Lt Gen Raheel Sharif chosen as new army chief : Pakistan

[Agnostic Muslim]

Yeah, my civies believed that propaganda too.

Why did you find it so hard to demonstrate an acceptable degree of functionality of a C4I system in a pre-planned, prepared and controlled environment like a military exercise? Was this back when 'punch-cards' were used to enter data in computer systems? :D

[Deltacamelately]

Why did you find it so hard to demonstrate an acceptable degree of functionality of a C4I system in a pre-planned, prepared and controlled environment like a military exercise? Was this back when 'punch-cards' were used to enter data in computer systems? :D

Originally Posted by notorious_eagle
This has been perfectly demonstrated by PA during these recent war games where all the assets of PA and PAF were synched together through a Joint C&C, C4I system is fully functional now.

Not when such claims are made so effortlesly. ;)

[notorious_eagle]

Not when such claims are made so effortlesly. ;)

Sir

I thought it was open secret that PA and PAF had achieved this capability. They wouldn't procure billions of dollars worth of Early Warning Systems, without a fully a functioning C4I to fully exploit these systems. I guess Pakistan can be thankful to the US because senior PA Officers were very impressed with this capability during their course of training in the US. Here's a very nice insight from Brig(r) Tughrai Yamin in regards to war games performed in 2011, where every key asset of PAF and PA were linked together:

""One idea that was tested during the exercise was the applicability of the network-centric approach in the joint Army and Air force operations. The network-centric as opposed to platform-centric operation aims to connect all sensors to with the shooter thus reducing his OODA (Orient, Observe, Decide, and Act) loop. Network-centricity provides a Common Operating Picture (COP) to all stakeholders and facilitates its decision making process. If indeed the Indians are planning to animate a Cold Start type scenario, a net-enabled force would be able to react in a timely manner by launching appropriate responses to reduce or eliminate any advantages that might be sought through reducing the time of operations. All three services of the Armed Forces are rapidly transforming into a network enabled force. Ex Azm-e-Nau III was the battle lab to test a number of ideas and concepts to counter the so called Cold Start offensive doctrine. Network centric operation was one concept, which emerged as a doable enterprise. It reduced the fog of war by allowing all tiers of the command from the highest to lowest field commander to look into the evolving battle picture through across the board connectivity using all means of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets i.e. UAVs, aerial imagery and early warning (EW). The real time availability of information not only reduced the chance of surprise through any proactive maneuvers, it also enhanced the decision making capability of commanders at all levels."

ISPR PUBLICATIONS - HILAL MAGZINE

From the book "Pakistan Air force; A new dawn"

"In April 2001 ..the then CAS, the late Mushaf Ali Mir, started the indigenous upgrade of the PAF's air defense system known as special project 1. Until then it had compromised of an automated network of Siemens Low level air control systems(SILLACS) and Hughes Sector operational Control/Operational control centre(SOC/OCC) Systems.
The late Air Cdre Hamid Shigri was designated as the chief project director (CPD); but was sadly killed in a road accident in 2006. Under his direction, an indigenous solution was developed to replace and upgrade the PAF's ageing C4I network, which was eventually achieved by using commercial off the shelf (COTS) technologies,...
....The first prototype mission control center was handed over in January 2003 and pronounced ready for operation by ACM Mushaf .....The onset of network centricity led to the evolution of the General Mission control centres(GMCCs).."

I would humbly suggest to look at the pictures and videos of Azm e Nau IV to get a feeling of what i am talking about.

Here's a picture of one of the C&C Sectors of PAF.



These IBMS are installed on Armoured and Mechanized Units.

[Officer of Engineers]

How often do your officer ranked pilots take orders from army corporals? Or worst, insults from the corporal telling the pilot that he can't worth crap?

[Agnostic Muslim]

How often do your officer ranked pilots take orders from army corporals? Or worst, insults from the corporal telling the pilot that he can't worth crap?

Isn't your comment here more about the specifics of how a particular military structures its C4I systems to perform? What I mean by that is that without knowing the specific metrics that the Pakistani military (or any military) uses to measure functionality, we can't really determine how successful that military has been at implementing C4I (as defined by that military). Or, are you arguing that the example you gave above is a general representation of a 'universally accepted' level of 'devolution' that needs to be met in order for a C4I system to be considered 'functional'?

Personally, I agree with you on what a final 'military wide integrated C4I' system should look like, with (using the case you presented for instance) the soldiers on the ground (whose lives depend on the officer ranked pilots delivering their payloads on time and on target) directing/controlling CAS. But what I don't know is whether the Pakistani Military has even considered devolution of authority, based on specific mission parameters, across service arms, and if it has, whether or not it plans on implementing it.

[Firestorm]

Opinion piece on Gen. Raheel Sharif by the Indian Lt.Gen.(retd) Syed Ata Hasnain, former General Officer Commanding of the XV Corps based in Srinagar.

The Tribune, Chandigarh, India - Opinions

Gen Sharif’s earned his stripes, spots yet to show
The most important question is how new Pak army chief General Raheel Sharif will view the J&K dynamics. However, a reversal of policy is least likely, especially when there is a change of command.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd)

Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd)General Raheel Sharif, as a protégé of Gen Parvez Musharraf, has a military pedigree many soldiers would envy. As a fellow of the prestigious Royal College of Defence Studies, London, he is in the exalted company of his mentor.

Media reports ascribe to him the thinking behind Pakistan’s doctrinal aspects of countering India’s pro-active strategy. While being a great professional citation, this is hardly likely even if he is considered an expert at defensive, and not offensive, warfare because Pakistan’s reaction of moving some of its formations to strategically more viable locations was thought through well before General Sharif rose to the level of a Corps Commander (30 Corps, Gujranwala).

Hamid Hussain’s assessment that General Sharif “is probably not suited to lead an army engaged in a war” needs to be evaluated more comprehensively. Study of history belies the assumption that the body language of senior military leaders and their appearance can lead to definitive deductions about their military intellect, translation into ground execution and leadership skills under duress and stress.

Of Pakistan’s senior leadership it can authoritatively be said that it is outstandingly wily and innovative at ‘conflict initiation’ but astonishingly unprofessional at taking the intent and aim to its military conclusion as part of ‘conflict termination’. This has been borne out in the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict, the actions in East Pakistan in 1971, in the operational content of Exercise Zarb-e-Momin in 1990, the Kargil misadventure in 1999 and in the recent exchanges on the LoC in Poonch, Mendhar and Keran.

None of these events led to any positive gains for Pakistan. In fact, the only decision which led to a possibly positive outcome was President Musharraf’s mutual initiative with the India to bring about ceasefire on the LoC on November 26, 2003, a decision which had far-reaching implications for both armies. Will General Sharif show similar cerebral capability and ‘soft’ approach towards the LoC to enable the task at hand on the more difficult western and internal security fronts, which are wrenching Pakistan apart? In fact, the most important question is how General Sharif will view the Jammu & Kashmir dynamics.

Will it be bravado at the LoC to display an offensive personality in charge? The negative spinoff of any such machismo will be an immediate effect on Nawaz Sharif’s declared intent of treading the peace path with India. Secondly, Pakistan’s current penchant with filling the Valley and Jammu region with infiltrated terrorists to retain options in calibrating the proxy war may well tempt General Sharif to project an offensive character. A reversal of policy is least likely especially when there is a change of command.

With Pakistan’s supposed perception that nothing major is likely on the diplomatic front over the next six months the situation points towards Mr Sharif giving his new army chief time and space to settle, even at the cost of a few flare-ups on the LoC. Although Mr Sharif has had negative experience with his chiefs, it is unlikely he will sully the internal military reputation of the new chief by placing unreasonable controls on him. We are therefore unlikely to see any major change in the policy on Jammu and Kashmir; only time and our response at the LoC will dictate which way the situation will head.

The Indian establishment needs to ensure that traditional assumptions of winter being a period of stability on the LoC are put at rest. The Pakistan defence establishment has been known for its innovations in conflict initiation. Whatever the personality of General Sharif, the dynamics of 2014 will force him to be aggressive on Kashmir. He may be forced by the hardliners to aid and abet the current Kashmir policy.

Some would expect that a personal loss in the form of his elder brother in a battle with the Indian Army in 1971 may have created in General Sharif a latent antipathy against India and this would be an opportunity for revenge. His credentials do not appear to suggest that. General Sharif is likely to think through any initiative.

The label of being less offensive possibly appears due to his track record of appointments and being an Infantryman. Flamboyant commanders are presumed to be black uniformed (Armoured Corps or Special Forces) with a record of commanding units and formations aggressively on the LoC, which General Sharif lacks. Possibly, PM Nawaz Sharif was advised on this and he deliberately chose to have a stable conformist. Infantrymen may not carry flamboyance, but it needs to be remembered that aggression comes naturally to them. On the Indian side the majority of iconic military leaders, Cariappa, Manekshaw and Aurora were all Infantrymen.

Predicting anything about Pakistan is fraught with danger, most of all the panning of personality of its military leaders. However, on balance, General Sharif’s tenure needs to lend stability in the approaching difficult and challenging years of the security scenario in the sub-continent. His politico-military compulsions of keeping J&K on the simmer (not boil) have to be assessed. He is unlikely to kowtow with radical elements beyond current levels knowing that tactical gains will not translate into strategic victory. Lastly, the Indian establishment needs to carefully evaluate whether General Sharif is the man to trust. In short, it is a situation where there are shades and shades of grey in which a black and white mind would only spell paralysis.

The writer is a Fellow of the Royal College of Defence Studies, London, and former General Officer Commanding of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps