Border face-off: China and India each deploy 3,000 troops

[Double Edge]

In his talk at hudson, Manoj mentioned that the border isn't managed by the foreign office of China. He said whenever there were any border meets or agreements it was always someone from the PLA that showed up. Implying the PLA gets to decide about border. This strikes me as a bit odd. I would have thought border goes all the way to the top

[Double Edge]

No movements here, still no mil mil crisis hotline setup

Doklam row: China hints at maintaining sizable troop presence in winter | IE | Nov 30 2017

[Double Edge]

Curve ball by Stobdan

The Dalai Lama Wants to Return Home | The Wire | Dec 04 2017

Is India bracing for the potential fallout?

the question is whether New Delhi has any role to play in this rapidly-evolving scene, and if so under what political parameters.

There is no sign of anyone having even considered the impact of this.

But to be cautious, any Sino-Tibetan deal would seriously risk undercutting India’s position on the boundary dispute with China.

Seemingly fretful about impending developments, the Dalai Lama now finds himself walking a political tightrope by espousing reconciliation between India and China, “living peacefully by putting the differences aside”.

He maintained a hands-off position and tried not to get drawn even into the Doklam standoff – instead calling for a peaceful solution.

One hopes he is successful this time.

[Double Edge]

Interesting account by chinese scholar Jianlin Li of the '62 war by accessing CCP documents and interviewing PLA veterans. By the time the '62 war broke out the PLA had three years of combat experience fighting Tibetans. The idea of sending in so many troops to suppress the Tibetan rebellion was to train the PLA

“Suppressing Rebellion in Tibet” and the China-India Border War | Dec 05 2017

In order to understand the scale of the war waged on Tibetans in Kham, Amdo and central Tibet from 1956 to 1962, I was able to gather various statistics, including participating PLA military commands, branches involved, numbers of combat forces and logistical support units, amount of supplies, etc. I also analyzed a number of major battles. Chinese official sources indicate that seven of the twelve military commands were directly involved, and another two of them provided logistic support. The cumulative total of combat forces reached over 200,000, not including logistics personnel, local militia and civilians drafted for transportation, road building, etc. The Central Military Commission sent nearly all PLA military branches to fight in Tibet, even the newly-formed chemical warfare unit.

The question is: why?

Openly published sources show that from January 22nd to February 19th 1959, Mao Zedong added written instructions to four reports on the situation in Tibet, in which he pointed out that “rebellion is a good thing”, as it could be used to “train the troops and the masses”, and to “harden our troops to combat readiness”

By analyzing many memoirs, autobiographies and biographies, openly published, classified or semi-classified, I found out that the 12 large scale battles fought in central Tibet from March 1959 to early 1962 were in fact conducted as a thoroughly organised military training, beyond the actual requirements of a counter-insurgency operation: individual soldiers were expected to train for combat on the high plateau, commanders were testing the battle strategies best suited to the terrain.

Shorter summaries by ajai shukla here

Chinese army prepared for 1962 war by fighting Tibetans | Broadsword | Dec 08 2017

Unlike India’s chaotic preparations in 1962, a Chinese war plan made months in advance | Broadsword | Dec 09 2017

So the chinese had three years of combat experience in the region, dispatched 10k troops against 2k of ours and on top of that had a 45k strong logistics support network

Besides the PLA’s overwhelming advantage in combat soldiers numbers, Li’s research reveals the CCP’s Tibet Work Committee supported the frontline with a major logistic effort. It dispatched 1,280 party cadres to lead civilian workers functioning as logistical support teams. 32,237 Tibetans and 1,057 pack animals were drafted to load, unload and transport supplies, carry wounded soldiers back from battlefront, and clear up battlefields, etc. Over 10,000 civilians were drafted to repair and construct roads.

It is hardly surprising that, on October 20, Indian defences in the Tawang sector crumbled in hours.

Earlier we actually helped the PLA consolidate their position in Tibet

In the early 1950s, China needed India’s help to send supplies into Tibet, so that the PLA could consolidate the occupation. India was quite generous in providing this help. In 1952, Beijing “used diplomatic channels” to ship 2,500 tons of rice from Guangdong province to Calcutta, and transport it up to Tibet through Yadong (Dromo). By April 1953, all the rice had arrived. This basically solved the food supply problem for PLA troops, and enabled them to establish a preliminary footing in Tibet.

Un fcuking believable : O

[Officer of Engineers]

By analyzing many memoirs, autobiographies and biographies, openly published, classified or semi-classified, I found out that the 12 large scale battles fought in central Tibet from March 1959 to early 1962 were in fact conducted as a thoroughly organised military training, beyond the actual requirements of a counter-insurgency operation: individual soldiers were expected to train for combat on the high plateau, commanders were testing the battle strategies best suited to the terrain.

What kind of idotic moronic statement is this? TWELVE LARGE SCALE BATTLES conducted as THOROUGLY ORGANIZED MILITARY TRAINING?

The closest these idiots came to soldiering is a comic book read. I would EXPECT a prepared battle as to as thorougly organized as possible with contingency plans up the ying-yang. If anything, training doesn't even come close to organizing a prepared battle.

[Double Edge]

The article i understand is challenging the earlier held notion by Yin & Ding that the PLA went into the 1962 war unprepared and then proceeds to show otherwise. That is the point

In 2005, Military History, a magazine produced for the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, published an interview with Yin Fatang, former first secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region Party Committee and a veteran of the 1962 war. During the interview, Yin claimed that the PLA had gone into the war unprepared.

Ding Sheng, who served as the commander of the 54th Army and led PLA forces on the Walong front of the eastern sector, echoed Yin in his 2008 memoir. He explained that in October 1962, the 130th division of the 54th army, one of the main PLA forces involved, was stationed in Sichuan, and scattered in a dozen locations for agricultural work.

On October 28th, he received the order to fight the Indian army at Walong. These troops were hastily mobilized, issued warm clothing and rushed to Tibet for the battle at short notice.[4] Both Yin and Ding gave the impression that all was well along the China-India border until October 1962, when war suddenly broke out.

If you think the claims of training are not training then how does an unprepared army fight in mountains and prevail ? they don't

When the Iron Bird Flies: A summary of findings

Came out in 2013 in Chinese

2. Actual number of battles (military actions):
Number of battles was calculated in different ways. Sichuan Military Gazetteer counts each military engagement and gives the total number as “over 10,000 big and small battles”.

In Central Tibet, PLA launched 12 military campaigns from March 1959 to November 1961, each consisting of many battles. For instance, the campaign referred to as The Second Stage Campaign in Chamdo in August to November 1959 consisted of 840 battles. No total number of battles can be found in Central Tibet, but it would be no less than a couple of thousand.

3639 battles were fought in Qinghai Province.

The 11th Infantry were responsible for military actions against nomads in Gannan and participated in a number of military campaigns in Central Tibet. They reported a total number of 996 battles fought in Gannan and Central Tibet.

The incomplete statistics shows that during the 6.5-year war, no less than 15,000 battles were fought.

For a bunch of guerilla nomads that is a lot of battles

6. PLA Military power used in the war

I use two measures for the term military power: (1) actual number of soldiers and officers involved; (2) cumulative figures, as the same units fought in different areas.

According to various Chinese military sources, the following army units were involved in the war: [16]

A. Infantry: 8 divisions, about 100,000 people.[17]
B. Air force: 3 divisions, 2 independent regiments.[18]
C. Calvary: at least three divisions.[19]
D. Special units: armour, chemical warfare, motorcycle, demolition, signals, etc.
E. Logistic units: 4 truck transportation regiments, engineer corps, field hospitals, army stations, supply stations, animal hospitals, gas stations, etc.


Although actual numbers of people in different branches of the armed forces is not the same, from the above list I estimate that the number of combat troops was no less than 150,000.

On the local level:
A. Sichuan (March 1956 – Dec. 1961): altogether over 80,000.
B. Gansu (March – Dec.1958): over 25,000.
C. Qinghai (April 1959 – October 1962): over 70,000.
D. Central Tibet (March 1959 – 1961): over 60,000.
Total: Over 235,000.[20]

Besides PLA units, a large number of local militia participated, with many armed units directly involved in actual combat. The numbers of militia I was able to find in Sichuan, Gansu, Yunnan and Qinghai add up to over 71,000 people.

There were also a considerable number of civilian laborers drafted for various war-related purposes, for instance, to transport supplies, carry wounded soldiers, handle pack animals and so on. During the 6 years of war, no less than 143,000 civilian laborers were drafted.

It is safe to say that during the six year war on the Tibetan plateau, the number of PLA combat troops, logistical units, militia and civilian laborers involved was no less than 300,000.

A lot of PLA, which isn't surprising given how many Indian troops were required in Kashmir, a much smaller area, at the height of a full blown insurgency

[Officer of Engineers]

The term you're looking for is battle hardened. There is a difference. A big difference.

200,000 to subjecate Tibet is not out of the ordinary for Eastern military practices.

As for the number of battles, replace the word with action and that would be consistant with an occupation.

[Double Edge]

The term you're looking for is battle hardened. There is a difference. A big difference.

200,000 to subjecate Tibet is not out of the ordinary for Eastern military practices.

As for the number of battles, replace the word with action and that would be consistant with an occupation.

Yeah maybe some fine tuning with words is required.

But do you find the account credible ? i don't know what Ms Jianlin Li's affiliation is. Independent scholar is all i got

[Double Edge]

India and China have completed fifty years without firing a shot at each other. To commemorate this occasion the PLA has decided there will be 1800 Chinese butts to keep company with another amount of Indian butts also freezing in the mountains this winter.

In first winter stay, 1,800 Chinese troops camping at Doklam | TOI | Dec 11 2017

Rajat Pandit | TNN | Updated: Dec 11, 2017, 11:59 IST

HIGHLIGHTS
- Presence of Chinese troops perpetuated with construction of two helipads, upgraded roads, scores of pre-fabricated huts, shelters and stores
- China is keen to usurp Doklam to add strategic depth to its narrow Chumbi Valley, which juts in between Sikkim and Bhutan

NEW DELHI: Around 1,600-1,800 Chinese troops have now virtually established a permanent presence in the Doklam area, near the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet trijunction, with the construction of two helipads, upgraded roads, scores of pre-fabricated huts, shelters and stores to withstand the freezing winter in the high-altitude region.

Indian security establishment sources said while India "achieved its strategic objective" of not letting China extend its existing road in Doklam (or the Dolam plateau) southwards towards the Jampheri ridge, the fallout has been "the almost permanent stationing of People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops in the region".

"Earlier, PLA patrols would come to Doklam, which is disputed between China and Bhutan, between April-May and October-November every year to mark their presence and lay claim to the area before going back," said a source.

"Now, after the 73-day eyeball-to-eyeball troop confrontation at Doklam between India and China ended on August 28, the PLA troops have stayed put in what we consider to be Bhutanese territory for the first time this winter. But the status quo prevails at the earlier face-off site," he added.

there has been relative calm at the face-off site in Doklam, with the rival troops separated by a distance of well over 500 metres, but both India and China continue to maintain stepped-up force levels along the Line of Actual Control. Apart from constructing accommodation for troops and helipads, China has also upgraded its existing motorable road in Doklam around 10 km north and east of the earlier face-off site. "But the PLA has not undertaken any fresh road construction activity southwards towards the Jampheri ridge," said a source.

Forcing the PLA into deploying troops on the LAC increases their cost for keeping the border unsettled. Look forward to more to keep the Indians company

[Officer of Engineers]

Yeah maybe some fine tuning with words is required.

But do you find the account credible ? i don't know what Ms Jianlin Li's affiliation is. Independent scholar is all i got

I have no reason to discount the research. It's the conclusion that I have problems with. The PLA went through all that trouble to conquer and occupied Tibet just so they could kick India's ass in 1962. There's one and only one reason why the PLA fought in Tibet. To take and hold Tibet. The Machon Line was not even a consideration.

[Double Edge]

I have no reason to discount the research. It's the conclusion that I have problems with. The PLA went through all that trouble to conquer and occupied Tibet just so they could kick India's ass in 1962. There's one and only one reason why the PLA fought in Tibet. To take and hold Tibet. The Machon Line was not even a consideration.

Oh sure, am not suggesting they went through that to fight India.

The experience with fighting Tibetans gave them the training which was useful later. I was not aware of the extent of the rebellion, from '56 - '62.

They were not unprepared as was suggested by Yin & Ding. Evidently the two did not want to let on too much about Tibet.

That's it

[Officer of Engineers]

Ok, some military definitions here.

There's the meeting engagement where two sides blindly crashs into each other not knowing anything about the other guy before contact.

There's the hasty engagement where one side spotted the enemy first and the enemy is about to make contact, so he make a quick plan on how to engage the enemy.

Then there's the prepared engagement where everything is thought out knowing when, where, and how the enemy is about to make contact and you have a thorough plan on how to engage him.

The very fact that in 1962, battle momentum collapsed Chinese LOCs would strongly suggest that it was not a prepared engagement.

[Double Edge]

Maybe not enough time to plan

In the same February 2005 interview, General Yin Fatang revealed that on June 11th 1962, the Tibet Military Command constituted a special organ called “Tibet Military Command Advance Command Post for China-India Border Self-defence Counter-attack”, commonly known as “Advance Command Post”, code-named Z419 (“Z” stands for “Xizang”=Tibet, also known as T419). Yin was appointed its political commissar.[27]

Wei Ke, director of Z419’s political department, recalled that in May 1962, Beijing decided to “create conditions for peacefully resolving the border dispute” by “resolutely fighting back” against the advancing Indian army. It was also decided that the main front would be the eastern sector, namely the Tawang and Walong areas.[28] He revealed that on June 7th 1962, General Tan Guansan, the commander of the battle of Lhasa in March 1959, chaired a military meeting and transmitted directives from the CCP Central Committee and Central Military Commission regarding preparation for combat with the Indian army on the border. It was at this meeting that Z419 Command was formed.

Regiments 154, 155 and 157 and a few supporting units were under the direct command of Advanced Command Post Z419, code-named “Z419 army”, with a combat force of around 8,000.

In October, some troops belonging to infantry division 11, artillery regiment 308 and engineers regiment 136 were also commanded by Z419 Command Post, a total of 10,300 men, responsible for fighting in Kejielang (Nyamjang valley) and Tawang.

Z419 formed in May

gets the go ahead to prepare in June

Mao tells them to move in October

Is four months enough ?

No fancy machinery, this is red china, fresh from 5 years fighting the Tibetans and know about mountain warfare

You've said numerous times they collapsed their LOC's. The terrain is pretty tough. Moving artillery of that vintage

Arunachal isn't friendly to China. Terrain drops 2km as you move south through the state. The rivers run north south. The Tibetans didn't know what to do with it so they parted with it. The Chinese couldn't hold it and hence withdrew

This however is only the eastern sector. The Chinese also fought in the northern sector and Jianlin's account does not mention anything about that front.

[Officer of Engineers]

Is four months enough ?

For a divisional size engagement? I'd be surprised if it took more than 30 days. The problem is what is the OPOBJ? I don't think anyone in the GHQ knew. Mao has a habbit of being very vague in what he wants. The other problem is what is India doing? The thing about mountains is that they can hide movement extremely well. You may have a platoon in front of you but you don't know if the whole regiment is behind that platoon or spread out through the hills.

For Nehru to order to evict the Chinese, the assumption would be that he gathered enough forces to do so.

So a lot of unknowns on the Chinese side and they assumed the most probable Indian deployments and assumed an Indian offensive posture. So, what are the Chinese OPOBJs? To smash an Indian advance? Pre-emptive strike? Settle the border by force? Or an invasion into India proper?

Without knowing what OPOBJs were decided and when, it's hard to say if their planning was adequate. They certainly had the forces in place but most certainly, they too much force for what they planned.

[Double Edge]

The problem is what is the OPOBJ? I don't think anyone in the GHQ knew. Mao has a habbit of being very vague in what he wants.

Punitive, enough so India does not think of taking over Tibet. Mao perceives India has expansionist designs. For all we know he is blaming India for the five year long insurgency

The other problem is what is India doing? The thing about mountains is that they can hide movement extremely well. You may have a platoon in front of you but you don't know if the whole regiment is behind that platoon or spread out through the hills.

From mid-June 1962, Z419 Command Post started to collect intelligence in the battle zone and work on a battle plan. Meanwhile, it started intensive military training, from individual soldiers’ battle manoeuvers, coordinating training for each unit all the way to “real battle exercises” at regimental level.

So they are collecting intel four months prior as well

For Nehru to order to evict the Chinese, the assumption would be that he gathered enough forces to do so.

So a lot of unknowns on the Chinese side and they assumed the most probable Indian deployments and assumed an Indian offensive posture. So, what are the Chinese OPOBJs? To smash an Indian advance? Pre-emptive strike? Settle the border by force? Or an invasion into India proper?

Without knowing what OPOBJs were decided and when, it's hard to say if their planning was adequate. They certainly had the forces in place but most certainly, they too much force for what they planned.

Settle the border by force & smash and Indian advance

“create conditions for peacefully resolving the border dispute” by “resolutely fighting back” against the advancing Indian army.

They may have been expecting an advance.

To win they need a 3:1 ratio, in the mountains 5:1

They had an idea how many they were up against.

But tell me this, why is a 45k strong logistics support network not enough to keep them going, how did their lines collapse. We had no air force bombing them