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  • Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
    Kargil offered some pretty good reverse slope positioning. Last I check of the Indo-Pak borders, other points offer the same. Now, mind you, what's good for the goose is good for the gander. India also enjoys the same terrain which makes defence meaningful and offense, challenging to say the least.
    Sir,

    Agreed, Indirect fire was almost always useless without timely remote communications to Direct fire, with the caveat - Unless the target was significantly deep, broad, and dense. This, when such conditions applied, there isn't much need to adjust fire between shots. Not as efficient as Direct fire to be sure, but I think the casualty returns demonstrate that Indirect fire in a target-rich environment can be pretty effective.
    sigpicAnd on the sixth day, God created the Field Artillery...

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    • Originally posted by Blademaster View Post
      See the build up action in 2001 Op Pakaram and how a Lt. Gen Vij was forced out of IA because he moved too fast for PA and Americans' taste and scared the crap out of them and Americans brought pressure on GoI to bring Vij to heel.
      Other commentary suggests that the events you are referring to were more nuanced than merely 'scaring the crap out of the PA and US':

      ... By January 7, 2002, while the IA had no options to launch offensive operations across the LoC in the snow-bound areas of Jammu & Kashmir, in the plains of Punjab and Rajasthan the climatic conditions were ideal for surgical operations backed up by punitive air-strikes (i.e. high-intensity conventional war with tactically limited objectives). Despite all this being communicated by Gen Padmanabhan (who by then was also the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, or COSC) to the CCNS, the Govt of India (GoI), through the CCNS, never spelt out any war-waging directives and related ROEs to either Gen Padmanabhan, or to Admiral Madhvendra Singh or to Air Chief Marshal Srinivasapuram Krishnaswamy. This in turn resulted in the armed services chiefs being subjected to severe psychological stress, since their respective theatre and fleet commanders were constantly badgering them for seeking approvals for activating their OP-PLANs. The IA’s Western Command (HQed in Chandimandir, Punjab) was then the most important theatre command as far as Pakistan went and held extensive strike power. II ‘Kharga’ Corps was then the most important offensive formation (possessing 50% of the IA’s offensive capabilities) and was tasked to tear through the Thar/Cholistan Desert at/near Rahimyar Khan and race towards Jacobabad, thereby cutting Pakistan into two.

      Lt Gen Kapil Vij, the then GOC of II ‘Kharga’ Corps, was unaware of all that was happening back at Army HQ and the shenanigans within the civilian corridors of power in Delhi, and therefore proceeded to unveill the operational art dictating his OP-PLAN on the premise that the “law of the initial advantage of the aggressor” assumes critical importance, as it is the aggressor who generally sets the pattern which operations will take. Since no further operational instructions were emanating from either HQ Western Command (since IA HQ had not been issued any directives regarding the higher directions of war and related ROEs from the GoI), Lt Gen Vij decided to take the initiative with perfectly honourable intentions and by mid-January 2002 ordered a third of his warfighting armoured and mechanised infantry formations along with supporting field artillery assets—all located about 150km away from the international boundary (IB)—to be forward-deployed just 40km away from the IB, ready for the initial contact battles. The rest of his warfighting strength (follow-on forces for waging the breakthrough battles), including operational reserves, were positioned in a three-arrowhead formation along three probable routes-of-advance (a deployment done just prior to initiating the offensive). This was immediately picked up by US overhead recce satellites and was viewed by the US as an escalation, since it violated the India-Pakistan confidence-building measures (CBM)—formalised in the late 1980s after EX BRASS TACKS—that called for all land-based warfighting assets (men and material) of both countries to be kept 10km [NOTE: I am uncertain if this should in fact be 100KM], away from the IB and working boundary (WB), while the airspace of both countries would be no-fly-zones for combat aircraft and military helicopters 10km on either side of the IB and WB during peacetime. Therefore, it was not Pakistan that alerted the US about this, but the US itself saw all this through its overhead recce satellites and then reportedly confronted Brajesh Mishra with the evidence and bluntly asked him whether the GoI really wanted a full-scale war, or did it sincerely want the US to lean over Pakistan and prevent it from taking the Indian military’s bait, which in turn would serve to subdue the ‘war-mongerers’ within the GoI and the three armed services. Consequently, a highly embarrassed Brajesh Mishra, in order to save his face and credibility in front of the US, allegedly directed the MoD under the then Defence Minister George Fernandes to force Army HQ to relieve Lt Gen Kapil Vij of his command of II ‘Kharga’ Corps (he was replaced by his junior Maj Gen Bhupinder Singh Thakur by January 21, 2002) as proof of Mishra’s ‘sincere’ intentions about averting a full-scale war ...
      TRISHUL: Travesties Of National Security

      I would see the dismissal of Gen. Vij as being a requirement (under the circumstances at the time) given his decision to unilaterally escalate and potentially spark a war despite the lack of any direction/orders/instructions to do so from either the Army or political leadership.
      Last edited by Agnostic Muslim; 26 Feb 14,, 15:24.
      Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission - Jinnah
      https://twitter.com/AgnosticMuslim

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      • Originally posted by Blademaster View Post
        Has PA ever practiced defense or warfare against a mobile force with the capability of bridge fording and mine breaching capabilities? I sure would be interested in reading about it because I have not seen any evidence of that.
        I suggest you research Azm-e-Nau exercises.

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        • Originally posted by Blademaster View Post
          I have to check off with Captain Lemontree and LCol Delta, but the IA exercises were intended to breach the three canals. They have to otherwise IA would be sitting ducks.
          I would'nt waste good troops on those canal based defences. That is a meat grinder.
          I would rather just pound the hell out of them, launch fients and tie their holding formations and reserves in that area and continue pounding them from the air and ground.

          The actual thrust lines should be else where.
          Last edited by lemontree; 27 Feb 14,, 08:10.

          Cheers!...on the rocks!!

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          • Originally posted by notorious_eagle View Post
            I suggest you research Azm-e-Nau exercises.
            Our reading is that Azm-e-Nau series of exercises were to counter Cold Start by "counter-offensive" strikes and not "counter-attacks".
            The Cold start battle groups were not addressed in those exercises. Do correct me if i'm wrong.

            Cheers!...on the rocks!!

            Comment


            • Originally posted by lemontree View Post
              Our reading is that Azm-e-Nau series of exercises were to counter Cold Start by "counter-offensive" strikes and not "counter-attacks".
              The Cold start battle groups were not addressed in those exercises. Do correct me if i'm wrong.
              Sir

              I was merely responding to the assertion that PA has not simulated fighting a mechanized enemy with the capability of throwing up bridges and mine breaching capabilities. Fox Land and and Blue Land literally treat each other as enemies and both sides are equipped with Mechanized/Armoured Assets. There were many objectives behind these War Games but the main primarily being mobilizing at the required set of time set by PA commanders and making the concept of 'Joint Warfare' fully operational with PA and PAF working closely under the new C4I system.

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              • Originally posted by notorious_eagle View Post
                making the concept of 'Joint Warfare' fully operational with PA and PAF working closely under the new C4I system.
                Hehehehehehehahahahahahahaha! Well, you would be the first.

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                • Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                  Hehehehehehehahahahahahahaha! Well, you would be the first.
                  True, not all of the force is the main assets are linked up.

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