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Why was the US only able to field 98 infantry divisions during WW2?
There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov
Although the thrust of this article by Bonin is about the core competencies the Army needs to demonstrate in providing strategic landpower, he uses the Army of WWII as his example and explores some of the reasoning, constraints, competing requirements that resulted in the number of combat divisions fielded.
From the article:
The National Defense Act of 1920 specifically charged the War Department and the Army General Staff with overall mobilization planning and preparation in the event of war and remained unchanged until 1947. In early 1942, then Chief of Staff General George Catlett Marshall organized the Army into three major administrative commands—Army Ground Forces (AGF), Army Service Forces (ASF), and Army Air Force (AAF). In 1945, 70 percent of AGF and ASF (some six million personnel) were deployed overseas, of which only 20 percent could be found in the 89 combat divisions, all overseas. Was some 80 percent of the Army unnecessary overhead or tail to the divisional tooth? No! This arrangement was the complete force structure required for the Army to perform its core competencies including providing prompt strategic landpower and simultaneously sustaining global campaigns in two theaters of war—Europe and Pacific—and six separate theaters of operations.
Actually I believe you may have posted it in the WWII mega thread. Anyway, I thought it was Marshall who originally suggested to mobilize 265 divisions. However, FDR wished to prioritize industrial output over raw fighting power, so Marshall revised his plans resulting in "the 99 division gamble."
All those who are merciful with the cruel will come to be cruel to the merciful.
-Talmud Kohelet Rabbah, 7:16.
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