Cheered when i read this. let's not upset the Chinese, bad things happen. fear fear. Well let me be the first to welcome our new chinese overlords then.
then turn it around and make them squirm. See what happens.
2) what is one china policy worth and where is that getting us in terms of China's behaviour? help in reining in NK that wants to build intercontinental missiles which can carry nuclear payloads. Being able to strike Japan isn't enough, NK need to cross the pacific ocean now it seems. All attempts to engage with this client state of China since Bush have failed. Both two term presidents.
The last administration went with G2 in the first term and then volte faced into pivot for the second. This one is going in challenging. Who else is going to do it. Maybe the terms of engagement with China are looking to be revised. They always get what they want but are coming up short.
I see this as an attempt at hard ball opening bid.
The gameplan from the little i've seen looks like manage Russia, challenge China.
Am not looking at this from a trade angle rather a geopolitical one.
Last edited by Double Edge; 19 Jan 17, at 18:20.
There's no way to balance, the question is whether the deficit is 33% or 10% of the total trade turnover.
That's the problem with that CSBA study.
No, Toby, it isn’t easy to replace the China-based production supply chain clusters. Take it from someone who watched them develop day by day for over 35 years: you’re not going to duplicate the efficiency, reliability and security of the Pearl River Delta (for example) in the Mekong River Delta and most certainly not in the Mississippi River Delta.
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The problem with “shaking up things now and then” is that disrupting delicate economic structures generally leads to starvation, or at least to major decreases in standards of living. Personally, I find it amoral to play around with people lives / livelihoods just to see what might happen.
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You seem to think that the One China policy is supposed to generate some kind of behavioral change in China (beyond Nixon’s strategic aims vis-à-vis the USSR).
Why is that?
North Korea may be highly dependent on China for food and fuel, but it is most certainly willing to forego those necessary inputs in order to retain an independent domestic and foreign policy. China knows the limits of its influence, but doesn’t want to advertise those shortcomings to the world.
Disrupting delicate economic structures? Like when Nixon went to China or like when Chamberlain thought it's not wise not to upset the Germans?
No such thing as a good tax - Churchill
To make mistakes is human. To blame someone else for your mistake, is strategic.
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