The Ardennes Offensive-Today in The Battle of The Bulge

[Albany Rifles]

Thanks Triple C.....good stuff as usual.

One other additional point. The 101st Airborne never thought it needed rescuing. They were an airborne division and expected to fight surrounded. They wanted a land line of communication opened to evacuate the wounded and improve supply flow. On the 27th that happened. A supply column from VIII Corps pulled into the city, with MG Maxwell Taylor, the division commander. He had been in DC at the start of the attack. On its return out the convoy included 28 ambulances with the worst of the wounded who had been stuck in Bastogne since it was cut off.

McAuliffe returned to his role as commander, division artillery.

[Triple C]

Dec. 30, 1944. Model and Rundstedt attempted to renew the stalled offensive by a strike against Bastogne from its east. Unknown to the German commanders, Bradley and Patton had agreed to pour in fresh troops and begin the American counterattack against the Germans at the same place on the same date. In fact, the opposing attacks were almost scheduled to the same minute.

The US 11th Armored, 87th Infantry and 35th Infantry Divisions crashed directly into the Fuerhrer Begleit Brigade, 167th Volksgrenadiers, and 1st SS Panzer. In Lutrebois, the 1st SS Panzer cut off and captured 2 companies of the 35th ID, and almost overran the rest of the division's line, but timely intervention by the 4th AD as well as heavy artillery and air support extinguished the German attack. In the words of Major Cole:

It is unfortunate that the historical reproduction of the Lutrebois fight in the von Rankian sense ("exactly as it was") is impossible, for the American use of the combined arms in this action was so outstanding as to merit careful analysis by the professional soldier and student. The 4th Armored Division artillery, for example, simultaneously engaged the 1st SS Panzer in the east and the 3d Panzer Grenadier in the west. Weyland's fighter-bombers from the XIX Tactical Air Command intervened at precisely the right time to blunt the main German armored thrust and set up better targets for engagement by the ground forces.

Dec. 30 ended with no significant alternation to the frontline between the antagonists.

[Doktor]

We've missed some of the heaviest fights. :(

[S2]

Dok,

You raise a great point. Why?

Because all the drama on the operational/strategic levels was gone.

The BULK of the heavy fighting remained, often against German forces bent on demanding a heavy price for equipment they'd never be able to extract from the Ardennes. IIRC, elements of the 82nd Airborne and a reconstituted regiment from the 106th Infantry Division recaptured positions along Skyline Drive in late January, 1945-over a month after the offensive had been initiated.

Raised the issue regarding WHERE Patton attacked north with his III Corps.

Was it possible for 3rd U.S. Army to cut off the German retreat back into Germany? Just as the Germans had both a short and long solution, so too the Allies. Attacking directly north to Bastogne might relieve direct pressure on the crossroads but squeeze German forces back across the border. Attacking northeast offered the opportunity to cut off all German forces west of Skyline Drive and destroy them.

IIRC, there was the usual wringing of hands about a German counterattack because, as we know, the Germans retained infinite resources even at this late stage.

BTW, over 600 pages of official U.S. Army history of the battle here.

[Albany Rifles]

We've missed some of the heaviest fights. :(

1. Feel free to post! This thread is not a wholey owned subsidiary of AR Enterprises!

2. Been a little busy....all the other managers at work are out leaving me to fill in for 2 other branch chiefs and our division chief.

3. I've been keeping the This Day in the Civil War up to date.

4. Dealing with internet & computer issues at home.

5. It's NFL playoffs, college bowl season and the Bruins have been playing a bunch of games!

[Albany Rifles]

Steve,

The Allies picked Houffalize as the common aiming point for the counterattack, mainly because Montgomery pushed for that because he judged the offensive power and capabilities on the Ninth and First Armies on his own army's experience. Ike couldn't get him to move off the dime and do what teh Americans wanted to do...counter attack along the shoulders using Skyline Drive as the axis of advance.

Von Rundstedt commented when his intelligence chief told him the Allied objective, "So they opted for the small solution."

And here are some of things I missed telling everyone!!!!


Operation NORDWIND, a German attack on 6th Army Group farther south to support Operation WACHT AM RHEIN. Operation Nordwind - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Operation BODENPLATTE, an attempt by the Luftwaffe to cripple Allied tactical support airpower on the Continent. Operation Bodenplatte - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Here is a map of the copunterattacks by which primarily American divisions...

[astralis]

from the Western allied standpoint, the "small solution" made perfect sense from a very cold, strategic perspective, as did Eisenhower's slow steady push.

no point in high-risk options when it was clear Germany was done...and most of that territory would be evacuated for the Soviets.

one wonders what would have happened had Hitler, instead of harboring visions of throwing the Americans off the Continent, gambled instead on throwing another big punch at the Soviets. at Seelow Heights the German commanders would openly rue the losses of the Battle of Bulge.

[Doktor]

AR,

All I said is I missed the posts. I am glad that you, Triple C and now Steve contribute here. Much to be learned.

What I miss is Allied Air Force input in the battle. I know their efforts to cut the supplies are most praised, especially German lack of oil due to these, but can't find much info on campaigns related to the battle itself.

[Albany Rifles]

Dok,

Try this link http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a397173.pdf

If you cannot open it PM me an e-maila ddress and I can send the pdf.

Also try To Win the Winter Sky: The Air War over the Ardennes 1944-1945 by Danny S. Parker.

[S2]

"...no point in high-risk options when it was clear Germany was done..."

The risk-reward calculation omitted that both German and allied infantrymen lacked both clarity of vision and comfortable persuasion. Nobody told either side the war was over. So they fought. They'd fight either way but the price in blood was unquestionably high given the selected axis of advance.

Do you really believe Germany could counterattack-either from the east, west or both- an Allied envelopement of their southern wing?

I don't.

I would believe that trafficability sucked in the southern sector; that both limited road networks and bridges along with a fair amount of no-go terrain would conspire to make the choice of an attack point further west far more preferable. I doubt this was part of the appreciation at Army Group level so simply coincidence colliding with prudence.

[Doktor]

Dok,

Try this link http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a397173.pdf

If you cannot open it PM me an e-maila ddress and I can send the pdf.

Also try To Win the Winter Sky: The Air War over the Ardennes 1944-1945 by Danny S. Parker.

Thanks. The link is working.

From what I can read both branches (Army and AF) wants most of the credit for themselves. While there are no doubts in the Army's efforts I reaad from various sources (including this one) that without air superiority the win in the Ardennes would be a lot harder task.

[Albany Rifles]

It was a combined arms effort.

But on the tactical/operational level, from 0600 on 16 DEC until sunup on 23 DEC there was little impact from airpower. It wa a straight up in your face guts by small knots of men, some without orders, who stood fast and said "F-it! This is as far as the bastards are going!"

Combined arms warfare won the campaign. The pure guts of infantrymen, artillerymen, engineers, tankers and medics won the battles.

[Triple C]

I am not a huge fan for Wikipedia's approach of labeling some battles as tactical victory but strategic defeat for an army like they did for Bodenplatte. Surely, Luftwaffe's near equal losses in aircraft and pilots should be counted as a significant loss for the force with inferior numbers in both?