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  • Originally posted by Funtastic View Post
    Just like the Dali lama wants to return to China, so will Taiwan be begging China for reunification therefore you should forget about including her in the mix for a workable counter balanceto China
    India does not consider Taiwan reliable in such an endeavour. Singapore however did participate in the naval get together in 2007, the quad became the squad : D

    And it was not me that suggested Taiwan, read the thread
    Last edited by Double Edge; 10 Dec 17,, 01:26.

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    • Good read, loaded with sources

      THE RISE, FALL, AND REBIRTH OF THE ‘QUAD’ | WOTR | Nov 16 2017

      Comment


      • Diplomatic Notes? Are they freaking serious? China aims to kill this quad with diplomatic notes.

        Again, this is nothing more than a dog and pony show. I can't speak for 10-20 years down the line because that is too far to predict with any certainty and I guarrantee you that whatever plans you have made today would be bastardized into an unrecognizable form.

        If the Chinese are serious about killing this quad, they would ban companies from doing business in China that are making systems for this "quad" as the gesture of displeasure.
        Chimo

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        • what is this quad quad

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          • Originally posted by WABs_OOE View Post
            Diplomatic Notes? Are they freaking serious? China aims to kill this quad with diplomatic notes.
            This time China's reaction is sure go ahead. None of the usual histrionics

            If China wants to kill this thing best way is to behave themselves. Take away the need for anti-china groupings

            Nobody has any illusions to their 'peaceful rise' in 2017 any longer. You could say that assertion was already in question as early as 2007

            Again, this is nothing more than a dog and pony show. I can't speak for 10-20 years down the line because that is too far to predict with any certainty and I guarrantee you that whatever plans you have made today would be bastardized into an unrecognizable form.

            If the Chinese are serious about killing this quad, they would ban companies from doing business in China that are making systems for this "quad" as the gesture of displeasure.
            How much pressure can China bring to bear this time remains to be seen and whether it will be effective.

            The quad didn't get much of a start the last time. Abe resigned in 2007, India was facing opposition from the commies that were part of the coalition and Rudd pulled Australia out unilaterally. Last time India was the odd man out. This time it is Australia. People look at this second coming and think its still 2007 and then question sustainability

            But they will learn from last times lessons, note how member countries go out of their way to state it isn't about containing China

            US looks at it from a military angle, India is looking at it from an economic and strategic angle. The other two see it as a get together to discuss China's latest moves and how to counter them, mostly economic and diplomatic. Lots to discuss.

            These four ideally form anchors in their respective regions to which smaller powers with similar idea can then join.
            Last edited by Double Edge; 10 Dec 17,, 13:34.

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            • Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
              These four ideally form anchors in their respective regions to which smaller powers with similar idea can then join.
              The only anchors of this quad of significance to the Chinese are Japan and the US. India and Australia are too far away to be of significance except as a flag waving support to Chinese hostilities.

              Again, the only possible alliance that sound air raid sirens in Beijing is a Taiwan-South Korea-Japan coalition. For the forseeable future, China cannot threaten Indian and Australian Maritime spheres of influence. Hell, Snakeheads is more of a threat than the China Navy.

              I simply do not see the signifcance of this quad except to stroke some egos in Dehli. Militarily, the Japan-Australia-US angle and by extension Canadian and British naval projections are the only ones that can produce the task forces needed to sink the China Navy.
              Chimo

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              • Originally posted by WABs_OOE View Post
                The only anchors of this quad of significance to the Chinese are Japan and the US. India and Australia are too far away to be of significance except as a flag waving support to Chinese hostilities.

                Again, the only possible alliance that sound air raid sirens in Beijing is a Taiwan-South Korea-Japan coalition. For the forseeable future, China cannot threaten Indian and Australian Maritime spheres of influence. Hell, Snakeheads is more of a threat than the China Navy.

                I simply do not see the signifcance of this quad except to stroke some egos in Dehli. Militarily, the Japan-Australia-US angle and by extension Canadian and British naval projections are the only ones that can produce the task forces needed to sink the China Navy.
                Military is the last resort. Think about what comes before and whether military is even required. 95% of the time great powers don't have to occupy smaller powers, that is messy and as we've seen unpredictable. smaller powers can absorb quite a lot of force too. Nobody really wants to fight either. But everybody is looking to gain whatever leverage for a rainy day

                No, what the great powers do is impose costs on the smaller ones. They do not tell smaller powers what to do but if the smaller ones do something they don't like there is a penalty.

                The CCP is very sensitive to how they are considered abroad, appear very thin skinned. The moment countries start supporting each other with statements against China then things start to turn in Beijing. If CCP wants to win without firing shots then they are also susceptible to the same

                If China wants to take out Japan, all they need is to get the Americans to agree to a G2. That is the beginning of a condominium at which point whatever treaty between the US & Japan, Taiwan & korea becomes worthless. Obama did talk about this back in 2009 and then did a u-turn. That chance was missed

                This military alliance with the US might be everything you say it is but if the US doesn't have the will to step in then China wins. This then will create instability as others will not accept this fait accompli and try to restore the earlier status quo. What is hardest to predict here is how others behave when its becomes more clear that the old order is crumbling and about to go away

                Just look at NK, this is a hostage situation. NK has been holding korea & Japan hostage for years and is now at the point where it is threatening their protector.
                Last edited by Double Edge; 10 Dec 17,, 16:18.

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                • Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
                  Just look at NK, this is a hostage situation. NK has been holding korea & Japan hostage for years and is now at the point where it is threatening their protector.
                  Exactly. Look at NK. It is still not enough to get a South Korean-Japan Coalition. What are the odds that this quad is going to step up against China?
                  Chimo

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                  • They don't hate each other ?

                    Am counting on a reduced US role here, without the US the distance between partners becomes more important.

                    There are some who think China can't be contained and therefore any attempts to do so are futile. Strikes me as defeatist. If the Soviets could be contained what makes China an exception. People can talk about economy all they want but security comes first.

                    What are China's plans for the region. What does their version of a rules based order for the region entail. Everything right now is premised on fear.
                    Last edited by Double Edge; 10 Dec 17,, 18:22.

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                    • Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
                      They don't hate each other ?
                      But they are of little use. Japanese and American OK in this is not enough. Without access to Korean and Taiwanese spheres of control, this quad won't be of any use and not of Chinese concern.

                      India needs her own String of Pearls to confront China and she's not going to get it.

                      Wheras Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are the American String of Pearls. Actually, tiger traps.
                      Chimo

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                      • Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
                        They don't hate each other ?

                        Am counting on a reduced US role here, without the US the distance between partners becomes more important.

                        There are some who think China can't be contained and therefore any attempts to do so are futile. Strikes me as defeatist. If the Soviets could be contained what makes China an exception. People can talk about economy all they want but security comes first.

                        What are China's plans for the region. What does their version of a rules based order for the region entail. Everything right now is premised on fear.
                        Korea and Taiwan dislike Japan intensely and Idoubt very much whether they support Japan in her territorial disputes with China

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                        • Originally posted by Funtastic View Post
                          Korea and Taiwan dislike Japan intensely and Idoubt very much whether they support Japan in her territorial disputes with China
                          I meant India, Australia, Japan & the US don't hate each other. That is the primary stumbling point with the a Japan - Taiwan - ROK nexus

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by anil View Post
                            what is this quad quad
                            How to Push Back against an Aggressive China: Enter the 'Quad' | National Interest | Feb 05 2015

                            "If Asia wants to give peace a chance—it could be time to give the Quad another chance."
                            James Jay Carafano
                            February 5, 2015

                            Face it. China is a problem. Nations across the Pacific and Asia are looking for constructive solutions. And that’s the promise of a Quad Dialogue—a forum for developing cooperative, synchronized policies among India, Australia, Japan and the United States.

                            Start with the facts. China's economic policies are increasingly mercantilist. It is developing military capabilities to exclude others from operating in Asia. Beijing is no friend of democracy. From a Chinese perspective, all these initiatives might make sense: they are reconstructing a world that looks like the Middle Kingdom. The rest of the world, however, would probably prefer to live in the 21st century.

                            China is going to be China. That's not going to change anytime soon. So unless the nations that have the power to punish bad behavior and take constructive steps, the neighborhood is going to get worse for everybody.

                            It’s past time to do something positive.

                            Interest in a four-way dialogue between India, Australia, Japan and the United States enjoyed a brief flurry of attention during the Bush administration. It quickly died, partly out of concern about antagonizing China. More fundamentally, there was no strong sense of common cause among the four powers.

                            When Barack Obama took over the Oval Office, the administration placed its bet on the Asian Pivot, the idea that refocusing American military, economic and diplomatic attention on the region would be enough to balance China.

                            Obama's pivot came up short. The crises in the Middle East and the Ukraine both showed that the United States cannot focus the preponderance of its power on Asia without engendering serious risk in other strategically important parts of the world. Further, as a practical matter, the pivot has had zero positive impact on China. Perhaps the best example of that is China's policy toward Hong Kong. Beijing has pretty much cast aside its commitments to honor the Basic Law that protected Hong Kong's status, and China doesn't seem to care what the United States or any other country thinks about that.

                            When it comes to working with China, Mr. Obama has hit a dead end. Meanwhile, recognition is growing in the capitals of India, Australia and Japan that there is common cause in addressing how China elbows its neighbors. Further, the nations of the Quad now instinctively share a common vision. Determining the future of Asia is not the birthright of any nation—least of all China.

                            If Asia wants to give peace a chance—it could be time to give the Quad another chance.

                            The Quad foundered last time before there was any coherent expression of what it should be. Part of bringing the Quad back will require a foundation of principles to get the dialogue off the ground.

                            First, the dialogue should focus exclusively on two issues—ensuring the freedom of the commons (air, seas, space and cyberspace) and establishing a common approach to resolving territorial disputes. Freedom of the commons and the peaceful resolution of territorial claims are the grease that can best keep the friction caused by China's expectations in check.

                            Second, the dialogue ought to remain a dialogue. There is no need for a formal strategy. Containing China and balancing China, for example, are wasteful and unproductive notions. Nor is there any need for all the baggage of a formal alliance. The Quad will happen if the four countries can view China from a common perspective. That is enough to make it work. If they can't, then this project doesn't have a prayer in the first place.

                            Third, the Quad dialogue shouldn't act like an exclusive club. The goal of the Quad is that all peaceable nations of Asia are equal, with the right to chart their own course without being dictated to by any overlord. There are many forums for dialogue and cooperation in Asia. The Quad should complement, not subvert or replace them. Remaining active and constructive participants in all these venues is part of what makes the Quad valuable.

                            Fourth, the objective of the Quad is simple: to promote a sustainable, liberal order that makes sense, that does not advantage some nations at the expense of others. Creating such a system, however, is not an end to itself. Relationships built on fair dealing and international norms serve little purpose unless the relationships also assure remedial action when bad actors don't play by the rules. That's the job of the Quad: to cry foul when China doesn't play fair and do something about it.

                            Fifth, the Quad works only if its members are voices worth listening to. Each nation has to remain a net-provider of free-market economic growth, free and open civil society and responsible security.

                            Sixth, be prepared to argue with China. Beijing will take every opportunity to paint the Quad as a threat to China. The Quad has to be prepared to defend itself and its actions. In this way, it will earn Beijing’s grudging respect. If the Quad doesn't stand behind what it says, there is little chance China will give it any more respect than Obama's pivot.


                            The Heritage Foundation’s E. W. Richardson Fellow, James Jay Carafano is also vice president, overseeing the think tank’s research on issues of national security and foreign affairs.
                            Better question is why quad. because the current configuration doesn't help to check Chinese assertiveness. The defense treaties only militarily protect, Japan, Korea, Taiwan & Australia. Well there are a lot of gaps in there that China exploits across many dimensions that those agreements do not address. So the big idea here is to come up with a consistent framework for like minded parties across the region to deal with China.

                            How America and Its Indo-Pacific Allies Will Redefine Regional Security | National Interest | Nov 10 2017

                            From the perspective of threats—as well as interests—the region will clearly be front and center in American global security strategy.
                            James Jay Carafano
                            November 10, 2017

                            Even before Trump headed off on his Asian grand tour, the shape of things to come started to emerge. The present administration’s foreign policy will place adequate emphasis on Europe and the Middle East, but America won’t be pivoting away from the Asia-Pacific.

                            Meanwhile, the region presents more challenges than ever. An emerging China is increasingly upsetting the status-quo; North Korea remains as rambunctious as ever, and transnational Islamist terror threats appear ever-present. How the administration manages these problems will go a long way toward determining our status as an Asian power.

                            A bit of chaos creates opportunity. America has an unprecedented opening to shape the future security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region—and Trump is likely to take advantage of the opportunity.


                            Too Many Architects, Not Enough Builders

                            Multinational forums festoon the nations of the Indo-Pacific like umbrellas in a Mary Poppins dance line. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) includes ten countries. Its East Asia Summit adds the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Australia, India and New Zealand. The Beijing-sponsored Shanghai Cooperation Organization consists of eight states, including recently added India and Pakistan. There is also the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), which does not include the United States, and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which does not include Europe. China’s last Belt and Road forum brought together the heads of twenty-nine states, from the Far East to Western Europe. And, the list goes on.

                            All these regional organizations and gatherings provide plenty of forums for debate and discussion, but none offers any foundation for building regional peace and security. Something is missing.

                            No existing regional multinational organization includes every regional player or covers the spectrum of political, economic, environmental and security issues that concern the Indo-Pacific community. More importantly, none can reconcile China’s drive for regional dominance, U.S. presence as an Asian power, European economic power, and a long list of nations who have no interest in being covered by Beijing’s shadow.

                            An effective security framework might help manage the competing forces that will determine the future of Asia. Building multinational frameworks that can handle such tough tasks, however, is easier said than done.

                            In times of trouble during the Cold War, the United States tried to erect a series of security frameworks to corral the Soviet Union. Only NATO endured—and for good reason. Michael Doran’s Ike’s Gamble, explains that the U.S.-sponsored Central Treaty Organization imploded because Washington failed to fully understand the interests and goals of players it tried to recruit to the cause. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization failed for similar reasons. Security architectures are durable only if nations share sufficient interests, a common appreciation of threats, and the ability to sustain these interests over time.

                            It is premature and presumptive to predict exactly what the framework of Asian security might look like. On the other hand, all the building blocks needed are already there.


                            Asia’s America

                            Perhaps the safest bet one could make about the future security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region is that it will include America as a regional power. Trump didn’t plan a twelve-day Asian swing because of a yen to travel abroad. Rather, he has undertaken the trip to make clear his personal support for the “pillars of the U.S. presence and explain what they mean in terms of policy.”

                            For starters, the administration has marked Asia as one of three regions of vital interest to the United States. America can’t afford to see large-scale destabilization in any of these parts of the world. That is key premise in the emerging strategy of the Trump team.

                            Further, the administration’s view of top threats are remarkably consistent with those of the two previous presidents. All have identified as primary concerns: Russia’s destabilizing influence in Western Europe, Iran’s meddling in the Middle East, managing competition with China in Asia, the danger of war and nuclear proliferation from North Korea, and the danger of transnational Islamist terrorism. The only major change in threat assessment is that the Trump administration rates transnational criminal activity as a higher concern. These criminal networks operate not just in the Western Hemisphere, but in Europe, Africa and Asia.

                            From the perspective of threats—as well as interests—the Indo-Pacific region will clearly be front and center in American global security strategy. Here are some assumptions that will likely govern the U.S. contribution to an emerging regional security architecture.

                            In Asia to Stay. This administration thinks that it will be in power for seven more years. Its goal is to apply a consistent, long-term policy toward the region. There will be no effort to contain or isolate China—neither option is possible or desirable in a globalized world. But the United States will be remain present as a powerful force to ameliorate China’s threat as a destabilizing regional influence.

                            Regional Freedom Caucus. Any regional framework must have a component built around the major democracies: Japan, India, Australia and the United States. Only recently have the world’s two largest democracies—the United States and India—looked more like strategic partners. That development has arisen due to a convergence of interest: concern about China’s drive for regional hegemony. Shared interests are a gravity pulling the great democracies; Democracy is a glue that will help the alignment endure.

                            While the regional democracies will become a band of brothers, they will likely attract a broader coalition of nations whose political systems share a common commitment to human rights and an interest in regional peace security. This, in turn, will serve to shape other elements of the framework, like the current suite of ASEAN-centric forums, to which Trump is reaffirming American commitment.

                            Peace through Strength. There will not be an arms race to be won in Asia. The United States currently lacks the military capacity to defend all its global interests in a two-conflict scenario. Trump is committed to fixing that problem. Indeed, many of America’s major friends and allies in the region are looking to strengthen their defensive arsenals. Denuclearization of North Korea remains the objective, but in the meantime, North Korea will face a combination of strategic and conventional deterrence and missile defense that will severely constrain its capacity to make mischief. Over time, China will find its expansion of military influence to be checked and it will discover that its capacity to limit the access that the United States and its allies have to sea lanes or key operational theaters to be significantly challenged.


                            Building Blocks of Asian Security

                            Over time, the security of architecture of Asia will emerge organically, largely as a matter of consensus among America and its friends and allies. Like the planners who plant grass and put sidewalks where the people walk, the United States will likely let a cooperative structure emerge from the regional players. Still, given what we know of America’s future intent for regional security, some pieces of the future framework would seem to be predictable.

                            Enter the Quad. Whatever framework emerges will be heavily influenced by a sustained, official quad dialogue—the four discussants being India, Japan, Australia and the United States. The administration has already announced that it will restart this initiative. The four nations reportedly will meet on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit. The four countries are unlikely to drive the conversation alone. This will be a quad “plus” dialogue that will permit other powers to engage and influence the discussion. South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Vietnam are some of the countries that will likely move in and out of the discussions.

                            From the Water’s Edge. Sustaining the capacity to operate in the maritime domain will be central to any effective regional-security architecture. Unlike naval operations of the nineteenth century, when mastery of the seas was all that mattered, operations in the modern maritime domain require the capacity to operate undersea, in space and cyberspace. The framework will integrate all of these and likely start by establishing a common maritime domain awareness picture for all the participants. Efforts will start with confidence-building measures such as joint patrols. Capacity-building initiatives will likely be accelerated as well. Pushing for the production of F-16 jets in India, for example, is the kind of initiative we might see more of.

                            Global Partnerships. The regional-security architecture of the future will likely have connections that extend beyond the region, because threats like transnational terrorist and criminal networks operate beyond the boundaries of Asia. Further, China’s plans for regional hegemony are partly based on establishing economic dominance through pathways that extend through the Middle East and Europe. Part of the framework will require dialogue and cooperation with key friends and allies in the Middle East and Europe. India’s cooperation with Israel is a good example of the lines of communication and cooperation to come.

                            Another area of emerging cooperation will involve evaluating Chinese investments that may impinge upon national security. Washington has a process for evaluating foreign investments for these concerns: the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States. Some other countries, like Australia, have similar mechanisms. In the future, partners in and out of the region will develop similar processes of their own, and they will increasingly share information. This kind of cooperation will typify what grows out of the emerging security architecture.

                            A Heritage Foundation vice president, James Jay Carafano directs the think tank’s research on issues of national security and foreign policy.
                            Last edited by Double Edge; 11 Dec 17,, 03:42.

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                            • Idea of quad isn't new. In the 70s, Aussie PM Fraser was proposing a quad of China, Australia, Japan & the US to contain soviet influence

                              Soviet fears shaped Fraser's view of the world | The Age

                              MALCOLM Fraser's deep distrust of Soviet power, particularly the way it was exercised in Europe and in the Indian Ocean, led him to radically recast Australia's foreign policy.

                              Earlier, the Whitlam government had advocated detente between the superpowers, and self determination (except for East Timor) for former colonial states in the Pacific and the Third World.

                              But Mr Fraser repositioned Australia, dumping Gough Whitlam's policy to have the Indian Ocean declared a nuclear-free zone.

                              He worked to stop the Soviet Union from spreading its influence to the tiny Pacific states such as Tonga — which had opened a dialogue with Moscow — and Norfolk Island.

                              David Kemp, a senior strategist and political adviser to the prime minister during those early years, said Mr Fraser believed the West had been unwilling to match Soviet military might in Europe, and he urged the US, demoralised after the Vietnam War, to do more to counter the communist state.

                              Dr Kemp said Mr Fraser's new direction met with opposition from the then head of Foreign Affairs, Alan Renouf, a Whitlam appointee, who argued that it was pointless for Australia to provoke a confrontation with the Soviet superpower.

                              While Mr Fraser was determined to take an aggressive posture against the Soviet Union, he also continued to forge the strong links — developed by Mr Whitlam — with China and Japan, believing they would provide a counter to Moscow
                              Last edited by Double Edge; 12 Dec 17,, 13:48.

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                              • Political influence or as Lenin referred to it as the united front. Russia works on Eastern Europe and the US (?) China works on the east. Nice tag team there.

                                Sam Dastyari's South China Sea support is a big deal and a timely warning | AFR (Op-ed) | Sept 05 2016

                                A yr old but the playbook is coming out. Works against Aussies. Could work in India ? if it isn't already...

                                The government and a thankfully robust reporting from The Australian Financial Review has been quick to uncover Senator Dastyari's extraordinary remarks in support of China's position on the South China Sea disputes that directly contradict his own party, Australia's allies and most of China's Asian neighbours.

                                China is desperate to prevent international solidarity against its construction of islands and armed bases in the South China Sea. Pressure has intensified since the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague found the basis of China's more expansive claims illegal under international law.
                                Who said that PCA ruling was worthless ? Obviously China is in PR damage limitation mode


                                Right now, Australia stands out as one of the few countries in the Asia-Pacific – or among developed democracies worldwide – that allow significant foreign funding of political parties. Britain, for instance, imposed a ban in 2001 after revelations of funding linked to Serbian leader and accused war criminal Slobodan Milosevic.

                                It is hard to believe six-figure donations from corporates linked to the Chinese Communist Party are gestures of admiration for our electoral system.

                                Beijing wants to neutralise Canberra's opposition to Chinese strategic moves in Asia. China seeks to weaken our vital security alliance with the United States and dissuade Australia from offering even moral support to Asian countries, such as Japan, when their interests clash with China's.

                                Alternately, if Chinese political largesse is meant merely as "protection money" paid to "bandits", as property developer Huang Xiangmo characterised it in the Chinese press last week – well, that is hardly reassuring.

                                Foreign funding may not buy real sway over decision-makers. Mr Huang is reported to have openly bemoaned that it doesn't. But the mere possibility that it could be seen that way is the heart of the problem.

                                Perception is critical. What is at stake is national credibility, and therefore our ability to advance our national interests in our region.

                                Voices seeking to distance Australia from its American ally argue that a more independent foreign policy would boost our credibility in Asia. They are right. Independence – sovereignty in national decision-making – is precisely what is at stake with the unchecked growth of Chinese Communist Party activity in Australia's domestic affairs.

                                Australia's credibility as a serious player in Asia will hardly be helped by any impression it has become deferential to China, or that this has been purchased through Chinese money in our politics.

                                Mutual respect and cooperation between Australia and China matters. Relations with India, Japan, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines and South Korea, among others, matter too. Those countries are becoming more wary of Chinese power and look for support in numbers from the United States, Australia and others with stakes in a rules-based order.

                                Moreover, Australia will have trouble being taken seriously in advocating governance, stability and law in our neighbourhood of Southeast Asia or the South Pacific when our politicians look less rule-bound than theirs.
                                The way for China to weaken any upcoming quad is to offer sweet heart deals to each of its members. Helps to buy time
                                Last edited by Double Edge; 12 Dec 17,, 14:51.

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