Shek,
I concur with your analysis of Meade.
Meade, with Humphries as a true Chief of Staff, was a doer. He may have been a little off on the selection of Warren as a corps commander...but Warren had been adequate the previous fall...maybe even very good when compared to Newton & French.
Meade was aggressive in the fall of 1863 when one considers what he dealt with between SEP-NOV. After getting his Army reorganized on the fly in July he has to spend quite a bit of August getting the Army refitted...you and I would say reconstituted. He had to reorganize brigades and divisions. The AOP lost over 6,000 horses and mules in he Gettysburg campaign...some dead, the rest wounded and broken down. The Quartermaster Remount Service was good but it was not THAT good. He had to deal with a LOT of back stabbing from Washington (see the beginnings of HERDOTUS) which exploded that winter.
In the Bristoe Campaign Meade moved out aggressively against Lee but made sure he had a secure base of supply along the rail line. Mid campaign he was ordered to send to send 2 corps to Chattanooga to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland in the wake of the Chickamauga disaster. While staying in a more defensive mindset than Lee, he used Lee's army's aggressiveness against at Bristoe Station and inflicted heavy casualties on AP Hill. Meade actually provided the most aggressive move of the campaign with his assault by the VIth Corps at Rappahanock Station. Meade showed aggresiveness durign the Mine Run campaign but was done in by the caution of French, Newton and Warren. Sedgwick's VIth Corps Vermont Brigade was actually able to breech the Confederate defensive line (something the VIth Corps was growing very adept at doing) but engineer that he was he could see he could not have success on a wide enough front so called of the assaults.
So to your question...
Meade did not fear Lee. Not surprising, Meade felt more comfortable on the defense than offense woudl prove to be just fine on the offense. He had a prediliction for fighting on favorable ground of his choosing. To that end I believe he and Humphreys would have pushed harder through the Wilderness (maybe even keeping a tighter reign on Sheridan since Grant would now be absent) and perhaps battle would have been joiined at Laurel Hill and vicinity ratehr than on the edge of the old Chancellorsville charnel house.
The one wild card with Grant gone...what was the role of the IXth Corps going to be? Would Burnside early on ignore his date of rank and willingly serve under Meade or cause a problem.
I normally hate what ifs...but this was a tasty one!
I concur with your analysis of Meade.
Meade, with Humphries as a true Chief of Staff, was a doer. He may have been a little off on the selection of Warren as a corps commander...but Warren had been adequate the previous fall...maybe even very good when compared to Newton & French.
Meade was aggressive in the fall of 1863 when one considers what he dealt with between SEP-NOV. After getting his Army reorganized on the fly in July he has to spend quite a bit of August getting the Army refitted...you and I would say reconstituted. He had to reorganize brigades and divisions. The AOP lost over 6,000 horses and mules in he Gettysburg campaign...some dead, the rest wounded and broken down. The Quartermaster Remount Service was good but it was not THAT good. He had to deal with a LOT of back stabbing from Washington (see the beginnings of HERDOTUS) which exploded that winter.
In the Bristoe Campaign Meade moved out aggressively against Lee but made sure he had a secure base of supply along the rail line. Mid campaign he was ordered to send to send 2 corps to Chattanooga to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland in the wake of the Chickamauga disaster. While staying in a more defensive mindset than Lee, he used Lee's army's aggressiveness against at Bristoe Station and inflicted heavy casualties on AP Hill. Meade actually provided the most aggressive move of the campaign with his assault by the VIth Corps at Rappahanock Station. Meade showed aggresiveness durign the Mine Run campaign but was done in by the caution of French, Newton and Warren. Sedgwick's VIth Corps Vermont Brigade was actually able to breech the Confederate defensive line (something the VIth Corps was growing very adept at doing) but engineer that he was he could see he could not have success on a wide enough front so called of the assaults.
So to your question...
Meade did not fear Lee. Not surprising, Meade felt more comfortable on the defense than offense woudl prove to be just fine on the offense. He had a prediliction for fighting on favorable ground of his choosing. To that end I believe he and Humphreys would have pushed harder through the Wilderness (maybe even keeping a tighter reign on Sheridan since Grant would now be absent) and perhaps battle would have been joiined at Laurel Hill and vicinity ratehr than on the edge of the old Chancellorsville charnel house.
The one wild card with Grant gone...what was the role of the IXth Corps going to be? Would Burnside early on ignore his date of rank and willingly serve under Meade or cause a problem.
I normally hate what ifs...but this was a tasty one!
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