at the section, platoon and company levels since non-commissioned officers are not yet able to play the important role they must if the services are to attain combat efficiency. This is being partially redressed with the opening of a non-commissioned officers' school. However, the selection of candidates on the basis of seniority means that much of the potential benefit is lost.


I think fortifactions to buy time and planning for a guerilla war are the only real options...

Posted by: xinhui Aug 15 2005, 01:42 AM
QUOTE
The modern ATGM will pretty much kill anything. The HJ8 managed to penetrate T72s with ease in Bosinia.


HJ-8 perform poorly in Bosina. Taken all PR crap aside from both sides. HJ-8 require a great of training time in addition to an intense maintiance cycle. Not all armies can affort it. In addition, HJ-8 unit only found in battalion level, consider the organzation of Bda, most of the engagement will be at Coy level.

Posted by: Bluejay Aug 15 2005, 01:50 PM
Just wondering, what do you base that on? From what I have read (and I admit it's not much) most of the combatants seemed fairly pleased with it. Unless there is some fundamental flaw with it, I can't see how it would be much different than TOW and MILAN. I realize it is heavy but perhaps the combination of the 8E missile (4km range) and the 8L launcher (23 kg?) would be pretty effective.

Posted by: xinhui Aug 15 2005, 02:11 PM
It was reported in some Indian publications. We are not talking about the L model with is vast improved, but the older A model, big and not very portable.

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[Ray]

Colonel

clicking the link I entered, but it is still flaky.

Gave a non comittal as a rejoinder, but enough to needle. ;)

ASk him if he is getting the Barak also for land warfare? ;)

[aaaditya]

when you want to take a threat scenario into consideration you also have to consider indian airforce and navy ,india will never go into a war with just its army,indian army airforce and navy always work together(for example operation cactus against the maldivean rebels etc0,the navy will block of the sea route of supplies for bangladesh starving bangladeshi economy while launching precision strikes on key targets,the army will just come in to consolidate the gains,airforce will acheive air superiority as it completely crushes the bangladeshi airforce india also has 60 attack helicopters if we do not add dhruvs(300 to be inducted each capable of carrying of firing 16 atgms0 and the 200+mi17's also capable of carrying atgms HOW MANY BATTLE TANKS DID YOU SAY BANGLADESH HAS? india's paramillitary forces are much larger and better equipped than the regular bangladeshi army,bangladesh's economy is so weak and fragile that it will not be able to sustain a full fledged war with india not even a guerrila war,all bangladsh can do is to resort to unfair means like torture and murder of indian paramillitary personnel on patrol that too only till india decides that they have had enough of it and decide to whip them the bangladeshi head of state will come running to new delhi begging for mrecy like it happened after india gave bangladesh a warnig after the bsf incident.
the best course for bangladesh is to maintain friendly relations with india like srilanka and both the nations can benefit from this.

[Blademaster]

Col,

tried accessing CDF but something weird was going on with the forum like huge yellow blinking blocks that keeps scrolling forever. I think it got hijacked or something.

Tell Maruf I got one answer for him that will render any defenses posed by Bangladesh irrelevant.


Flooding.

India controls all the dams on all rivers that go into Bangladesh. If India ever feels the need to, she can release all the water and drench almost all of Bangladesh in water, practically destroying the entire country.

We don't want Bangladesh. We just want the Chittagong Hills tract because it used to be an area for hindus but after the creation of Bangladesh, the muslims either drove out or killed all remaining hindus.

[Officer of Engineers]

Hitesh, I got that with my wife's computer. I blame Bill Gates. Have not sourced down the problem but then again, it's my wife's computer. Will let the powers that be know (ie, the software support).

The Brigadier's reply

Colonel,

I have somehow entered. Hope it lasts.

Numbers is not the only problem for BD. It is a three front war that it will have to face.

Given the combat ratio between BD and India in all the three services, the cards are on the table as to what will happen.

Even if BD gets the most sophisticated tank in the world free (since iti s claimed she is a third world country), the sitaution will still be the same even if the casualties taken by India greater to achieve the same.

But then, who wants to attack BD?

It is also interesting to learn that India's Eastern Command has tanks.

Against whom?

The terrain does not permit againt China and BD is not a cognisable threat at all.

------------------------------------------------------

India has no British tanks on its inventory.

The fleet is entirely of Russian origin.

The comparison of India and BD is misplaced since the hardware of all the three services are modern as far as India is concerned. The Chinese eqpt with BD have not been combat tested. Therefore, that is a point of interest like the Pattons in the Indo Pak 1965.

The BD Air force is no comparison with the Indian Air force and this aspect is a match winner and hence should also be taken into consideration.

The Indian navy blockaded Karachi. It is much more modern now and the ships are more. BD is landlocked except towards Bay of Bengal. Myanmar will bot come to BD's assistance since its stakes with India are very high.

The Indan Army is surfeit of river and canal crossing equipment. This maybe taken into consideration regarding the riverine terrain of BD.

The state of training and operational readiness is also another factor, it have been tested in recent time.

The Cold Start doctrine theoretically is also a factor.

India army is battle seasoned. BD army is not. This is also a factor for consideration.

The Colonel has summed up the issue rather well. There is no combined arms concept.

Therefore, one can only wonder what modern tanks can do for BD apart from the prestige point of view. It maybe noted that heavy or medium tanks cannot operate in battle formation in BD's terrain.

Sir, about the tanks in the InA Eastern Command. Wouldn't that be simple bureaucratic inertia, ie get the tanks and fill the slots just because the book says it's needed?

But then, who wants to attack BD?

And that, gentlemen, is the difference between knowledge and wisdom.

[Blademaster]

Hitesh, I got that with my wife's computer. I blame Bill Gates. Have not sourced down the problem but then again, it's my wife's computer. Will let the powers that be know (ie, the software support).


Sir, about the tanks in the InA Eastern Command. Wouldn't that be simple bureaucratic inertia, ie get the tanks and fill the slots just because the book says it's needed?



And that, gentlemen, is the difference between knowledge and wisdom.

But who knows? After all, Bangladesh would do something really stupid such as trying to move the border (they tried before without success) with force or kill too many BSF soldiers that GoI would have no choice but to respond in face of huge public outcry. The question is how stupid can Bangladesh get be before India responds with invasion or series of raids.

Personally, I prefer raids because it relieves us the necessity of holding ground and does the job of teaching a painful lesson.

As for tanks, tanks are totally unusable in that area. Any commander who requests tanks would have to be in such serious dire straits to warrant a request because tanks are only useful in stopping overwhelming attacks, ie, defensive warfare since the land is totally unusable for offensive/manuever warfare with tanks.

What kind of software do you use for your laptop? I use Windows XP for the main reason that it is widely used and supported and easy for me to use. I can fix the problems on my OS but as for servers, I'd rather use Linux.

[Officer of Engineers]

But who knows? After all, Bangladesh would do something really stupid such as trying to move the border (they tried before without success) with force or kill too many BSF soldiers that GoI would have no choice but to respond in face of huge public outcry. The question is how stupid can Bangladesh get be before India responds with invasion or series of raids.

The obvious stupidity is right there with their own citizens not taking and refusing a realistic view of their own military. It's obvious that territorial defence is not high on the BdA agenda. Their biggest military advantage is that no one wants to attack Bd. Propaganda certainly play a big part in this - the mighty BdA is so well respected that no one dares to attack. With officers all over the world studying military developements, including their own colleges set up by the British.

In the meantime, no one is questioning why brigade commanders ain't acting like brigade commanders and division commanders ain't acting like division commanders.

Just briefly looking over their training strongly suggests a UN peacekeeping centric mandate. Don't know whether this is true or not but you would not need brigade and divisions for such roles. You need companies and battalions.

Personally, I prefer raids because it relieves us the necessity of holding ground and does the job of teaching a painful lesson.

A massive bombing campaign would do fine.

As for tanks, tanks are totally unusable in that area. Any commander who requests tanks would have to be in such serious dire straits to warrant a request because tanks are only useful in stopping overwhelming attacks, ie, defensive warfare since the land is totally unusable for offensive/manuever warfare with tanks.

You've misunderstood. A corps has an armoured regiment and an arm'd regt has tanks. Fill the slots. Don't have to make sense. Just do it. It's alot easier than trying to explain to the beancounters the reality. If you make the beancounters understand that you don't really need tanks, they just might take away tanks from the other corps (or reduce their training). "Eastern Command doesn't need to do that, why do you?"

Just go with it. It's alot easier.

What kind of software do you use for your laptop? I use Windows XP for the main reason that it is widely used and supported and easy for me to use. I can fix the problems on my OS but as for servers, I'd rather use Linux.

My laptop is Win2K. Wife's WinXP SP2.

[Ray]

Colonel,

Bangladesh terrain is riverine.

Even the PT 76 light tanks during 1971 got bogged down. Therefore, tanks are more of a headache than of use.

Given the force levels of all three services of the India, it is not worth even a tinker's damn to even contemplate BD as a threat and I am not being supercilious.

The BD airforce will be knocked out of the sky and then it the sky is the limit for India.

Maruf informed you that the British were teaching them in their schools of instructions. The point to note is that the thought process of the British is NATO oriented while the subcontinental thought is still non nuclear and as they say in one day cricket, all about the slog overs.

Maruf has the tendency of day dreaming and is highly gung ho. He fails to realise that BD is pathetical and there is no grounds to even be gung ho. It is like a little child acting stupid and wanting to punch and knockout Mohamed Ali (Cassius Clay).

On his board, he had also mentioned that BD was just seconds away from making the nuclear bomb if I remember correctly! He wa highly peeved when he was told that BD was a breadbasket case and if one bomb was made (even if they were on the threshold which was highly imaginative and absurd) then it would be the end of BD since as an international pariah, all aid including food would stop and BD would have committed suicide and not even the honourable harakiri! ;)

[Ray]

Lemon,

You should join CDF (China Defense Forum).

Good stuff for China updates.

It is not a Communist China site.

[lemontree]

I had read some where that the cost of a nuke submarine can eradicate malaria from BD and the cost of a nuke can eradicate poverty from there.
Should'nt these two things be the criteria from BD decision makers, than buying tanks that will just white elephants.
It is more practical it they buy cheap armd cars IMO.

[lemontree]

Lemon,

You should join CDF (China Defense Forum).

Good stuff for China updates.

It is not a Communist China site.

Sir,
I am a member there for quite some time now. But i have not logged on for about 3 months since I changed my job.

[Ray]

I had read some where that the cost of a nuke submarine can eradicate malaria from BD and the cost of a nuke can eradicate poverty from there.
Should'nt these two things be the criteria from BD decision makers, than buying tanks that will just white elephants.
It is more practical it they buy cheap armd cars IMO.

[Jay]

I know the reason for your yellow screen. Its your firewall blocking all CDF advertisements, so CDF decided to give a finger for those who dont see those google advertisements. I dont know whether its intentional or un-intentional.

Try turning off your firewall, you can get in to the website.