OK I read your post about awhile ago and it has nagged me about responding - mostly because of current parallels - in which I am involved. I am not criticising your military analysis - which I largely agree with but I think alot of the pure military analysis misses the political influence on these events. The Dutch and Belgians did not want to declare on Germany as they were a. scared stiff and b. more inclined therefore to compromise solutions with Hitler even after it had become compromise was not possible. However being smaller nations bordering the Hitlerite regime (I will not call it Germany because many Germans were not fascists as in any dictatorship) they did not wish provoke Hitlerite military response by welcoming the allied Anglo French forces into their territory.
Britain and before that England historically fights for the "Low Countries" and even before that Burgundy for strategic reasons; they have the invasion ports if an invasion of Britain is planned. Thus is was natural that once Belgian neutrality had been breached that the BEF would rush to their assistance to defend the ports if nothing else.
The real problem politically was that the offensive was not taken while the Nazi's were busy in Poland and that the Belgian and Dutch did not - albeit for somewhat understandable reasons - allow the allies in the first place.
Britain and before that England historically fights for the "Low Countries" and even before that Burgundy for strategic reasons; they have the invasion ports if an invasion of Britain is planned. Thus is was natural that once Belgian neutrality had been breached that the BEF would rush to their assistance to defend the ports if nothing else.
The real problem politically was that the offensive was not taken while the Nazi's were busy in Poland and that the Belgian and Dutch did not - albeit for somewhat understandable reasons - allow the allies in the first place.
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