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  • Trying to drive a wedge between South Korea and the US when the talks fail


    https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/20...-ahead-summit/

    North Korea says U.S. ruining mood of detente ahead of summit
    BY ERIC TALMADGE
    AP

    MAY 6, 2018
    ARTICLE HISTORY PRINT SHARE
    PYONGYANG – With just weeks to go before President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un are expected to hold their first-ever summit, Pyongyang on Sunday criticized what it called “misleading” claims that Trump’s policy of maximum political pressure and sanctions are what drove the North to the negotiating table.

    The North’s official news agency quoted a Foreign Ministry spokesman warning the claims are a “dangerous attempt” to ruin a budding detente on the Korean Peninsula after Kim’s summit late last month with South Korean President Moon Jae-in.

    At the summit, Kim agreed to a number of measures aimed at improving North-South ties and indicated he is willing to discuss the denuclearization of the peninsula, though exactly what that would entail and what conditions the North might require have not yet been explained.

    Trump and senior U.S. officials have suggested repeatedly that Washington’s tough policy toward North Korea, along with pressure on its main trading partner China, have played a decisive role in turning around what had been an extremely tense situation. Just last year, as Kim was launching long-range missiles at a record pace and trading vulgar insults with Trump, it would have seemed unthinkable for the topic of denuclearization to be on the table.

    But the North’s statement on Sunday seemed to be aimed at strengthening Kim’s position going into his meeting with Trump. Pyongyang claims Kim himself is the driver of the current situation.

    “The U.S. is deliberately provoking the DPRK at the time when the situation on the Korean Peninsula is moving toward peace and reconciliation,” the spokesman was quoted as saying. DPRK is short for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the North’s formal name.

    Kim and Trump are expected to meet later this month or in early June.

    Trump has indicated the date and place have been chosen and said he believes the Demilitarized Zone that divides the Koreas might be a good venue. Singapore was also believed to be a potential site.

    Experts are split over whether Kim’s statement made with Moon at the DMZ marks a unique opening for progress or a rehash of Pyongyang’s longstanding demand for security guarantees.

    Sunday’s comments were among the very few the North has made since Trump agreed in March to the meeting.

    The spokesman warned the U.S. not to interpret Pyongyang’s willingness to talk as a sign of weakness. He also criticized Washington for its ongoing “pressure and military threats” and its position that such pressure won’t be eased until North Korea gives up its nuclear weapons completely.

    Before Trump meets Kim, Washington is hoping to gain the release of three Korean-Americans accused of anti-state activities. Trump hinted the release of Kim Dong Chul, Kim Hak Song and Tony Kim was in the offing.

    There was no sign of an imminent release on Sunday, though the men had reportedly been moved to the capital.

    The White House, meanwhile, has announced a separate meeting between Trump and Moon at the White House on May 22 to “continue their close coordination on developments regarding the Korean Peninsula.”

    Comment


    • Originally posted by Gun Grape View Post
      There are no US Army combat troops stationed in Japan. All logistic forces.
      30k US personnel in Japan and not a single combat soldier ? is this correct

      Thought the reason the Kim's fired missiles off Japan is because Japan is where any invading force would start from, in the event of a war say

      Comment


      • Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
        30k US personnel in Japan and not a single combat soldier ? is this correct
        No US Army combat troops.

        There is a Div (-) of Marines on Okinawa.

        Comment


        • Not counting on Trump to voice their concerns. Plus maybe discussing a few trade things. Since the US wants to start a trade war/impose trade sanctions on all three countries.

          http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/SDI201805027976.html

          TOKYO--A blistering pace of meetings to discuss the prospects for peace on the Korean Peninsula will continue next week in Tokyo, when Japan hosts a meeting with leaders from China and South Korea.

          Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced Tuesday during a visit to Amman, Jordan, that he would host President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and Premier Li Keqiang of China in Tokyo on May 9.

          The meeting would put Japan back into the diplomatic fray after it had looked increasingly isolated, with the primary discussions about North Korea progressing without it. Abe had spent the past year cultivating a close relationship with President Donald Trump and hewing to the United States’ hard-line approach to North Korea, only to be caught by surprise when Trump abruptly accepted an invitation to talk with the North’s leader, Kim Jong Un.

          “A trilateral summit in Tokyo is an opportunity for Abe to reassert himself in fast-moving regional politics in a way that does not depend on his relationship with the U.S. president,” said Mira Rapp-Hooper, a senior research scholar at Yale Law School who writes about security in Asia.

          Speaking in Amman, where Japan announced grants of up to 1.63 billion yen, about $15 million, to help Jordan support an influx of Syrian refugees, Abe said he planned to discuss “all aspects of the future development of relationships between Japan and China, and Japan and South Korea” at the meeting next week. He added that he would push for more “concrete actions” from North Korea to flesh out the commitment to denuclearization that Kim discussed with Moon in historic talks in the border village of Panmunjom on Friday.

          Of the three leaders convening in Tokyo next week, Abe, who has lately been dogged by influence-peddling scandals at home, is perhaps most in need of a domestic boost. Undoubtedly, all three leaders will want to talk about advancing the North Korean peace process. But Trump’s unusual personality and style is an equally urgent topic.

          “A lot of the stimulus for this diplomacy in northeast Asia is certainly the North Korean threat,” said Mireya Solis, co-director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. “But they are also dealing with this president, who is in so many ways changing the parameters of U.S. foreign policy.”

          The meeting will provide an opportunity for the three leaders to discuss commercial ties, at a time when the United States is threatening a trade war with China and has recently renegotiated a two-way trade agreement with South Korea.

          It will be the first visit to Japan by Moon since he was elected president last May, and the first visit to Tokyo by a South Korean president in more than six years. Li would be the first Chinese premier to visit Japan in eight years.

          With the region’s dynamics shifting rapidly, Abe will not be in the driver’s seat. He has been looking to secure a meeting with Li in the hopes of visiting Beijing this summer and ultimately hosting President Xi Jinping in Tokyo before the end of the year.

          But China has dragged its feet in agreeing to set dates.

          “Whenever Japan would call they were basically saying ‘Well, we’ll check our schedule book and get back to you,'” said J. Berkshire Miller, a senior visiting fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo.

          And South Korea, which had typically been a backseat player in northeast Asia, is now emerging as a leading broker of the North Korean peace negotiations.

          “Traditionally it was really Japan and China leading, with South Korea being the shrimp between two whales,” Miller said. “But now you have the scenario where, after the Kim-Moon summit, both sides will be very actively talking to President Moon to understand what’s happening on the Korean Peninsula. It’s an interesting change of scenario.”

          At next week’s summit, the challenge for Japan is to establish a significant role for itself in the diplomatic gyrations.

          “The biggest source of tension is really what role Japan can play in this process,” said Tobias Harris, an expert on Japanese politics at Teneo Intelligence in Washington. “China is North Korea’s backstop, and they might nudge North Korea in the direction of constructive concessions that lower the temperature. Obviously South Korea is playing this role of drawing North Korea out and almost in some ways speaking on behalf of North Korea before much of the world. But it’s not quite clear what Japan’s role in all of this is going to be.”

          Japan clearly has its own agenda of ensuring that Trump does not agree to a deal that would accept North Korea giving up intercontinental ballistic missiles and future nuclear tests while retaining short- and medium-range missiles that could still hit Japan.

          In talking with South Korea and China, Abe will want to make sure his country does not get “dragged along with relaxing sanctions because it’s facing pressure from China, South Korea and the U.S. to play a good sport and support an agreement” without protecting Japan’s interests, Harris said.

          Abe is also particularly keen to reach some kind of resolution for the families of Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korean spies four decades ago, and will undoubtedly reiterate his request for support from South Korea.

          And in hopes of continuing a trend toward warmer ties with China, Abe will host separate one-on-one talks with Li during his visit to Tokyo next week.

          -------

          Makiko Inoue contributed reporting.

          (May 1, 2018)

          Comment


          • I still cannot wrap my head around how 32,000 Americans in South Korea has any effect on Japanese defence. As I stated quite often, there is no alliance between South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. That essentially means the only integration of all 3 forces are American. South Korean troops, airmen, and sailors are not going to answer to Japanese Admirals and Generals which are essential if Japan is to rely on South Korea for its defence.

            That leaves the Americans and Seoul is not going to give an ok for a retalitory strike on behalf of Japan if that means North Korean artillery is going to rain down on South Korea.

            On top of that, Japan doesn't need South Korea to bomb North Korean launch sites and sink her navy.

            And 32,000 Americans is not enough to determine any campaign against North Korea. You need the South Korean Army and that means that Seoul and Tokyo must feel some kind of solidarity. They don't. They hate each other.
            Chimo

            Comment


            • Originally posted by Gun Grape View Post
              The Japanese military is a defensive force only.
              A 900-lb gorilla of a defensive force, let's be honest.
              “He was the most prodigious personification of all human inferiorities. He was an utterly incapable, unadapted, irresponsible, psychopathic personality, full of empty, infantile fantasies, but cursed with the keen intuition of a rat or a guttersnipe. He represented the shadow, the inferior part of everybody’s personality, in an overwhelming degree, and this was another reason why they fell for him.”

              Comment


              • Originally posted by WABs_OOE View Post
                I still cannot wrap my head around how 32,000 Americans in South Korea has any effect on Japanese defence. As I stated quite often, there is no alliance between South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. That essentially means the only integration of all 3 forces are American. South Korean troops, airmen, and sailors are not going to answer to Japanese Admirals and Generals which are essential if Japan is to rely on South Korea for its defence.

                That leaves the Americans and Seoul is not going to give an ok for a retalitory strike on behalf of Japan if that means North Korean artillery is going to rain down on South Korea.

                On top of that, Japan doesn't need South Korea to bomb North Korean launch sites and sink her navy.

                And 32,000 Americans is not enough to determine any campaign against North Korea. You need the South Korean Army and that means that Seoul and Tokyo must feel some kind of solidarity. They don't. They hate each other.
                Wanted to summarise what Gunny said

                Originally posted by Gun Grape View Post
                There is the missile threat from NK.

                Originally posted by Gun Grape View Post
                with the troops there it is an unknown with teeth.

                With the troops gone, there isn't any threat of retaliation.
                So Japan becomes more vulnerable to any NK belligerence, than has been the case up to now

                Whether this more frequent beligerence amounts to anything beyond what we've seen so far is the question

                What is clear is that a softening of American stance or maybe change is the better word has Abe running around.

                Comment


                • Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
                  Wanted to summarise what Gunny said.
                  The only thing the Japanese could possibly use from South Korea is early warning and even that is migitated with real time satellite watch. Missile intercepts are done from Japanese waters and Japanese fighter-bombers are more than capable of laying waste to North Korean launch sites.

                  I just don't see how 32,000 Americans are going to strike north without Seoul's ok, especially when doing so would put Seoul under direct retallitory threat.
                  Chimo

                  Comment


                  • Now is as good a time to better understand the US - Japan Security alliance

                    https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-...urity-alliance

                    In 2008, the Bush administration removed North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism in exchange for concessions on its nuclear program.

                    The shift toward negotiations with Pyongyang triggered fears in Tokyo that Washington could accept a nuclear North Korea, diminishing the U.S. security guarantee for Japan.
                    Sound familiar ?

                    So it isn't about troops stationed in SK.

                    But why does the US security guarantee for Japan get diminished ?

                    There are no US nukes in Japan. Three point policy of 1967 says no producing, introducing or possessing nukes for Japan. No nukes means should not become a target for nukes

                    So Japan depends on the US nuclear umbrella. That umbrella doesn't go away or at least it makes no sense why that umbrella should go away and US still accepts a nuclear NK

                    It may go away if NK denuclearises. Koreas + Japan = Nuke free zone. Some want it, others are afraid. Which group is larger ? maybe the second

                    There is always the Trump factor and whether he is committed to Japan's defense but this is no different than doubts over whether US will truly use nukes to defend Japan and SK.

                    The bottomline is if the US is also under threat will it trade Tokyo for LA
                    Last edited by Double Edge; 08 May 18,, 00:34.

                    Comment


                    • Holes forming in US nuclear umbrella, some in Japan argue (Op-ed) | Nikkei | Sept 07 2017

                      Ex-defense minister floats possibility of hosting American nukes

                      September 09, 2017 04:25 JST

                      TOKYO -- Debate is growing in Japan over whether the American commitment to defend allies with nuclear force will hold as Washington's own defense interests loom larger, and whether stationing nuclear weapons here could shore up this key deterrence strategy.

                      The cure

                      To former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, the time has come to discuss letting the U.S. military bring nuclear weapons within the country's borders. "Is it right to say that Japan will not host them but will take shelter under the American umbrella?" the veteran lawmaker in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party asked in a television appearance Wednesday.

                      The proposal speaks to concern that the nuclear umbrella might not work as advertised. With North Korea having developed an intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach the U.S. and working on a miniaturized warhead to go with it, Washington could think twice about responding in kind to a nuclear attack on Japan for fear of retaliation, the thinking goes. Ishiba and peers worry that if Pyongyang realizes this, the American pledge to defend Japan with nuclear force could lose credibility and thus its power as a deterrent.

                      Enabling the U.S. military to bring a portion of its nuclear capabilities to Japan -- by letting nuclear-missile-equipped submarines call on bases here, for example -- could make Pyongyang more reluctant to move against Japan. And unlike during the Cold War, when the U.S. deployed many tactical nuclear weapons in West Germany, the arms could be kept in Japan only temporarily, blunting public opposition.

                      Worse than the disease?

                      But adopting such a plan would prove tougher it sounds. Japan's three "non-nuclear principles" bar bringing nuclear weapons within its borders, in addition to proscribing their manufacture and possession. Altering this bedrock credo would risk a severe public backlash, not to mention objections from such neighbors as China and Russia. Nor is the move particularly well-supported within the LDP. Japan's thinking is "the same as ever" as far as the principles are concerned, Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera told reporters Friday.

                      Whether taking in nuclear weapons would boost deterrence is itself questionable. Nuclear-armed American submarines frequently patrol the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, according to an official in Japan's Ministry of Defense, and could launch a nuclear attack on North Korea at any time.

                      In fact, "if it's understood that there are nuclear weapons here, Japan could end up becoming more of a target," warned an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs here.

                      Besides, the American extended-deterrence scheme, including the nuclear umbrella, is "unwavering," Onodera said.

                      (Nikkei)

                      Comment


                      • Another review on Roehrig's book

                        The Limited Roles of U.S. Nuclear Deterrence in Northeast Asia | Carnegie | Jan 30 2018

                        One of the sticking points in debates about the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which is also the main question of this book, is the issue of credibility: “Would the United States truly be willing to use nuclear weapons in defense of an ally?” (p. 2). Roehrig concludes that the United States is highly unlikely to use nuclear weapons to defend its allies because this is “not in the [U.S.] strategic interest and should be avoided at all costs” (p. 189).

                        Rather, “the nuclear umbrella vis-à-vis North Korea is more important as a message of reassurance for U.S. allies than a tool that adds further to an already stable strategic situation” (p. 186) and has a significant “function for U.S. efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons” both regionally and globally (p. 196).

                        As Roehrig states a number of times in the book, the U.S. nuclear umbrella offered to South Korea and Japan has been successful in persuading these two allies to remain non-nuclear thus far, which means that U.S. extended deterrence is still regarded as credible by Tokyo and Seoul.
                        One of Roehrig’s major conclusions is that “the United States would respond to an attack on Japan or South Korea with conventional weapons in the context of a credible alliance” (p. 190), while “an uncertain umbrella retains value as a deterrent” (p. 193).

                        The overwhelming conventional capability of the United States no doubt poses a grave threat to North Korea, but it is still questionable how much longer conventional military assets can effectively deter Pyongyang.

                        The more advanced North Korea’s nuclear program becomes, the harder it will be to deter the country through the traditional means of deterrence policy unless other tools, such as diplomacy, are simultaneously applied.

                        Furthermore, any small sparks, either intentionally or inadvertently lit, could escalate into a nuclear war in the worst-case scenario, no matter how effectively the United States’ conventional or nuclear capability is supposed to deter a nuclear North Korea. Indeed, in an age of uncertainty led by Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un, it is increasingly hard to expect that the status quo in this region will be maintained only through traditional deterrence policy.
                        Canada, not the United States, played the decisive role in pressing the ROK leadership to ratify the NPT.3 The influence of the United States over South Korea’s foreign or security policy often tends to be overemphasized.

                        Although “the U.S. nuclear umbrella is essential in keeping South Korea from pursuing its own nuclear weapons” (p. 153), U.S. extended nuclear deterrence historically has been a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for South Korea to remain non-nuclear.

                        Despite U.S. tactical nuclear weapons continuously being deployed on the Korean Peninsula, other aspects of the alliance relationship made South Korea less secure and more willing to go nuclear in the 1970s. Moreover, non-U.S. factors such as nuclear reactor deals with Canada would sometimes exert a stronger influence on South Korea’s decision to take a step forward to support nuclear nonproliferation.

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by WABs_OOE View Post
                          I still cannot wrap my head around how 32,000 Americans in South Korea has any effect on Japanese defence. As I stated quite often, there is no alliance between South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. That essentially means the only integration of all 3 forces are American. South Korean troops, airmen, and sailors are not going to answer to Japanese Admirals and Generals which are essential if Japan is to rely on South Korea for its defence.
                          The same way nukes were a stabilizing force.

                          On top of that, Japan doesn't need South Korea to bomb North Korean launch sites and sink her navy.
                          The only strike capability Japan has are anti-ship missiles, and JDAM capable F-2 fighters

                          And 32,000 Americans is not enough to determine any campaign against North Korea. You need the South Korean Army and that means that Seoul and Tokyo must feel some kind of solidarity. They don't. They hate each other.
                          So maybe those US troops in Korea are also there to keep South Korea from attacking Japan?


                          But the bottom line is that the only combat troops/air strike capability in the Pacific are stationed in South Korea. Clark AB and Subic are gone. The Army combat forces in Japan are gone. All that's left is Japan and Guam. Guam has no aircraft permanently assigned.

                          Take those combat troops/tactical air away and all our allies will feel a little abandoned

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by Gun Grape View Post
                            But the bottom line is that the only combat troops/air strike capability in the Pacific are stationed in South Korea. Clark AB and Subic are gone. The Army combat forces in Japan are gone. All that's left is Japan and Guam. Guam has no aircraft permanently assigned.

                            Take those combat troops/tactical air away and all our allies will feel a little abandoned
                            Ok, now I'm following you, GS.
                            Chimo

                            Comment


                            • I've read this wrong. Xi is pissed.

                              https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/w...rth-korea.html

                              What is notable is now China is heading towards Japan and South Korea to discuss North Korean issues - without North Korea present. Can't rely on Fat Boy to keep China in the loop.
                              Chimo

                              Comment


                              • China fears fat boy won't keep China in the loop

                                Japan fears the US won't keep Japan in the loop.

                                It would be a good idea for Japan to talk to Kim some time

                                Meanwhile Kim's playing one off the other and hustling the best deal possible

                                Xinhua quoted Mr. Kim as saying he came to China again to “strengthen strategic communication” with Mr. Xi.
                                That quoted bit was also used with Modi at the Wuhan summit

                                But Chinese analysts say the warmth between the two leaders should not be overstated, and that Mr. Kim retains his streak of independence.

                                “North Korea was never a vassal state,” said Shi Yinhong, a professor at Renmin University of China in Beijing. It is even less so now that the United States has agreed to deal with Mr. Kim, he said.
                                heh, all Trump said is he would meet and now Kim has wings and is flying

                                What are the Chinese so afraid of ? they would be integral to any peace settlement. Where is the question of being left out of the loop

                                Any deal that makes NK safer also makes China safer
                                Last edited by Double Edge; 08 May 18,, 16:23.

                                Comment

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