"An armor brigade would be 2 armor 1 infantry battalions and an infantry brigade would be two infantry and 1 armor battalion..."
Armor/Mech division TO&E weren't set up that way in Corps 86. That was the model we took into Desert Storm. We had no formal "armor" or "mechanized" brigade save two separate brigades at Benning and Knox. A "heavy division" was assigned four manuever brigade H.Q.s-three "heavy" and one combat aviation brigade- and the personnel/vehicles/equipment to man, operate and maintain them. That same division (according to TO&E) was assigned 10 maneuver battalions, four artillery battalions, an armored cav squadron, an air defense artillery battalion and a combat engineer battalion.
Composition differed depending upon whether an armored division (think 3rd Armored Div) or a mechanized division (1st Infantry Div, as example). A mechanized division would, according to Corps 86, possess five armored and five mech infantry battalions assigned. An armored division would possess six armored and four mechanized battalions. Division commanders would apportion battalions to brigade commanders as indicated by mission requirements. The U.S. Army embraced a notion of "span of control"- that is the minimum efficient and maximum controllable collection of forces. Generally, it is considered 2-5 primary subordinate units that can be efficiently controlled by a single command entity from the platoon level upward to Corps. Thus you may see brigades managing 2-5 battalion task forces.
The term "task force" is loosely used when civilians discuss the military. Both "task force" and "team", however, carry doctrinal organizational significance within the U.S. Army. Once the division commander has attached or op conned (never assigned) a 2-5 manuever battalions to a brigade commander, depending upon mission requirements, those battalions may fight "pure", meaning no further attachments, "plus"- reinforced with company/platoon divisional assets such as engineers, ADA and others, "Pure minus" would indicate battalion forces DETACHED elsewhere or, finally, as a mixed TASK FORCE. A proper, old-school grease pencil map identification of these units would include graphics that indicated the nature of each unit represented on the map.
A "task force" was a battalion-sized and controlled organization of mixed infantry/armor companies. This was accomplished by cross-attaching company-sized maneuver units between battalions within the brigade. Again, think span-of-control. It would not be uncommon to see battalions task-organized with 2-5 company sized units. Our doctrine authorized further cross-attachments at the company level. When platoons were cross-attached between company-sized forces within a battalion, they create "teams". This also was a doctrinal organizational term referring specifically to cross-attached company sized elements possessing 2-5 platoons.
There were numerous real-world factors mitigating against this organizational fluidity. A number of U.S. based heavy divisions lacked an active component maneuver brigade bought by Congress. Those divisions either operated without the additional battalions or had Nat'l Guard maneuver brigades assigned to the divisional TO&E. As events revealed, at least two of those divisions (24th Mech and 1st Cav Div) deployed to Saudi Arabia without a third heavy brigade as the Army refused to validate the Guard brigades for combat. 1st Cav was, instead, given 2nd Bde, 2nd Armored Division (Tiger Brigade) to offset that loss only to have the Tiger Brigade sent east to the Marines just before hostilities ensued. 24th Mech never received a third heavy brigade and operated without.
Europe brought its own issues for USAEUR. Because of housing constraints and other logistical impediments, brigade kasernes in Germany typically held battalion units as already semi-permanently attached...at least until the first shots of World War III were fired. Battalions and brigades spent decades in Germany in habitual attachments based upon initial war plans and IDPs (initial defense positions). Updating and altering plans was discouraged if it required re-attaching units. The costs of relocating a battalion within W. Germany was considered prohibitive. This worked for and against these units from a training perspective. Close habitual association clearly fostered deeper understanding of the operating nuances of sister battalions located on the same kaserne. The down-side was it didn't lead to rapid assimilation and inter-operability when taken out of their comfort zone.
These issues were exacerbated by related issues. Artillery battalions on the same Kaserne would presume a direct-support relationship with the co-located brigade H.Q. Maybe, but ultimately that artillery battalion was the DIVARTY commander's asset to be used as the division commander and he saw fit. Understandably, this wasn't always made clear to younger officers and N.C.O.s. Oh, it'd been discussed at their basic courses...and then ignored by the imposed practical realities for better AND worse.
Anyway...off my soapbox. Loved organization for combat. One glance at the attachements annex to an op-ord would often tell commander's intent.
Armor/Mech division TO&E weren't set up that way in Corps 86. That was the model we took into Desert Storm. We had no formal "armor" or "mechanized" brigade save two separate brigades at Benning and Knox. A "heavy division" was assigned four manuever brigade H.Q.s-three "heavy" and one combat aviation brigade- and the personnel/vehicles/equipment to man, operate and maintain them. That same division (according to TO&E) was assigned 10 maneuver battalions, four artillery battalions, an armored cav squadron, an air defense artillery battalion and a combat engineer battalion.
Composition differed depending upon whether an armored division (think 3rd Armored Div) or a mechanized division (1st Infantry Div, as example). A mechanized division would, according to Corps 86, possess five armored and five mech infantry battalions assigned. An armored division would possess six armored and four mechanized battalions. Division commanders would apportion battalions to brigade commanders as indicated by mission requirements. The U.S. Army embraced a notion of "span of control"- that is the minimum efficient and maximum controllable collection of forces. Generally, it is considered 2-5 primary subordinate units that can be efficiently controlled by a single command entity from the platoon level upward to Corps. Thus you may see brigades managing 2-5 battalion task forces.
The term "task force" is loosely used when civilians discuss the military. Both "task force" and "team", however, carry doctrinal organizational significance within the U.S. Army. Once the division commander has attached or op conned (never assigned) a 2-5 manuever battalions to a brigade commander, depending upon mission requirements, those battalions may fight "pure", meaning no further attachments, "plus"- reinforced with company/platoon divisional assets such as engineers, ADA and others, "Pure minus" would indicate battalion forces DETACHED elsewhere or, finally, as a mixed TASK FORCE. A proper, old-school grease pencil map identification of these units would include graphics that indicated the nature of each unit represented on the map.
A "task force" was a battalion-sized and controlled organization of mixed infantry/armor companies. This was accomplished by cross-attaching company-sized maneuver units between battalions within the brigade. Again, think span-of-control. It would not be uncommon to see battalions task-organized with 2-5 company sized units. Our doctrine authorized further cross-attachments at the company level. When platoons were cross-attached between company-sized forces within a battalion, they create "teams". This also was a doctrinal organizational term referring specifically to cross-attached company sized elements possessing 2-5 platoons.
There were numerous real-world factors mitigating against this organizational fluidity. A number of U.S. based heavy divisions lacked an active component maneuver brigade bought by Congress. Those divisions either operated without the additional battalions or had Nat'l Guard maneuver brigades assigned to the divisional TO&E. As events revealed, at least two of those divisions (24th Mech and 1st Cav Div) deployed to Saudi Arabia without a third heavy brigade as the Army refused to validate the Guard brigades for combat. 1st Cav was, instead, given 2nd Bde, 2nd Armored Division (Tiger Brigade) to offset that loss only to have the Tiger Brigade sent east to the Marines just before hostilities ensued. 24th Mech never received a third heavy brigade and operated without.
Europe brought its own issues for USAEUR. Because of housing constraints and other logistical impediments, brigade kasernes in Germany typically held battalion units as already semi-permanently attached...at least until the first shots of World War III were fired. Battalions and brigades spent decades in Germany in habitual attachments based upon initial war plans and IDPs (initial defense positions). Updating and altering plans was discouraged if it required re-attaching units. The costs of relocating a battalion within W. Germany was considered prohibitive. This worked for and against these units from a training perspective. Close habitual association clearly fostered deeper understanding of the operating nuances of sister battalions located on the same kaserne. The down-side was it didn't lead to rapid assimilation and inter-operability when taken out of their comfort zone.
These issues were exacerbated by related issues. Artillery battalions on the same Kaserne would presume a direct-support relationship with the co-located brigade H.Q. Maybe, but ultimately that artillery battalion was the DIVARTY commander's asset to be used as the division commander and he saw fit. Understandably, this wasn't always made clear to younger officers and N.C.O.s. Oh, it'd been discussed at their basic courses...and then ignored by the imposed practical realities for better AND worse.
Anyway...off my soapbox. Loved organization for combat. One glance at the attachements annex to an op-ord would often tell commander's intent.
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