As I alluded to yesterday, I plan to write a paper that's inspired by Spielberg's Lincoln. I think that the movie really highlights Lincoln's understanding of the root cause of the American Civil War: slavery. Without killing slavery, then the conditions for future war over the same issue would remain, despite the results on the battlefield. This is an interesting notion to me since had the war ended in 1862, then it probably wouldn't have ended. It would have only kicked the can down the road with a "false peace of Nicias."
Here's my first cut at an introduction for the paper. It's going to be until probably the end of the year until I can really develop it since I'm coming up shortly on my busy season with my job, but I'm excited to flesh this thing out.
One can sense the frustration in the words penned by Ulysses S. Grant after leaving the White House. Having successfully overseen the surrender of the Confederate armies as the General-in-Chief of all Federal armies, he then saw some of the fruits of victory slip through the fingers of the Union with the unsuccessful implementation of Reconstruction as the President and Commander-in-Chief. Since “war is the continuation of politics through other means,” it is critical that strategists understand the linkage of politics to war, and more specifically, the linkage between war termination and conflict resolution, the period in which peacemaking has the opportunity to create “lasting strategic effect.”
Studying the American Civil War presents a unique case study to explore this. While it was fought on the battlefield for just over four years from 1861-1865, some argue that with the defeat of Reconstruction in 1877, the war did not end until the signing of the Civil Rights Act, nearly a century after the guns fell silent on the battlefield. This long view of history allows for the rich development of strategic insights on peacemaking, to include proximate cause and root cause analysis, assessment and reassessment; policy-strategy match; and assuaging fear, honor, and interest.
Here's my first cut at an introduction for the paper. It's going to be until probably the end of the year until I can really develop it since I'm coming up shortly on my busy season with my job, but I'm excited to flesh this thing out.
"[Conciliation has failed] because it was all on one side . . . There has never been a moment since Lee surrendered that I would not have gone more than halfway to meet the Southern people in a spirit of conciliation. But they have never responded to it . . . The pacification of the South rests entirely with the South. I do not see what the North can do that has not been done, unless we surrender the results of the war."
Studying the American Civil War presents a unique case study to explore this. While it was fought on the battlefield for just over four years from 1861-1865, some argue that with the defeat of Reconstruction in 1877, the war did not end until the signing of the Civil Rights Act, nearly a century after the guns fell silent on the battlefield. This long view of history allows for the rich development of strategic insights on peacemaking, to include proximate cause and root cause analysis, assessment and reassessment; policy-strategy match; and assuaging fear, honor, and interest.
Comment