The way I understand it is that for China to fight over the SCS is defending forward ground. What that means is that China can use the SCS and ECS issues to apply pressure on America and its allies, as well as make sure that the frontier, that is to say, the ante that's on the table, is far away from its core interests. If it doesn't work out and you lose the ante, so what? It's the SCS, the next breach (Hainan) is infinitely more defensible, and China already has a OBOR strategy aimed at allowing China to pivot West, away from American naval interdiction.
It's not different than say, a negotiator coming to the table with completely absurd demands. There's a tiny chance they'll be accepted, but any regression from such demands to something more reasonable becomes major gains to the counterparty, and the median of what is "reasonable" is moved. Of course, the other negotiator could just get offended and walk away, or the other negotiator could make equally absurd demands to keep the median line, but the rationale is obvious.
It's not different than say, a negotiator coming to the table with completely absurd demands. There's a tiny chance they'll be accepted, but any regression from such demands to something more reasonable becomes major gains to the counterparty, and the median of what is "reasonable" is moved. Of course, the other negotiator could just get offended and walk away, or the other negotiator could make equally absurd demands to keep the median line, but the rationale is obvious.
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