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Thread: CPEC and Developments

  1. #226
    Senior Contributor Oracle's Avatar
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    Old news, DE, and not quite upto date.

    Chinese warships return to South China Sea as Indian Navy continues heavy deployment around Maldives

    The Indian Navy, meanwhile, continues maintaining a heavy presence of battle-ready warships in the Arabian Sea, including many close to the Maldives.

    According to a navy announcement last Wednesday, “A tri-service maritime exercise, codenamed ‘Paschim Lehar’, commenced on the Western seaboard on 12 Feb[ruary 20]18. This exercise includes the participation of a large number of ships, submarines and aircraft from the Western Naval Command of the Indian Navy.”

    The announcement also revealed the presence of “Eastern Naval Command, Indian Army, Indian Air Force and the Indian Coast Guard [units that are] also participating to build interoperability.”

    In all, India has over 40 ships and submarines deployed in Exercise Paschim Lehar, and a similar number of combat aircraft.

    If further signalling were needed of the ready availability of Indian military power, the Navy also announced that army amphibious forces – specialist units used to assault and capture island targets – were also participating in the on-going exercise.

  2. #227
    Turbanator Senior Contributor Double Edge's Avatar
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    hrm yes, things appear to have changed since my last google search.

    Very good, so go to the UN but also keep other options at hand

    India denies Chinese Navy is near Maldives, refutes reports that 11 warships deployed | The Print | Feb 21 2018

    Chinese portal claims ships sailed into the eastern Indian Ocean this month, India says nearest Chinese Navy force is on routine duty in the Gulf of Aden.
    lol

    Quoting the Chinese media, Reuters has reported that 11 Chinese warships sailed into the eastern Indian Ocean this month, linking it to the Maldivian crisis. Chinese reports described the deployment as consisting of frigates, amphibious ships and support tankers.
    So we wait for Reuters to post a clariyfying article to clear up this confusion
    Last edited by Double Edge; 21 Feb 18, at 14:53.

  3. #228
    Turbanator Senior Contributor Double Edge's Avatar
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    Really old news indeed going by the date of this editorial a week back

    Editorial: China And India Need To Strengthen Communication On Maldives Crisis | GT (Chinese) | Feb 14 2018

    The crisis in Maldives is being described by some in the Indian and Western media as a “breaking point” between New Delhi and Beijing. It is important to prevent the situation from being driven by this fantasy in the interest of helping Maldives properly resolve this crisis, safeguarding the fundamentals of the Sino-Indian relationship and maintaining The peace and stability in the Indian Ocean region.

    ………we have not given top priority to dispelling India’s doubts (about China’s strategic goals inn South Asia). It will be very helpful for China and India to carry out strategic communication through diplomatic channels in the wake of this crisis in Maldives. Beijing and New Delhi need to understand each other’s deepest thinking and concerns and prevent the crisis in Maldives from triggering a new crisis between China and India. This will be the best policy for both sides and will also play an active facilitating role for ensuring a soft landing of the country.

    China must make every effort to dispel India’s doubts about China and Maldives as much as possible. China and India should reach a consensus that it is impossible for India to completely control the Maldives in an era of globalization and that it will not be possible for China to replace India as another big country dominating it. If China and India compete in Maldives, neither side will be able to overwhelm the other or gain victory for all time to come.

    The Maldives should become a testing ground for resolving mutual suspicions between China and India, especially New Delhi’s suspicion of Beijing. The best way to do this is by letting the Maldives do its own thing. Maldives must be able to ensure the safety of investment of both China and India at the same time and make the legal rights of foreigners in the country the same for all countries.

    India needs to give up its privileged way of thinking in South Asia. When developing relations with South Asian countries, China also needs to consider India’s feelings. In the process, both China and India ought to abide by the generally accepted international rules so as to maximise mutual understanding. Both countries should clarify that the highest priority for both countries is to speed up economic and social development. If the two countries paint themselves into the corner of geopolitical competition, future historians of China and India will have to sigh.
    hmm, seems they employ adults to write editorials for the Chinese version of GT compared to the English version

    Can't see the Indian administration disagreeing with the bolded bit
    Last edited by Double Edge; 21 Feb 18, at 21:26.

  4. #229
    Senior Contributor Oracle's Avatar
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    There was this rumor recently that mandarin has been declared as an official language of Pak. And twitter erupted.

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    LOL.

  5. #230
    Turbanator Senior Contributor Double Edge's Avatar
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    Post mortem of how that story spread

    Fact check: Relax, Pakistan has not adopted Mandarin as an official language | Scroll | Feb 20 2018

    In what seemed like a game of Chinese whispers gone too far, the Indian media on Monday and Tuesday reported with great relish that Pakistan had decided to make Mandarin one of the country’s official languages, apart from Urdu and English. The Pakistan Senate, the story went, had approved a motion to this effect on Monday, ostensibly to strengthen the country’s ties with China. The narrative was furthered with glee by the Indian media, who viewed it as a fresh example of Pakistan’s appeasement of rival China.

    So how did the news get misinterpreted and then amplified?

    The news seems to have been first misreported by Pakistan’s Abb Tak news channel (!)

  6. #231
    Turbanator Senior Contributor Double Edge's Avatar
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    Entrepreneurs in the retail sector are gearing up for the influx of Chinese into Pakistan

    How Pakistan is becoming China's land of opportunity | Dawn | Jun 07 2017

    Comments section is mixed about this development

  7. #232
    Turbanator Senior Contributor Double Edge's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by cataphract View Post
    Come on man. Hambantota and Gwadar and you still don't see India in the picture? The objective is to have an effective PLAN presence in the Indian Ocean to deny USN and IN complete control of it. Not only is India in the picture but also Diego Garcia.
    Another article to read, adding to my earlier reply

    India increases its presence in Indian Ocean, with an eye on China | Straits Times | Nov 08 2017

    The Indian Navy is increasing its presence in the Indian Ocean with a permanent deployment of over a dozen ships, including on important sea routes, amid China's growing naval presence in the region.

    Around 12 to 15 naval ships are being deployed at strategic points along sea lanes from the Malacca Strait to Bay of Bengal and Sunda Strait for "greater presence and visibility'', said the Indian Navy.

    The deployment, under which ships will be on permanent patrol as opposed to going on short missions, aims to help countries in the Indian Ocean region counter threats like piracy as well as offer humanitarian aid and disaster relief, said the Indian Navy.

    "Initially, the Indian Navy's foray into these places was once in a year for overseas deployment. Now there is a change in the dynamics (in the region) and the presence of an extra regional power has necessitated that our presence be increased,'' an Indian Navy spokesman told The Straits Times, without naming any country.

    Indian experts welcomed news that India was boosting its presence in the Indian Ocean, but said much more needs to be done to counter the Chinese presence.

    "Basically, what they are stressing is the capacity to mount distant operations. But I am not sure that 15 ships will suffice... if the idea is to concentrate on Chinese activities in the Malacca Strait, then we can manage with 15 ships,'' said Professor Bharat Karnad at the Centre for Policy Research,
    Last edited by Double Edge; 22 Feb 18, at 23:08.

  8. #233
    Turbanator Senior Contributor Double Edge's Avatar
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    Belt And Road And US-China Relations In 2018 – Analysis | Eurasia review | Feb 18 2018

    By Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy*



    In early February 2018, US forces conducted air operations targeting both the Taliban and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in Afghanistan’s north-eastern Badakshan province which shares a border with China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The US is visibly interested in co-opting China in the region rather than contesting it. And, in the backdrop of emerging regional developments, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) may be poised to become key determinants in the Washington-Beijing relationship in South and Central Asia.

    Timing and Context
    Referring to the strikes, the Commander of the NATO Air Command Afghanistan Air Force Maj Gen James Hecker said, “The destruction of these training facilities prevents terrorists from planning any acts near the border with China and Tajikistan.” Responding to a question on the strikes, China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang said, “…We stand ready to continue strengthening pragmatic cooperation in fighting terrorism with all other parties based on the principle of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit so as to jointly maintain international and regional peace and stability.” The operative words here are “pragmatic cooperation,” “mutual benefit,” and “jointly maintain.”

    The timing of the strikes is important. They took place soon after reports emerged that China is in talks with the Afghan government to establish a military base for Afghan troops in Badakshan province (Kabul has confirmed but Beijing has officially denied it); a month after Beijing and Islamabad invited Kabul to join CPEC; and days before China’s State Councillor Yang Jiechi visited Washington. This is at a time when Russia is mobilising the Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s Afghanistan Contact Group to address security issues along the Central Asian borders with Afghanistan.

    Beijing is also actively engaged in various peace process formats in Afghanistan and has for long maintained a direct communication channel with the Taliban. Meanwhile, the US-backed Quadrilateral Coordination Group comprised of the US, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan has been rendered dead-on-arrival, and the Russia-backed process in which China is a major partner is broader and brings more regional countries to the table. China has initiated the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism, a security alliance on counter-terrorism involving intelligence-sharing and training with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan. It is is part of a trilateral arrangement with Islamabad and Kabul; and in the past, Chinese and Tajik troops have held joint drills in Ishkashim district in Tajikistan’s Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Region bordering Afghanistan’s Badakshan province.

    This places Beijing in a unique position in the region. Although a China-built military base in Badakshan will have a bearing on US presence and influence in Afghanistan, Washington seems to view co-opting Beijing as more beneficial than contesting it. US actions suggest that it may be offering China a potential partnership role for closer alignment between the two. Beijing has long considered ETIM a threat, and cooperation on countering it—designated as a terrorist organisation by the US in September 2002—provides a “mutually beneficial” launch-pad for the US to enhance regional engagement with China.



    Additionally, that the US strikes in Badakshan took place less than a month after Liu Jinsong took over as China’s new ambassador to Afghanistan is telling. Liu’s personal and professional background is fitting for promoting BRI objectives, especially CPEC. He was raised in Xinjiang; was the director of the Silk Road Fund in 2015 when Pakistan and China formally agreed to commence work on the US$ 46 billion CPEC project; was a deputy director in the Chinese foreign ministry’s international economic cooperation office; and until recently, was the deputy chief of mission at the Chinese embassy in New Delhi.

    US is likely to find CPEC non-problematic—perhaps even useful—provided China uses it as leverage to align Pakistani foreign policy towards the US’ current objectives on transnational terrorism and Afghanistan’s economic progress. Yet, it is certainly not lost on Washington that China could gain the capability to influence regional developments via CPEC – a component of BRI – as seen in the invitation to Afghanistan. Liu’s appointment demonstrates that China is seeking increased engagement with Afghanistan, one directly aligned with BRI via CPEC.

    If China were to actively compete with the US for a ‘security provider’ role in the region—which the BRI will enable it to—the US will not find it favourable. Thus, the US attempt to woo China could be viewed as a two-pronged approach: co-opting China (or at least decelerate its growing proximity to Russia); and ensuring that the Washington has more room to manoeuvre, possibly by aligning its hard power with Beijing’s soft power as China makes inroads into Afghanistan and Central Asia.

    Washington may be attempting to pragmatically employ the ‘regionalise’ component of its R4+S strategy by courting Beijing. However, it is unclear whether this approach is conditional on the US retaining its ‘primacy’ in the region. Nonetheless, despite rhetoric, the US seems sceptical of regional actors taking on more active roles in the region.

    Looking Ahead
    Washington’s signalling has delivered Beijing’s curiosity, but its willingness to “jointly maintain” regional peace and stability might ultimately determine the level and duration of Beijing’s attention.

    Suffice to say, in 2018, the US will demonstrate a lot more interest in CPEC. Additionally, BRI and Central Asia will likely be in focus throughout the year, particularly in the run up to the second US-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue, scheduled to take place before July 2018.

    * Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy
    Deputy Director, IPCS

  9. #234
    Turbanator Senior Contributor Double Edge's Avatar
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    Continuing on from post 211

    Chinese Projects in Pakistan Prove Tempting Targets for Terrorist Groups | Jamestown | Feb 08 2018

    Specifically targeting CPEC projects and workers would provide ETIM with a major propaganda victory and constitute a major blow to Chinese pride. A major terrorist attack on CPEC would undermine the confidence of other BRI participants in the Chinese initiative and present a possible setback to China’s global ambitions.

    China’s treatment of its Uighur population is a key driver for jihadist attacks on Chinese nationals and interests both in Pakistan and further afield. In Pakistan specifically, CPEC has presented an additional driver for attacks and its projects and workers are potential targets.

    If Beijing’s approach to its Uighur population remains repressive and if CPEC’s benefits do not reach local communities in Baluchistan and other provinces, the potential for attacks will only increase.

    As China’s global footprint expands, so too will its exposure to international terrorists groups. This has already prompted enhanced Chinese engagement abroad, including the deployment of its special forces to protect its projects and rescue Chinese nationals who have been taken hostage. The array of terrorist threats that Chinese projects and personnel face in Pakistan is a pointer to what it can expect in other countries participating in the BRI, and from radical Islamist groups sympathetic to the Uighur cause.
    Get the impression its only a matter of time before there is a major attack
    Last edited by Double Edge; 24 Feb 18, at 18:09.

  10. #235
    Senior Contributor Oracle's Avatar
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    China sets stage for Xi to stay in office indefinitely

    BEIJING: China's ruling Communist Party on Sunday set the stage for President Xi Jinping to stay in office indefinitely, with a proposal to remove a constitutional clause limiting presidential service to just two terms in office.

    Xi, 64, is currently required by the country's constitution to step down as president after two five-year terms. Nearing the end of his first term, he will be formally elected to a second at the annual meeting of China's largely rubber-stamp parliament opening on March 5.

    There is no limit on his tenure as the party and military chief, though a maximum 10-year term is the norm. He began his second term as head of the party and military in October at the end of a once-every-five-years party congress.

    The announcement, carried by state news agency Xinhua, gave few details. It said the proposal had been made by the party's Central Committee, the largest of its elite ruling bodies. The proposal also covers the vice president position.

    "The Communist Party of China Central Committee proposed to remove the expression that the President and Vice-President of the People's Republic of China 'shall serve no more than two consecutive terms' from the country's Constitution," Xinhua said.

    The Central Committee also proposed inserting "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" into the constitution, Xinhua said in a separate report, referring to Xi's guiding political thought that is already in the arguably more important Communist Party constitution.

    Constitutional reform needs to be approved by parliament. That is stacked with members chosen for their loyalty to the party, meaning the reform will not be blocked.
    There has been persistent speculation that Xi wants to stay on in office past the customary two five-year terms.

    One of his closest political allies, former top graft buster Wang Qishan, stepped down from the party's Standing Committee - the seven-man body that runs China - in October.

    Aged 69, Wang had reached the age at which top officials tend to retire. But he has been chosen as a parliament delegate this year and is likely to become vice president, sources with ties to the leadership and diplomats say.

    The move is significant because if Wang does not retire, that could set a precedent for Xi to stay on in power after he completes the traditional two terms in office.

    However, the role of party chief is more senior than that of president. At some point Xi could be given a party position that also enables him to stay on as long as he likes.

  11. #236
    Senior Contributor Oracle's Avatar
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    A Summer Vacation in China’s Muslim Gulag

    Since announcing a “people’s war on terror” in 2014, the Chinese Communist Party has created an unprecedented network of re-education camps in the autonomous Xinjiang region that are essentially ethnic gulags. Unlike the surgical “strike hard” campaigns of the recent past, the people’s war uses a carpet-bombing approach to the country’s tumultuous western border region. Chen Quanguo, Xinjiang’s party secretary and the architect of this security program, encouraged his forces to “bury the corpses of terrorists in the vast sea of a people’s war.” But the attempt to drown a few combatants has pulled thousands of innocent people under in its wake.

    Sporadic violence has rattled the region since July 5, 2009, when indigenous Uighurs, a largely Muslim minority, took to the streets of Urumqi, the regional capital, to protest the murder of fellow Uighurs who worked in the southern Chinese city of Shaoguan. The protests spiraled into a riot, which claimed 197 lives and nearly 2,000 injuries before order was restored. Insurrection has since spread beyond the capital, and skirmishes between Uighurs and security personnel have become common occurrences.

    Amid the protracted conflict and rising Islamophobia in China, Communist Party officials are responding by creating a surveillance state. In the 12 months preceding September 2017 alone, the party-state advertised nearly 100,000 security positions in Xinjiang. Every resident of the region has been affixed with the label “safe,” “normal,” or “unsafe,” based on metrics such as age, faith, religious practices, foreign contacts, and experience abroad. Those deemed unsafe, whether or not they are guilty of wrongdoing, are regularly detained and imprisoned without due process.

    Estimates indicate that as many as 800,000 individuals, mostly Uighurs, have been incarcerated in the re-education camps. Based on the current population of Uighurs in Xinjiang, which stands at some 11 million, this amounts to the extrajudicial detention of nearly 10 percent of the ethno-national group.

    While Chinese officials maintain that these re-education camps are schools for eradicating extremism, teaching Chinese language, and promoting correct political thought, Radio Free Asia has reported that the detention centers are overpopulated and detainees poorly treated. Those reports are confirmed by testimony from a young Uighur man studying in the United States, torn from the American university where he studied, and where I work, to a Chinese gulag. He shared his story with me over four meetings in 2017 and 2018. (Due to concerns for Iman’s security — the Chinese government has previously targeted the families of Uighur writers — pseudonyms have been used for all parties.)

    Iman, from a middle-class Uighur family, came to study in the United States a few years ago. He succeeded in the Chinese education system, even earning a degree from a university in eastern China. In 2017, Iman flew back to China for the summer recess, planning to spend time with friends on the east coast before he returned to Xinjiang to see his mother. Despite the exhaustion from the long flight, he was filled with joy as he landed in the Chinese metropolis where he’d previously lived for several years, despite the discrimination he would likely face. Ethnic minorities in China, especially Uighurs, are often denied hotel rooms.

    As he remained strapped in his seat, a flight attendant approached. “They are asking for you,” the woman told him. “It’s probably just a visa issue.” Her words were of little comfort — after all, he possessed a Chinese passport.

    Three uniformed Han Chinese border patrol officers waited for the young Uighur student on the jet bridge. Taken into custody, he was subject to a cavity search and then had his devices checked. “I knew to delete any sensitive files before the flight,” Iman recalled with a smirk. Unable to find incrementing files, an officer rattled off a barrage of questions: “What do you do in North America? Where do you study? We found business cards of Chinese professors. You know a lot of important people, don’t you?”

    Although unnerved, Iman answered each question with carefully constructed responses. Airport interrogations were nothing new to the young man — he was subjected to questioning after landing in China the previous year — but the protocol was different this time. The inspection was much more thorough, the officers more meticulous and less friendly. “I knew something was wrong when an officer inspected my shoes. They took out the soles, looked inside, turned them upside-down, and violently shook them. This never happened in the past.”

    Another officer approached Iman and told him he would be transported to a local jail. The young man demanded an explanation or at least a formal charge. He was given neither. “May I at least call my mother?” Iman asked. “I want to let her know I’ve arrived safely.” His request was denied. “Will you call her for me?” the young man pleaded. The officer retorted, “No, we can’t call her. The local police in Xinjiang should provide her with an update.”

  12. #237
    Senior Contributor Oracle's Avatar
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    China’s romance with terrorists in Af-Pak region

    A story published in the Financial Times on 19 February revealed China’s strategy of adopting Pakistan’s state policy of wooing “good” terrorists for its intended self-gains. The story exposed China’s clandestine talks with Baloch militants for “more than five years to protect the $60 billion worth of infrastructure projects it is financing as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)” and have made “a lot of progress by not making a forceful push.”

    Covert romancing with terrorists is not new to China, especially in the Af-Pak region. China’s appeasement policy towards terrorists has a long history, starting with the “Baren incident” in the restive Xinjiang province that took place between Uyghur militants and Chinese government forces in April 1990. The Baren incident was the outcome of militants who participated in proxy war for Afghanistan against Soviets and Islamists trained in the Af-Pak region.

    According to Chinese officials, Uyghur militants used automated weapons against Chinese security forces throughout the Baren town. The uprising lasted for several weeks in which 23 were killed and 232 got injured. But, according to other sources and indigenous population whom the author met in 2013 as part of his PhD research, more than 1,600 people were killed in the incident. After the incident, China tackled the Xinjiang problem with an iron fist, arrested more than 10,000 Uyghurs, put a control on religious activities and started “ethnic cleansing” through mass migration of Hans from other parts of China. China’s internal actions to curb the uprising in Xinjiang created global uproar for mass human rights violations. Externally, besides strategic reasons, China also started its romanticism with terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan to make Xinjiang secure from centrifugal tendencies and terrorist activities.

    The romance started in the late 1990s, when China held talks with Taliban for the shutdown of Uyghur training camps in Afghanistan. The Taliban representatives gave assurances from time to time. However, the year 1997 once again saw the reinforcement of ethnic separatism and “Islamic fundamentalism” in Xinjiang. In February 1997, Kulja in northwest Xinjiang became the centre of violence between Uyghur militants and Chinese forces, in which, according to official Chinese account, more than 120 people died and thousands got injured. Uyghur sources, on the other hand, claim that this wave of violence resulted in the killing of more than 400 natives. Internally, once again, China gave immense powers to security forces and started its “strike hard campaign” to curb terrorism, separatism and extremism in the province. Chinese authorities in Xinjiang arrested 2,773 terror suspects and seized 6,000 pounds of explosives and 31,000 rounds of ammunition.

    After 1997, China adopted an external policy to reinforce and help authoritative regimes of Central Asia for curbing all Uyghur activities in their countries and also started a fresh round of high-level talks with the Taliban. In November 2000, Chinese ambassador to Pakistan held talks with Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omer. This was the first time when a senior diplomat of any non-Muslim country had a meeting Mullah Omer. Mullah Omer promised that Taliban will not allow Uyghurs to launch attacks in Xinjiang against the interests of China, with the condition that they will continue to remain in the Talibani ranks.

    After 9/11 attacks, the United States dethroned Taliban from Afghanistan. The Chinese state maintained their relations with Quetta Shura, the Taliban leadership council based across the border in Pakistan for security and peace in their sensitive and strategic Muslim-dominated region of Xinjiang. There are reports that China openly provided arms and ammunition to the Taliban as the US military presence in Afghanistan made it feel encircled by the Americans to an extent even greater than was the case before the Afghan war.

    In December 2017, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pitched for talks between the Afghan government and Taliban at a trilateral meeting between foreign ministers from Pakistan, Afghanistan and China in Beijing, which is against the Indo-US interests and also against the stated position of the Afghan government on this issue. Therefore, it is easy to also see the real intention behind the Chinese strategy of inviting Afghanistan to become part of the CPEC.

    Towards the terror groups in Pakistan, China used same strategy as in Afghanistan, but the reasons are much broader, more strategic and motivated by strong economic and political undercurrents. China was the only country among the 15-member United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that blocked India’s bid to designate Masood Azar, the chief of Jaish-e-Mohammad, as a global terrorist in November 2017. China has kept its “technical hold” on the ban of Masood Azhar even after President Xi Jinping started his second term in office. The factors that shaped the policy of China to romance terrorists in Pakistan, which is further reinforced by its repeated technical hold on Masood Azar, are intended to create a trust-worthy impression of China among terror outfits in Pakistan. But here, the factors are much more complicated than in Afghanistan.

    The first reason is to secure the $60 billion worth of Chinese investment and its human resources working on the multitude of CPEC projects, as a sizeable part of the CPEC runs through the disputed area of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). The CPEC is exposed to direct threats from the terror groups which have found safe haven in the illegally occupied areas as also from Indian security forces in case of any escalation of conflict between India and Pakistan.

    The number of Chinese living in Pakistan in 2017 has reached 30,000 to 40,000 against 10,000 in 2009. More than 15,000 to 20,000 Chinese are directly working on CPEC projects. Though Pakistan has promised to provide security to CPEC projects and the Chinese workers, the decrease in the number of attacks and killings of Chinese workers is actually thanks to the Chinese outreach to terror groups and political support extended to Masood Azhar at the global level. How else, is it possible that in 2017 only two Chinese workers were killed in the terror sanctuaries of Pakistan in Quetta? These killing were not done by any of the terror organisations in the Af-Pak region with whom China had political understanding, but by the terrorists of the Islamic State (IS). Such is the confidence of the Chinese following its romance with the terrorists, that the Chinese ambassador to Islamabad was quoted by the Dawn News that “terrorists are no longer a threat to the economic corridor”.

    As China suspects India as an ally in the US efforts to contain China in the Asian and the global theatre, especially after MOU of Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) between the US and India on 29 August 2016, they have found appeasement of the terror networks as a good countermeasure against India.

    The other reason to appease the terror groups in Pakistan is to stop the secessionist and centrifugal tendencies in restive Xinjiang, as more and more Uyghurs and Pakistanis travel across the Karakorum highway for trade and other activities. Uyghur militants in the past were trained and radicalised in Pakistan by its home-grown terror groups. Tacit support to terror organisations in the international arena has helped China to stop the radicalisation of Uyghurs in Xinjiang by Pakistani terrorists.

    For global peace and prosperity, China should keep its promise on terrorism. It is a member of all the international and regional forums and has criticised terrorism, extremism and separatism as the three evils. As a member of BRICS and the founder-nation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), China should live up to the pledge of these forums to fight terrorism. The SCO’s first charter signed in Shanghai Convention was on “combating terrorism, separatism and extremism”. The same was highlighted in BRICS summit at Xiamen, China, where the summit declaration asserted that those responsible for committing, organising or supporting terror acts must be held accountable. This summit declaration had named almost all the global terror organisations.

    However, question remains when will China stop its tango with terrorists. China walking the talk on its anti-terror commitments is an absolute must for global and regional peace and also a pre-condition for betterment of India-China relations.

  13. #238
    Turbanator Senior Contributor Double Edge's Avatar
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    Xianjiang could be a model for the rest of the country.

    This Is What A 21st-Century Police State Really Looks Like | Buzzfeed | Oct 18 2017

    It seems the crackdown begins middle 2017. No longer a secret, what goes on there. There will be payback in time. That's what they're waiting for so they can crack down further. Thing is how will this sit in other muslim countries.

    9 million in xianjiang is a relatively small number to police, maybe that's why they get away with it, for now anyway

  14. #239
    Former Staff Senior Contributor Ironduke's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Double Edge View Post
    Xianjiang could be a model for the rest of the country.

    This Is What A 21st-Century Police State Really Looks Like | Buzzfeed | Oct 18 2017

    It seems the crackdown begins middle 2017. No longer a secret, what goes on there. There will be payback in time. That's what they're waiting for so they can crack down further. Thing is how will this sit in other muslim countries.

    9 million in xianjiang is a relatively small number to police, maybe that's why they get away with it, for now anyway
    The Chinese are broadening the Xinjiang police state reach to include Uighurs in France:

    http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/02/...hurs-xinjiang/
    Chinese Police Are Demanding Personal Information From Uighurs in France
    Officials have threatened to detain relatives of those who don’t comply.

    Amid a global campaign to monitor and control the Uighur diaspora, Chinese police are demanding that Uighurs living in France hand over personal information, photos, and identity documents — and in some cases, the personal information of their French spouses.

    Police officers from local public security bureaus in China have asked French Uighurs to send their home, school, and work addresses, photos, scans of their French or Chinese ID cards, and, in some cases, the ID cards of their spouses and scans of their marriage certificates if they were married in France.

    Chinese police have contacted French Uighurs directly via phone or WeChat, a Chinese messaging app, or have paid visits to their family members in China, asking relatives to convey these demands, according to screenshots of WeChat conversations and a phone recording obtained by Foreign Policy.

    One Uighur living in Paris who now has French citizenship first refused to comply, then gave in when relatives in China asked the individual to send the information and documents, including home address, school name and address, work name and address, and a scan of the individual’s French passport.

    “I was very, very angry. I said, ‘I am not Chinese, I am French, I have nothing to do with China,’” the Uighur living in Paris told FP, requesting anonymity. “My family said very sadly, ‘Yeah, but you are Uighur and we are here.’”

  15. #240
    Turbanator Senior Contributor Double Edge's Avatar
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    See first question in CPEC website FAQ

    http://cpec.gov.pk/faqs

    Q: 1. Is CPEC becoming another East India Company?

    A : • Pakistan and China are all weather and time tested friends. CPEC is a fusion of Vision 2025 and China's One-Belt One-Road philosophy. This is not the first time we are partnering in any front. We had been tied into strategic partnership for decades. CPEC brings forth a transformational paradigm, moving from geo- strategic to geo- economic partnership between the two countries. China's huge investment in energy, infrastructure and suggested industrial sectors doesn't provides any extra ordinary mileage to either of the partnering countries rather it offers win-win situation and equal opportunities to both China and Pakistan. Hence, no question to compare CPEC with East India Company. China is putting into lot of sincere efforts to help Pakistan to improve socio-economic indicators in Pakistan.

    • In 18th century, Indo-Pak GDP share was quite higher as compared to Britain’s share in global GDP. This was the main attraction to capture the higher share, however at this moment China is holding the largest share in global GDP, i.e. 18.3% (23T USD, PPP) Whereas, Pakistan is at 0.3 trillion USD GDP.

    • We might be able to better understand how China operates by looking towards its involvement in other regions, specifically Africa. While East India Company cemented its power in the sub-continent through brutal force and with no regard to the well-being of local population, China’s approach has been to expand its influence around the globe through economic prosperity rather than military might.
    Now that question has been conclusively answered to everybody's satisfaction we can all relax.

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