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Army Looks to Mount 30mm Cannons on Strykers

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  • Army Looks to Mount 30mm Cannons on Strykers

    The idea to up-gun Strykers seems like a good idea to me, especially since the MGS didn't make it into service in the originally envisioned numbers, but what really gets me excited about this article is that the Army is thinking about tanks for the Airborne again! :Dancing-Banana:

    On a side note, with the USN, USAF, and USMC all doing a decent job articulating why they need money in this horrible fiscal climate, its about effin time that the Army started to spin the tale of why it is essential to the future of national security. The service that does the best job selling itself to the morons in Congress is probably going to get hurt the least, and so far IMHO, the Army is really falling behind in this regard.



    Army Looks to Mount 30mm Cannons on Strykers | Military.com


    FORT BENNING, Ga. -- Lightly-armed U.S. Army infantry brigades need heavier firepower -- that means light tanks and bigger guns on Stryker infantry carriers, say senior leaders here at the Maneuver Center of Excellence.

    The enemy's use of home-made bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan forced the Army to make vehicle protection a higher priority than mobility and firepower, MCOE Commander Maj. Gen. H.R. McMaster said.

    The Army is hoping to balance that approach with programs such as the Ground Combat Vehicle to replace the Bradley fighting vehicle and the Armored Multipurpose Vehicle to replace the M113 armored personnel carrier.

    But maneuver leaders maintain that the Army cannot forget about lighter units such as Stryker and infantry brigade combat teams that currently are not equipped with enough potent firepower to win fights quickly, McMaster said.

    "Across all of our formations we need the right combination of mobility protection and firepower," he said. "We need to emphasize what is next. What is the light tank that … we can give our infantry freedom of maneuver in action? And we want to up-gun our Strykers. We can see the enemy; it would be nice to be able to kill them."

    Stryker Brigade Combat Teams first saw combat in Iraq in late 2003. The highly-mobile infantry force is equipped with potent variants such as the 105mm Mobile Gun System and anti-tank guided missile.

    But most Stryker vehicles are infantry carriers armed with .50 caliber machine guns or MK19 automatic grenade launchers.

    This has to change, argues MCOE Command Sgt. Major James Carabello.

    "The Stryker needs to get up-gunned; a World War II weapon system on a Stryker? It needs a bigger gun," Carabello said. "It needs something that is a better platform than a MK 19 or a .50 caliber machine gun."

    The need is now greater, officials maintain, since the Army is cutting the number of MGS Strykers from 27 to 10 per SBCT.

    Currently, Training and Doctrine Command is working with Stryker program officials on a plan that could mean mounting a 30mm cannon on to the remote weapons stations on Stryker infantry carriers.

    This would give much greater firepower and still not require a turret be mounted on the Stryker, Army officials say. The plan is to purchase a company set of 30mm cannons, test them, and also try to determine should they be issued for every Stryker of have one per company, officials said.

    "Looking at the fire fights we have had on a continuous basis … we see the need to be able to provide an overmatch in the close fight as well for the purpose of ensuring freedom of maneuver and action of our infantry squads," McMaster said.

    A .50 caliber machine gun can be very effective, "but you don't get a round that blows up and ends firefights," McMaster said.

    Lightly-armed IBCTs also need mobile protected firepower such as a light tank for forced-entry style missions, Army leaders began saying earlier this year.

    The conventional Army's primary unit for that mission is the XVIII Airborne Corps' 82ndAirborne Division, "but all of our IBCTs are pretty strategically mobile," Brig. Gen. David Haight, chief of infantry at Benning.

    "So in the early hours and days of forcible-entry missions, we need a light-tank force that can facilitate movement and provide those light forces with additional protection and firepower."

    The 82nd Airborne Division was equipped with the M551 Sheridan Armored Reconnaissance Airborne Assault Vehicle until the mid 1990s. Developed during the Vietnam War, the Sheridan resembled a light tank and featured a 152mm main gun capable of firing standard ammunition or the MGM-51 Shillelagh antitank missile.

    The Sheridan was used in the Invasion of Panama in 1989 and Operation Desert Shield/Storm in 1991, but it was considered ineffective since its lightweight, aluminum armor was thin enough to be pierced by heavy machine-gun rounds, and the vehicle was particularly vulnerable to mines.

    Army officials were considering the Stryker MGS, but it has proven to be less effective in off-road operations.

    Maneuver officials say they would want a platform that could be air-dropped from a C-130 aircraft. It should have a base armor package capable of defeating 14.5mm ammunition. Once follow-on forces arrive, addition armor packages could be bolted on as necessary.

    One option could be to take another look at the Armored Gun System, a 105mm light tank that the Army had considered as a replacement to the Sheridan in the mid 1990s.

    It met the requirement in 1996 and still does, according to Benning officials, who described the AGS as "old technology that kills T72 tanks."

  • #2
    I am curious what Shek has to say since he commanded Stryker units.

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    • #3
      Originally posted by Blademaster View Post
      I am curious what Shek has to say since he commanded Stryker units.
      Yeah, that would be an amazing bit of insight if he is around.

      The bit in this article that interested me the most though is the idea of armor for IBCTs. I wonder how that might happen organizationally. Would it make sense to incorporate armor into individual IBCTs? Or would an approach like the Fires Brigade make more sense, where light armor was a corps level asset and could be attached to IBCTs as the need arose. However they might do it, from my perspective its a fine idea.

      Comment


      • #4
        Originally posted by HKDan View Post
        Yeah, that would be an amazing bit of insight if he is around.

        The bit in this article that interested me the most though is the idea of armor for IBCTs. I wonder how that might happen organizationally. Would it make sense to incorporate armor into individual IBCTs? Or would an approach like the Fires Brigade make more sense, where light armor was a corps level asset and could be attached to IBCTs as the need arose. However they might do it, from my perspective its a fine idea.
        The whole reason why we had Stryker brigades in the first place so we could air-deploy them quickly and they would have more firepower and a bit more protection than the "speed-bumps" capabilities that 82 Airborne Division and 101st Scream Eagles Division would offer and thereby give a more fighting chance.

        Now if you want to add more protection and firepower, then what is the reason for Strykers in the first place? Might as well stick with Bradleys and M1 Abrams tanks in the first place. I would only support the addition of protection and firepower if it doesn't take away the air mobility that Strykers offer us in the first place.

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        • #5
          For a start,they're cheaper to buy and operate.Second any armor is likely to be modular.You put it on or you take it out as needed.
          Those who know don't speak
          He said to them, "But now if you have a purse, take it, and also a bag; and if you don't have a sword, sell your cloak and buy one. Luke 22:36

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          • #6
            Russian paratroopers have a few parachute and rocket equipped IFVs that can be dropped.
            All those who are merciful with the cruel will come to be cruel to the merciful.
            -Talmud Kohelet Rabbah, 7:16.

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            • #7
              Originally posted by Blademaster View Post
              The whole reason why we had Stryker brigades in the first place so we could air-deploy them quickly and they would have more firepower and a bit more protection than the "speed-bumps" capabilities that 82 Airborne Division and 101st Scream Eagles Division would offer and thereby give a more fighting chance.

              Now if you want to add more protection and firepower, then what is the reason for Strykers in the first place? Might as well stick with Bradleys and M1 Abrams tanks in the first place. I would only support the addition of protection and firepower if it doesn't take away the air mobility that Strykers offer us in the first place.
              The article above mentioned two separate ideas. One was to upgrade Strykers with a 30mm. I agree with you that adding weight to these Brigades would be a mistake and out of line with their intent to be more deployable units. However, I don't see that a 30mm mounted on the RWS would necessarily increase the weight by too much.

              The other was to add light tanks to the IBCTs(Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, such as those found in the 82nd, 101st, and 10th divisions as well as in other units). In that situation, I do think that the current organization of these Brigades do lack organic firepower and that the addition of armor would bring a great deal of capability to them. The 82nd Airborne Division used to have a Battalion of M551 Sheridan light tanks that were retired in the mid-90s, IMHO adding either organic armor, or introducing deployable units of light armor is a really good idea.
              Last edited by HKDan; 22 Sep 13,, 15:05.

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              • #8
                What's more interesting than what's being sold, is who is doing the selling. I know General McMaster. He's the kind of guy the Army loves to hate: too smart by half. He's also the kind of guy they trot out when push comes to shove. If it needs selling, he'll sell it. If it needs killing, he'll kill it. It's all the same to him.

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                • #9
                  Originally posted by desertswo View Post
                  What's more interesting than what's being sold, is who is doing the selling. I know General McMaster. He's the kind of guy the Army loves to hate: too smart by half. He's also the kind of guy they trot out when push comes to shove. If it needs selling, he'll sell it. If it needs killing, he'll kill it. It's all the same to him.
                  I have seen him described as a Warrior-Intellectual, maybe its letting my inner fanboy show, but I have a lot of time for anything that he suggests. Not to say he is infallible, but the man has some very solid credentials.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    It's a LAV-III

                    LAV III - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by HKDan View Post
                      I have seen him described as a Warrior-Intellectual, maybe its letting my inner fanboy show, but I have a lot of time for anything that he suggests. Not to say he is infallible, but the man has some very solid credentials.
                      Like I said, the kind of guy the Army loves to hate. He got passed over several times because he pisses people off. He should be wearing four stars by now, but never will. I like him just fine, but then I enjoy a good, intellectual conversation on the relative value of Clausewitz vs. Sun Tsu.

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                      • #12
                        Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                        Actually, Colonel. I respectfully disagree. It larger and hold a much larger number of troops.

                        The issues with converting to 30 MM for most vehicles are numerous.

                        1. Can they fit within the existing turret ring? That includes feed systems, ejection set up, fire control, etc. The CROW may work...not too sure. FYI, one of the reasons the M2 has nto been upgunned is the 30 MM feed systems and ammo drums can not fit within the current BFV hull footprint.

                        2. The weight can be substantial and cause issues of becoming top heavy. A 30mm weighs considerably more than an M2...as do the rounds...not to mention recoil. Additionally, what does the weight do to engine power? Transmission lifespan? Fuel usage? Uparmoring HMMWVs lead to issues in all 3 areas which impacted the vehicle fleet.

                        I am not arguing against the requirement. But I don't think a COTS solution is going to be easy to find.
                        “Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it.”
                        Mark Twain

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                        • #13
                          Some may find interesting the circa 2002 report available at the links below, estimating transport requirements (air lift and/or sea lift) for quick deployment of a medium force, which was to be SBCTs for near future, and was to be FCS as the objective force further out.

                          The Stryker Brigade Combat Team
                          Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness
                          and Assessing Deployment Options

                          http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA411886

                          The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options | RAND

                          The U.S. Army perceives a gap between its current light and heavy forces: light forces deploy rapidly, but lack staying power; heavy forces have immense power, but take too long to deploy. To close this gap and also to experiment with new tactics, General Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, has begun a transformation process that will field medium-weight brigade combat teams beginning in 2003. The Army goal is to make these brigades light enough to deploy anywhere in the world in 4 days. Initially, these brigades will supplement the light and heavy forces. Over the next 20 to 30 years, the Army envisions the entire force becoming medium weight, with the ability to deploy by air anywhere in the world.

                          To better understand the requirement for strategic responsiveness, as well as what is achievable, this study sought to answer the following questions: Can the Air Force meet the Army's 4-day deployment goal? What combination of deployment and basing options would maximize the strategic responsiveness of new Army forces? How much unambiguous warning does the United States usually have before it initiates military operations? How much of this time will civilian decisionmakers typically consume in their deliberations before ordering deployment of military forces? Are large U.S. forces likely to deploy globally or just to certain regions? At what depths from the littoral might U.S. forces have to operate?

                          To assess deployment and basing options, the study team developed a simple spreadsheet that calculated transit times, loading and unloading times, and airfield throughput. It used military planning factors to determine aircraft usage rates, and maximum loads and ranges, and it drew on a variety of historical materials and interviews for the broader analysis of strategic responsiveness.

                          This report concludes that the Stryker Brigade cannot deploy by air or sea from bases in the United States to key regions in 4 days. Deployment times range from 9 days (Colombia) to 21 days (Afghanistan). Even if unlimited numbers of aircraft were available, airlift would still be constrained by the condition of receiving airfields in most scenarios. In some scenarios, the brigade would close as rapidly with sealift but still fall well short of the 4-day goal. However, using combinations of airlift and fast sealift to move forces from forward bases or preposition sites, forces could reach key regions in 5 to 9 days and most of the globe could be covered in two weeks — a great improvement over historic deployment times for motorized forces.

                          This study should be of interest to airmen and soldiers serving in plans, operational, analytic, and R&D organizations, as well as to the broader defense community.


                          TABLE of CONTENTS
                          Preface ......................................... iii
                          Figures ......................................... ix
                          Tables .......................................... xi
                          Summary ....................................... xiii
                          Acknowledgments ................................. xix
                          Acronyms ....................................... xxiii
                          Chapter One
                          INTRODUCTION .............................. 1
                          Background .................................. 2
                          Army Transformation Initiatives ................... 4
                          Emerging Doctrine ........................... 5
                          The Stryker Brigades .......................... 6
                          The Objective Force ........................... 8
                          Purpose and Organization ........................ 10
                          Chapter Two
                          DEPLOYING THE SBCTs ......................... 13
                          Airlifting the SBCT .............................. 15
                          Available Airlift Fleet .......................... 18
                          Airfield Infrastructure ......................... 20
                          Deployment of the SBCT from Projected Bases ....... 21
                          Sealifting the SBCT ............................. 28
                          Sealift Assets Considered ....................... 30
                          Calculating Sealift Deployment Time .............. 31
                          Outside Harbor Unload Operations ............... 33
                          Shallow-Draft Sealift .......................... 38
                          Road March ................................. 41
                          Deployment Times ............................. 42
                          Representative Scenarios ....................... 42
                          Airlift Deployment Analysis ..................... 46
                          Sealift Deployment Analysis ..................... 50
                          Airlift Versus Sealift ........................... 53
                          Chapter Three
                          DECISIONS TO INITIATE OPERATIONS ............. 57
                          Missions ..................................... 57
                          Stopping Aggressors .......................... 58
                          Conducting Contingency Operations .............. 59
                          Conducting Enforcement Operations .............. 60
                          Conducting Counterterrorism Operations .......... 61
                          Timeline ..................................... 62
                          Warning ..................................... 62
                          Concern ................................... 64
                          Urgent Danger ............................... 65
                          Precipitating Events ........................... 65
                          Timelines for Selected Operations ................ 66
                          The Crisis Decisionmaking Process ................. 70
                          Exploring Alternatives ......................... 71
                          Threats to Important U.S. Interests ................ 71
                          Risks of U.S. Casualties ........................ 72
                          Historical Response Times ....................... 74
                          Chapter Four
                          REGIONS OF INTEREST ......................... 79
                          Discerning Patterns of Interest .................... 81
                          U.S. Operations Since 1945 ..................... 82
                          Areas of Current Crises and Conflicts .............. 83
                          The War on Terrorism ......................... 83
                          Terrorism: Looking to the Future ................. 90
                          Regions of Interest ............................. 90
                          Central America and the Caribbean ............... 92
                          Europe .................................... 95
                          Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa ................. 100
                          Middle East and Southwest Asia .................. 103
                          East Asia and the Pacific Rim .................... 106
                          Summary .................................... 113
                          Chapter Five
                          CONCLUSIONS ................................ 115
                          Key Findings .................................. 115
                          Recommendations for the USAF ................... 117
                          Appendix
                          A. DEPTH OF U.S. OPERATIONS ..................... 119
                          B. COMPONENTS OF DEPLOYMENT TIMES FOR ALL
                          SCENARIOS FROM CHAPTER TWO ................. 123
                          Bibliography ..................................... 127

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                          • #14
                            I spent 10 weeks on the a joint CASCOM/ASAALT Task Force back then on this topic. One of the beliefs was by going to a Stryker the log footprint would be greatly reduced.

                            Our conclusion? Not so much. There would be a reduction in Class 3 bulk requirements and weight and cube in Class 5 and some Class 9. But overall total was only a reduction of about 20% versus a heavy brigade.
                            “Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it.”
                            Mark Twain

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Originally posted by Albany Rifles View Post

                              But overall total was only a reduction of about 20% versus a heavy brigade.
                              Was that enough to tip the scales in favor? The only way I see out of this mess is to increase the payload of Hercules which is a 40 year old design. I think that instead of beating around the bush, the next best option is to design a tactical airlift plane that can lift 40 tons with the use of new technology such as carbon fiber and rakes and airfoil tips and etc. The A-400M plane doesn't make sense since it is way overpriced.

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