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Thread: Rights of Military Personnel

  1. #16
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    BLUF - as a security manager, you can (and should) confiscate the material, and turn it over to OSI if the member is not willing to consent to a search, or simply destroy it. You as a security manager do not have the authority to start doing your own half assed investigation in order to save paperwork.
    This was the issue, where our guys wanted to not cause undue stress to a guy and searched his phone and said it was good. It worked out for the guy, since he didn't lose his phone, but he WASN'T ASKED if they could search it, which was my issue. And even searching it, if this guy was really a spy, our guys wouldn't have found the square root of crap.

    Regs:

    10 U.S. Code ß 831 - Art. 31. Compulsory self-incrimination prohibited
    (a) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any question the answer to which may tend to incriminate him.
    (b) No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.
    (c) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to make a statement or produce evidence before any military tribunal if the statement or evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to degrade him.
    (d) No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article, or through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement may be received in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.


    AFMAN33-282 27 MARCH 2012
    6.8. Privately-Owned hardware and software. Privately owned hardware and software used to process unclassified and/or unclassified sensitive information requires operation mission justification and DAA approval according to DoDI 8500.2. Document the approval between the user and government organization. The organizational IAO maintains the documentation and provides it to the system IAM as required.
    6.8.1. Violations of the IS user agreement and/or DoD IA training may result in the confiscation of personal hardware and software. Follow Security Forces and AF Office of Special Investigations (AF OSI) procedures along with supporting JA advice and guidance on confiscation of personal equipment.
    6.8.2. Privately owned ISs contaminated with classified information will be confiscated and sanitized as specified in Chapter 8, Remanence Security.
    REMANENCE SECURITY
    8.1. Introduction. Remanence security is actions taken to protect the confidentiality of information on ISs. Methods to protect confidentiality include sanitization, overwriting, and destruction. Each method provides specific levels of information protection.
    8.1.1. Unless determined by mission or operational need and documented in the IS C&A package or directed by the IP chief, the destruction of any media is the preferred method for all rather than clearing or sanitizing. See USCYBERCOM CTO 10-084 and the DISA Removable Storage and External Connection Technologies STIG for higher risk data transfer requirements.
    8.1.1.1. In situations where a media sanitization plan of action is not clearly defined and governed by this guide, MPTO 00-33B-5008, Remanence Security for Information Systems, or the IS C&A package, exercise risk management procedures according to guidelines in DoDD 8500.01, CJCSI 6510.01, and NIST Special publication 800-88, Guidelines for Media Sanitization. Balance risk management decisions on information sensitivity, threats and vulnerabilities, and the effectiveness and potential impact of the decided action.


    AFI71-101V1 8 APRIL 2011 13
    2.21. Crimes that Involve Air Force Computer Systems. AFOSI provides computer crime investigative expertise for all investigations in which computers are used as a tool in the commission of a crime, may contain evidence of a crime, or are the target of a crime. AFOSI agents who specialize as Computer Crime Investigators (CCI) assist other AFOSI agents by providing computer forensics analysis of suspected computer evidence, assist in interviews of people where technical computer terminology is used, and assist with developing various legal documents (e.g., an affidavit used in applying for a search warrant). In addition, AFOSI CCIs are the primary investigators for intrusions into USAF and selected DoD computer systems. Upon discovery, Air Force officials report all suspected intrusions to AFOSI.
    2.21.1. AFOSI is the only agency in the Air Force with the authority to investigate computer intrusions. AFOSIís CCIs produce intelligence reports that detail intrusion methods and techniques and attempt to identify known Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS), subversive, or terrorist groups attacking DoD computer systems. AFOSI computer intrusion investigative and operational activities may identify additional information system vulnerabilities, information system threat information, subject (criminal or counterintelligence) attribution, and exfiltrated data to aid in damage assessments during the course of the investigation or operation.
    2.21.2. DoD Cyber Crime Center (DC3), in accordance with AFPD 71-1, conducts digital and multimedia forensics analysis for forensic support to investigations of computer intrusions. DC3 should be the first option for digital forensic support to AFOSI investigations and operations.

    AFI71-101V4 8 NOVEMBER 2011
    4.8. Use of Specialized Techniques in Counterintelligence Investigations and Operations Targeting U. S. Persons. AFOSI is the sole agency within the Air Force authorized to use specialized techniques for counterintelligence purposes, as defined by Procedures 5 through 10, in DoD 5240.1-R. This same definition applies if AFOSI requests other agencies to conduct these techniques in support of the Air Force. For the purposes of this paragraph, AFOSI is a DoD intelligence component as defined in DoD 5240.1-R. The authority to conduct specialized techniques resides solely with the Commander, AFOSI. The Commander, AFOSI, may delegate this authority in writing under specified circumstances to a headquarters-level senior official who exercises direct oversight authority of counterintelligence investigative operations. Although the authority may be delegated, the Commander, AFOSI, retains authority over AFOSI operations at all times. The following subparagraphs describe the specialized techniques under DOD 5240.1-R available to AFOSI for CI activities. In all cases, AFOSI must comply with the specific requirements of DOD 5240.1-R and AFI 14-104 which implements it
    4.8.4. Procedure 6, Concealed Monitoring, applies to targeting by electronic, optical, or mechanical devices of a particular person or group of persons, without their consent, in a surreptitious and continuous manner. This technique is conducted for foreign intelligence and CI purposes. Concealed monitoring applies both within the United States or whenever targeting U.S. persons outside the United States. The subject must not have a reasonableexpectation of privacy and under circumstances where no warrant would be required if the monitoring was undertaken for law enforcement purposes. Concealed monitoring operations must be approved by the Commander, AFOSI, in accordance with DoD 5240.1-R.
    4.8.4.1. Under 18 U.S.C. ß2511(2)(i), the electronic communications of a computer trespasser transmitted to, through, or from a protected computer may be intercepted under the following circumstances: (a) the owner/operator of the protected computer authorizes, in writing, the interception of the computer trespasserís communications on the protected computer; (b) the interception is to be conducted pursuant to a lawful CI investigation; (c) there is reason to believe the contents of the computer trespasserís communication will be relevant to the investigation; and (d) the interception does not acquire communications other than those transmitted to or from the computer trespasser.
    4.8.4.2. DELETED
    4.8.5. Under Procedure 7, Physical Search, AFOSI is authorized to conduct nonconsensual physical searches of active duty military personnel or their property within the United States when authorized by a military commander empowered to approve physical searches for law enforcement purposes under the provisions of the Manual for Courts Martial, and there is probable cause to believe that the subject is acting as an agent of a foreign power.
    "Bother", said Poo, chambering another round.

  2. #17
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    When I was in the air-force and worked in an area that was secured for open storage of confidential and secret info many of us regularly had cell phones in our shop. Admittedly social media was not as pervasive but camera phones were pretty standard. I am not going to say that we never took pictures in the shop, (the whole shop was secured storage area)but at least in our case in order for any breach of real consequence someone would have either been trying to pass information on or been being watched closely by a very very good and technical intelligence agent) but it was extremely rare and I believe we sanitized the area before at least one and possibly both of the the photos as they were parties for leaving personal...

    We never had any doubt as to weather we could be searched, if you can be searched entering or leaving the base your shop which is a classified area is a no brainier.

  3. #18
    Military Professional dundonrl's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Maxor View Post
    When I was in the air-force and worked in an area that was secured for open storage of confidential and secret info many of us regularly had cell phones in our shop. Admittedly social media was not as pervasive but camera phones were pretty standard. I am not going to say that we never took pictures in the shop, (the whole shop was secured storage area)but at least in our case in order for any breach of real consequence someone would have either been trying to pass information on or been being watched closely by a very very good and technical intelligence agent) but it was extremely rare and I believe we sanitized the area before at least one and possibly both of the the photos as they were parties for leaving personal...

    We never had any doubt as to weather we could be searched, if you can be searched entering or leaving the base your shop which is a classified area is a no brainier.
    same here.. of course my space was cleared for Top Secret (Tomahawk Equipment Room). We were just careful as to what we'd do with our phones and make sure not to take any photos of any classified information if it was out or displayed on a monitor. Yes I have photos of the space, but nothing in the photos is showing classified data.

  4. #19
    Senior Contributor Stitch's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by dundonrl View Post
    same here.. of course my space was cleared for Top Secret (Tomahawk Equipment Room). We were just careful as to what we'd do with our phones and make sure not to take any photos of any classified information if it was out or displayed on a monitor. Yes I have photos of the space, but nothing in the photos is showing classified data.
    dundonrl - Did you work on the TASM or the TLAM?
    "There is never enough time to do or say all the things that we would wish. The thing is to try to do as much as you can in the time that you have. Remember Scrooge, time is short, and suddenly, you're not there any more." -Ghost of Christmas Present, Scrooge

  5. #20
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    This is not directed at any one post or member: Let's remember OPSEC and keep sensitive subjects off the thread please
    Far better it is to dare mighty things, than to take rank with those poor, timid spirits who know neither victory nor defeat ~ Theodore Roosevelt

  6. #21
    Military Professional dundonrl's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Stitch View Post
    dundonrl - Did you work on the TASM or the TLAM?
    TLAM (C, D and E variants) for me. TASM was phased out long before I started on the program. Of course, Raytheon is developing a new version of the Tomahawk for anti-shipping work.

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