Is the SU-30MKI the worlds best fighter?

[uss]

If you are basing that on Cope India, you miss the entire point of DACT. Did you read the ROE's? If that's the logic, then I can say that the Mirage 2000 is superior to the SU-30 because the Adl'A handed India their asses in Garuda I and II.

can you please give me a source on the Garuda II bit where the french bested IAF? From what i recall reading, the french, found the SU 30k a powerful beast esp. in WVR (and ya these are Mirage 2000-5s not older models against the SU 30k equipped with mid 80s n001 or 19 radars).
from the above magazine as quoted in BR: http://www.press-vision.com/files/00...000176_c_l.jpg

The exercice make the front page of Air&Cosmos mag' this week. Long article.

In few words:

- India showed its brilliant ability to project its forces far away
- first the exercice was to learn to work together with comon missions, cross refuelling, and patrols with M2000C (RDI)
- then, it became more and more complex with fight visual range 1 vs 2 then 2 vs 2 with simulated fires of Magic2 and AA-11 Archer.
- After the 24th of june, the arrival of M2000-5 and more and more complex missions. First, comon patrols then BVR simulated fights with Mica's and R-77. The problem was the evaluations, it was solved with SLPRM mission recording system for french side, and Indian side GPS recording plus Otaris software aboard a E-3F AWACS which recorded every radar signatures. I worked well, just that they had to stay concentrated for long debriefing at the end of the day, sometime 2 or 3 hours...
- some comon 'sky forbiden' mission were made in comon with the participation of some M2000N and Tucano to simulate the intruders.
- In 8 days, 160 fight sorties, 2 to 4 each days: 80 for the 2000, 74 for the SU30, 4 for the E3-F and 4 for C-135FR as well as Il-78
- unanimous comment: "Indians showed a outstanding proffessionalism as well as a amazing adaptation ability with already good knowledges of OTAN procedures".
"It was simply a pleasure to work with them. On the ground or on the air, the are precise and serious as well as friendly and great comarad".
- French pilots learnt to know the SU30K better. "A powerfull and very manoeuvrable weapon system, which performs as well as the 2000 RDI but inferior to the 2000-5 RDY in its K version.
In close combat, the Mirage is more 'nervous' than the Sukhoi, "the edge must be tacken in the first minute or then, the power and the manoeuvrability of the Su-30 make the difference".

And in Garuda I, the IAF had the French again in WVR combat. Also, in BVR while the FAF caused problems initially (since the iaf had no previous experience), but later were matched by the IAF which obviously has some sharp thinking people. Again remember, the Armee d leair has more experience in BVR and uses better model Mirage 2000s.

kind regards,
USS.

[highsea]

This has all been discussed before...Cope India 2004

Indian 'Scare'; 3rd Wing explains what happened when U.S. pilots faced innovative Indian air force tactics

David A. Fulghum
1,311 words
4 October 2004
Aviation Week & Space Technology
50
Volume 161, Number 13
English
(c) 2004 McGraw-Hill, Inc.

The losing performance of F-15Cs in simulated air-to-air combat against the Indian air force this year is being perceived by some, both in the U.S. and overseas, as a weakening of American capabilities, and it is generating taunts from within the competitive U.S. fighter community.

The Cope India exercise also seemingly shocked some in Congress and the Pentagon who used the event to renew the call for modernizing the U.S. fighter force with stealthy F/A-22s and F-35 Joint Strike Fighters.

The reasons for the drubbing have gone largely unexplained and been misunderstood, according to those based here with the 3rd Wing who participated. Two major factors stand out: NONE OF THE SIX 3RD WING F-15CS WAS EQUIPPED WITH THE NEWEST LONG-RANGE, ACTIVE ELECTRONICALLY SCANNED ARRAY (AESA) RADARS. These Raytheon APG-63(V)2 radars were designed to find small and stealthy targets. At India's request, the U.S. agreed to mock combat at 3-to-1 odds and WITHOUT THE USE OF SIMULATED LONG-RANGE, RADAR-GUIDED AIM-120 AMRAAMS that even the odds with beyond-visual-range kills.

These same U.S. participants say the Indian pilots showed innovation and flexibility in their tactics. They also admit that they came into the exercise underrating the training and tactics of the pilots they faced. Instead of typical Cold War-style, ground-controlled interceptions, the Indians varied aircraft mixes, altitudes and formations. Indian air force planners never reinforced failure or repeated tactics that the U.S. easily repelled. Moreover, the IAF's airborne commanders changed tactics as opportunities arose. Nor did U.S. pilots believe they faced only India's top guns. Instead, they said that at least in some units they faced a mix of experienced and relatively new Indian fighter and strike pilots.

Maj. Mark A. Snowden, the 3rd Wing's chief of air-to-air tactics and a participant in Cope India, spoke for the 13 U.S. pilots who attended the exercise. They flew six F-15Cs, each equipped with a fighter data link for rapid exchange of target information, AIM-9Xs and a Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System, he says. The aircraft had been to Singapore for another exercise and for the long, six-week jaunt it was decided not to bring along the additional maintenance package needed to support AESA-equipped F-15Cs.

Cope India was held Feb. 15-28 at Gwalior, about 150 mi. south of Delhi, where the Indian air force has its Tactics Air Combat Development Establishment, which operates late-model MiG-21 Fishbeds as fighter escorts and MiG-27 Floggers as strike aircraft. Aerospace officials who have heard the classified brief on the exercise say the MiG-21s were equipped with a "gray-market" Bison radar and avionics upgrade.

Mica-armed Dassault Mirages 2000s are also stationed there. BROUGHT IN FOR THE EXERCISE WERE SUKHOI SU-30S (BUT NOT THE NEWEST SU-30 MKIS) carrying simulated AA-11s and AA-12 Adders. There also were five MiG-29 Flankers involved in a peripheral role and an Antonov An-32 Cline as a simulated AWACS.

"The outcome of the exercise boils down to [the fact that] they ran tactics that were more advanced than we expected," Snowden says. "India had developed its own air tactics somewhat in a vacuum. They had done some training with the French that we knew about, but we did not expect them to be a very well-trained air force. That was silly.

"They could come up with a game plan, but if it wasn't working they would call an audible and change [tactics in flight]," he says. "They made good decisions about when to bring their strikers in. The MiG-21s would be embedded with a Flogger for integral protection. There was a data link between the Flankers that was used to pass information. [Using all their assets,] they built a very good [radar] picture of what we were doing and were able to make good decisions about when to roll [their aircraft] in and out."

Aerospace industry officials say there's some indication that the MiG-21s also may have been getting a data feed from other airborne radars that gave them improved situational awareness of the airborne picture.

Generally the combat scenario was to have four F-15s flying at any time against about 12 Indian aircraft. While the U.S. pilots normally train to four versus 12, that takes into account at least two of the U.S. aircraft having AESA radar and being able to make the first, beyond-visual-range shots. For the exercise, both sides restricted long-range shots.

"That's what the Indians wanted to do," Snowden says. "That [handicap] really benefits a numerically superior force because you can't whittle away some of their force at long range. They were simulating active missiles [including] AA-12s." This means the missile has its own radar transmitter and doesn't depend on the launch aircraft's radar after launch. With the older AA-10 Alamo, the launching fighter has to keep its target illuminated with radar so the U.S. pilots would know when they were being targeted. But with the AA-12, they didn't know if they had been targeted. The Mirage 2000s carried the active Mica missile. Aerospace industry officials said that some of the radars the U.S. pilots encountered, including that of the Mirage 2000s, exhibited different characteristics than those on standard versions of the aircraft.

The U.S. pilots used no active missiles, and the AIM-120 Amraam capability was limited to a 20-naut.-mi. range while keeping the target illuminated when attacking and 18 naut. mi. when defending, as were all the missiles in the exercise.

"When we saw that they were a more professional air force, we realized that within the constraints of the exercise we were going to have a very difficult time," Snowden says. "In general, it looked like they ran a broad spectrum of tactics and they were adaptive. They would analyze what we were doing and then try something else. They weren't afraid to bring the strikers in high or low. They would move them around so that we could never anticipate from day to day what we were going to see."

By comparison, the U.S. pilots don't think they offered the Indians any surprises. The initial tactic is to run a wall with all four F-15s up front. That plays well when the long-range missiles and AESA radar are in play.

"You know we're there and we're not hiding," Snowden says. "But we didn't have the beyond-visual-range shot or the numerical advantage. Eventually we were just worn down by the numbers. They were very smart about it. Their goal was to get to a target area, engage the target and then withdraw without prolonging the fight. If there were a couple of Eagles still alive away from the target area, they would keep them pinned in, get done with the target and then egress with all their forces.

"All their aircraft seemed to be capable of breaking out [targets] and shooting at the ranges the exercise allowed," he says. "We generally don't train to an active missile threat [like the Mirage's Mica or the AA-12 for the Russian-built aircraft], and that was one of the things that caused us some problems."

F-15's had no AESA, the AIM-120 range was restricted, and it was used in passive mode only- e.g., the F-15's had to illuminate the target for the entire flight of the missile. India had a simulated AWACS, and the F-15's were outnumbered 12-3.

These were the rules. If you guys want to conclude that the SU-30 is superior based on this, go right ahead.

On DACT: This was posted by a friend of mine on another forum. Hopefully it will explain some basics to some of the members who think they can draw any conclusions from a DACT excersize.

The guy who penned this has had long term exposure to air combat and dissimilar air combat training, so he is an expert in his field.


There are some serious misconceptions out there about how air combat training is conducted so I’ve decided to write a post about how it really happens. Everybody seems to want to cite a particular exercise as proof of their point, when in reality, they have no contextual reference for these results they are referencing. Realize that I am writing from a USAF/USN/USMC/NATO perspective. If anyone else can provide some information about how it’s done elsewhere, please chime in.

Air-to-air combat is an extremely complex and dynamic undertaking. The combination of speed and the ability to maneuver in three dimensions creates an environment that is constantly changing and rarely allows any of the participants to see and understand the entire picture at once. In order to be successful in this environment, participants must be highly skilled, (reasonably) intelligent individuals who fight in these types of battles regularly.

Fighter pilots from countries all over the world are expected to use hardware purchased with national treasure to defend their homeland against attackers or attack others as directed by their leaders. In order to effectively accomplish those missions, pilots must regularly train for air combat. Air combat skills are perishable and even the best pilots are not as keen as they might be if they haven’t flown in a while – especially when flying in large force exercises where one decision may be the difference between success and failure.

Definitions: Air Combat Training (ACT) is a term used to describe a battle between similar aircraft. If 2 F-16s are fighting against 2 other F-16s, this would be an ACT war, whereas 2 F-15s fighting 2 F-16s would be termed Dissimilar Air Combat Training (DACT).

When planning a DACT exercise, planners typically will build an Offensive Counterair (OCA) strike package and Defensive Counterair (DCA) package with appropriate aircraft - this was displayed in the Cope India exercise when a strike package consisting of SU-30s, Mirages, and Jaguars attacked a target defended by F-15s. Besides designating types of aircraft and missions, planners will also draw up objectives for the exercise. These objectives can be very specific or quite broad depending on the situation.

A broad objective may be stated as “building trust between countries” or “familiarize pilots with other air forces.” More specific objectives may be “effectively integrate air forces for lane defense.” In order to accomplish these objectives, rules of engagement (ROE) will also be set.

ROE consist of weapons load, identification criteria, maneuvering limitations, tactics restrictions, and just about anything else you can think of. ROE can be pretty liberal or very restrictive, depending on the objectives, experience level of the pilots, or number and type of aircraft involved. If the objective is to “build trust” between nations, you can bet your ass that the rules are going to be damn restrictive to try to ensure there will be no accidents/dangerous or stupid stunts that would embarrass one side or the other or result in needless loss of life. This is why briefings are conducted, and “pickup games” are not allowed. (This is also the reason why this article about the Typhoons getting bounced by F-15Es is absolute *******s.) Regardless of the particular ROE established, somebody needs to be the bad guy.

In most exercises there will be a threat aircraft and weapons designated as the training aid for the other side. In U.S. exercises such as Red Flag, this will be something like a MiG-29 with aa-10s and aa-11s, and will be referred to as “opfor” or “red air.” Red air will usually consist of F-15s or F-16s (or whatever they can get) and will do their best to simulate that threat by limiting their radar modes, lock ranges, tactics, etc. “Blue air” will fly with their normal weapons loadout and will normally not have any restrictions other than operating their systems in a training/peacetime mode. There may be other restrictions imposed based on the objectives. Typically, the threat capabilities will start out low – short range missiles and very benign tactics, then increase as the exercise continues, as long as the blue air players are learning something and they are ready to progress to the next level. If the blue air fighters are getting their butts handed to them, the threat level will remain low, but if they are doing well, the threat capability will increase so the training is useful.

Notice that the red air players are training aids. They are supposed to follow the rules and die like men when blue air is executing well. If, however, the blue air screws something up and they have an opportunity to kick some tail, they are expected to do so. Violating the ROE by using a capability that is restricted, shooting beyond a specified range, or not adhering to an established ID criteria is considered a training rule violation and is dealt with severely. Several pilots have been sent home from exercises and have even been reassigned because they didn’t like to follow the rules.

By now it should becoming clear why one side or the other in these exercises often has a larger kill:loss ratio than the other. Red air is supposed to die – even if there are more capable aircraft on the red side. This is how many of the “surprising” results occur in large exercises – the threat level is tailored to the training needs of the blue air so they can learn from their mistakes in the debrief.

When conducting the debrief, kills must be assessed in order to find out what really happened. In order to do this, pilots must review the recording of the mission so they can evaluate their targeting and weapons employment. Red and blue air will get together, exchange data, and together decide who shot who and when. This is often an inexact science, however, with ACMI monitoring and extensive recording equipment in the aircraft, it is getting better. With results in hand, the blue fighters can then determine what they did wrong, and how to do better next time. This training is very effective for the blue air, but it usually sucks for red. What about exercises with real “threat” aircraft like MiG-29s, MiG-25s, etc? This is obviously the best training there can be, however, there is a problem.

When participating in an international exercise, both sides are probably going to hold some information back. This is not a “you show me yours, I’ll show you mine” game. In many cases, the shot data/weapons performance is classified, and not releasable to those on the other side. This is exactly the case in Cope India 04.

How do you debrief an engagement when neither side wants to say what really happened? Nobody is going to walk into the debrief and say “I shot that guy at this time and this range with this missile,” because they are basically giving away their capabilities. There are a couple of ways to deal with this, one of which is to not relay any of the shot information, but to merely say “that guy is dead at this time.” In that situation, no information (other than the f-pole) is released to the other side. However, astute people on the other side can extrapolate the data and figure out approximately when the shot was fired and can have a pretty good idea as to the performance of the missile. The other thing you can do is to establish a theoretical missile, with a nominal range to be used by both sides. This levels the playing field and rewards the side which executes better, rather than the side with the longer range missiles.

Detailed assessments that would normally take place to validate shots can't/won't happen in an exercise like this, therefore the overall results are not really accurate. However, as you say, they most certainly will debrief to get some results regardless of the potential inaccuracies. How valid the results are depends on how the exercise was planned.

As you can see, the results of these exercises (especially those released to the public) are quite likely not accurate. And, for one side or the other to claim victory in one of these exercises is either dishonest or just plain ignorance. Normally, the results are released as a series of politically correct statements such as those we’ve seen by the authorities after Cope India. Both sides are happy, they learned a lot, and can’t wait to do it again.

It should be noted that these types of exercises are planned many months in advance. A key part of the training syllabus is to agree on the types of scenarios to be performed during initial planning.

Most of the learning experience occurs on the ground, not in the air. The evolution from Air Tasking Order to Mission Planning/C3I/Asset Coordination to Aircraft Generation is where air battles are won or lost. The mechanics of flying airplanes and shooting off ordnance is icing on the cake.

I’m certainly not trying to stifle the spirited debate that goes on here. It’s fun reading the arguments for and against various aircraft, however, be careful when you’re quoting the results of some exercise when making your point!

I'm only saying that without details, all of this, "my airplane kicked your airplane's butt" is entertaining, but silly. One valuable part of the exercise is simply watching how the other side operates, what kind of tactics they use (they may have been "modified" along with the weapons), how they talk on the radio, etc. Obviously, the technology represented by the Su-30s is of great interest to the USAF also.

When the US conducts DACT and DUCT excersizes with our allies, we take red. The purpose for us, is to test our defences, and for our allies and friends, to test their offensive capabilities against the US.

The only time I am aware of that the ROE's have been loosened was in RIMPAC 2004 with the Aussies.

[uss]

Indian 'Scare'; 3rd Wing explains what happened when U.S. pilots faced innovative Indian air force tactics

David A. Fulghum
1,311 words
4 October 2004
Aviation Week & Space Technology
50
Volume 161, Number 13
English
(c) 2004 McGraw-Hill, Inc.

The losing performance of F-15Cs in simulated air-to-air combat against the Indian air force this year is being perceived by some, both in the U.S. and overseas, as a weakening of American capabilities, and it is generating taunts from within the competitive U.S. fighter community.

The Cope India exercise also seemingly shocked some in Congress and the Pentagon who used the event to renew the call for modernizing the U.S. fighter force with stealthy F/A-22s and F-35 Joint Strike Fighters.

The reasons for the drubbing have gone largely unexplained and been misunderstood, according to those based here with the 3rd Wing who participated. Two major factors stand out: NONE OF THE SIX 3RD WING F-15CS WAS EQUIPPED WITH THE NEWEST LONG-RANGE, ACTIVE ELECTRONICALLY SCANNED ARRAY (AESA) RADARS. These Raytheon APG-63(V)2 radars were designed to find small and stealthy targets. At India's request, the U.S. agreed to mock combat at 3-to-1 odds and WITHOUT THE USE OF SIMULATED LONG-RANGE, RADAR-GUIDED AIM-120 AMRAAMS that even the odds with beyond-visual-range kills.

These same U.S. participants say the Indian pilots showed innovation and flexibility in their tactics. They also admit that they came into the exercise underrating the training and tactics of the pilots they faced. Instead of typical Cold War-style, ground-controlled interceptions, the Indians varied aircraft mixes, altitudes and formations. Indian air force planners never reinforced failure or repeated tactics that the U.S. easily repelled. Moreover, the IAF's airborne commanders changed tactics as opportunities arose. Nor did U.S. pilots believe they faced only India's top guns. Instead, they said that at least in some units they faced a mix of experienced and relatively new Indian fighter and strike pilots.

Maj. Mark A. Snowden, the 3rd Wing's chief of air-to-air tactics and a participant in Cope India, spoke for the 13 U.S. pilots who attended the exercise. They flew six F-15Cs, each equipped with a fighter data link for rapid exchange of target information, AIM-9Xs and a Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System, he says. The aircraft had been to Singapore for another exercise and for the long, six-week jaunt it was decided not to bring along the additional maintenance package needed to support AESA-equipped F-15Cs.

Cope India was held Feb. 15-28 at Gwalior, about 150 mi. south of Delhi, where the Indian air force has its Tactics Air Combat Development Establishment, which operates late-model MiG-21 Fishbeds as fighter escorts and MiG-27 Floggers as strike aircraft. Aerospace officials who have heard the classified brief on the exercise say the MiG-21s were equipped with a "gray-market" Bison radar and avionics upgrade.

Mica-armed Dassault Mirages 2000s are also stationed there. BROUGHT IN FOR THE EXERCISE WERE SUKHOI SU-30S (BUT NOT THE NEWEST SU-30 MKIS) carrying simulated AA-11s and AA-12 Adders. There also were five MiG-29 Flankers involved in a peripheral role and an Antonov An-32 Cline as a simulated AWACS.

"The outcome of the exercise boils down to [the fact that] they ran tactics that were more advanced than we expected," Snowden says. "India had developed its own air tactics somewhat in a vacuum. They had done some training with the French that we knew about, but we did not expect them to be a very well-trained air force. That was silly.

"They could come up with a game plan, but if it wasn't working they would call an audible and change [tactics in flight]," he says. "They made good decisions about when to bring their strikers in. The MiG-21s would be embedded with a Flogger for integral protection. There was a data link between the Flankers that was used to pass information. [Using all their assets,] they built a very good [radar] picture of what we were doing and were able to make good decisions about when to roll [their aircraft] in and out."

Aerospace industry officials say there's some indication that the MiG-21s also may have been getting a data feed from other airborne radars that gave them improved situational awareness of the airborne picture.

Generally the combat scenario was to have four F-15s flying at any time against about 12 Indian aircraft. While the U.S. pilots normally train to four versus 12, that takes into account at least two of the U.S. aircraft having AESA radar and being able to make the first, beyond-visual-range shots. For the exercise, both sides restricted long-range shots.

"That's what the Indians wanted to do," Snowden says. "That [handicap] really benefits a numerically superior force because you can't whittle away some of their force at long range. They were simulating active missiles [including] AA-12s." This means the missile has its own radar transmitter and doesn't depend on the launch aircraft's radar after launch. With the older AA-10 Alamo, the launching fighter has to keep its target illuminated with radar so the U.S. pilots would know when they were being targeted. But with the AA-12, they didn't know if they had been targeted. The Mirage 2000s carried the active Mica missile. Aerospace industry officials said that some of the radars the U.S. pilots encountered, including that of the Mirage 2000s, exhibited different characteristics than those on standard versions of the aircraft.

The U.S. pilots used no active missiles, and the AIM-120 Amraam capability was limited to a 20-naut.-mi. range while keeping the target illuminated when attacking and 18 naut. mi. when defending, as were all the missiles in the exercise.

"When we saw that they were a more professional air force, we realized that within the constraints of the exercise we were going to have a very difficult time," Snowden says. "In general, it looked like they ran a broad spectrum of tactics and they were adaptive. They would analyze what we were doing and then try something else. They weren't afraid to bring the strikers in high or low. They would move them around so that we could never anticipate from day to day what we were going to see."

By comparison, the U.S. pilots don't think they offered the Indians any surprises. The initial tactic is to run a wall with all four F-15s up front. That plays well when the long-range missiles and AESA radar are in play.

"You know we're there and we're not hiding," Snowden says. "But we didn't have the beyond-visual-range shot or the numerical advantage. Eventually we were just worn down by the numbers. They were very smart about it. Their goal was to get to a target area, engage the target and then withdraw without prolonging the fight. If there were a couple of Eagles still alive away from the target area, they would keep them pinned in, get done with the target and then egress with all their forces.

"All their aircraft seemed to be capable of breaking out [targets] and shooting at the ranges the exercise allowed," he says. "We generally don't train to an active missile threat [like the Mirage's Mica or the AA-12 for the Russian-built aircraft], and that was one of the things that caused us some problems." This has all been discussed before...Cope India 2004 F-15's had no AESA, the AIM-120 range was restricted, and it was used in passive mode only- e.g., the F-15's had to illuminate the target for the entire flight of the missile. India had a simulated AWACS, and the F-15's were outnumbered 12-3.

These were the rules. If you guys want to conclude that the SU-30 is superior based on this, go right ahead.

On DACT: This was posted by a friend of mine on another forum. Hopefully it will explain some basics to some of the members who think they can draw any conclusions from a DACT excersize. When the US conducts DACT and DUCT excersizes with our allies, we take red. The purpose for us, is to test our defences, and for our allies and friends, to test their offensive capabilities against the US.

The only time I am aware of that the ROE's have been loosened was in RIMPAC 2004 with the Aussies.

Before I analyze this most informative post, I want to clarify one thing - personally, I don't believe the cope india 04 exercise show anything to prove the superiority of one a/c over another (neither for the SU 30 nor against it).

Now the AWST article has some v. interesting tidbits:

For ex:
IAF mirages carry Micas (whoa! this must definitely one of the BiG secrets of the IAF cause no mica purchase was ever reported to any monitoring body)

Now, another interesting thing is that if the F15s performed both offensive and defensive plays as the article suggests, then did they do this with the same number of a/c? I mean if the IAF was using 12 a/c (much of it being a dedicated strike packet) during attack, what was contained in the F15's strike packet - just 4 f15s doing the whole shebang - strike, a2a etc? This whole article and commentary talks mainly of the USAF defending and although it implies offensive tactics, does not really comment on them - I wonder why?

And if they (USAF) did act as aggressors, did they have simulated awacs support? - this question is not answered by the article.

Also, the whole 3 to 1 odds bit seems a little overemphasized, I mean out of 12 a/c, if you have a whole bunch dedicated to a strike role, what great advantage do they provide to the attacking side? I mean for land's sake you'd think the defensive air force would at least get a couple of the strike a/c. considering they were bloody floggers!

Not allowing the USAF to use full AMRAAM capabilities is also interesting - why would the IAF want such ROE? waita minit, it says also in the article that "both sides restricted their long range shots", so I guess this was not any real handicap since the ROE were not disadvantageous to the AMRAAM equipped F15s.

One more thing, the article calls the MiG29s flankers, news to me! I thought they were fulcrums.

Another thing of interest that the article brings out is that some of the guys who flew for the IAF were "relatively new" not experienced top gun types. this surely tell us something about the IAF pilot's skill and abilities.

So overall, one would reach the same conclusion that the article writers did:
while the DACT exercise cope india did not prove the superiority of any one plane over another; tactics wise, the IAF surely bested the USAF in rules of engagement that were equal to both sides and definitely DID NOT favor any one side.

Just my two cents.

kind Regards,
USS.

[troung]

IAF mirages carry Micas (whoa! this must definitely one of the BiG secrets of the IAF cause no mica purchase was ever reported to any monitoring body)

They don't use them in the real world. Indian Mirage 2000EH/DHs use the RDM-4 and the new 10 Mirages use the RDM-7.

They were firing missiles the planes cannot use... so really think about that....

[uss]

They don't use them in the real world. Indian Mirage 2000EH/DHs use the RDM-4 and the new 10 Mirages use the RDM-7.

They were firing missiles the planes cannot use... so really think about that....

Troung,

The article clearly states that

Mica-armed Dassault Mirages 2000s are also stationed there (i.e. gwalior)

There have been such rumors, and who knows perhaps there is a fire behind all the smoke. On the other hand, if the Micas really cannot be fired by IAF mirages, then perhaps the article is not the most credible is it? Check out the naming error wrt MiG29 as well. I could be wrong but AWST (based on this article anyway) seems to be more of a "pop" aviation magazine rather than something really substantial - somewhat akin to all the other hype media around that embellished how the "IAF trounced the USAF F15s and all" .


Regards,
USS.

[troung]

Well then the article is clearly wrong... or it shows that India was using weapons it doesn't have... And seeing as the dog and pony show also had An-32s acting as AWACs... makes one wonder...

InAF Mirage 2000s use the Super 530D and not the MICA EM in the real world as of today.

[highsea]

Troung, it's a range excersize. You can simulate anything you want to, you are not using real missiles, AWACS, etc. You have ACMI pods and range radar- datalinks. You don't know the results until it's over and everyone is debriefed. There's a lot of "we'll take your word for it"- the forces don't really share any classified data. You have to read between the lines. If a pilot claims a kill, he claims a kill- he simply shows that he was within x range of the target and simulated a fox. If the AC were within the parameters agreed upon, the kill gets credited.

I guess this was not any real handicap since the ROE were not disadvantageous to the AMRAAM equipped F15s.

Both sides restricted the range, but only India was allowed active guidance. And no, nothing I have seen, including the UNCLASS reports, say that the US side made any offensive strike sorties. If anything, there would have been 2 on 2, or maybe a couple 4 on 4 A2A only engagements. Note this: "Indian air force planners never reinforced failure or repeated tactics that the U.S. easily repelled." This makes it pretty clear that not all of the engagements were one sided, as most people try to make it out to be.

the IAF surely bested the USAF in rules of engagement that were equal to both sides and definitely DID NOT favor any one side.

No, allowing AWACS, equal numbers of AC and equal weapons parameters would have made the ROE's equal to both sides. But the training value would have been lost. DACT is not about "Top Gun" free-for-alls.

Cope India was a training excersize. Nothing more, nothing less. Trying to make it into something else is an excersize in sophistry. The US conducts excersizes with our allies in all of the services, we do it several times a year, always taking red forces. There's no point for us to take blue, because we are the ones acting as the "training aid."

Only when we train with India, do we have to listen to all this bullsh*t from Indian media. It happened with Cope Thunder, and again with Cope India. Funny, but the other allies that we train with seem to have a little more class, and don't try to blow things all out of proportion. I notice that India wasn't invited to Cope Thunder this year...wonder why...

There will be another excersize in November, at India's request we will be bringing F-16's. Obviously they want an opportunity to assess the Viper. I am sure we will hear a bunch more boasting/bullsh*t after that one too. Personally, I hope it's the last time we train with the IAF. I'd rather deal with the Aussies, Brits, and Canucks. At least they know how to discuss these training excersizes with the media.

That's it for me on DACT discussions, and x vs. y "who is best" threads. What a fukking waste of time...

[uss]

Troung, it's a range excersize. You can simulate anything you want to, you are not using real missiles, AWACS, etc. You have ACMI pods and range radar- datalinks. You don't know the results until it's over and everyone is debriefed. There's a lot of "we'll take your word for it"- the forces don't really share any classified data. You have to read between the lines. If a pilot claims a kill, he claims a kill- he simply shows that he was within x range of the target and simulated a fox. If the AC were within the parameters agreed upon, the kill gets credited. Both sides restricted the range, but only India was allowed active guidance. And no, nothing I have seen, including the UNCLASS reports, say that the US side made any offensive strike sorties. If anything, there would have been 2 on 2, or maybe a couple 4 on 4 A2A only engagements. Note this: "Indian air force planners never reinforced failure or repeated tactics that the U.S. easily repelled." This makes it pretty clear that not all of the engagements were one sided, as most people try to make it out to be.

Both sides restricted the range, but only India was allowed active guidance. And no, nothing I have seen, including the UNCLASS reports, say that the US side made any offensive strike sorties. If anything, there would have been 2 on 2, or maybe a couple 4 on 4 A2A only engagements. Note this: "Indian air force planners never reinforced failure or repeated tactics that the U.S. easily repelled." This makes it pretty clear that not all of the engagements were one sided, as most people try to make it out to be.


No, allowing AWACS, equal numbers of AC and equal weapons parameters would have made the ROE's equal to both sides. But the training value would have been lost. DACT is not about "Top Gun" free-for-alls.

Cope India was a training excersize. Nothing more, nothing less. Trying to make it into something else is an excersize in sophistry. The US conducts excersizes with our allies in all of the services, we do it several times a year, always taking red forces. There's no point for us to take blue, because we are the ones acting as the "training aid."

Only when we train with India, do we have to listen to all this bullsh*t from Indian media. It happened with Cope Thunder, and again with Cope India. Funny, but the other allies that we train with seem to have a little more class, and don't try to blow things all out of proportion. I notice that India wasn't invited to Cope Thunder this year...wonder why...

There will be another excersize in November, at India's request we will be bringing F-16's. Obviously they want an opportunity to assess the Viper. I am sure we will hear a bunch more boasting/bullsh*t after that one too. Personally, I hope it's the last time we train with the IAF. I'd rather deal with the Aussies, Brits, and Canucks. At least they know how to discuss these training excersizes with the media.

That's it for me on DACT discussions, and x vs. y "who is best" threads. What a fukking waste of time...

Highsea, it is unfortunate that this type of discussion makes you mad. Personally, I thought it was pretty civilized. The point I was making is v. clear - the magazine article you used to support your view had some glaring errors.

Again, I emphasize that I'm not trying to make this exercise a "who is best" type of game, I'm just trying to point out that one will never know the full implications of such an exercize. And the AWST article did nothing to convince me that it was more than a mere tit-for-tat against indian media for trying to buff up the image of the IAF. Both media (AWST and Indian media) have some obviously glaring errors as you point out. And since unfortunately, most of us common folk are not privy to UNCLASS (i'm assuming these are not so unclassified as the name suggests) type documents, we are stuck with trying to analyze such reports in forums such as WAB.

I will not comment about your feelings towards Indians since I'm assuming you just mean the indian media and nothing personal.

Kind Regards,
uss.

[troung]

Troung, it's a range excersize. You can simulate anything you want to, you are not using real missiles, AWACS, etc. You have ACMI pods and range radar- datalinks. You don't know the results until it's over and everyone is debriefed. There's a lot of "we'll take your word for it"- the forces don't really share any classified data. You have to read between the lines. If a pilot claims a kill, he claims a kill- he simply shows that he was within x range of the target and simulated a fox. If the AC were within the parameters agreed upon, the kill gets credited.

I know, my point was they were in fact simulating things they don't even have...

[highsea]

I know, my point was they were in fact simulating things they don't even have...

I guess guess I'm just beating my head against the wall...

The US was simulating the PAF as it now stands (read the ROE's again), HELL F.U.C.K.I.N.G. -LO?

I *****in give up....you guys will not get this, will you????

No, you won't..........................end of story, end of attempt.

[highsea]

I will not comment about your feelings towards Indians since I'm assuming you just mean the indian media and nothing personal.

Kind Regards,
uss.

No, I'm talking about Indians. When I say I hope we don't do any more DACT with India, I mean it. Because it's just easier for me to not have to deal with it. That's not meant to be personal to you- you have been straightforward. It's your countrymen that give offense...

I have a lot of Indian friends that I have partied with, and done business with over the years. What I am discovering here is, I no longer feel that I can trust them. Now maybe I was the dumbsh*t, I don't know. It's these things I learn as I get older.

Frankly, it's always been difficult to do business, but now I have less desire to work through the difficulties, and I am more likely to just forego the effort. The common ground that we once had has gone away. I am not anymore friendly to India. That's a loss for both of us.

[Bill]

The Cope India DACT is about the most overblown training exercize of modern times.

The Jews used to always babble about how they 'spanked the US' too. It wasn't any more true when they said it either.

[Jay]

Ah, cummon highseas you are changing your beliefs based on a internet discussion board??

Also, the Indian Govt has always kept mum about all these exercises. Its the guess work of tabloids.

[hammer]

Only when we train with India, do we have to listen to all this bullsh*t from Indian media. It happened with Cope Thunder, and again with Cope India. Funny, but the other allies that we train with seem to have a little more class, and don't try to blow things all out of proportion.

What BS. The US media broke the story first. The Indian media quoted the American sources for that news. We dont gloat, unlike a few others.Its you guys who were whining that other airforces are catching up and that you need F/A-22's to offset it. what crap are talking about now?

There will be another excersize in November, at India's request we will be bringing F-16's. Obviously they want an opportunity to assess the Viper. I am sure we will hear a bunch more boasting/bullsh*t after that one too.

If you guys stfu, you wouldnt hear a peep from us either.

Personally, I hope it's the last time we train with the IAF. I'd rather deal with the Aussies, Brits, and Canucks.

Probably thats why you are not in the decision making loop.

That's it for me on DACT discussions, and x vs. y "who is best" threads. What a fukking waste of time...

Then don't fukking waste your time. Go try to stop the USAF-IAF exercises.

[hammer]

The common ground that we once had has gone away. I am not anymore friendly to India. That's a loss for both of us.

You never were. And guess what we dont really care.