Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

What ever happened to Small Unit leader knowledge?

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • What ever happened to Small Unit leader knowledge?

    I've been pondering this question lately. We seem to be reinventing the wheel.

    One example, I was reading the MC Times last week and there was a article about this new training technique being used that increases the efficiency of Marines in combat, yada, yada, yada,. Seems they were Having Marines do "Failure to Fire" immediate action, and clearing jams while BLINDFOLDED. Greatest new idea since sliced bread. Gonna save lots of lives in reduced light firefights. Allows individuals to keep eyes on enemy when weapon stops firing ect, ect ect.


    My question is When did we stop doing that?

    During my whole time in the Corps (1980-2002) we practiced that.Also Reloading and field stripping weapons blindfolded, both individual and crew served. How is it that 12 years later this is considered something new?

    I'm sure all us old farts can pick many other examples of what we considered basic skills that either are not being taught any more has been rediscovered as a new idea recently.

    Back in the day, things were mostly word of mouth, then we formalized schools, published POIs, created the Center for lessons learned. All so this kind of stuff didn't get lost. What happened.

  • #2
    When the majority of our training became don't rape / don't commit suicide. It left little room for lesser important things like your job.
    "Bother", said Poo, chambering another round.

    Comment


    • #3
      Originally posted by Gun Grape View Post
      Back in the day, things were mostly word of mouth, then we formalized schools, published POIs, created the Center for lessons learned. All so this kind of stuff didn't get lost. What happened.
      You said it Gunny.You created a bureaucracy.And the God of bureaucracy is paper.And may the real God save your a$$ if you don't do it as they say in the paper.You may do other things,but after you bow to the demands of bureaucracy.
      I saw a manifestation of this once. Doctrine said that the best reaction to a close ambush is immediate,instinctive and determined assault on the ambushers.Well,tough luck,the OPFOR(some nasty recce guys ) just drew a wire across the killing zone.And none of the determined assaulters saw it. ;)
      Those who know don't speak
      He said to them, "But now if you have a purse, take it, and also a bag; and if you don't have a sword, sell your cloak and buy one. Luke 22:36

      Comment


      • #4
        "Doctrine said that the best reaction to a close ambush is immediate,instinctive and determined assault on the ambushers..."

        It's the ONLY reaction, and you don't need doctrine to know that. If truly a triggered ambush and you're truly in the kill-zone and they truly are nasty recce guys (or even really smart kindergarteners) your life is measured in seconds. Whatever else you suggest best rapidly put you somewhere other than where you are at that moment.

        NVA and VC tactics often included emplacing Claymores facing reverse slopes of dikes. Obviously we very quickly abandoned the dikes as paths through rice-fields. Mined, booby-trapped and usually silhouetted. Might stay dry but, otherwise, an absolute no-go. Still, if taking fire from a tree-line parallel to that dike then it immediately becomes cover and a base from which to return fire. The volume of fire generating from the dike towards the NVA would determine when they'd reach for their clackers.

        Gunny isn't discussing those things you suggest. There's no training for FUBAR. That's what you describe- wrong-footed by a really good unit that knows what they're about.
        "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
        "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by Gun Grape View Post
          I've been pondering this question lately. We seem to be reinventing the wheel.

          One example, I was reading the MC Times last week and there was a article about this new training technique being used that increases the efficiency of Marines in combat, yada, yada, yada,. Seems they were Having Marines do "Failure to Fire" immediate action, and clearing jams while BLINDFOLDED. Greatest new idea since sliced bread. Gonna save lots of lives in reduced light firefights. Allows individuals to keep eyes on enemy when weapon stops firing ect, ect ect.


          My question is When did we stop doing that?

          During my whole time in the Corps (1980-2002) we practiced that.Also Reloading and field stripping weapons blindfolded, both individual and crew served. How is it that 12 years later this is considered something new?

          I'm sure all us old farts can pick many other examples of what we considered basic skills that either are not being taught any more has been rediscovered as a new idea recently.

          Back in the day, things were mostly word of mouth, then we formalized schools, published POIs, created the Center for lessons learned. All so this kind of stuff didn't get lost. What happened.
          You know what was sort of tragically funny, is that the only outfit that didn't develop "doctrine," a la the Army, was the Navy. We even resisted Jointness (mostly out of wrongheadedness in my view . . . I'm ever so much smarter about killing people and breaking things after six years of being Joint) longer than anyone else, and it was out of fear that we would lose our basic skill set for fighting and winning wars at sea. Then the Congress more or less held the funding hammer over our heads and forced us to develop "doctrine" that left most of us old timers sitting around slack jawed and going, "Well duh??!! I needed an official book to tell me THAT?!"

          The question remains however, are we any better than we once were, because the ground truth is that other than the SEALs, the Airedales, and some odds and ends working with the Corps or in other true "Joint" capacities (I don't consider the Marine Corps-Navy team as being Joint in the accepted sense of the term. We've never not fought and died together, and speak the same language, and have since 1776), the "real Navy" hasn't fought a major war at sea since WWII. Yes, some of us Surface and Submarine guys have pickled off some Tomahawks over the years, and a few like me were "lucky" enough to have been on hand turning Boghammers into kindling at the far end of a string of Ma Deuce tracer rounds, but other than that, a big nada.

          I really fear what will happen when we start taking meaningful battle damage at sea. I trust our weapons systems, but I do not trust entirely our ability to save the ship when her guts are open and she's dangling entrails aft. Not only are the new platforms undermanned, but they aren't "manned" entirely gender-wise either. I have great respect for women who have punched all of the tickets and been promoted accordingly, but having been XO/CO in a frigate with women in the crew, I am under no illusions about their ability to do some of the damage control processes due to sheer lack of physical strength. Instead of two men carrying a stretcher, it takes four women. Carrying multiple coils of 1.5 inch fire hose up ladders? Not happening.

          I could go on, but I think you take the point. We've conned ourselves into believing that this will all work, and I don't know that it will. I was as close as a SATCOM phone to what was going on aboard USS Cole, and the women performed as well as they could, and the ship was saved by the combined efforts of the crew and some salvage help flown into the scene, but believe me when I tell you that had they been at sea and taken damage like that, they were going down, period. Would the mixed-gender of the crew have helped or hurt in that case? Hopefully we will never know, but I know in my heart of hearts that it wouldn't have helped. And no amount of "doctrine" is going to change that.

          Comment


          • #6
            Sir, are those "true joint" capacities the entire Gator Navy and Corpsmen? Because we get about as "joint" as you can be...
            "We are all special cases." - Camus

            Comment


            • #7
              Originally posted by Squirrel View Post
              Sir, are those "true joint" capacities the entire Gator Navy and Corpsmen? Because we get about as "joint" as you can be...
              In my view they are beyond "Joint" because, as I said, neither of us had any real learning to do because we were always joined at the hip. Being both in the Department of the Navy, we've been forced over 200 years to "work and play well together." The Marines among us may well disagree, but at many levels we are essentially the same service; e.g. Marine Corps Harrier drivers wear "wings of gold" and are, by definition "Naval Aviators." The Marine Corps is the pointy end of the spear. The Navy is the shaft, and as such, provides much of what the Army would call "Combat Service Support" so that the Corps doesn't have to. It's not only the Corpsmen, who may as well be Marines once qualified, but the doctors, nurses, chaplains, and a whole host of other services provided that are more or less transparent to the average sailor or Marine, but are very important points of articulation at the DoN level; like base infrastructure and housing. There are a lot of food fights that the Army and Air Force used to undertake when funding for such things was being divided, that the Navy-Marine Corps team never had to worry about. The same regional facilities guru at the civilian GS-15 level was taking care of both Corps and Navy base infrastructure concerns with an admonition to ensure everyone got a fair shake. Did it always work that way? I'm sure not, but compared to what the Army and Air Force went through, it was a walk in the park.

              When you look at it from my point of view as a field grade officer during the big push to become "Joint" with the other services after some screw-ups in Grenada, Panama and of course what became known as Desert One, you cannot imagine the hue and cry, especially from the Navy side of the street. In the traditional Navy view of things, we belong at sea and only at sea, doing Navy things. The thing is, we didn't know what we didn't know, and what's more is we didn't want to know. Changing that sort of mindset is at the heart of being "Joint," and it has been a tough climb, but we are pretty much there now, and being Joint while maintaining our key skill set is no longer the challenge it once was. I imagine people of my age and pay grade in the other services would say the same. It's a wonderful learning experience that only enhances one's worth to the nation.

              Comment

              Working...
              X