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  • Last U.S. ship to sink an enemy

    USS SIMPSON decommissioned. She was the last U.S. warship to sink an enemy ship in battle out of the 272 ships now left in the Fleet. Well almost since that brings up a trivia question as there is one more ship in the Fleet that has sunk an enemy ship or two. Both frigates come to think of it.

    http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/29/politi...hip/index.html

    Nice video
    Last edited by tbm3fan; 29 Sep 15,, 20:16.

  • #2
    Then the 272 number segues into this. So are we comparing apples to apples or apples to oranges when talking about numbers vs. capabilities.

    http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/08/politi...016/index.html

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    • #3
      Looking at total ship numbers clearly doesn't tell the whole story. According to the handy chart on Wikipedia you can see this result.

      PLAN Ships: 370
      PLAN Tonnage: 1,034,289

      USN Ships: 227
      USN Tonnage: ≈3,000,000+

      While Wiki isn't the most accurate of sources, it is clear enough to get the jist of what is going on with ship size vs number. Arguing that the PLAN has overtaken the USN just because it has more total ships is a bit of hyperbole.

      Comment


      • #4
        Originally posted by tbm3fan View Post
        Then the 272 number segues into this. So are we comparing apples to apples or apples to oranges when talking about numbers vs. capabilities.

        http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/08/politi...016/index.html
        Apples to oranges

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by tbm3fan View Post
          USS SIMPSON decommissioned. She was the last U.S. warship to sink an enemy ship in battle out of the 272 ships now left in the Fleet. Well almost since that brings up a trivia question as there is one more ship in the Fleet that has sunk an enemy ship or two. Both frigates come to think of it.

          http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/29/politi...hip/index.html

          Nice video
          Never doubt the efficacy of the Standard Missile in surface mode. Not as big a warhead as a Harpoon obviously, but at Mach 2 the kinematics of the missile's air frame alone are a quantum leap deadlier. Then you throw in the warhead and all that un-burned fuel and you have a bloody mess on your hands. I put white birds on the rails more than once during Earnest Will. I had 88 of them at my disposal. After Simpson they had the ability to improve Iranian powers of concentration.

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          • #6
            Originally posted by desertswo View Post
            Never doubt the efficacy of the Standard Missile in surface mode. Not as big a warhead as a Harpoon obviously, but at Mach 2 the kinematics of the missile's air frame alone are a quantum leap deadlier. Then you throw in the warhead and all that un-burned fuel and you have a bloody mess on your hands. I put white birds on the rails more than once during Earnest Will. I had 88 of them at my disposal. After Simpson they had the ability to improve Iranian powers of concentration.
            Also, never doubt the stupidity of those that claim to know so much!
            In visiting the above link, I couldn't help but notice who the article quotes to support the "smaller Navy" when it says "However, not everyone thinks that the U.S. Navy needs more ships."! ala, "Gregg Easterbrook, a journalist" GHU!

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            • #7
              The U.S. Coast Guard still has 2 left in service that sank a couple of North Vietnamese vessels in running surface battles. USCGC Boutwell and USCGC Sherman, both are 378's. The Rush and Dallas also 378's did as well but were decommissioned within the last few years.
              Last edited by Tom24; 07 Oct 15,, 13:45.

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              • #8
                USCG HISTORY:
                On this day, November 21, 1970 -Two 378-foot cutters, CGC Sherman and Rush, combined with USS Endurance to attack and sink a North Vietnamese trawler attempting to smuggle arms into South Vietnam.
                ----------------------------------------------
                THE COAST GUARD IN VIETNAM:
                Recollections of Coast Guard Captain Paul A. Lutz, commanding CGC Sherman, on events during Sherman's Vietnam Cruise, 1970.

                The interdiction of SL3 Steel-Hull Infiltration Trawler, 21-22 November 1970
                (Captain Paul A. Lutz, USCG)

                My recollections of the events of 21 November 1970, on board Sherman, off the mouth of the Mekong River, Viet Nam. On 21 November 1970 the Coast Guard 378-foot cutter Sherman was running south just off the coast of South Viet Nam, going from Hong Kong to Area 9, the southern most operating area for maritime operations off of Viet Nam, headed for our last patrol as part of the US Navy Coastal Surveillance Force. We knew that ahead of us the cutter Rush was following a steel hull enemy vessel as it ran on a NW course toward a barrier line of allied vessels. Apparently, the enemy vessel intended to reach the coast in the vicinity of the Mekong River to off load arms for VC [Viet Cong] or NVN [North Vietnamese] use. It was a very dark night with no moon and a high tide.

                When evening darkness fell, Sherman was still north of the Mekong and was approaching the track line of the enemy vessel and of Rush. Sherman arrived at the vicinity of the action just before the OTC (Rush) [officer in tactical command--the commanding officer of Rush] directed the Navy minesweeper Endurance to challenge the enemy vessel that was now in South Viet Nam waters. All units were dark, both allied and enemy. We saw the minesweeper Endurance challenge the enemy vessel with flashing light and immediately after there was a fire fight with gun flashes from both the enemy and from the minesweeper. After a sharp exchange of fire, the gun fire stopped. The minesweeper was hit by a recoilless rifle round (85mm) which was imbedded in the wooden hull of the minesweeper but it did not explode. The minesweeper then disengaged.

                The enemy vessel, which our radar tracked, was on a course between N and NW at about 10 knots and when the firing stopped it was still underway at 10 knots. I remember looking at the radar scope on the bridge of Sherman and noted Rush and other units following the enemy at three or more miles. The enemy vessel was beyond all allied units and closing the shore. Further, I remember saying "my God he is through the barrier." At this point Rush commenced 5" gun fire which Sherman CIC [combat information center] and fire control reported were not hitting. After a short period of time, I guess a minute or two, Rush stopped firing and OTC (Rush) directed Sherman to engage the enemy vessel, which was still underway, closing the shore which was about one mile ahead.

                Sherman was stopped, just outside the shallow water of the Mekong River mouth, maintaining very accurate positioning with LORAN "C." I saw that to close the enemy vessel, I would need to proceed into water that our charts showed as too shallow for Sherman. I also knew that there was a very high tide and there would be some maneuvering possible. The delta was very flat and we should have indications from our two excellent fathometers when we begin to lose our water.

                I knew that Sherman had to act very quickly or the enemy and its arms cargo would make it to the shore and I went into the shallow water of the delta. Our course was set the same as our fire control bearing (our fire control was locked on the enemy). Additionally, the Navy mine sweeper confirmed as we passed her, "enemy directly ahead." When over the shallow water delta, our charts showed depths of between 2 to 3 meters of water, not enough for Sherman. The Sherman fathometers (as I remember) showed about 15 feet of water under our keel when on the Delta. As Sherman propellers went down to about 6 feet below the keel we were all right for the time being. Sherman was on the turbines at speed of 210 turns (about 26 knots).

                I don't know how long we were at this speed, my guess about five minutes, until my navigator LCDR Roger Williams became very concerned and screamed at me "Captain, you have got to stop!." I replied "All right Roger we will stop" and I personally put the annunciators at "Stop." Sherman then stopped and our gun fire began while stopped.

                The enemy vessel was still at 10 knots, running dark in a pitch black night and no unit was firing. I probably could have opened fire immediately, as our fire control team was sure they were locked on the enemy ship, but to be doubly cautious, I ordered firing three star shells to illuminate the target and ensure identification. Accordingly, Sherman first fired three star shells that clearly showed an enemy steel hull infiltration trawler. As soon as the star shells were fired, the enemy ship opened fire on Sherman. Her rounds had red tracers from one kind of gun, which I believe were from his 60 caliber machine guns, and brilliant green tracers from a different weapon, which I believe was his 85mm recoilless rifle. The tracers were coming directly at Sherman but falling short. [Sherman's running lights were on as ordered at the time of the challenge to the enemy ship.] The open fire range was about 2600 yards. I next ordered fire control to shift to direct fire.

                As soon as the enemy rounds began coming inbound, I wanted to expedite the Sherman direct fire and told fire control "There are incoming rounds, pour it on them." Fire control replied "Do not understand." I told my excellent battle talker "God damn it! Fire for effect!" To my surprise CSC Petrusovich, my talker, correctly repeated it exactly to fire control "God damn it! Fire for effect!" Gunnery moved quickly to begin direct fire and I couldn't help chuckling to myself at the way the order was relayed. (Chief Petrusovich was able to simultaneously report on one subject while receiving info on another subject. This was an extraordinary talent.)

                As we prepared to begin direct fire, the 5" gun was depressed and the barrel struck the forward bulwark. I had to twist Sherman so the gun could be lowered aft of the bulwarks. The low elevation of the gun was soon seen as very advantageous.

                After the first round in direct fire with point detonating rounds, I saw an explosion and a bright illumination of the enemy vessel. I knew that prior enemy vessels had usually destroyed themselves when caught by allied forces and accordingly I thought it must be a self destruct explosion. However, as our succeeding rounds showed as they hit there was the same marked explosion and a vivid illumination of the enemy vessel. Sherman was firing her forward 5" 38 caliber gun at maximum rate of fire (as I remember 18 rounds/minute) and every round hit and brilliantly illuminated the enemy. The rhythmic hit, hit, hit etc. were synchronized with the firing of Sherman's 5 inch gun and were awesome to observe. After about 8 to 10 rounds (and hits), taking about one half a minute the enemy ship was stopped and brightly burning.

                (Although there was some question, I believe even our first round hit because only one very small 1/2 mil spot was made after the first round. One of our two fire control operators saw the first round as a hit. The other fire controlman saw the first round as very close.)

                With the enemy ship stopped, I ordered a shift to air burst to silence any remaining guns in case we wanted to board the enemy vessel. Before this shift could take place the enemy ship sank (flames disappeared and radar target disappeared). As Sherman was still on the Delta and vulnerable to the shallow depth of water I moved out to open water with a feeling of relief, and set course south to relieve the patrol ship in area 9 after recommending to OTC to have a small vessel search the area of the sinking of the trawler.

                Post-Action Comments

                After relieving as patrol ship in Area 9, we began to see messages from the naval command in Viet Nam that reported the next day that the wreck of the enemy ship was found and visited by U.S. Navy divers. The wreck was above water, at low tide, its location was, as I remember, about one mile from the shore. The divers reported her starboard side was "riddled by 5 inch gun fire". This confirmed the sinking by Sherman as Sherman was the only vessel firing at the starboard side of the enemy and in fact the only ship firing at the time of the sinking.

                The Navy divers found the 60 caliber machine guns and recoilless rifles (2) that we expected and found the hold of the vessel filled with enough ammunition and weapons to arm a division. A few bodies were found. On the first or second day probable crew members from the enemy ship were found dazed and wandering on the shore and were captured. They were tattooed "Death before surrender" or something very similar.

                I believe our first or second round killed the Commissar and this halted the usual self destruct. This was the first (and I believe only) capture of crew members from the steel-hull arms running vessels during the Vietnam War. Sherman never received any report on what happened to these prisoners. A week or two later Sherman requested a memento from the wreck and Sherman received a trophy board with a B40 rocket launcher (a very popular VC weapon that was like our bazooka) from the Commander U.S. Naval Forces Viet Nam. This trophy has a brass plate on it, which read:

                USCGC Sherman WHEC 720

                PRESENTED IN RECOGNITION OF OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OF DUTY IN THE ENGAGEMENT AND SINKING OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SL-3 INFILTRATION TRAWLER IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE TERRITORIAL WATERS ON 22 NOVEMBER 1970.

                J.H. King Jr.
                Rear Admiral, United States Navy
                Commander U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam

                I donated this trophy board with the B40 launcher and brass dedication plate to the museum at the Coast Guard Academy along with one of the paintings of the action made by John Wisinski, a well known Coast Guard artist in 1972. These donations were made in 1972 or 1973. The Superintendent of the Academy, Rear Admiral Bill Jenkins sent me a very kind letter of thanks for these donations to the Academy museum.

                Following the action, awards were received from the Navy: Meritorious Unit Citation for Sherman; Bronze Star for Capt. Lutz for "heroic achievement" and a Bronze Star for our very capable executive officer, CDR John Maloney; Navy Commendation Medals for our careful navigator LCDR Roger Williams, excellent OOD LTJG Douglas Cox; and Navy Commendation Medals for the outstanding Sherman gunnery, fire control team and 5" gun mount team. CAPT Lutz also received the Distinguished Service Medal from the Republic of Vietnam and additional ships members received Vietnam decorations.

                At the end of Sherman's patrol in Area 9, Sherman was relieved by USCGC Rush, CAPT Robert Durfey, an outstanding officer and an old friend. The Rush had performed outstandingly by following the suspect enemy vessel for several days and never being detected by the suspect vessel. I believe this was the only time in the Vietnam War that an American Ship had been able to do this.

                At this time Captain Durfey and I discussed the engagement. Captain Durfey described to me the Rush tracking of the enemy ship from just over the horizon. He said that the Rush radar plots showed the enemy ship continuously turning in circles and he could not understand why. Captain Durfey told me that Rush had trouble with its five inch gun fire control and wrote in the Sherman guest log "Robert W. Durfey Capt USCG CO RUSH (WHEC 723) With many thanks for your fine help and outstanding shooting."

                At some later time the [Coast Guard] Squadron Three Commander, Captain Richard Hoover told me that the Navy divers had recovered crates of living homing pigeons from the wreck of the enemy vessel. We discussed what the pigeons were for. Captain Hoover felt that they were to take messages to the home base of the vessel. My view was that since the enemy vessel made their attempt to infiltrate on a very dark night onto an unlighted shore, without radar, they needed navigational help. The homing pigeons, if their home was the destination of the enemy vessel, would show them the course, when released, for the vessel to follow, and also could take messages. The circles made by the enemy, as described by Captain Durfey, were to help the pigeons homing orientation, which I understand is related to the earth's magnetic field.

                The officer of the deck for Sherman during the steel trawler shoot out was LTJG Douglas Cox. This excellent officer was sent with the Sherman after action report to the headquarters of CTF 115 at Cam Rahn Bay. Upon returning to Sherman he gave me a copy of the chart which CTF 115 staff prepared to show the action with track lines for the different units. A reduced copy of this is enclosed. Also he informed me that the Commander Naval Forces Vietnam (ComNavV) was recommending Sherman for a Presidential Unit Citation, but this never materialized. After returning to Boston I learned that Sherman's gun crew had retained eight of the expended five inch brass powder casings. Four of these were given to the First District Commander and four are being offered to the Coast Guard Museum.

                This account is an accurate summary of the action of 21-22 November 1970 in Vietnam. It has been prepared to document the story for those of us who were there.

                Comment


                • #9
                  Originally posted by SteveDaPirate View Post
                  Looking at total ship numbers clearly doesn't tell the whole story. According to the handy chart on Wikipedia you can see this result.

                  PLAN Ships: 370
                  PLAN Tonnage: 1,034,289

                  USN Ships: 227
                  USN Tonnage: ≈3,000,000+

                  While Wiki isn't the most accurate of sources, it is clear enough to get the jist of what is going on with ship size vs number. Arguing that the PLAN has overtaken the USN just because it has more total ships is a bit of hyperbole.
                  Lest we all have forgotten just how much that additional "tonnage" helped the Spanish Armada!

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by SlaterDoc View Post
                    Lest we all have forgotten just how much that additional "tonnage" helped the Spanish Armada!
                    Now if I add up all our carriers, including FORD, then they count for just over 1,025,000 tons in 11 ships.

                    What is left leaves us at an average of 9300 tons per ship and PLAN at 2800 tons. Sounds like a lot of coastal ships.

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