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Kim Jong Un's strange behavior on the job.

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  • Kim Jong Un's strange behavior on the job.

    I just discovered more information related to the execution of Jang Song-T'aek. It could be that Kim Jong-Un is behaving a bit strangely as of late. Some behaviors that would've not occurred under the previous leaders.

    This article is part of a series. It can be found at:
    http://newfocusintl.com/kim-jong-un-charge

    ************************************************** ******************************

    Kim Jong-un is not in charge. Then who is?
    DECEMBER 25, 2013 BY NEWFOCUSINTL

    After the fall of Jang Song-thaek, many saw the removal of such a supposedly influential figure as evidence of Kim Jong-un’s absolute power. But the public purging and execution of Jang Song-thaek at once exposes Kim Jong-un’s lack of power and the attempts of Kim Jong-il’s associates to uphold a power structure that lacks an unquestioned head.

    Our analysis is based on an understanding of Kim Jong-il era politics from within, and according to its internal structure rather than its external manifestations.

    In this series, we provide an overview of differences between the Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un systems, in an attempt to provide a clearer understanding of both. Here is the link to our first and second installments, which focus on the visible presentational and procedural differences between the Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un eras.

    We present our final installment in two halves: here, we focus on differences in content, to show who is driving the events. In the next installment, we show where these events are heading.


    To reveal Jang Song-thaek’s ‘womanising’ is an overt attack on the prestige of Kim Kyong-hui.

    In North Korea’s official statement of the Politburo decision condemning Jang Song-thaek, there are mentions of his personal life and ‘womanising’. It may have been rumoured in the outside world that Kim Kyong-hui and Jang Song-thaek did not have a close relationship as a couple; but within North Korea, it is blasphemy of the highest order to comment at all on a member of the Kim family as an ordinary human being, let alone comment on details of his or her personal life.

    The outside world may mock accusations of sexual impropriety as petty attacks on Jang Song-thaek’s reputation, but for North Koreans, this official message is unprecedented. Was Kim Jong-il’s own sister held in such contempt by her husband? How could the ruling Kim be a holy divinity with his family members exposed to be so corrupt and fallen?

    There couldn’t be a more shocking and unsettling threat to the legitimacy of the North Korean state than a confession of imperfection at the heart of the Kim family.

    The Politburo meeting chaired by Kim Jong-un needed so urgently to undermine Jang Song-thaek that it infringed, and then destroyed, the previously untouchable sanctity of the Kim family – a sanctity which underpins the legitimacy of the North Korean state.

    To attribute criminal and factional charges to Jang Song-thaek is more than enough as a message confirming his eternal removal and disassociation from the Kim family. The additional charge of ‘womanising’ is unnecessary for such a removal and utterly destroys the sanctity, prestige and legitimacy of Kim-family based sanctity and power.

    In the kinship society of North Korea, guilt by association formally convicts family members of a political criminal and imbues him or her with shared responsibility for a crime committed by one of their own. But the principle of guilt by association is never applied within the Kim family itself.

    Several close members of the Kim family have defected and so the enforcement of the principle within the Kim family is impossible. In fact, if it was enforced, Kim Jong-un himself would be in a political concentration camp.

    Not only was the pointed and very deliberate attack on the prestige of Kim Kyong-hui carried out without regard for a ruling Kim-centred authority, it was completely unnecessary and profoundly self-destructive if its goal had been the neutralisation of Jang Song-thaek in order to strengthen Kim Jong-un’s personal authority.

    The orchestration of these events was not controlled by those whose political power depends on the nominal power structure visible to outsiders, but on the separate and clandestine structure of executive and enforceable power.

    There is only one chain of command with the power to destroy Jang Song-thaek in this way, and this is the Organisation and Guidance Department of Kim Jong-il’s era.

    Not only are they the only entity that could enforce the purge of Jang Song-thaek, but the rivalry between the OGD and Jang Song-thaek had to come to a head after the bloody confrontations of 1997-2000, which we will address in a later post.

    Jang Song-thaek’s subsequent establishment of power relied on his grip on business and trading rights, and he was both protected and constrained by his status as a side-branch of the Kim family. In Kim Jong-il’s era, Jang Song-thaek was kept on side through balancing the man’s immunity by marriage to the Kim family against his status as a side-branch of the Kim family.

    If Kim Jong-un was truly at the helm and in control, and if risking his own cult prestige in conducting the purge was merely a miscalculation, the OGD would never have allowed this mistake to happen.

    If Kim Jong-un were acknowledged by the OGD as the true holder of absolute authority, the OGD would have protected his prestige at all costs.

    Above all, the executive structure of the OGD, with full chain of command over the nation’s surveillance and physical enforcement institutions, is such that it is impossible for Kim Jong-un to have overruled it at his whim, let alone command it to do his bidding.



    Kim Jong-un did not speak at the Politburo meeting.

    At the top of the official Politburo account of Jang Song-thaek’s purge, there is a statement that “Comrade Kim Jong-un chaired the Politburo meeting.” But neither in the section that records the proceedings of the meeting nor in the final decision of the purge, do the words of Kim Jong-un feature at all.

    For the ruling Kim’s words to go unreported, and for his voice to be so absent in the record of the meeting, is yet another in the list of unprecedented and overwhelmingly abnormal features of this meeting. Such an omission speaks very loud and clear to any North Korean elite reading the account.

    In any meeting chaired by Kim Jong-il, the proceedings always began with ‘Great Guidance’ from the Dear Leader; and whatever the outcome or decision, it was invariably ended with Kim Jong-il’s ‘Great Conclusion’. But in this Politburo meeting, there is only a feeble mention of the ruling Kim’s authority, and no mention of it at all in the conclusion.

    It is no exaggeration to say Kim Jong-un’s role was as a mere manikin, a prop to legitimise the meeting. There are absolutely no words attributed to him regarding the crimes or the conclusion that was reached, both of which would have been prerequisites for the force of law to be applied to a meeting in Kim Jong-il’s era.

    In this way, in a meeting where the ruler’s uncle had his most intimate and shameful ‘crimes’ detailed, Kim Jong-un was present on the surface but absent in essence and in authority.

    If Kim Jong-un really did feel anger at his uncle and had directed the whole episode, or if there were some individual using Kim Jong-un as a puppet, the emphasis on Kim Jong-un’s control and authority over the faction of Jang Song-thaek would have been the key priority of the propaganda infrastructure.

    It is difficult to come to any conclusion other than that the insult to the prestige of the Kim family was aimed not just at Kim Kyong-hui, but at Kim Jong-un himself. The driving force behind the purge is far more than an entity that can ignore the superficial structures of power: it is a system strong enough to demonstrate to the elite that it can and will do so with impunity.

    It is to the OGD that everyone in the elite must answer. If there is a Big Brother in North Korea, it is the Organisation and Guidance Department of the Korean Workers’ Party. To conclude that Kim Jong-un can direct the OGD is absurd. Unfortunately, interpretations of recent events have yet to consider the central role of the structure that controls the North Korean system.

    Here are the names of the most powerful men in today’s North Korea:

    Cho Yon Jun – OGD First Vice Director with chain of command over organisational structures
    Hwang Byong Soh – OGD First Vice Director with chain of command over military structures
    Kim Kyong Ok - OGD First Vice Director with chain of command over surveillance structures
    It is these men who hold the reins of executive power and enforcement in North Korea, and not the people most publicly recognised outside North Korea as being in control.

    Even more than the individuals, however, it is the structure and shape of the OGD that matters. This entity controls the power elite of North Korea; in Kim Jong-il’s time it was the OGD directors who negotiated between the power elite and Kim Jong-il, each according to his own area of responsibility.

    No ordinary North Korean has access to the structure, and even members of the elite can know only about sections directly relevant to them.

    Collaborative studies with high-level exiles and internal correspondents over the years have at last led us to a picture of an OGD that has five sections and thirty-eight sub-divisions.

    The nature of the system is such that no one person can see all of it at once: the only way to perceive a comprehensive overview is for those who were part of the power system (and therefore understand the significance of the OGD) to share and combine their knowledge with others who still remain within it.

    This is why it’s not just fragments of knowledge about North Korea that counts, but the experience-based understandings that bring the fragments to cohesion and coherence.

    This synthesis can only be achieved when those within the system communicate beyond its compartmentalisation and atomisation which, along with the liberal use of proxies and publicised elite power rankings, was what kept Kim Jong-il’s power structure from being truly understood – and therefore manipulated – by any individual North Korean or by the outside world.
    Last edited by Crocodylus; 09 Feb 14,, 00:02.

  • #2
    Interesting defectors' perspective.
    About Us - New Focus International
    Trust me?
    I'm an economist!

    Comment


    • #3
      Deception through information

      Originally posted by DOR View Post
      Interesting defectors' perspective.
      About Us - New Focus International
      There is always the possibility of fragmented bits of information being given, which when brought together may or may not form a concrete picture. Even so the articles on this website offer a perspective on North Korea different from that of other news outlets.

      I guess that, thus far, we can conclude that KJU is consolidating power away from those who were loyal to his father, Jong-Il. I discovered that certain military figures each had a piece of the DPRK government under KJI, with the Dear Leader serving as a mere figurehead. (A king surrounded by powerful ministers is usually in a most precarious position.) Apparently KJU wants to have more political power and so has begun to consolidate it.

      Also, from the above article it seems to me that KJU may have begun a slow process of dismantling the cult of personality surrounding him and his family. I say slow because that cult of personality is deeply entrenched in DPRK society and it definitely will not disappear overnight. For the time being, KJU will be consolidating his power - by making it all about the Party. Please view the article by clicking on the link below.

      The transformation of N.Korean politics through the execution of Jang Song-thaek - New Focus International

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      • #4
        I never heard anyone describe Kim Jong-il as a figurehead.
        Trust me?
        I'm an economist!

        Comment


        • #5
          Keep your friends close and your enemies closer.

          Originally posted by DOR View Post
          I never heard anyone describe Kim Jong-il as a figurehead.
          Of course no one's going to say that! Even if KJI were actually just a figurehead, his cult of personality is what allowed the DPRK government to exercise absolute authority. By telling everyone that the Party seeks only to carry out the will of the Great Leader, the government wears the mantle of his authority - regardless of whether he actually approves of what is being done or not.

          My guess is that this time around Kim Jong Un wants to remind the government just who is boss - and put any wannabe kingmakers in their place. Taking out Jang Song-T'aek and his immediate company - at least to me - looked like a really risky maneuver, considering the position he held.

          Comment


          • #6
            Well, at least we now know JST did not become dog food.

            I was probably talking out of my ass in the last post, but it looks like I guessed right all along. According to this New York Times article dated 2013-12-23, JST was in a position to force KJU to accept a "ceremonial kingship". So "Li'l Fatty" decided to have his uncle and his aides taken out of the picture.

            ---------------------------------------------------------------------

            Korea Execution Is Tied to Clash Over Businesses
            By CHOE SANG-HUN and DAVID E. SANGER

            SEOUL, South Korea — The execution of the uncle of Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s leader, had its roots in a firefight between forces loyal to Mr. Kim and those supporting the man who was supposed to be his regent, according to accounts that are being pieced together by South Korean and American officials. The clash was over who would profit from North Korea’s most lucrative exports: coal, clams and crabs.

            North Korean military forces were deployed to retake control of one of the sources of those exports, the rich crab and clam fishing grounds that Jang Song-thaek, the uncle of the country’s untested, 30-year-old leader, had seized from the military. In the battle for control of the fishing grounds, the emaciated, poorly trained North Korean forces “were beaten — very badly — by Uncle Jang’s loyalists,” according to one official.

            The rout of his forces appears to have been the final straw for Mr. Kim, who saw his 67-year-old uncle as a threat to his authority over the military and, just as important, to his own family’s dwindling sources of revenue. Eventually, at Mr. Kim’s order, the North Korean military came back with a larger force and prevailed. Soon, Mr. Jang’s two top lieutenants were executed.

            The two men died in front of a firing squad. But instead of rifles, the squad used antiaircraft machine guns, a form of execution that according to South Korean intelligence officials and news media was similar to the one used against some North Korean artists in August. Days later, Mr. Jang himself was publicly denounced, tried and executed, by more traditional means.

            Given the opaqueness of North Korea’s inner circle, many details of the struggle between Mr. Kim and his uncle remain murky. But what is known suggests that while Mr. Kim has consolidated control and eliminated a potential rival, it has been at a huge cost: The open warfare between the two factions has revealed a huge fracture inside the country’s elite over who pockets the foreign currency — mostly Chinese renminbi — the country earns from the few nonnuclear exports its trading partners desire.

            Only a few months ago Mr. Jang was believed to be the second most powerful man in North Korea. In fact, American intelligence agencies had reported to the White House and the State Department in late 2011 that he could well be running the country behind the scenes — and might edge out his inexperienced nephew for control. In part that was based on his deep relationship with top officials in China, as well as his extensive business connections there.

            His highly unusual public humiliation and execution on Dec. 12 set off speculation about the possibility of a power struggle within the secretive government. But in recent days a more complex, nuanced story has emerged.

            During a closed-door meeting on Monday of the South Korean National Assembly’s intelligence committee, Nam Jae-joon, the director of the National Intelligence Service, disputed the North’s assertion that Mr. Jang had tried to usurp his nephew’s power. Rather, he said, Mr. Jang and his associates had provoked the enmity of rivals within the North’s elite by dominating lucrative business deals, starting with the coal badly needed by China, the North’s main trading partner.

            “There had been friction building up among the agencies of power in North Korea over privileges and over the abuse of power by Jang Song-thaek and his associates,” Mr. Nam was quoted as saying. Mr. Nam’s comments were relayed to the news media by Jeong Cheong-rae and Cho Won-jin, two lawmakers designated as spokesmen for the parliamentary committee.

            In interviews, officials have said that the friction described in general terms to the South Korean Parliament played out in a violent confrontation in late September or early October, just north of the western sea border between the Koreas.

            There, the North harvests one of its major exports: crabs and clams, delicacies that are also highly valued by the Chinese. For years the profits from those fishing grounds, along with the output from munitions factories and trading companies, went directly to the North Korean military, helping it feed its troops, and enabling its top officers to send cash gifts to the Kim family.

            South Korea was a major market for the North’s mushrooms, clams, crabs, abalones and sea cucumbers until the South cut off trade with the North after the sinking of a South Korean Navy ship in 2010, forcing the North Korean military to rely on the Chinese market.

            But when Mr. Kim succeeded his father two years ago, he took away some of the military’s fishing and trading rights and handed them to his cabinet, which he designated as the main agency to revive the economy. Mr. Jang was believed to have been a leading proponent of curtailing the military’s economic power.

            Mr. Jang appears to have consolidated many of those trading rights under his own control — meaning that profits from the coal, crabs and clams went into his accounts, or those of state institutions under his control, including the administrative department of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea, which he headed.

            But this fall, the long-brewing tensions that arrangement created broke into the open. Radio Free Asia, in a report last week that cited anonymous North Korean sources, reported that Mr. Kim saw North Korean soldiers malnourished during his recent visits to islands near the disputed western sea border. They say he ordered Mr. Jang to hand over the operation of nearby fishing grounds back to the military.

            According to accounts put together by South Korean and American officials, Mr. Jang and his associates resisted. When a company of about 150 North Korean soldiers showed up at the farm, Mr. Jang’s loyalists refused to hand over the operation, insisting that Mr. Jang himself would have to approve. The confrontation escalated into a gun battle, and Radio Free Asia reports that two soldiers were killed and that the army backed off. Officials say the number of casualties is unknown, but they have received similar accounts.

            It is hard to know exactly how large a role the episode played in Mr. Jang’s downfall — there is more money in coal than in seafood — but Mr. Kim was reportedly enraged when he heard of the clash. Mr. Nam said that by mid-November his agents were already reporting that Mr. Jang had been detained. The Dec. 12 verdict noted that Mr. Jang “instructed his stooges to sell coal and other precious underground resources at random.”

            Mr. Nam said the fact that such behind-the-scenes tensions had spun so far out of control that Mr. Kim had to order his own uncle’s execution raised questions about the government’s internal unity.

            “The fissure within the regime could accelerate if it further loses popular support,” the lawmakers quoted Mr. Nam as saying.

            Mr. Jang was the husband of Kim Kyong-hui, the only sister of Mr. Kim’s father, the longtime leader Kim Jong-il. Mr. Nam told the committee Monday that Mr. Kim’s aunt had retained her position in the hierarchy, even while the purge of Mr. Jang’s other associates continued. But he denied news reports in South Korea and Japan that some of Mr. Jang’s associates were seeking political asylum in Seoul and Beijing.

            Mr. Nam pointed to Vice Marshal Choe Ryong-hae, the top political officer in the North Korean People’s Army, and Kim Won-hong, the head of the North’s secret police and its intelligence chief, as the government’s new rising figures since Mr. Jang’s execution, the two lawmakers said.

            Choe Sang-hun reported from Seoul, and David E. Sanger from Washington.

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