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Thread: What was the point of Hitler's project?

  1. #31
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    Quote Originally Posted by tantalus View Post
    But my point is that under such a scenario, the war will still take longer and cost more american lives, as there is a greater portion of the German army intact with no active mainland enemies. My point does not extend past that narrow platform, nothing else.
    Occupation armies would still be needed and not confronting the Americans but you also do know that the British Indian Army numbered 2.5 million men.

    Quote Originally Posted by tantalus View Post
    The Germans clearly desired a two war front, the soviets clearly wanted to avoid it, but you maintain that it could have had no material effect in favour of the Germans over the Soviets if it transpired. I am sorry, but I see a possibility. That's not to say your points wouldn't have dominated such a scenario, we will never know how everyone and everything would have developed , but I see the possibility that such a scenario could have favoured the axis powers and increased the length of the war.
    With what? The Imperial Japanese Empire dies within a week. The IJA was outgunned, out-manuvered, out-thought, out-skilled, out-officered, out-generalled, out-supplied and out-positioned vis-a-vi the Soviets. You praised Zhukov but failed to acknowledge that the Soviets were decades ahead of the Japanese in military theory and practice. The IJA was a WWI foot infantry army pitted against a motorized army that wrote the book on Deep Battle.

    Read Operations MARS, URANUS, and AUGUST STORM and then tell me that the Japanese have a chance in hell of keeping Korea and Manchuria outside a week's time.

    And MARS and URANUS happened without Lend-Lease help.

    The best the Japanese had was Isoroku Yamamoto but he was Navy and completely out of his depth when it came to land warfare.

    Quote Originally Posted by tantalus View Post
    But how long is important. How long will the Americans take to enter and what can the axis achieve with better coordinated strategic goals in the intermediate...
    The best the Axis could have hoped for was what happened. Had the Fleet sailed out from Pearl before the Japanese attack, it would have made the IJN completely miserable. As it was, they had a year (6 months more than Yamamoto had hoped for) before the Americans came knocking.

    Quote Originally Posted by tantalus View Post
    It becomes a question if Stalin and soviet morale survives the shock of further defeats at this stage of the war, combined with a Japanese front, and later arrival of the US threat and land lease.
    For Pete sakes, read the damned history! Stalin was scared shitless the first days of BARBAROSA. Nowhere to be seen and losing entire armies and men by the 100s of 1000s every week. It was only after that the Russian people refused to surrender and continued the fight that he emerged. At that point on, Stalin was in the fight for the win.
    Last edited by Officer of Engineers; 01 Feb 15, at 15:09.
    Chimo

  2. #32
    Senior Contributor Triple C's Avatar
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    Tantalus,
    I think the point is that the IJA could not have made a scratch against the Soviet war machine. The Japanese did not have the reaction time or the conceptual understanding for waging a continental war against the Russian Army, to say nothing of their hardware. This means the Soviets defeat IJA with their far eastern forces while the western military districts remained to engage Hitler's invasion.

    YoungIndia,
    Mein Kampf is pretty damn clear on the basic principals of the Nazi program if a bit vague on the details. That is probably because Hitler hadn't decided on the implementation at the time of writing. Racial purity, imperialist conquest, maximum exploitation of conquered territories by linking them to the heartland and eliminating any non-German who is not useful is all in there.
    G. Megaree's War of Annihilation also illuminates Nazi intentions through an examination of actual economic war planning in 1941. To put it simply, the Nazi strategy seemed sum up as 1. go east, 2. kill anyone not useful as part of a slave labor workforce, and 3. hog all the agricultural and mineral resources.
    You might also look into the Mitteleuropa Plan conceived during the first weeks of the First World War in which control of Central Europe (Ukraine & Belorus included as per Brest-Litvosk Treaty) and its resources was deemed a long term strategic goal.
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  3. #33
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    1941 - and the war in general - is considerably too late to address this question. Hitler pushed a movement formed in the 1890s, and did so in public primarily between 1933 and 1939.

    Hitler considered the then 136 people per square kilometer in Germany as "too many to feed off the land" (1936), strove to enlarge the "agricultural and resource basis for the German people" (1936), proclaimed a need for a "sufficient ratio of population and land" (1939) in which Germany would be entitled to reach for a better proportion than other countries (1937) and for which Eastern Europe was the natural expansion room to be "ruthlessly Germanized" (1933).

    That's about it for a short summary. Hitler, in this regard, only grabbed up what some bourgeouis groups had already put together in the 1890s, opposing then imperial colonization because in their opinion it was driven by the wrong - capitalist - impetus, usually mixed in with some neopagan-antisemitic crude religious sermon. In Mein Kampf he explicitly states that he wanted to pull precisely these groups in in order to broaden the political base for the NSDAP - and that's what he did in the next decade, folding them into the NSDAP and quickly dismantling them.

  4. #34
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    Quote Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
    With what? The Imperial Japanese Empire dies within a week. The IJA was outgunned, out-manuvered, out-thought, out-skilled, out-officered, out-generalled, out-supplied and out-positioned vis-a-vi the Soviets. You praised Zhukov but failed to acknowledge that the Soviets were decades ahead of the Japanese in military theory and practice. The IJA was a WWI foot infantry army pitted against a motorized army that wrote the book on Deep Battle.
    We both know it wouldn't be a week. The 1939 battles outlasted that. There is an operational a challenge to mounting a large scale offensive in those remote regions, that would slow the campaign. I understand (to a limited extent) the degree of the backwardness of the IJA, but why did the soviets fear an offensive on two fronts, and the Germans desire one if it could have no material effect on the soviet war machine in the early years of the war. Did they simply miscalculate greatly?

    It also seems clear that the soviets weighed in heavily for Khalkin Gol. The Japanese were caught by surprise. I know your going to furiously point out Soviet superiority, I'am not arguing against that superiority, while clearly real, just speculating that it may not be as grave as Khalkhin Gol suggested. Also, military leaders clearly learnt as wars progressed, although the Japanese did seem particularly slow to adapt.

    Quote Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers View Post

    Read Operations MARS, URANUS, and AUGUST STORM and then tell me that the Japanese have a chance in hell of keeping Korea and Manchuria outside a week's time.

    And MARS and URANUS happened without Lend-Lease help.
    But those large armies were needed against the Germans, along with the men and material removed from the russian far east. Even if you hold complete confidence of an eventual soviet victory on both fronts under such a scenario, would you agree that the soviets may have lost the Battle of Moscow would out such redeployment. Perhaps we could establish if we can agree on any scope for an effect that a Japanese North Strike could have had on the European eastern front.

    The ability of the Soviets to continually raise armies in the middle period of the war was not endless, they could suffer great material loss and afford it against the Germans not just because they relocated their industrial base behind the Urals, but also because of Land lease.

    edit. Just for clarity, so what I am actually tried to claim doesn't get lost in the thread, my position is not that a soviet defeat is an inevitable outcome of the scenario I have proposed, but that a possible soviet collapse under such pressure could have materialised, just possible, and I grant this is speculative, even under the context that speculative is a significant element of a what-if. Furthermore, that Japanese actions in favouring a southern strike at the time carried out, over a northern strike executed anytime before and instead of Pearl Harbour also worked negatively from a German perspective, not neutral, nor positive. I am not trying to establish anything beyond this scope.

    Quote Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
    The best the Axis could have hoped for was what happened. Had the Fleet sailed out from Pearl before the Japanese attack, it would have made the IJN completely miserable. As it was, they had a year (6 months more than Yamamoto had hoped for) before the Americans came knocking.
    From a German perspective, the day after Pearl Harbour would have been preferable, the day after that even better, and so on. The axis removed the possibility of finding out, the Japanese prevented the best possible outcome.

    edit. I understand that it was a catch 22 for the Japanese regarding the desire to hit the US navy before they left. But the imperative to hit the US navy increased when the Japanese decided on a southern strike and to target American colonial assets among others.

    It would be interesting to hear an analysis in regard to how long the Americans may have delayed entry to the war, if the IJN were give the backseat, and the North Strike was favoured, the IJN told to stay in port or turn towards Vladivostock.

    Quote Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers View Post

    For Pete sakes, read the damned history! Stalin was scared shitless the first days of BARBAROSA. Nowhere to be seen and losing entire armies and men by the 100s of 1000s every week. It was only after that the Russian people refused to surrender and continued the fight that he emerged. At that point on, Stalin was in the fight for the win.
    Scared, and therefore probably thinking that an IJA attack in the east would be a problem.
    Last edited by tantalus; 01 Feb 15, at 17:25.

  5. #35
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    Quote Originally Posted by Triple C View Post
    Tantalus,
    I think the point is that the IJA could not have made a scratch against the Soviet war machine. The Japanese did not have the reaction time or the conceptual understanding for waging a continental war against the Russian Army, to say nothing of their hardware. This means the Soviets defeat IJA with their far eastern forces while the western military districts remained to engage Hitler's invasion.
    Even if it is this simple, certain redeployed far eastern forces could not have been utilised to defeat or hold the Germans in battles such as Moscow. The war lengthens. Likewise, Americans entry is later than the attack on pearl Harbour, as is the arrival of Land Lease, the Japanese never move south or do so at a later date. Under such a scenario, the war may become a longer one.

    The potential significance is not just damage to the soviet war machine, but a question of the timing of the American contribution to axis defeat.

  6. #36
    Senior Contributor Mihais's Avatar
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    Manchuria was done in 12 days.

    The Colonel has a point with the Japanese dying sooner.But there is no way the Soviets can do anything without several months of preparation.The Soviets of winter 1941 simply aren't able to prepare for attacks in Far East with the Germans watching Moscow with binoculars.
    The Soviets of 1942 can try an attack on the Japanese,but tham means losing the war with the Germans.The Soviet vicory of 1942 was brought by German operational mistakes.Having a million men on the Transsiberian is simply making the score even and guarantee an Axis victory in the East.
    The big question is if the Soviets are in any mood for more war after that.After Manstein counteroffensive they had some shady efforts to negociate a separate peace.
    With Caucasus lost and the Axis positions on Don/Volga impregnable,even the Soviets of 1944 don't have much of a chance.
    Second,Soviet policy in pre-war era and the very reason for R-M pact was to let the capitalist pigs to slaughter each other.Having Americans,British and Germans killing themselves benefits them.
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  7. #37
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    Quote Originally Posted by tantalus View Post
    We both know it wouldn't be a week.
    A week. Again Operations MARS, URANUS, and AUGUST STORM.

    Quote Originally Posted by tantalus View Post
    The 1939 battles outlasted that. There is an operational a challenge to mounting a large scale offensive in those remote regions, that would slow the campaign. I understand (to a limited extent) the degree of the backwardness of the IJA, but why did the soviets fear an offensive on two fronts, and the Germans desire one if it could have no material effect on the soviet war machine in the early years of the war. Did they simply miscalculate greatly?
    Get it through your head. Stalin was fully prepared to kill Tojo before taking on Hitler. He needed the Japanese monkey off his back ASAP. When the monkey was too scared to move, then and only then did he moved his armies West. But make no mistake, that Japanese monkey was going to die fast and hard.

    Quote Originally Posted by tantalus View Post
    It also seems clear that the soviets weighed in heavily for Khalkin Gol. The Japanese were caught by surprise. I know your going to furiously point out Soviet superiority, I'am not arguing against that superiority, while clearly real, just speculating that it may not be as grave as Khalkhin Gol suggested. Also, military leaders clearly learnt as wars progressed, although the Japanese did seem particularly slow to adapt.
    Well, Japanese military leaders learnt squat all. They were still using Banzai charges against entrenched machine guns right up until the end of the war while everyone else learned how to set up a kill zone.

    Quote Originally Posted by tantalus View Post
    But those large armies were needed against the Germans, along with the men and material removed from the russian far east.
    They were needed to DESTROY Army Group Central, not to hold the line. Again, I point Chuikov to you.

    Quote Originally Posted by tantalus View Post
    Even if you hold complete confidence of an eventual soviet victory on both fronts under such a scenario, would you agree that the soviets may have lost the Battle of Moscow would out such redeployment.
    Fine. Stalin moves to the Urals. What then? The armies that did MARS and URANUS were still there.

    Quote Originally Posted by tantalus View Post
    Perhaps we could establish if we can agree on any scope for an effect that a Japanese North Strike could have had on the European eastern front.
    Nothing.

    Quote Originally Posted by tantalus View Post
    The ability of the Soviets to continually raise armies in the middle period of the war was not endless, they could suffer great material loss and afford it against the Germans not just because they relocated their industrial base behind the Urals, but also because of Land lease.
    A G A I N !!!!!! LL had ZERO effect on MARS and URANUS.

    Quote Originally Posted by tantalus View Post
    edit. Just for clarity, so what I am actually tried to claim doesn't get lost in the thread, my position is not that a soviet defeat is an inevitable outcome of the scenario I have proposed, but that a possible soviet collapse under such pressure could have materialised, just possible, and I grant this is speculative, even under the context that speculative is a significant element of a what-if. Furthermore, that Japanese actions in favouring a southern strike at the time carried out, over a northern strike executed anytime before and instead of Pearl Harbour also worked negatively from a German perspective, not neutral, nor positive. I am not trying to establish anything beyond this scope.
    The military perspective WORKS against you.

    Quote Originally Posted by tantalus View Post
    From a German perspective, the day after Pearl Harbour would have been preferable, the day after that even better, and so on. The axis removed the possibility of finding out, the Japanese prevented the best possible outcome.
    A G A I N !!!! The Japanese would die faster; releasing the might of the USN and the British Empire to fully concentrate on the Germans.

    Quote Originally Posted by tantalus View Post
    edit. I understand that it was a catch 22 for the Japanese regarding the desire to hit the US navy before they left. But the imperative to hit the US navy increased when the Japanese decided on a southern strike and to target American colonial assets among others.
    AGAIN, the US was already preparing for war for a year already. Well, before any decision about north or south.

    Quote Originally Posted by tantalus View Post
    It would be interesting to hear an analysis in regard to how long the Americans may have delayed entry to the war, if the IJN were give the backseat, and the North Strike was favoured, the IJN told to stay in port or turn towards Vladivostock.
    And lose Korea and Manchuria inside a week. And the Imperial Japanese Empire just died.

    Quote Originally Posted by tantalus View Post
    Scared, and therefore probably thinking that an IJA attack in the east would be a problem.
    Why the hell are you ignoring the part that HE WAS IN THE FIGHT FOR THE WIN!

    Quote Originally Posted by Mihais View Post
    Manchuria was done in 12 days.

    The Colonel has a point with the Japanese dying sooner.But there is no way the Soviets can do anything without several months of preparation.The Soviets of winter 1941 simply aren't able to prepare for attacks in Far East with the Germans watching Moscow with binoculars.
    The forces were in place for the kill. Only when Stalin was sure that the Japanese chickened out that he moved a third of his forces west.
    Chimo

  8. #38
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    Quote Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
    A week. Again Operations MARS, URANUS, and AUGUST STORM.
    Without American radios, American trucks, American high-octane aviation gasoline, American explosives, American trains on American rails, American and British planes and tanks, American canned rations, American clothes and boots...? I think not. Soviet "Deep Battle" depended heavily on mechanization and a massive preliminary buildup of supplies, and without Lend-Lease I don't see the Soviets being able to provide either. Certainly not in 1941, and if the Japanese don't drag the Americans into the war, probably not ever. Absent those hundreds of thousands of American trucks, the Red Army - like the Wehrmacht - predominantly a hoof-and-foot force. Like in WWI, they can achieve breakthroughs, but they can't exploit them on the scale of the Eastern Front. If the Japanese Army goes north and America sits the war out (or at least has a delayed entry, since they were doing everything short of actual combat to keep England afloat even absent a declaration of war), the Germans stall out somewhere between Moscow and the Urals when they overextend their supply lines one time too many, and the western allies eventually meet the Soviets in Ukraine.

    Quote Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
    A G A I N !!!!!! LL had ZERO effect on MARS and URANUS.
    The tires Russian trucks rolled on were made in America, or made from British rubber. The gasoline in Russian aircraft was made from oil drilled in the United States, and refined in the United States. The rations their troops ate and the shoes they wore throughout the Stalingrad campaign bore the stamp "Made In U.S.A.". Even ignoring the significant contributions of actual war material (planes, tanks, trucks, etc.) that started flowing into Soviet stocks in 1941, the fact of the matter is that Lend-Lease allowed the Soviets to focus almost 100% of their own economic output on combat equipment, because the western allies were giving them everything else. I have no idea how you could say that anything the Red Army did in late 1942 was unaffected by Lend-Lease - it was probably one of the biggest determining factors in their successes.
    Last edited by Genosaurer; 02 Feb 15, at 05:23.
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  9. #39
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    Quote Originally Posted by Genosaurer View Post
    If the Japanese Army goes north and America sits the war out (or at least has a delayed entry, since they were doing everything short of actual combat to keep England afloat even absent a declaration of war), the Germans stall out somewhere between Moscow and the Urals when they overextend their supply lines one time too many, and the western allies eventually meet the Soviets in Ukraine.
    Doesn't change the fact that the IJE would have died fast and hard, leaving the USN and the British Empire to throw their entire weight against Germany.

    Quote Originally Posted by Genosaurer View Post
    The rations their troops ate and the shoes they wore throughout the Stalingrad campaign bore the stamp "Made In U.S.A."
    The US couldn't even make a dent in feeding and clothing the armies of MARS and URANUS. They were fed and clothed local. Yes, there were large stocks from the US available but that was the exception. Not the rule.

    Quote Originally Posted by Genosaurer View Post
    Even ignoring the significant contributions of actual war material (planes, tanks, trucks, etc.) that started flowing into Soviet stocks in 1941, the fact of the matter is that Lend-Lease allowed the Soviets to focus almost 100% of their own economic output on combat equipment, because the western allies were giving them everything else. I have no idea how you could say that anything the Red Army did in late 1942 was unaffected by Lend-Lease - it was probably one of the biggest determining factors in their successes.
    Alan Clark and David Glantz both produced TOEs from Russian archives that stated quite differently. LL produced material did not enter into full force until early 1943.
    Chimo

  10. #40
    Senior Contributor Triple C's Avatar
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    Two-thirds of Soviet divisions participated in the Moscow Counteroffensive were recently created units, not re-deployed from the East. And that's the counteroffensive; the German attack on Moscow had already stalled out and could be pushed back even by a smaller force than the one the Soviets actually deployed.

    Battles with the U-Boats and KG temporary closed down the LL line several times between 1941-43 for months on end.Russian revisionist historians who emphasize the importance of LL argue that LL allowed the Russians to win clear cut victories instead of inching forward, but survival in the first two years did not depend on it. Glantz mostly agrees and says that significant injections of LL occurred in 1943, not the first two years.
    Last edited by Triple C; 02 Feb 15, at 09:57.
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  11. #41
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    Quote Originally Posted by Triple C View Post
    Two-thirds of Soviet divisions participated in the Moscow Counteroffensive were recently created units, not re-deployed from the East. And that's the counteroffensive; the German attack on Moscow had already stalled out and could be pushed back even by a smaller force than the one the Soviets actually deployed.

    Battles with the U-Boats and KG temporary closed down the LL line several times between 1941-43 for months on end.Russian revisionist historians who emphasize the importance of LL argue that LL allowed the Russians to win clear cut victories instead of inching forward, but survival in the first two years did not depend on it. Glantz mostly agrees and says that significant injections of LL occurred in 1943, not the first two years.
    But the expert analysis was considering LL under the context of the actual war, not an alternative scenario of a Japanese North Strike. LL becomes disproportionately important under such a scenario. Its the cumulative effect of such a North Strike through a range of knock-on effects that could have had the potential to significantly alter the length of the war.
    Last edited by tantalus; 02 Feb 15, at 11:44.

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    Quote Originally Posted by tantalus View Post
    But the expert analysis was considering LL under the context of the actual war, not an alternative scenario of a Japanese North Strike. LL becomes disproportionately important under such a scenario. Its the cumulative effect of such a North Strike through a range of knock-on effects that could have had the potential to significantly alter the length of the war.
    Tantalus,

    Why you envision prolonged operations in your scenario? The good Col explained to you in length that the IJA had nothing to throw on the Soviets without loosing and losing big. In a matter of weeks.
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    Quote Originally Posted by Doktor View Post
    Tantalus,

    Why you envision prolonged operations in your scenario? The good Col explained to you in length that the IJA had nothing to throw on the Soviets without loosing and losing big. In a matter of weeks.
    Dok, my position is all there in my posts. The potentials are...

    Operationally due to the remote region such a front would take a long time to develop.

    The IJA would be fully committed, all southern forces and material that did combat the USA in the war thrown north at the same time the Germans strike in the East. Its not simply another Khalkhin Gol. And this is not the Soviet monster late in the war, but one being thrashed during Barbarbossa.

    if the transiberian route is cut, chinese lose war supply from the soviets as envisioned by the north strike strategy, strengthening IJA position in China.

    The soviet need to commit heavily to dismiss the IJA even in a scenario remotely close to a quick crushing defeat, heavily, means less men and material to the fight the Germans at a crucial period in the war. They can not redeploy to engage the entire IJA early in the war quickly enough and with enough strength to crush the IJA while the Germans are executing Barbarossa.

    The US enter later the war later. How long is crucial...

    Land Lease arrives later, when it does arrive the IJN engage those conveys as it has direct material consequence to their strategy.

    There is a later threat to the Germans in Africa and the west. The German even removed men and materials from the east to the west during the war.

    The Germans can commit more heavily in the east. The soviets position is weakened.

    Worse case scenario is the soviets come to the table from behind the Urals. The war lengthens dramatically.

    Best case scenario Soviets continue to fight but the allies face a stronger axis powers in 1943, lengthening the war.

    A key question becomes how long does it take the States to enter if the Japanese never look south.

    OOE has provided his insight on these premises and stated there is no chance of a meaningful impact of a Japanese north strike on the soviet war machine, including potential scenarios of the indirect consequences of a south strike never happening or being delayed, so at this point I don't see much more to add.

  14. #44
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    Quote Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
    Alan Clark and David Glantz both produced TOEs from Russian archives that stated quite differently. LL produced material did not enter into full force until early 1943.
    It's often difficult to assess the full scope of the impact Lend-Lease had on the Soviet war machine because there's so many disparate parts and a lot of the most critical things are glossed over because they're complicated, and less interesting than the completed war equipment that were the most visible but probably the least important part of the program. Harrison's "Soviet Planning in Peace and War, 1938–1945" as far as I know remains the definitive work on the subject.

    The real significance of Lend-Lease, even in 1942-1943, shows when you break down specific areas. For example, the Russians famously shipped their weapons, armor and aviation production east of the Urals in the early phase of the war, saving it from being overrun by the advancing Germans. But their chemical industry, not too strong in the prewar period, was almost completely centered on the Donbas region, as were the majority of their ammunition factories. The Russians had absolutely massive prewar stockpiles (which they'd been building up since 1936) of artillery shells and mortar bombs - and by December 1941 they had completely exhausted them. Lend-Lease provided not just finished ammunition, but a full 50% of the finished explosive material and more than 50% of the chemical components required to make explosives; this was one of the most desperate Soviet needs that aid from the western allies provided. Those massive artillery bombardments using thousands of guns that preceded the opening of URANUS and MARS? Lend-Lease made them possible.

    And that's just one example of dozens where western aid propped up the Soviets as far back as early 1942 in some critical but unglamorous war industry. Rubber and finished tires is another (hard to judge exactly, but some estimates approach 50% - and this doesn't count Lend-Lease trucks, only domestic production). Telephone wire and railroad tracks (upwards of 75% of total recipts by the end of 1943 and significant but much less critical thereafter). Aviation fuel (60% of total war expenditures). Canned meat (80% from Lend-Lease, although this did not make up a major proportion of the average Soviet soldier's rations).

    On the more interesting war equipment, the biggest material contributions seem to be tanks (mostly as a "bridge" to make up for immediate shortfalls following Barbarossa, and significantly less important as Soviet domestic tank production ramps back up), light antiaircraft guns (Soviet production of 25mm and 37mm pieces was woefully inadequate for their needs and this was apparently one of the most desired items for all four Lend-Lease protocols), trucks and trains (only in the later war period) and aircraft (only in the early war period). All of these were important, but don't appear to be vital the way the raw materials and finished supplies above were.
    Last edited by Genosaurer; 02 Feb 15, at 13:16.
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    Quote Originally Posted by Genosaurer View Post
    Those massive artillery bombardments using thousands of guns that preceded the opening of URANUS and MARS? Lend-Lease made them possible.
    Both Clark and Glantz and even Keegan disagreed. LL made up some 53% of the chemicals needed for shells and exlosives ... but they only became a steady supply after the Soviets drove the Germans out of reach of the LL LOCs, ie after Stalingrad. That meant the only steady supply the Soviets had was their own 47%. LL made a tremendous impact on Kursk forward when the Germans were no longer able to stop it.

    Did LL supplies reached Stalingrad? Yes. Would it have stopped URANUS and MARS without it? No.
    Chimo

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