Originally posted by Triple C
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a simple comparison of Bagration vs Barbarossa should suffice for even the casual observer regarding the trope that the Soviets won only through sheer manpower alone.There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov
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Originally posted by Triple C View PostThe Russians got a bloody nose in 1941 in spite of the superlative quality of their tanks, not because of it. A perusal of writers such as Zaloga, Glantz or Jantz readily conveys the impression that well-handled T-34s and KV-1s were a terror on the battlefield, and the Red Army's self-inflicted logistics and leadership flaws, not their technology, accounted for their defeat in tactical engagements.
For example, a majority of divisional tank engagements during Op. Barbarossa Jantz related to in Panzer Truppen Vol 1 show that while the Germans usually prevailed in tank combat against the Russians, they did so by throwing an entire Panzer battalion or regiment at a handful of T-34s at a time, with extremely desperate tactics and great difficulty. What was impressive about the Germans were the near suicidal courage of their Panzer crews and motorized infantry. The stereotype of commanders throwing men and machines at a field problem applied almost as well to Germans as the Russians, to my way of thinking.
As well, the Russians bungled their logistics and march planning, with the result that for about half a year, they could not manage putting more than a handful of T-34s or KV-1s at the point of contact.
When the Russians attacked in the Winter Offensive of '41, the situation was turned around, and in Jantz's select texts it seems that facing an even number of T-34s was considered a very dicy situation for Pz-III and Pz-IV units.
Mostly, the Russian logistics during this period was atrocious. Zaloga noted that many T-34s went to the front with only machine gun bullets, some with just high-explosive shells for their main gun and many broke down or ran out of gas for a host of easily avoidable issues. I'd chalk it up to the totalitarian regime's obsession with parade and appearance, which probably infected post-purge Russia to a greater extent than Nazi Germany during this time.
For situational awareness, even the god-awful Frech S-35 and Char-1 could be formidable at the right circumstances. Those were tanks with single-man turrets; the T-34 had two-men turrets. Colonel Kühn, who fought at Hannut leading the 3rd Panzer Brigade said: "The feelings of superiority by our panzertruppen over the opponent is based primarily on our better combat morale, secondarily on our superior firepower." The advantages of the gun-armed panzers over French tanks he cited were bigger guns and better mobility. Those advantages were not present when they were up against T-34s or KVs.
As for doctrine, the Soviet deep battle doctrine was a fully-fleshed out system of mechanized warfare that was comparable to the German system. But Tugashevski and most of Red Army generals who wasn't a brown-noser got purged by Stalin. The military purge would go on in earnest until Russia's military humiliation by Finland, and a goodly number of the able Soviet commanders who performed well during the war with Germany were the new blood whose career as general officers took place after the purge. Rokossovsky, they said, was fished out from the Gulag sans his teeth and fingernails...
I would close up by noting that, though the Russians had a well-deserved reputation of being insensitive to losses, their best generals were quite cunning and had outfoxed their opposite numbers in the OKH. The Germans had failed to assess Russian intent in every major battle since Kursk, so even taking their material superiority in full stock, how bad could the Russian generals be?
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Originally posted by astralis View Posta simple comparison of Bagration vs Barbarossa should suffice for even the casual observer regarding the trope that the Soviets won only through sheer manpower alone.
The use of deception is something the Russians were very good at and it was notable in both these battles. I remember reading about just how elaborate this was, right down to making sure German recon flights weren't intercepted in certain places precisely so they would see what the Russians wanted them to see. It was impressive stuff and it wasn't limited to this battle. It allowed the Red Army to concentrate forces. I don't have exact figures, but at this point I think the numerical advantage across the entire Eastern front was about 2.5 or 3:1. Locally the Red Army was able to get advantages 2 or 3 times that without the Germans being aware of it.
These two battles also illustrate the difference in awareness of Red Army operations v Wehrmacht operations among English speakers. The German generals who drove through the French & British armies in 1940 & the Red Army in 1941 have shelf after shelf of books dedicated to them. Yet few of the people who can list their 'top 5' German generals have even heard of Bagramyan, Vasilevsky, Chernyakhovsky, Zakharov or Malinovsky, who won these two battles, or Konev, Chiukov and Vatutin, who won many more. Get beyond Zhukov, Rokossovsky and maybe Timoshenko and most folks blank. Its a pity, because lack of familiarity makes it easy to assume lack of ability. Like all armies, the Red Army had a mixed bag when it came to high command, but they deserve greater recognition than most of them have.Last edited by Bigfella; 03 Jul 17,, 10:15.sigpic
Win nervously lose tragically - Reds C C
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Originally posted by Triple C View PostI would close up by noting that, though the Russians had a well-deserved reputation of being insensitive to losses, their best generals were quite cunning and had outfoxed their opposite numbers in the OKH. The Germans had failed to assess Russian intent in every major battle since Kursk, so even taking their material superiority in full stock, how bad could the Russian generals be?sigpic
Win nervously lose tragically - Reds C C
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Originally posted by Bigfella View PostCome on Z. We're all friends here. Out with it. You talkin' about the other big Z?
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Toby
I believe this is the document which BF was referring to:
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/car...ubs/glantz.pdf
If you have problems send me an e-mail in a private message and I can send it to you in digits.
Cheers!
Buck
“Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it.”
Mark Twain
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Originally posted by Albany Rifles View PostToby
I believe this is the document which BF was referring to:
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/car...ubs/glantz.pdf
If you have problems send me an e-mail in a private message and I can send it to you in digits.
Cheers!
Buck
[ATTACH]44064[/ATTACH]
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That one is fine,but IIRC it ends in 1943,then talks about post war experience.However,the most interesting part was in Manchuria.There the airbourne forces had some astounding successes.
Glantz' book has some conclusions that are opposed the operations described.It describes Soviet failures in large scale ops,while talking of succes in small scale ones.Post-war doctrine however saw both the emergence of increasingly massive drops,of ever more heavier VDV units and the appearance of dedicated small scale units.
There is a coonection between pre-war doctrine,Manchuria and post-war developments that I believe to be insufficiently presented.
Soviet fvck ups vs the Germans are easily explained.The 10 abn corps were wiped out in '41.Those who know don't speak
He said to them, "But now if you have a purse, take it, and also a bag; and if you don't have a sword, sell your cloak and buy one. Luke 22:36
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Originally posted by Toby View PostBecause they were being used as Infantry?
Western units suffered the same problems (Arnhem). The shining light of paratroopers resisting heavy units is often cited as Bastogne, but at Bastogne the 101st was backed by an armed divisions CCB. This added a lot of fire power including a full battalion of 105mm guns
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