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Thread: US Naval Forces assigned to Invasion of Japan in WW2

  1. #16
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    The problem is that if the japanese manage to sink the troopships, then banzai charges etc are a non event!

    That is the point I have been trying to make all along.

    OC

  2. #17
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    Quote Originally Posted by Old Codger39 View Post
    The problem is that if the japanese manage to sink the troopships, then banzai charges etc are a non event!

    That is the point I have been trying to make all along.

    OC
    And just how are the Japanese going to do that when the kamakazie can't even get a 3% hit ratio. Just because they're now aiming for the troopships instead of the carriers does not mean the AD screen is any less dense. If anything, the AD screen would even be thicker.

    I would not even count those 19 destroyers as a credible threat and Japanese submarines would have to contend with the ASW that sunk the kreigsmarine uboats.

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    Quote Originally Posted by astralis View Post
    the Japanese, on the other hand, had no idea of what the Americans could do given operational space of manuever.
    KETSU-GO is an invading maneuver army's wet dream. The IJA has zero concepts of battery operations, let alone corps or divisional level artillery groups. No fall back position. Stockpiling is their logistics. Zero concepts of LOCs. The Americans would have no need to fix the IJA in place. They would fix themselves.

    Hell, that's what the Kwantung Army did in AUGUST STORM. Didn't even bother to move when they found out that they were already enveloped and still tried to take on the fixing force.

  4. #19
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    "And just how are the Japanese going to do that when the kamakazie can't even get a 3% hit ratio. Just because they're now aiming for the troopships instead of the carriers does not mean the AD screen is any less dense. If anything, the AD screen would even be thicker."


    They do that by sending 500 kamikazis every hour against the troopships instead of the carriers, instead of 50 at a time every day. Not sure where you get the 3% from, can you give me a link?

  5. #20
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    "KETSU-GO is an invading maneuver army's wet dream. The IJA has zero concepts of battery operations, let alone corps or divisional level artillery groups. No fall back position. Stockpiling is their logistics. Zero concepts of LOCs. The Americans would have no need to fix the IJA in place"


    That invading army did OK in Manchuria, China, Malaya, and all of South East Asia. They even managed to get within sight of Port Moresby, and Guadalcanal in early 1942, well over 3000 kms from home. It was a "damned close run thing" up to that point.

    I realise you think you are a greater authority than the FAS, the IJA and the Japanese Command, but I have bad news for you! Perhaps you can tell me how YOU would have fought the final battle to defend your homeland given the constraints they were in fact facing at that time. They did not NEED LOCs on the island of Kyushu, they did not NEED logistics, they needed what they had already in place.

    Saipan cost 3000 US dead, Iwo Jima Cost 6000 US Dead and Okinawa cost 12,000 US dead all by in-place defenders, and if Kyushu cost 250,000 drowned US dead in the troopships the VOTERS would have thrown Truman out of the White House! The defenders did not NEED logistics or LOCs on Kyushu!

  6. #21
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    That invading army did OK in Manchuria, China, Malaya, and all of South East Asia. They even managed to get within sight of Port Moresby, and Guadalcanal in early 1942, well over 3000 kms from home. It was a "damned close run thing" up to that point.
    the Chinese Army wasn't a manuever force, and as for the rest, they were fighting against largely colonial police armies consisting of light infantry.

    the island battles you mention weren't battles of manuever warfare. given terrain and space constraints those were battles of attrition.

    Kyushu is indeed still an island but it's large enough to execute manuever warfare. the defenders would have been cut off, isolated, and overwhelmed.

    if Kyushu cost 250,000 drowned US dead in the troopships the VOTERS would have thrown Truman out of the White House!
    the war wouldn't have lasted until November 1948, let alone Jan 1949.

    if the US did take 250,000 KIA in invading Japan, the Japanese propaganda of "The Glorious Death of 100 million" would probably have become more accurate.
    There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

  7. #22
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    astralis,

    "the Chinese Army wasn't a manuever force, and as for the rest, they were fighting against largely colonial police armies consisting of light infantry.

    the island battles you mention weren't battles of manuever warfare. given terrain and space constraints those were battles of attrition.

    Kyushu is indeed still an island but it's large enough to execute manuever warfare. the defenders would have been cut off, isolated, and overwhelmed. "



    It did not have to be, Kyushu was the final battle to the death, and not only did the japanese correctly deduce that it was, but they also deduced just where the 2 most probable landing beaches were. The defenders were not planning on a vast battlefield like Nth Africa but a fight to the death on the coast, yes a "battle of attrition". AGAIN, I point out that main goal of the Japanese was to sink the troopships! The battle on the beach was to be with the survivors of that conflict! They had no intention to manouvre anywhere! Lines of communication were secondary.

    All that battle plan is clearly laid out in the 'Ketsu-Go' essay! And given that the troopships would have had maybe 3 to 5000 troops in each one the prize of 20 ships sunk would tip the balance, all invasion plans would have been out the window. The USA knew it was very possible, they did not mint 500,000 Purple Hearts for no reason!

  8. #23
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    PS,

    "the war wouldn't have lasted until November 1948, let alone Jan 1949."



    I do not understand this statement.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Old Codger39 View Post
    They do that by sending 500 kamikazis every hour against the troopships instead of the carriers, instead of 50 at a time every day. Not sure where you get the 3% from, can you give me a link?
    500 kamikazies an hour? It would take that long just to get 500 planes into the air and organize them into formation. If you're lucky, you may have a squadron leader who knows how to fly over open water and not get lost. If you're extremely lucky, you may have a division leader who can recognize ships. These kamakazies were not even train on how to handle a dive. Namely because the Japanese didn't have the time nor the dual seat trainer planes to train them to recognize the characteristics of a dive where the instructor can take over when they get into trouble.

    The number one reason why kamakazie was a failure was because the pilots could not steer the plane in a dive.

    As for the 3%, it's call the Marianas' Great Turkey shoot. The Battle of the Phillipine Seas had more kamakazie and greater Japanese capital ship concentration than KETSU-GO. And it was a turkey shoot.

    Quote Originally Posted by Old Codger39 View Post
    That invading army did OK in Manchuria, China, Malaya, and all of South East Asia.
    I was not refering to the IJA. The IJA was never a maneuver force but since you brought it up. They sucked in their attempt to invade Siberia in 1939 and were ripped to smithereens. They also didn't learn squat and got the lesson repeated to them in August, 1945.

    Quote Originally Posted by Old Codger39 View Post
    They even managed to get within sight of Port Moresby, and Guadalcanal in early 1942, well over 3000 kms from home. It was a "damned close run thing" up to that point.
    It wasn't. The Japanese were stretched beyond the breaking point. They might have occupied it for a week at the most and would have to run home right after. It looked that way from the defender's POV but the reality was far different.

    Quote Originally Posted by Old Codger39 View Post
    I realise you think you are a greater authority than the FAS, the IJA and the Japanese Command, but I have bad news for you!
    Hahahahahahahahahahahahaha. You seriously think the IJA and the Japanese High Command have more education than me? Especially since I have the hindsight of studying their mistakes. Do you think the IJA had any clue how to face two entire Soviet tank armies, 100,000+ men, armed with enough nukes to burn every capital in Europe? With only the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, ie 5000 men?

    Quote Originally Posted by Old Codger39 View Post
    Perhaps you can tell me how YOU would have fought the final battle to defend your homeland given the constraints they were in fact facing at that time.
    Unconditional Surrender. Yes, when the objective is no longer attainable and further fighting would only result in wasting my people, I will surrender. It's the job of the officer to take care of his men the best way he could. If surrendering saves their lives, then so be it.

    Now, would I have surrender to the Japanese? In the beginning of the war, I would have but not after the Bantan Death March. The objective in surrendering is to tie up as many Japanese troops as you can guarding you. Since they ain't going to bother to guard dead men, I might as well take as many of them with me as I could. Both have the same objectives, to deny the IJA as many men as you could at the front.

    Quote Originally Posted by Old Codger39 View Post
    They did not NEED LOCs on the island of Kyushu, they did not NEED logistics, they needed what they had already in place.
    You're showing your military ignorance. LOCs stands for Lines of Communications. Logistics is to get men and material to where you need them. It's great you have an entire platoon manning a machine gun nest but the fight is 10 miles that-a-way. Your 30 men, machine gun, and upteen 1000s rounds of ammo ain't contributing to the fight.

    Quote Originally Posted by Old Codger39 View Post
    Saipan cost 3000 US dead, Iwo Jima Cost 6000 US Dead and Okinawa cost 12,000 US dead all by in-place defenders, and if Kyushu cost 250,000 drowned US dead in the troopships the VOTERS would have thrown Truman out of the White House! The defenders did not NEED logistics or LOCs on Kyushu!
    Eric already pointed out your fallacy. I will point out another. The IJA didn't need to worry about Kyushu. They needed to worry about Hokkaido.
    Last edited by WABs_OOE; 13 Jun 19, at 20:31.

  10. #25
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    Quote Originally Posted by Old Codger39 View Post
    It did not have to be, Kyushu was the final battle to the death, and not only did the japanese correctly deduce that it was, but they also deduced just where the 2 most probable landing beaches were. The defenders were not planning on a vast battlefield like Nth Africa but a fight to the death on the coast, yes a "battle of attrition". AGAIN, I point out that main goal of the Japanese was to sink the troopships! The battle on the beach was to be with the survivors of that conflict! They had no intention to manouvre anywhere! Lines of communication were secondary.
    And what happens when the Americans decide not to land? Instead get their men off the beaches? And ready for another fight somewhere else.

    The Americans ain't the Japanese. Retreat is not an unknown concept. The Americans ain't coming onto the beaches in 1 wave. There would have been 3 waves. 1st to secure the beachhead, the 2nd to punch through, the third to establish the assembly area. If the Japanese somehow got throughso that the 1st wave was unattainable, there was absolutely zero reason why the Americans would not have withdrawn. If the first wave could not establish a beachhead, then shore bombardment would cover a retreat.

    Military concepts that were completely alien to the Japanese.

  11. #26
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    Quote Originally Posted by Old Codger39 View Post
    'Operation Olympic' would have been a disaster at Kyushu.

    https://fas.org/irp/eprint/arens/chap4.htm

    ....and other links on a Google search.

    OC
    Since this debate all began with this essay, let's go through it and see just how much the Japanese didn't know squat all about maneuver warfare.

    The strategy for Ketsu-Go was outlined in an 8 April 1945 Army Directive.(4) It stated that the Imperial Army would endeavor to crush the Americans while the invasion force was still at sea. They planned to deliver a decisive blow against the American naval force by initially destroying as many carriers as possible, utilizing the special attack forces of the Air Force and Navy. When the amphibious force approached within range of the homeland airbases, the entire air combat strength would be employed in continual night and day assaults against these ships. In conducting the air operations, the emphasis would be on the disruption of the American landing plans. The principal targets were to be the troop and equipment transports. Those American forces which succeeded in landing would be swiftly attacked by the Imperial Army in order to seek the decisive victory. The principal objective of the land operation was the destruction of the American landing force on the beach.
    First off, OC got it wrong. The Japanese were going after the carriers first. They were not husbanding their resources to attack the transports. Essentially, they want to reduce the AD screen as much as possible. There's the #1` flaw with this thinking and it should have been obvious since Yamato made the same decision at Midway. When the IJN lost their carriers at Midway, they abandoned the invasion of Midway. Why would the Americans not do the same.

    There comes the 2nd problem. The Americans could replace their losses. The Japanese could not. The Atlantic Fleets were being transferred to the Pacific.

    Thus, there is very little possiblity of the Japanese reducing American air superiority by any significant amount.

    Thirdly, KETSU-GO ain't no Atlantic Wall. While correct in their assesement that the battle must be fought on the beaches, dug outs and sandbags ain't no replacement for concrete. Also, no long range artillery to challenge the USN 15 inch guns is damned detrimental to defence. While USN battleships may not be accurate enough to take out dug in artillery position, 15 inch shells landing all around you are going to cripple the entire crew for minutes; more than enough time for the Marines to storm the position.

    Ketsu-Go operation was designed as an all-out joint defense effort to be conducted by the entire strengths of the Army, Navy and Air Force. In the various orders and directives issued by IGHQ regarding Ketsu-Go, inter-service cooperation was stressed.(5) The basic plan for the operation called for the Navy to defend the coasts by attacking the invasion fleets with its combined surface, submarine, and air forces. The Air General Army would cooperate closely with the Navy in locating the American transports and destroying them at sea. Should the invasion force succeed in making a landing, the Area Army concerned would assume command of all naval ground forces in its area and would exercise operational control of air forces in support of ground operations. An integral part of the Ketsu-Go operational planning included reinforcement of sectors under attack by units transferred from other districts. Since U.S. air raids had already seriously disrupted the transportation system, time schedules were planned to provide for all troop movements to be made by foot.(6) If the battle at the beach showed no prospect of a successful ending, then the battle would inevitably shift to inland warfare; hence, interior resistance would be planned. Guard units and Civilian Defense Corps personnel, with elements of field forces acting as a nucleus, would be employed as interior resistance troops. Their mission would be to attrite the Americans through guerrilla warfare, espionage, deception, disturbance of supply areas, and blockading of supplies when enemy landing forces advanced inland. It is interesting to note that the Japanese normally exercised little inter-service coordination throughout the war. Now when the homeland was threatened, the Japanese finally stressed inter-service coordination and unity of command.
    As I stated beforfe, Japanese logistics was human mules.

    But what more than jumps out at me is that the Japanese right here had no hope stopping an American landing. There's no mention of bringing in a fresh army should the defence fail. Yeah, they mention the decisive battle on the beaches but no means of ensuring it. Compare this to the planning of Kursk. Three lines, each as tough as the others and on top of that, the Soviets held in reserves an entire tank army ready to attack any breakthrough.

    One line. If it collapsed, fall back to guerrilla warefare.

    And testing out a combined HQ in the middle of a battle? Yeah, good luck with that one.

    The completion of defensive preparations in Kyushu was of the greatest urgency as the initial U.S. attack was almost certain to be directed at that island. Its defense was also the most difficult of all the districts, as Kyushu had the greatest length of vulnerable sea coast to defend.(13) Since it was generally conceded that the U.S. would make initial landings in Kyushu, the Sixteenth Area Army had been given priority in the receipt of supplies and in the build-up of troop strength. Fortification construction had also been emphasized and, in general, preparations were further advanced in Kyushu than in other areas of Japan.
    This speaks volumnes. The Japanese conceded that they could not stop an American landing.

    The defensive concept called for each army to hold one division in reserve. In the event of an invasion, the Sixteenth Area Army would concentrate a force composed principally of the armies' reserve divisions and the three tank brigades. This force would then be utilized as an assault group to be rushed to the area of the main American effort. Their mission would be to annihilate the American forces as soon after the initial landings as possible. The defensive plan called for a major counterattack to be delivered within two weeks of the initial American landings.(15) As stated by a Japanese officer, the object of the defense was "to frustrate the enemy's landing plans with a counterattack like an electric shock, and at the proper moment to annihilate the enemy by close-range fire,
    The counter-attack was supposed to happen within 2 weeks. Are you freaking shitting me? You have 24 hours before the Americans land armour. This should have been known right after Saipan and Okinawa.

    by throwing hand grenades, and by hand-to-hand combat."(16) Groups assigned to coastal defense were to contain the enemy, while reserve troops were being concentrated for the decisive battle or, in some cases, hold out for long periods of time until a decisive battle was won in some other area and permit the release of strength for a counterattack in the sector being held.(17)
    The problem with CQB is that you have to get close. Essentially, the banzai bayonet charge. No one is impressed but as I stated before, the IJA was the best WWI Army in WWII. And their thinking reflect as much, that you could survive an artillery barrage if you're dug in but ignoring the fact that you're useless for a few minutes after.

    Having no way to counter U.S. air power, every effort would be made to confuse the battle lines so as to prevent the use of naval gunfire and air power to support the ground troops. The advances of the mobile reserves would be accomplished under cover of darkness for protection from aircraft.(18)
    Shows the IJA had zero concept of a grid.

    The production, movement and distribution of supplies was one of the most important aspects of the defense preparations on Kyushu.(20) Preparations included the storing of munitions in caves and other underground shelters to protect them from air raids and naval bombardment. The original Japanese plan called for the supplying of each division with one campaign unit of fire, and by July 1945 this quantity was actually in the possession of the area armies. One campaign unit of fire was sufficient ammunition for one campaign - generally understood to be a three month supply.(21) This called for the following rounds per weapon: 1,000 rounds per field piece, 25,000 rounds per machine gun, and 240 rounds per rifle.(22) However, by August 1945 with the greatly increased number of troops, it was necessary to reduce ammunition stocks to a one-half unit of fire for each unit (about 1 1/2 months). This reduction in ammunition supplies made it necessary to adjust supply plans for the high priority areas and to plan for the rapid transfer of ammunition from one area to another when the invasion was actually launched and the place and direction of attack had been determined.(23) The Japanese were preparing and may have been able to bring their ammunition supplies back up to the three month level given the amount of time between August and November.
    Since an army is tied to its logistics, this clearly shows that the Americans would not need a fixing force. The IJA had fixed themselves in place.

    Air operations against American landings on Kyushu were to be the responsibility of the 5th Naval Air Fleet and 6th Air Army, both under the control of the Air General Army. They had airfields throughout Kyushu, Shikoku and Chugoku. Fields in southern Kyushu which were being attacked almost daily had been abandoned as bases and were only to be employed for staging suicide missions. Their plan called for the neutralization of as many transports as possible as the American fleet approached the shores of Japan. If landings were made, the air forces would conduct operations to sever supply lines to facilitate the fighting of the ground forces. Planes were to be released in waves of 300-400, at the rate of one wave per hour, against the invasion fleet. Sufficient fuel had been stored for this use, but only about 8,000 pilots were available.(24) Although the pilots were poorly trained and no match against experienced American pilots, they were capable enough to carry out suicide attacks against ships. At the end of the war, Japan had approximately 12,725 planes. The Army had 5,651 and the Navy had 7,074 aircraft of all types.(25) While many of these were not considered combat planes, almost all were converted into kamikaze planes. The Japanese were planning to train enough pilots to use all of the aircraft that were capable of flying.
    Damned amateur prep work. The requirements are the same whether for kamikaze pilots or veteran combat pilots. You need to penetrate the AD screen in order to get to a target. Kamakaze pilots were damned amateurs know nothing pilots. They don't know how to dodge or weave through incoming fire or to evade enemy CAP. Essentially, this is the air version of the banzai charge. There is some merit to the banzai charge. It takes a cold hearted bastard to ignore all but one crazy Japanese bastard, shoot him, and then calmly acquire another target. By the end of the war, everyone was a cold hearted bastard.

    For the banzai infantry charge, all you really need is adrenaline. Unfortunately for the kamakazie, adrenaline ain't hydrolics. Most of these planes don't have it and in a dive, the plane can't steer. It takes a very well trained pilot to control the dive in a shallower angle.

    Unfortunately for the Japanese, they were unaware of this lack of training since there was no such thing as a kamakazie veteran but no one had bothered to ask why the kamakazie were so ineffective.

    Medium and heavy artillery were to cover the landing craft approaches, the beaches, and plains areas surrounding the beaches. Plans for the employment of artillery seemed to combine the beach defense tactics employed on Saipan with some of the fixed defense plans employed on Iwo Jima.(29) Coastal defense and artillery batteries were to withhold their fire until landing craft came in range. However, there was no centralized control or fire-direction of the coast defense and artillery batteries.(30) The Japanese considered the massing of fires a waste of ammunition. Each artillery position was to remain in place conducting fires independently until destroyed. Artillery and mortar units were to be emplaced generally on the reverse slope of the first ridges inland from the beach and in caves further inland. The priority for employment of mortars was beach defense.
    I can't even believe this. This lesson was taught all the way back to the Napoleonic Wars. Artillery is an area weapon and mass fire is the idea. The Japanese had observers watching the devastating effect katyshusa had on German troops and they think individual guns could do better.

    Now, I have been writing from the POV that these lessons were inflicted on the Japanese. it was not unknown intelligence but Japanese arrogance had always been a problem with After Action Reports and Evals.

    Even the idea of the fixing force was not new as Zhukov slaughtered an entire Japanese army in 1939 proving it. That lesson remained unlearned in August, 1945.
    Last edited by WABs_OOE; 14 Jun 19, at 21:11.

  12. #27
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    • Originally Posted by Old Codger39
    They do that by sending 500 kamikazis every hour against the troopships instead of the carriers, instead of 50 at a time every day. Not sure where you get the 3% from, can you give me a link?


    500 kamikazies an hour? It would take that long just to get 500 planes into the air and organize them into formation. If you're lucky, you may have a squadron leader who knows how to fly over open water and not get lost. If you're extremely lucky, you may have a division leader who can recognize ships. These kamakazies were not even train on how to handle a dive. Namely because the Japanese didn't have the time nor the dual seat trainer planes to train them to recognize the characteristics of a dive where the instructor can take over when they get into trouble.
    I have had a chat to my near Commercial Pilots licence nephew about that and he tells me that a pilot with maybe 3 to 5 hours solo CAN manage to take off, set a course to a general area in the ocean, and dive his plane into a ship. These guys were intelligent enough to qualify that far and most of us not brain dead know the difference between a passenger ship, an aircraft carrier, and a destroyer. It really in not all that hard!

    The number one reason why kamakazie was a failure was because the pilots could not steer the plane in a dive.
    See Above! They failed because they had a zillion shells in the air!


    As for the 3%, it's call the Marianas' Great Turkey shoot. The Battle of the Phillipine Seas had more kamakazie and greater Japanese capital ship concentration than KETSU-GO. And it was a turkey shoot.
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall An even better essay than the FAS one.
    Capital ships and CVs are NOT in this scenario. And I still cannot see the source for your 3%.





    Originally Posted by Old Codger39
    That invading army did OK in Manchuria, China, Malaya, and all of South East Asia.

    I was not refering to the IJA. The IJA was never a maneuver force but since you brought it up. They sucked in their attempt to invade Siberia in 1939 and were ripped to smithereens. They also didn't learn squat and got the lesson repeated to them in August, 1945.

    Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa were NOT manoeuvre actions they were kill or be killed in the dugouts battles. Kyushu was to be the same. The Japanese had NIL intention of moving anywhere from where they were and that they would die there, just like Okinawa etc.

    Originally Posted by Old Codger39
    They even managed to get within sight of Port Moresby, and Guadalcanal in early 1942, well over 3000 kms from home. It was a "damned close run thing" up to that point.

    It wasn't. The Japanese were stretched beyond the breaking point. They might have occupied it for a week at the most and would have to run home right after. It looked that way from the defender's POV but the reality was far different.
    Come off I, t the US took SIX months to defeat them at Guadalcanal! And the Kokoda Track took about the same. Both were at the very limit of their ‘Lines of Communication’.

    Originally Posted by Old Codger39
    I realise you think you are a greater authority than the FAS, the IJA and the Japanese Command, but I have bad news for you!


    Hahahahahahahahahahahahaha. You seriously think the IJA and the Japanese High Command have more education than me? Especially since I have the hindsight of studying their mistakes.

    Do you think the IJA had any clue how to face two entire Soviet tank armies, 100,000+ men, armed with enough nukes to burn every capital in Europe? With only the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, ie 5000 men?
    Your education has not impressed me so far! And yet again you are comparing apples with oranges, It was to ALL about Iwo Jima type warfare!

    " armed with enough nukes to burn every capital in Europe?"

    Russia had nulkes in 1945 I thought it was 1949?


    Originally Posted by Old Codger39
    Perhaps you can tell me how YOU would have fought the final battle to defend your homeland given the constraints they were in fact facing at that time.


    Unconditional Surrender. Yes, when the objective is no longer attainable and further fighting would only result in wasting my people,
    Amazing, Japan had NIL intention of surrendering, certainly not without saving the Emporer, only for dying for the Emporer and their country! Why the hell do you think they went to all that trouble of boosting Kyushu for a final battle? They INTENDED to die, ALL of them!

    I will surrender. It's the job of the officer to take care of his men the best way he could. If surrendering saves their lives, then so be it.
    See above, the officers intended to die also remember, just like Iwo Jima!

    Now, would I have surrender to the Japanese? In the beginning of the war, I would have but not after the Bantan Death March. The objective in surrendering is to tie up as many Japanese troops as you can guarding you. Since they ain't going to bother to guard dead men, I might as well take as many of them with me as I could. Both have the same objectives, to deny the IJA as many men as you could at the front.
    I am again amazed, I have never seen being taken prisoner being viewed as such. The soldier had NIL to do with his fate or his effect on the enemy. I had a friend that was a POW in Germany, he told, me the worst part about it all was the first few minutes when he never knew if he was was going to be shot or not. Many were on both sides.

    Originally Posted by Old Codger39
    They did not NEED LOCs on the island of Kyushu, they did not NEED logistics, they needed what they had already in place.


    You're showing your military ignorance. LOCs stands for Lines of Communications.

    Knew that, but LOC is easier to type, like you do. And try very hard to keep a civil tongue in your head! Your tone damages your cred.


    Logistics is to get men and material to where you need them. It's great you have an entire platoon manning a machine gun nest but the fight is 10 miles that-a-way. Your 30 men, machine gun, and upteen 1000s rounds of ammo ain't contributing to the fight.
    Iwo Jima etc had NIL need to go chasing the enemy, they were a few yards away! And died there!

    Originally Posted by Old Codger39
    Saipan cost 3000 US dead, Iwo Jima Cost 6000 US Dead and Okinawa cost 12,000 US dead all by in-place defenders, and if Kyushu cost 250,000 drowned US dead in the troopships the VOTERS would have thrown Truman out of the White House! The defenders did not NEED logistics or LOCs on Kyushu!
    Eric already pointed out your fallacy. I will point out another. The IJA didn't need to worry about Kyushu. They needed to worry about Hokkaido.

    SIGH! KYUSHU was to be the first and final battle of the home islands. Failure there meant a ‘Conditional Surrender’ retaining the Emporer, which ended up happening anyway! And Russia had nothing to do with it!



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    • Today, 05:08 #25
    WABs_OOE

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    Originally Posted by Old Codger39
    It did not have to be, Kyushu was the final battle to the death, and not only did the japanese correctly deduce that it was, but they also deduced just where the 2 most probable landing beaches were. The defenders were not planning on a vast battlefield like Nth Africa but a fight to the death on the coast, yes a "battle of attrition". AGAIN, I point out that main goal of the Japanese was to sink the troopships! The battle on the beach was to be with the survivors of that conflict! They had no intention to manouvre anywhere! Lines of communication were secondary.

    And what happens when the Americans decide not to land? Instead get their men off the beaches? And ready for another fight somewhere else.


    The Americans ain't the Japanese. Retreat is not an unknown concept. The Americans ain't coming onto the beaches in 1 wave. There would have been 3 waves. 1st to secure the beachhead, the 2nd to punch through, the third to establish the assembly area. If the Japanese somehow got throughso that the 1st wave was unattainable, there was absolutely zero reason why the Americans would not have withdrawn. If the first wave could not establish a beachhead, then shore bombardment would cover a retreat.
    Military concepts that were completely alien to the Japanese.

    The Japanese at that time only had ONE “military concept’ and that was to die fighting on Kyushu! Sorry but I cannot imagine the Americans doing a ’Dynamo’.

  13. #28
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    Sorry members, i have run out of patience.

    Far too much repetitive typing etc. I am going cross-eyed with it.

    My opponent is now BLOCKED!

    OC

  14. #29
    Senior Contributor Bigfella's Avatar
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    OC,

    Can I suggest you learn how to use the quote function. Without it your posts are very difficult to follow. If you have question just ask, it is very easy.

    On the more general issue, blocking the Colonel may reduce your irritation, but it will also hinder your education. In addition to being extremely well read he spent his professional life training to do (and actually doing some of) the things he is discussing. That might not guarantee that he is correct on 100% of occasions, but it gives him a fair head start on those of us just relying on reading stuff.


    Win nervously lose tragically - Reds C C

  15. #30
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    Yeah, whatever, I've already torn apart KETSU-GO. Your nephew is extremely wrong. Anyone who studied the Battles of Coral Seas and Midway saw just how hard it was to locate enemy ships.

    And yeah, there were a billion shells in the air. What the hell did you think I was talking about when I said AD screens? More than that, they were proxmity fused shells from the AAA. Near misses were good enough to bring down Japanese planes.

    I strongly suggest you look at the size of Saipan, Okinawa, Guadal Canal and compare them to Kyushu. If you can't tell the difference, then you're as thick as the Japanese. Die-In-Place is a wonderful saying to put on your tombstone but does nothing to stop an enemy usinjg Deep Battle and Air Interdiction from marching down your capital. All DIP guarrantes is that you DIP.

    Yes, there is a very obvious maneuver force you ignore - paratroopers and air resupply. The BIA killed an entire Japanese army defending an area no bigger than two tenis courts.

    You want to tout the Japanese could have won? I already pointed out the flaws at KETSU-GO. I've also pointed out that OLYMPIC was obsolete mainly because of AUGUST STORM and Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Op OLYMPIC no longer needed to fight through an opposed landing. They would nuke the beach open. And the Japanese are now divided into 2 fronts. The Soviets were posed to invade Hokkado.

    As for putting me on block, that's your prorgative but you still have not shown anything that could stand up to an American maneuver force on the openned spaces of Kyushu.

    And let me clue you in on Deep Battle. In classical combat litterature, it takes 3 men to attack 1 entrenched man. So, an even fight between an attacker and defender would be 3 to 1. In Deep Battle, I use 1 man (my fixing force) to make sure your man doesn't move and I send my other two men (my enveloplment forces) around you to attack your rear. I don't give a damn if you're going to DIP. I give a damn that you're not going to move so that 66 percent of my force would go around you and since you're camped with all your gear and all your supplies in that shit hole you dug, you just lost the battle. You want to Die-In-Place. I want to fix you in place. You just did half my job for me.

    What's more, even if you do decide to move, you're foot infantry. I'm a tank army. I would be hitting your rear before you can even pack up your shit hole.

    I keep point out actual combat operations that were tested against the Japanese and the Japanese came up short, real short and you keep presenting a plan that does not even reflect the actual combat history the Japanese had faced and ignored and now, you're trying to tell this board that you know the Japanese would win? Not likely.

    But you're not going to read this which is fine but it does show to other members why KETSU-GO was a disaster waiting to happen.
    Last edited by WABs_OOE; 15 Jun 19, at 07:10.

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