Again, that is true if you don't count the AF, especially AF assets under the Bde CO's command.
From 20,000 feet? And they're under the Bde's command. The Bde Col decides if the risk is acceptable.
Not sure about this...USARE? Do you mean USAREUR? Just never saw that acronym.
But to others' points...it just canot e the US. Other NATO need to beef up as well.
"The genius of you Americans is that you make no clear-cut stupid moves, only complicated stupid moves which make us wonder at the possibility that there may be something to them we are missing." - Gamal Abdel Nasser
What if tacair bases get hit by theater ballistic missiles and planes in the air are threatened by long range SAMs?
That seems to be what the Russians are putting together.
It doesn't seem like this combo can hold off NATO airpower indefinitely, but maybe the Russians can create windows of vulnerability to engage in ground operations?
Sure. They can take down the entire air base with little green men surrounding it and us not putting up a fight. You need over 100 missiles just for AVIANO alone and that's not counting the civilian airports and long range SAMs. That's what we have the F-22s for.
You can always come up with scenarios that would pit their strengths against our weaknesses and the truth is that we can't be strong at everything but do we have enough capability to have confidence?
Yes, we do.
The growing inventory of F-35Bs also make cratering runways ineffective at preventing stealth aircraft from operating from forward locations. When you can easily land and potentially even takeoff from an average parking lot sized strip of pavement, the list of suitable locations to disperse aircraft rapidly outpaces ballistic missile inventories.
I don't doubt that our birds will be in the air and able to find alternative facilities, but that will also affect their sortie rates.
I don't think the Russians can achieve durable air superiority over the battlefield, but what if their goal is to create opportunity to fight a short high intensity engagement and then use their entrenched position along with diplomatic means and strategic blustery to achieve a favorable outcome within their own definition?
A combination of hybrid war and limited conflict under modern conditions a la PLA thinking?
I think the Russians fully realize that we have superiority once our full conventional capabilities are brought to bear, but I think they also see that we are vulnerabilities can be amplified by weakness in our political leadership.
Thus they may perceive opportunities to combine military and political dimensions and strategic gamesmanship to achieve favorable outcomes.
Tell me, would Putin dare to play these games if Reagan or Bush Sr were still in charge?
But that does not change the fact that we have overmatch against the Russians. What they can put on the field and what we can put into the field are two different things.
Hell, their best strategic move in the last 10 years are little green men. You actually think that they would scare us?
Last edited by Officer of Engineers; 09 Jun 16, at 02:54.
Are we likely to get another Reagan or another Obama?
Maybe there's just nothing we can do about that.
It also seems to me an army that can beat Putin is different than an army that can deter him from misadventure. We know we can beat him, but it seems best for all concerned to deter him.
McMaster et la seemed worried that we are sliding tfrom the latter to the former.
This may merit reading. From Jeffrey Rathke, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director for the Europe Program, CSIS-
"...NATO reviewed its deterrence posture in 2012 and determined that, “in the current circumstances, the existing mix of capabilities and the plans for their development are sound.” But neither of the crucial post-Cold War circumstances – reduced tensions and increased transparency – exists today; indeed it is quite the opposite, with increasing tensions and a substantial loss of transparency and confidence. In 2008, Russia 'suspended' its implementation of the CFE treaty, which has effectively erased the limits that previously existed on Russia's conventional forces on NATO’s eastern flank. A last-ditch 2011 U.S.-led effort to revive conventional arms control with Russia was unsuccessful. Russia also increasingly circumvents the Vienna Document’s 6-week notification requirement for “scheduled” exercises by conducting no-notice, full combat readiness exercises, a category of activity not subject to the notification requirement. (According to the U.S. government, Russia remains in violation of the INF treaty as well, undermining the nuclear pillar of stability in Europe.)
The result, when coupled with Russia's post-2008 military modernization, has been a quantum leap in Russia's ability to amass forces and a substantial decrease in NATO's warning time. As Russia demonstrated in 2014 in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, when a 150,000-man exercise took place simultaneous with Russia’s intervention, it can concentrate forces along its western borders without significant warning to neighbors or to NATO allies. This has been underscored throughout 2014 and 2015 in other no-notice “snap” exercises, the largest of which numbered 100,000 troops. United States military officials estimate that Russia is able now to deploy 60,000 troops by air in a span of 72 hours, and they acknowledge that U.S. intelligence capabilities provide no significant advance indication or warning of the Russian “snap” exercises.
In these circumstances, NATO does not currently have the ability to repel a possible Russian attack or prevent Russia from occupying territory in the east, in particular along NATO’s eastern borders in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland..."
"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
"The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs
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