Page 4 of 4 FirstFirst 1234
Results 46 to 56 of 56

Thread: 17 Indian soldiers killed in Kashmir attack, worst in recent days

  1. #46
    Turbanator Senior Contributor Double Edge's Avatar
    Join Date
    11 Sep 10
    Location
    Bangalore
    Posts
    5,970
    Quote Originally Posted by 667medic View Post
    Well, so much for the surgical strike being a deterrent. Pakistan just showed a big middle finger to India. The Pakistani public largely believes the surgical strike to be a figment of Indian imagination and now are probably thrilled at this latest incident.
    Exactly a month to the date our raid took place. That is pretty good proof it happened. The people responsible got the message and they replied. They look for parity at any chance but cannot have it.

    As for the rest of the Pak public its better they don't believe it. These moves will be under the radar.

    What's the sentiment in India now....
    The people in north block will cook something up. The goal is to raise the costs of the opponent. Nobody expected one raid to solve the problem. The goal was to signal a change in tack and a determination to up the ante where necessary. This was not the case earlier.

    There will be a series of moves after which we can assess the results. Doing something, anything is welcome compared to the past.

    In his farewell speech, General Sharif warned India that it “should know that mistaking our policy of patience for weakness would be dangerous.”
    Same to him.
    Last edited by Double Edge; 13 Dec 16, at 12:46.

  2. #47
    Senior Contributor kuku's Avatar
    Join Date
    28 Feb 08
    Location
    New Delhi, India, India
    Posts
    980
    Quote Originally Posted by anil View Post
    Thank you for sharing the thoughts - https://youtu.be/jRKz82v5JQY
    Good day
    Wow, stay happy in "The Hind".
    cheers

  3. #48
    Military Professional 667medic's Avatar
    Join Date
    22 Jul 05
    Posts
    954
    Quote Originally Posted by Double Edge View Post
    Exactly a month to the date our raid took place. That is pretty good proof it happened. The people responsible got the message and they replied. They look for parity at any chance but cannot have it.

    As for the rest of the Pak public its better they don't believe it. These moves will be under the radar.


    The people in north block will cook something up. The goal is to raise the costs of the opponent. Nobody expected one raid to solve the problem. The goal was to signal a change in tack and a determination to up the ante where necessary. This was not the case earlier.

    There will be a series of moves after which we can assess the results. Doing something, anything is welcome compared to the past.


    Same to him.
    My point is that "any" response is not good enough. The Paks have a huge strategic advantage when it comes to planning this kind of operation. They have endless supply of volunteers willing to do anything to fuck 72 virgins in paradise. The leadership has convinced their population that there is never going to any retaliation from India. This in turn convinces their population that Kashmir will be "liberated" at any cost.

    I understand that it is all not so simple but Paks have no respect for India. One surgical strike is not going to change anything. What's needed is sustained attack to keep them on the defensive. I don't see that happening anytime and in the mean time Indian military bases continue to remain vulnerable, which doesn't give confidence to Indian let alone deter the Paks...
    Seek Save Serve Medic

  4. #49
    Senior Contributor kuku's Avatar
    Join Date
    28 Feb 08
    Location
    New Delhi, India, India
    Posts
    980
    Their goal is to make the next strike, that is their Victory. With the limitless supply of fanatics mentioned (that have been cultivated for this very purpose), they will always be able to make the next strike, even with 99% of them failing, there will be the 1% which will be the victory for them.
    Given that a sustained low intensity response is the only option people see, will this sustained campaign may also ensure that the current attitude of Pakistan continues forever? in essence feeding the beast.
    cheers

  5. #50
    Military Professional 667medic's Avatar
    Join Date
    22 Jul 05
    Posts
    954
    In my opinion, the only way Pak will fall in line is if they can be made to realize the limits of Chinese support that they will receive in any conflict. Their current thinking is that China will back them with money/material/weapons at any cost. A few Paks realize the folly of such thinking but the majority of the population, including the English educated elite seem to believe otherwise. Just look at the comments section in DAWN about CPEC, I bet many of them don't even know the full definition of CPEC...
    Seek Save Serve Medic

  6. #51
    Turbanator Senior Contributor Double Edge's Avatar
    Join Date
    11 Sep 10
    Location
    Bangalore
    Posts
    5,970
    Quote Originally Posted by 667medic View Post
    My point is that "any" response is not good enough. The Paks have a huge strategic advantage when it comes to planning this kind of operation. They have endless supply of volunteers willing to do anything to fuck 72 virgins in paradise. The leadership has convinced their population that there is never going to any retaliation from India. This in turn convinces their population that Kashmir will be "liberated" at any cost.
    They have their weak points as well. The difference is our raid showed a willingness to explore them. I would not call our raid just any attack it was precise in objective, targets and result. Future ones will be as well.

    How long are their population to continue believing. At some point it all seems like hot air. Do they actually even care. How many people in the world agree with them.

    I understand that it is all not so simple but Paks have no respect for India. One surgical strike is not going to change anything. What's needed is sustained attack to keep them on the defensive. I don't see that happening anytime and in the mean time Indian military bases continue to remain vulnerable, which doesn't give confidence to Indian let alone deter the Paks...
    The talk is don't expect any change in relations until the next elections in 2019. Assuming the present administration can win it.

    This means there are two years left.

    I don't care whether Paks have respect for India just that their administration does.

  7. #52
    Turbanator Senior Contributor Double Edge's Avatar
    Join Date
    11 Sep 10
    Location
    Bangalore
    Posts
    5,970
    This lead from the Hindu at the time does an excellent job of explaining what this strike means and what it does not

    The lines that have been crossed | Hindu (lead) | Oct 04 2016

    While strategic restraint vis-ŕ-vis Pakistan may still persist as grand strategy, the predawn operation into PoK signals that the era of visibly ‘doing nothing’ militarily may be ending

    As the dust settles following the so-called September 29 “surgical strike” which witnessed the publicly acknowledged employment of Indian special forces across the Line of Control (LoC) for the first time in over a decade, it is useful to take stock of the larger implications — what the operation does and does not mean for India’s broader strategic dynamic with Pakistan.

    On the one hand, those heralding a “new era” where India has “called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff” will be disappointed: the operation did not fundamentally alter the strategic options available to India. On the other hand, those decrying that the operation meant absolutely nothing are also wrong: it has very real implications for future iterations of this tragic and dangerous conflict dynamic, and indicates the degree to which domestic political pressure to do something in response to Pakistani provocations against even military targets — let alone civilians — is boiling over.

    Three myths
    What are the wrong lessons to draw from the surgical strike? First, it does not show that India has “called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff”. There is a lot of self-congratulation in the Indian media that India has finally called Pakistan’s nuclear threat for what they believe it is: a bluff. This is wrong and extremely dangerous. No serious analyst, scholar, or military officer ever argued that the threat of nuclear use against Indian forces was salient, or even possible, for operations across the LoC. It is only operations across the international border — and more likely in the desert sector where India’s 21 Corps has a quantitative and manoeuvre advantage over Pakistan’s forces — which present possible targets for tactical nuclear use (such as logistics, bridgeheads, or concentrated armoured forces) where the threat of Pakistani nuclear use becomes salient. Short of that, and particularly on the LoC, India has always had — and will continue to have — a wide berth to use limited force, both on the ground and in the air. This does not mean that such operations may not escalate to a broader conflict, and there is a real fear they might spiral. But, in and of itself, the surgical strike was well below any Pakistani nuclear threshold, and analysts have long known that. The strike does not mean that India can now conduct operations that significantly attrite the Pakistan military or seize valuable territory across the international border. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are real, and they impose strategic limits on what India can do.

    Second, the surgical strike does not herald a new era of conventional retaliatory options for India. This was not evidence that India has a proactive strategy (popularly known as Cold Start) option available for deeper punitive strikes — either on the ground or with air and stand-off capabilities. The use of special forces, at most several kilometres across the LoC, was carefully planned and, by most official accounts, highly successful. But one should not be deluded into believing that India has now developed the capability to catch the Pakistan military by surprise with even more punitive strikes than this. The Narendra Modi government was very careful not to use helicopters across the LoC, and even the drone that recorded the strike could have easily loitered over Indian territory to do so. Furthermore, as security analyst Manoj Joshi has shown, one should not mistake special force strikes like this with the capability to conduct deeper covert special operations. This strike should therefore not be read as evidence that India has advanced its so-called Cold Start options.

    Three consequences
    Third, and important, the strike in no way suggests that the government has abandoned strategic restraint as a general grand strategy towards Pakistan. There is a lot of confusion about what strategic restraint means. Most precisely, it means avoiding operations that risk major conventional escalation: attriting the Pakistan military or seizing valuable territory across the international border. Strategic restraint does not mean “do nothing”. It means responding in a way that does not potentially become strategically costly for India by risking a broader conventional war, which carries with it not only human and economic costs, but also the risk of nuclear use if the war spills across the international border. By carefully framing the operation as defensive and pre-emptive, limited in time and scope, and avoiding targeting Pakistan Army personnel, the government squarely stayed within the parameters of strategic restraint. This was a strike with immediate tactical consequences, but it demonstrated significant strategic restraint by what it took great pains not to do: target the Pakistan Army.

    So what, then, are the major implications of the surgical strike? First, although the surgical strike demonstrated immense strategic restraint, it suggests that visibly “doing nothing” militarily may no longer be domestically politically tenable. Given the public outrage, expressed most vehemently online and on television, the notion that attacks by Pakistani-supported militants can be suffered with no response may be increasingly unsustainable. The cumulative harms believed to be suffered by India since the Kargil war in 1999 have slowly built pressure amongst at least a very vocal section of the public that enough is enough. The groundswell of anger, and Mr. Modi’s own professed tough line against militant attacks, tied his hands to some degree. He believed he could not “do nothing” without suffering some damage to his domestic credibility. This dynamic is now a fact. But it is also potentially dangerous. One must walk a fine line with hawkish nationalism. On the one hand, it can generate a deterrent to more audacious Pakistani attacks, if Pakistan fears that hawkish Indian nationalism might force a disproportionate response. On the other hand, hawkish nationalism can force leaders to escalate when it is not in the national interest to do so. Nevertheless, while strategic restraint may still persist as grand strategy, the era of visibly “doing nothing” militarily may be ending.

    Second, and relatedly, although the Indian national security establishment is often given a lot of grief — for one, was there adequate force protection at Uri, and why were the jawans not in fire-retardant tents? — it deserves a lot of credit for how this finely calibrated operation was conceived, planned, executed, and managed. The Modi team needed to find a sweet spot between “do nothing” and abandoning strategic restraint, simultaneously satisfying the domestic political forces baying for blood while avoiding risking further escalation. It found that sweet spot and deserves acknowledgement for it. By publicly announcing that it had responded with a concrete justifiable objective, and highlighting the enduring professionalism of the armed forces, it satisfied wide portions of the media and public. But by limiting the scope and duration of the operation, subsequently framing it not as retaliation but as a pre-emptive strike against an imminent attack from the launch pads, it avoided further escalation by giving Pakistan a largely face-saving way to not have to respond in kind — if it chooses to avail itself of it. For a national security apparatus that is often accused of dysfunction, this strike illustrated that it is immensely capable when it needs to be.

    Altering the long-term dynamics
    Finally, and most broadly, the surgical strike shows Pakistan that it must now consider potential Indian responses in the future. And the nature of those responses may be unpredictable. Perhaps they will be calibrated like this one. Or perhaps they may escalate, if the attacks persist or, worse, expand against civilians in metropoles. Although this strike in and of itself was limited in duration and aims, it sets a precedent that could potentially have a growing deterrent effect on Pakistan. Strategically, Pakistan must now account for potential Indian retaliation where the intensity is uncertain — anywhere from “doing nothing” to higher intensity military action around the LoC — and this is perhaps the most enduring implication of the strike.

    Thus, the strike does have some very real long-term strategic consequences that are important to consider. It was not nothing. At the same time, it is imperative that India does not get drunk on success. The strike was reportedly highly successful at the tactical level, but it did not alter the fundamental strategic dynamic between India and Pakistan — nor was it intended to do so, for very good reasons. It should not thus be viewed as a carte blanche with which India can now impose its will on Pakistan militarily — that is neither possible nor in India’s broader strategic interest. And it remains to see how Pakistan will respond, if at all, which could touch off a dangerous escalatory action-reaction cycle. This is a conflict dynamic, after all, and the adversary always gets a vote.

    Vipin Narang is Mitsui Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science, and a member of the Security Studies Program, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

  8. #53
    Senior Contributor
    Join Date
    12 Jul 13
    Location
    Bangalore, India
    Posts
    2,325
    So Mr. Narang says that if India crosses the IB (say in response to a terrorist attack), the Paks would use tactical nukes on the advancing Indian forces in Pak land, knowing that Indian retaliation would not remain at the tactical level. Why does he think that?

    The tried and tested approach (one that works) has been for Pak Army to send a civilian representative (PM Nawaz during Kargil) to the US, requesting the US to ask India to stop from further humiliating the Pak Army. Did the Pak Army foresee such a scenario that when their relationship with the US would be too shallow for US to accomodate Pak interests, resorting to nuclear blackmail would help? What if Indian military planners have already taken the nuclear blackmail into account while planning for a slice and dice through Pakistan? Have the Pak Generals taken into account that there will still be pockets in India that will remain untouched by nuke or radiation (north-east for exampe, why waste it there?), but it is not the same case with Pak? Are the Pak Generals willing to forego the millions they make from the Fauji Foundation, lob nukes at India and lose everything? And lastly, if nukes are for deterrance, will Pak actually use them?

    Pakistan thinks that its nukes make it's terrorism maufacturing industry sustainable from external threats and from an existential crisis. Why would Pak use its nukes and give up the only leverage they have?

  9. #54
    Turbanator Senior Contributor Double Edge's Avatar
    Join Date
    11 Sep 10
    Location
    Bangalore
    Posts
    5,970
    Quote Originally Posted by Oracle View Post
    So Mr. Narang says that if India crosses the IB (say in response to a terrorist attack), the Paks would use tactical nukes on the advancing Indian forces in Pak land, knowing that Indian retaliation would not remain at the tactical level. Why does he think that?
    We crossed the LOC in response to Uri and didn't use air power. That's where the infiltrator camps are located as i understood. So..

    particularly on the LoC, India has always had — and will continue to have — a wide berth to use limited force, both on the ground and in the air. This does not mean that such operations may not escalate to a broader conflict, and there is a real fear they might spiral. But, in and of itself, the surgical strike was well below any Pakistani nuclear threshold, and analysts have long known that. The strike does not mean that India can now conduct operations that significantly attrite the Pakistan military or seize valuable territory across the international border. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are real, and they impose strategic limits on what India can do.
    we weren't looking to seize territory or target the PA

    Pakistan thinks that its nukes make it's terrorism maufacturing industry sustainable from external threats and from an existential crisis. Why would Pak use its nukes and give up the only leverage they have?
    They are for an existential crisis.

  10. #55
    Senior Contributor
    Join Date
    12 Jul 13
    Location
    Bangalore, India
    Posts
    2,325
    DE,
    I wasn't talking about SoF raids across the border. I was talking about military action by crossing the IB incase of a terrorist attack with mass casulties. Crossing the IB doesn't mean seizing Pak land. The Indian forces retreated in 65 and 71, and the Pak army knows this. Defanging the PA is not existential crisis for the Paks. I am not sure how it can be done, but this land grab propaganda needs to be tackled as well as the nuclear bluff too. History tells us that when the chips are down, the PA runs to US, or withdraws from the fight.

    If Pak lobs its nukes, it has already lost. And IMO, the top brass of the PA still retain some professionalism as to understand and differentiate between military loss and an apocalyptic future of Pak. However, if Pak doesn't initiate a nuclear exchange, Pak as a state remains, probably less toxic than it is. I am also thinking about the possibility of taking out Pak C4ISR and known nuke launch sites in the first raid. 24X7 reconaissance by military satellites and pounding them with ballistic/cruise missiles when any movement is noticed. Pretty much what I said about NKorea. This requires atleast a decade, heavy defence modernization (artillery, ballistic/cruise missiles, guided rockets etc - in large numbers) and vision. The nuke threat is a bluff propagated by the PA and ISPR to let US get in the middle and mediate, and for the PA to stop being humiliated further.

    Another point to think of is, if Paks use tactical nukes on advancing Indian forces on its soil, India will have limited choices to retaliate with nukes since Indian forces will be ingressing across many theaters on Pak land. IIRC, Vipin is the same guy who said that India would go nuclear first if Indian planners think Pak is going to go nuclear. This is a wrong assumption because: A. It doesn't satisfy the Indian nuke doctrine of not initiating a nuke attack, and B. If ballistic missiles with conventional warheads can inflict more or less the same damage, why use nukes?
    Last edited by Oracle; 17 Aug 17, at 05:00.

  11. #56
    Turbanator Senior Contributor Double Edge's Avatar
    Join Date
    11 Sep 10
    Location
    Bangalore
    Posts
    5,970

Thread Information

Users Browsing this Thread

There are currently 1 users browsing this thread. (0 members and 1 guests)

Similar Threads

  1. Replies: 30
    Last Post: 10 Jun 17,, 12:28
  2. India Says Five Soldiers Killed in Attack on Pakistan Border
    By Oracle in forum Central and South Asia
    Replies: 235
    Last Post: 29 Sep 13,, 02:54
  3. Recent Spam-Attack
    By Tarek Morgen in forum WAB Information Center
    Replies: 10
    Last Post: 13 Jul 13,, 01:45
  4. Eight soldiers killed in India's Kashmir, attacks escalate
    By Agnostic Muslim in forum Central and South Asia
    Replies: 8
    Last Post: 01 Jul 13,, 13:48
  5. Iraq| Three U.S. soldiers killed in Baghdad attacks; 31 US soldiers wounded
    By Dago in forum The Middle East and North Africa
    Replies: 0
    Last Post: 07 Apr 08,, 02:58

Share this thread with friends:

Share this thread with friends:

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •