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Why was the Imperial Japanese Army deficient?

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  • #16
    Originally posted by WABs_OOE View Post
    Battle of Kohima - Wikipedia
    Battle of Imphal - Wikipedia

    Not fortified but these were prepared defences. Absent the concrete barriers, the British enjoyed and applied overwhelming firepower without fear of running out of munitions. The IJA could not breach these mass fire defences and they themselves did not believe in mass artillery fire, they did not engage in counter-battery operations.

    They sufferred some 58,000 casualties - that's an entire army, three entire corps.

    You can imagine the slaughter had it been a Maginot Line.
    I never doubted that they would lose a lot of men. I would like to know how they would attack such a position?

    E.g. would they mass charge the enemy with bayonets?

    Would they try to press towards the enemy using fire and movement and smoke til they reach grenade range, where they would then clear out the enemy with grenade spam?

    Etc..

    Hypothetically, if you're in command of the entire Kwantung Army, and you're ordered to attack the Maginot Line head-on, how would you do it.

    Originally posted by astralis View Post
    hell, the Japanese at Imphal couldn't even -supply- themselves. they starved to death!
    Why didn't they just eat their fallen comrades?
    Last edited by hboGYT; 08 Jul 19,, 14:40.

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    • #17
      Why didn't they just eat their fallen comrades?
      if i recall correctly, they did.
      There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

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      • #18
        Originally posted by hboGYT View Post
        I never doubted that they would lose a lot of men. I would like to know how they would attack such a position?

        E.g. would they mass charge the enemy with bayonets?

        Would they try to press towards the enemy using fire and movement and smoke til they reach grenade range, where they would then clear out the enemy with grenade spam?
        One of the reason why they emphasized the banzai charge so much is that they didn't have that much munitions. Never mind food, they ran out of ammunition. They did not have the concept of covering fire or rolling barrage. Their reasoning is that it's a waste of ammunition.

        Originally posted by hboGYT View Post
        Hypothetically, if you're in command of the entire Kwantung Army, and you're ordered to attack the Maginot Line head-on, how would you do it.
        I would surrender.
        Chimo

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        • #19
          hboGYT,

          The Colonel and astralis are far more knowledgeable than me on matters concerning China, Japan, and East Asia, both in the present-day and historically. I'm not sure what kind of pre-conceptions you're working with that shapes how you think about and perceive Japan's capabilities in the 1930s/40s, so I'd like to make a few broad points.
          • modern Japan has a nominal GDP per capita about 2/3 that of the US and roughly equivalent to that of the modern UK and France
          • 1937 Japan had a nominal GDP per capita of roughly 35% of US and UK levels
          • to illustrate the economic gap, though the UK and Japan are equivalent today on a per capita basis, in the 1930s/40s comparing Japan to the UK would be like comparing Poland, Romania, or Argentina to the UK today
          • while modern Japan is a first world country with economic output and industrial production comparable to other first world countries, in the 1930s/40s Japan was only at 1/3 US-UK level on a per capita basis
          • Japan was only able to succeed to the extent it did early on against Western powers in the Pacific theater, because the Western countries were pre-occupied (and also occupied) elsewhere
          • as far as the sum total of the US war effort in WWII was concerned, ~80% of US expenditures and resources went toward the European theater. Only ~20% was devoted to the Pacific theater.
          • the total US economy and output was 10x or more than that of the Japanese economy in WWII
          Last edited by Ironduke; 08 Jul 19,, 19:48.
          "Every man has his weakness. Mine was always just cigarettes."

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          • #20
            Originally posted by astralis View Post
            if i recall correctly, they did.
            Not just their own comrades. There are stories from the fighting in PNG, where Japanese supply lines over the Owen Stanley Range were bad to non-existent, of the remains of Australian soldiers being found that indicated cannibalism. I believe my Grandfather saw some evidence of that, though even 40 years on he was reluctant to go into details.
            sigpic

            Win nervously lose tragically - Reds C C

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            • #21
              IJA didn't do too well in Shanghai and flat out lost to the nationalists in Tai-er-zhuan. I am revisiting an old book and might add a few post after reading the relevant chapters.
              All those who are merciful with the cruel will come to be cruel to the merciful.
              -Talmud Kohelet Rabbah, 7:16.

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              • #22
                Originally posted by hboGYT View Post
                I never doubted that they would lose a lot of men. I would like to know how they would attack such a position?

                E.g. would they mass charge the enemy with bayonets?

                Would they try to press towards the enemy using fire and movement and smoke til they reach grenade range, where they would then clear out the enemy with grenade spam?

                Etc..

                Hypothetically, if you're in command of the entire Kwantung Army, and you're ordered to attack the Maginot Line head-on, how would you do it.



                Why didn't they just eat their fallen comrades?
                It would depend on the unit and its commander. The only real constant is they would attempt at night. In Singapore and the Philippines and in later Island battles they would often try infiltration to by-pass strong points. However the banzai charge is not a myth and many units impaled themselves on prepared defenses like it was 1915. An example is the Ichiki Detachments mass suicide at the Tenaru River.

                If I am commanding the KA and ordered to assault the Maginot Line I would use infiltration behind a covering barrage and hopefully pin point support from IJAAF dive bombers. It has at least a limited history of success such as at Verdun and may yield results similar to what happened to the forces commanded by Percivel and MacArthur. The problem is then what? Assuming I blow a hole wide enough to create a cordon through the line that is safe from enfilade fire from untaken forts I am now fixed to a single point when French mobile forces show up. As bad as Japanese armor did in Manchuria facing heavy French tanks is going to be a huge problem. I have nothing with a longer range than a flame thrower except artillery over open sites that can hurt a Char-B1bis even from the side.

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                • #23
                  Originally posted by zraver View Post
                  If I am commanding the KA and ordered to assault the Maginot Line I would use infiltration behind a covering barrage and hopefully pin point support from IJAAF dive bombers.
                  Hey Jason, really good to read you again.

                  Even this would be probamatic as Japanese artillery was never up to even WWI standards.

                  The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Artillery
                  Japanese Artillery

                  The Japanese were handicapped by a relatively weak industrial base that made it difficult to equip their army with large numbers of guns and howitzers. When the Army modernized its artillery in the period 1927-1937, it had to settle for relatively light 75mm guns and a few 105mm howitzers, because the 2000 artillery pieces required would have been beyond Japan's industrial capacity if they had been of heavier caliber. The lighter guns were also compatible with Japan's tactical doctrine, which emphasized lightning infantry thrusts supported by highly mobile artillery. Supplying the guns with adequate ammunition was also problematic: Production in 1936 was one-tenth the estimated wartime consumption, and artillery units suffered serious restrictions on live-fire training. In combat, artillery tended to be dispersed among supported units and deployed well forward, with an eye towards careful placement on favorable terrain, but communications were poor and coordinated fire uncommon.

                  The Japanese were fond of mortars, though most of these were smaller infantry mortars. Most infantry divisions had an artillery regiment equipped with 36 75mm howitzers or mountain guns. In a few of the better-equipped divisions, a third of these guns were replaced with 105mm howitzers. Independent mixed brigades typically had eight 75mm howitzers.
                  Chimo

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                  • #24
                    Originally posted by WABs_OOE View Post
                    Hey Jason, really good to read you again.

                    Even this would be probamatic as Japanese artillery was never up to even WWI standards.
                    That is interesting considering that Japanese naval artillery, minus antiaircraft guns, was excellent.
                    “Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it.”
                    Mark Twain

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                    • #25
                      Originally posted by Albany Rifles View Post
                      That is interesting considering that Japanese naval artillery, minus antiaircraft guns, was excellent.
                      Do you recall any mass IJN shore bombardment? Because aside from a few lone submarines on a terror strike, I can't name any.
                      Chimo

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                      • #26
                        Guadalcanal in 1942 ?

                        While the USN mostly prevented the IJN ships from performing the planned large-scale bombardment a couple cruisers did indeed succeed at shelling Henderson Airfield (without much effect).

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                        • #27
                          Originally posted by kato View Post
                          Guadalcanal in 1942 ?

                          While the USN mostly prevented the IJN ships from performing the planned large-scale bombardment a couple cruisers did indeed succeed at shelling Henderson Airfield (without much effect).
                          My thanks. I knew there must have been a few cases but as you stated ... without much effect ... that it escaped my mind.
                          Chimo

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                          • #28
                            Originally posted by kato View Post
                            Guadalcanal in 1942 ?

                            While the USN mostly prevented the IJN ships from performing the planned large-scale bombardment a couple cruisers did indeed succeed at shelling Henderson Airfield (without much effect).
                            There was also The Night Of The Battleships, also known simply as "The Bombardment", on October 13-14, when Kongo and Haruna hurled over 900 14-inch (356mm) shells at Henderson Field.

                            Captain Charles Kelly, the battalion executive officer, spent the night in the dugout with Puller and afterward said ‘there is nothing more demoralizing than naval gunfire–you can hear each round leave the ship and come in like a freight train.’

                            A Marine sergeant recorded in his diary: ‘I shook and trembled all through the first night, more afraid [for] my life than I’ve ever been before.’


                            Incidentally, it's been questioned why the Japanese didn't sent Yamato and/or Musashi down the slot and pulverize the Marines on Guadalcanal. The answers are threefold:

                            1. The Kongos were considered more "expendable" than the Yamatos
                            2. The Yamatos had an incredible fuel consumption rate
                            3. The Yamatos lacked a suitable land bombardment projectile for their 18.1-inch (460mm) guns.
                            “He was the most prodigious personification of all human inferiorities. He was an utterly incapable, unadapted, irresponsible, psychopathic personality, full of empty, infantile fantasies, but cursed with the keen intuition of a rat or a guttersnipe. He represented the shadow, the inferior part of everybody’s personality, in an overwhelming degree, and this was another reason why they fell for him.”

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                            • #29
                              Originally posted by TopHatter View Post
                              There was also The Night Of The Battleships, also known simply as "The Bombardment", on October 13-14, when Kongo and Haruna hurled over 900 14-inch (356mm) shells at Henderson Field.

                              Captain Charles Kelly, the battalion executive officer, spent the night in the dugout with Puller and afterward said ‘there is nothing more demoralizing than naval gunfire–you can hear each round leave the ship and come in like a freight train.’

                              A Marine sergeant recorded in his diary: ‘I shook and trembled all through the first night, more afraid [for] my life than I’ve ever been before.’


                              Incidentally, it's been questioned why the Japanese didn't sent Yamato and/or Musashi down the slot and pulverize the Marines on Guadalcanal. The answers are threefold:

                              1. The Kongos were considered more "expendable" than the Yamatos
                              2. The Yamatos had an incredible fuel consumption rate
                              3. The Yamatos lacked a suitable land bombardment projectile for their 18.1-inch (460mm) guns.
                              Yes, there were many bombardments of shore areas in the Solomons, especially at Guadalcanal as has been said. But there were other fights in Solomons where their destroyers and cruiser engaged US vessels.

                              But I was talking their ship to ship capability, which proved superior at the Java Sea and other areas.

                              What doomed them was poor antiaircraft guns.

                              BTW, at the time of the Guadalcanal the US Pacific Fleet had battleships available in the Pacific...I think the Idaho and one or two others but can't remember. But they too were fuel hogs and the USN did not have the fleet oilers to keep them forward into the fight.
                              “Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it.”
                              Mark Twain

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                              • #30
                                Missed you Colonel,

                                No amount of heavy artillery is going to break the Maginot Line unless the Japanese could somehow dismount Yamato's 18.1 guns and put them on railway carriages that could do plunging fire. Even that might not work. In WW1 the french forts at Verdun were impervious to the big German guns becuase of the way the french layered concrete and sand in a way the Belgians didn't. I don't see why the French would have down graded construction of the Maginot Line.

                                The Japanese would ahve to use what they have: night assault under cover of a smoke barrage to get infantry on to the fort with satchel charges and flame throwers. As daylight arrived IJAAF bombers could interdict French mobile forces and provide pinpoint dive bombing of French strong points to either side of the Japanese breech that were trying enfilade fire on the assault troops...

                                Would it work? I dunno, they did rather well in 41-42 against an enemy who did not understand how to counter infiltration and who under-estimated just how tenacious they were. Given the amount of French hubris regarding the Maginot line, and the weakness of the French air force its at least possible. Now dealing with Char 2B's and Souma's is another story altogether. Japan didn't have anything in their army that could deal with them.

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