US Carrier force reduction?

[Gun Boat]

Is this the beginning of a 'slippery slope' or just a needed restructuring?

A US Navy With Only 8 Carriers? | Defense News | defensenews.com

I would fear that once the precedent is set to cut the carrier force then the bottom will fall out of the box. I can also see the point that the US Navy has twice the carrier force of the rest of the world combined and in terms of capability 3-4 times that of the rest of the world.

I think I just really hate seeing some of most technically impressive and awe inspiring machines of the western world facing the knackery.

[gf0012-aust]

Adm Towers would be rolling in his grave.....

Curtis LeMay would be doing handstands

[surfgun]

LeMay would not like losing his B-1B's (as is being bantered about). A remaining force of less than a hundred bombers would make LeMay suicidal! Or would it be homicidal?

[JRT]

Throwing a log on this campfire...

Why America Needs Aircraft Carriers

Scott C. Truver | 02 October 2013 | Breaking Defense

[ATTACH=CONFIG]34086[/ATTACH]

The Navy’s aircraft carrier programs are once again at the vortex of intense scrutiny and debate, fueled by strategic ambiguity, questions about spending billions of dollars for a single ship (http://breakingdefense.com/2013/05/1...vys-shrinking/) during a period of painfully tight budgets (http://breakingdefense.com/2013/09/1...uester-sticks/), and uncertainty whether advanced technologies and systems will deliver the “goods.” As well, carrier critics point to supposed warfighting vulnerabilities to potential adversaries’ anti-access/area-denial strategies, tactics and weapons as reasons to change the Navy’s course.

The critics are short-sighted. Indeed, as long we need to protect vital U.S. interests, citizens and friends in critical world regions from the sea, the nation’s naval forces will project national power in support of national strategy and policy. Because of this, regional commanders continue to ask the question every admiral loves to quote: “where are the carriers?” Certainly, no ship is invulnerable, but the modern carrier is “least vulnerable among equals” and much less at risk than bases ashore. And, while the Navy’s next-generation carriers (http://breakingdefense.com/2013/05/0...-x-destroyers/) are pushing technological envelopes and experiencing what some have called “birthing pains,” the service and its industry partners are committed to resolving all issues and getting on with it.

Winston Churchill once noted, “The farther backward you look the farther forward you can see.” This can help put today’s controversies in a useful perspective.

In the spring of 1977, the Carter administration had been in office only a few months when it virtually declared war on defense spending. Inheriting a federal budget deficit of some $74 billion (about $316 billion in fiscal 2013 dollars), Carter’s Office of Management and Budget Director Bert Lance identified some $10 billion (about $43 billion today) to cut from defense. No “rice bowls” or “sacred cows” would go unchallenged.

Ominously for the Navy’s carrier forces, the administration supported former-President Gerald Ford’s decision to cancel the Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)––the fourth Nimitz (CVN-68)-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier––and to buy instead two smaller, conventional oil-fired “Tentative Conceptual Baseline” (TCBL) carriers. The new TCBL/CVX carriers were to take advantage of the promise of supersonic V/STOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing) aircraft (http://breakingdefense.com/2013/07/1...rrier-landing/). During the next 18 months, the TCBL/CVX design (such as it was) morphed into the smallish (roughly 65,000 tons full load), V/STOL Support Carrier (CVV), which would also be capable of operating the Navy’s conventional takeoff/landing aircraft in addition to the still-conceptual V/STOL “A” and “B” aircraft. An even smaller, 25,000-ton V/STOL Support Ship (VSS) was also mooted, to embark V/STOL aircraft and helicopters.

In 1978 Carter vetoed the FY1979 DoD Authorization bill because Congress inserted funding for CVN-71.

However, the Iranian Hostage crisis of 1979, which sparked a dramatic increase in aircraft carrier battle group deployments to the region – with the USS Nimitz forward deployed from September 1979 to May 1980 and continuously underway for a total of 144 days – changed Carter’s mind about CVNs. The Congress funded TR in FY1980, and there was no threat of a presidential veto. (CVN-71 cost about $2 billion in fiscal 1980 dollars, some $6.8B in fiscal 2013.) A political cartoon soon appeared, showing a Brontosaurus with its head under the Capitol Dome––munching dollars––and a flight deck affixed to its back and hull number CVN-71 scrawled across its flanks, with the caption: “Quick! How do we tell it that this is the last time?”

“Last time,” indeed! What followed almost immediately was a period of no-holds barred Naval Aviation self-assessment––the Sea-Based Air Master Plan (1979-80) and the Sea-Based Air Platform Project (1981-82) are two studies that stand out among others––which identified more than 40 distinct aircraft carrier concepts before concluding that the Nimitz class was superior. So compelling was the analysis that six more CVN-68 class ships have been acquired since 1979: remarkably two were authorized in fiscal 1983 and two again in fiscal 1988, with the last two Nimitz carriers funded in 1995 and 2001, respectively.

In the meantime, between 1980 and 2013, aircraft carriers and battle group surface warships, submarines and replenishment vessels have deployed to virtually every crisis and conflict – in addition to routine forward deployments to important world regions. The only major crisis that did NOT have a carrier – or several flattops – on scene was Operation Odyssey Dawn’s (http://breakingdefense.com/2011/06/1...f-the-marines/) regime change in Libya in 2011. [Editor's note: While no one in the Navy will, we will point out that Libya marked the very successful deployment (http://breakingdefense.com/2011/06/1...f-the-marines/) of what one can only call one of the Marines' aircraft carriers, the USS Kearsarge (http://www.kearsarge.navy.mil/) (LHD 3).]

In 2013, like 1977-1979, the Navy’s plans for CVNs are coming under intense scrutiny. Although initial efforts for a next-generation “CVN-21” carrier were kicked off in 1993, the formal program for a Nimitiz follow-on began in earnest five years later. This would be the Navy’s first new-design since 1968.

But, unlike that earlier period, when the Carter Administration looked to alternative ways to sustain sea-based tactical aviation at the expense of Theodore Roosevelt and follow-on CVNs, the Obama Administration has remained steadfast in its decision to sustain (http://breakingdefense.com/2013/03/2...ripple-throug/)11 CVNs and 10 carrier air wings and to continue with the next-generation Ford (CVN-78) class––even in the face of excruciating fiscal cuts as a result of sequestration.

“We’re an 11-carrier Navy in a 15-carrier world,” Rear Adm. Thomas Moore, program executive officer for carriers, noted in October 2012. “The demand signal is not likely to go down any time soon….”

“We need 11 carriers to do the job,” Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Jonathan Greenert affirmed a month later.

When CVN-71 was conceived, the “minimum essential” carrier force-level goal was 15 deployable oil-fired and nuclear-powered carriers, with another flattop undergoing a lengthy service life extension availability (http://breakingdefense.com/2013/03/2...ripple-throug/). The requirement for global naval warfighting against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact was for more than 20 carriers and associated battle group surface warships and submarines.

Good enough. However, today’s critics point to the “unaffordable” cost of these enormous ships, capped at $12.8 billion for the first of the Ford class, according to Navy data. But that figure includes about $3.3 billion in non-recurring costs that will be spread over the planned 10-carrier Ford class. Factor these out and the cost of CVN-78 will be approximately $9.5 billion – still a high-visibility item as the Navy goes about looking for ways to meet sequestration “bogeys.” (http://breakingdefense.com/2013/08/0...ship-comeback/)

That said, these increased upfront costs for much-increased increased technology density would pay some $5 billion in reductions in the total acquisition and ownership cost over the 50-year lifetimes of each of the 10 Ford-class carriers, compared to the in-service CVNs.

Another way of looking at the costs is to figure out how much a “pound of warship” costs today. Clearly, all are needed to protect important U.S. interests worldwide, but the 100,000-ton CVN-78 is a bargain at about $48 a pound; the Navy’s restarted Arleigh Burke (http://breakingdefense.com/2012/11/1...-award-or-not/) Flight IIA guided-missile destroyers are coming in at some $98 a pound; and Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines (http://breakingdefense.com/2013/09/1...-cant-pay-for/) at $195 a pound. (This isn’t all that superficial, as for years Navy cost-estimators have used a “pound of combat system” or a “pound of hull” to guide early approximations.) By way of comparison, according to U.S. Air Force data, the F-22 Raptor (http://breakingdefense.com/tag/f-22/) runs about $3,300 a pound.

While the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in a September 2013 report (http://www.gao.gov/products/gao-13-396) raised concerns about lead-ship testing and reliability of advanced systems in the first two Ford CVNs, which the Navy and the shipbuilder are addressing, nowhere did the GAO question the inherent value of sea-based tactical aviation or call for an assessment of alternatives to the CVN.

This also plays to the CNO’s new “payloads over platforms” initiative (http://breakingdefense.com/2012/04/1...the-waves-cno/), looking at ways in which the Navy can take full advantage of modular weapon, sensor, and unmanned vehicle payloads a platform carries or employs. “In addition to being more affordable,” Greenert explained, “this decoupling of payload development from platform development will take advantage of a set of emerging trends in precision weapons, stealth, ship and aircraft construction, economics, and warfare….”

His number-one example of the payload-centric approach to adaptability and warfighting was the USS Enterprise (CVN-65), which was deactivated in December 2012 after 51 years of operations. CORRECTED DATE OF DEACTIVATION Oct. 3 at 3:05 p.m. “The Enterprise was conceived in the 1950s to deal with a growing Soviet threat,” Greenert wrote. “At the time our national strategy was to contain the Soviet Union…. But times change,” he acknowledged, “and so do trends in economics, technology, and warfare. The Enterprise went from carrying a mix of A-7 Corsairs, A-6 Intruders, and F-14 Tomcats—designed predominantly to counter the Soviets—to homogeneous air wings of multi-mission F/A-18 Hornets to address the range of post–Cold War operations.”

Finally, carrier Cassandras worry about vulnerabilities against advanced weapons, including anti-carrier ballistic missiles. “Regardless of the number of carriers national leadership decides to maintain,” wrote retired Navy Commander John Patch (http://www.usni.org/magazines/procee...erability-myth), “because they remain the U.S. Navy’s preeminent capital ship and a symbol of American global power and prestige, they are a potential key target for both unconventional and conventional adversaries.”

Acknowledged.

However, one inexplicable aspect of the “carriers are vulnerable!” argument, particularly versus the Chinese DF-21 ballistic missile threat (http://breakingdefense.com/2013/09/1...bmarine-fleet/), is that while the carrier’s vulnerability is trumpeted, there is little mention of the fact that every ship suffers from similar, if not greater, vulnerabilities – particularly ships built to commercial standards and simply painted haze-gray. This includes platforms on the various lists of options if the Navy were to stop building carriers. It also ignores enhanced passive and active systems––e.g., the cruise- and ballistic-missile defenses provided by the Navy’s Aegis cruisers and destroyers––that are designed to defeat tomorrow’s threats. Finally, to put the entire vulnerability issue in context, land bases, which never move, are much more vulnerable to attack than are mobile naval forces at sea.

So, it’s déjà vu all over again. The more things change the more they stay the same.

Scott Truver is director of Gryphon Technologies’ TeamBlue National Security Programs.

.

[RustyBattleship]

This just came up on the web. The Forrestal was sold to a scrapping yard for just I cent.

USS Forrestal, the Navy's first supercarrier, sold for 1 cent | Fox News

[Tamara]

This just came up on the web. The Forrestal was sold to a scrapping yard for just I cent.

USS Forrestal, the Navy's first supercarrier, sold for 1 cent | Fox News

WE-ll, given the legacies of the scrapping of the USS Bennington and USS Coral Sea and given that the Forrestal was probably built at a time that we used asbestos and other not so nice material, what the company makes in profit may not be that much.

[desertswo]

WE-ll, given the legacies of the scrapping of the USS Bennington and USS Coral Sea and given that the Forrestal was probably built at a time that we used asbestos and other not so nice material, what the company makes in profit may not be that much.

Based on my experience with Constellation, I can vouch for that. They try to remove as much of it as possible in various yard periods, but often it is just sealed and left in place. The eight boiler fireboxes for sure are full of asbestos impregnated refractory (brickwork to the lay person).

[TopHatter]

Yeah I think the Navy got off pretty lightly on the deal. One HAZMAT nightmare disposed of? Priceless.

[tbm3fan]

Darn right! Now we get to wait for the next 4 years to see if she becomes another Coral Sea, for All Star Metals, or they cover their costs to stay in business.

[Native]

Based on my experience with Constellation,

desertswo,
Were you on the Connie during decom?
We got a bunch of your guys over to the Kitty during/after that.

[desertswo]

desertswo,
Were you on the Connie during decom?
We got a bunch of your guys over to the Kitty during/after that.

Nope. She was my first ship. August 79 to August 82. I was initially the Communications Message Center Division Officer for six months, and made the mistake of being half-way competent. So the Old Man sent me down to Engineering where I became first the A-Division Officer, then fleeted up to the Auxiliaries Officer billet. They fill that with a LCDR XO equivalent person these days, but back then it was me, a lowly JG and/or frocked Lieutenant. Which is probably why they made it a LCDR billet! ;) Anyway, I managed that rare hat trick of OOD, EOOW, and SWO all on a bird farm. With two nearly ten month deployments, there wasn't much else to do but get PQS signed and stand watches. At least it made the days march.

[surfgun]

It's back.
WASHINGTON — The reality of finalizing the fiscal 2015 budget submission is driving top defense officials and the White House to quickly make major decisions, and indications are growing that the elimination of one carrier and one carrier air wing could be among the defense request’s key features.

Pentagon officials would not confirm or deny the matter, citing the fluid nature of budget discussions. But numerous sources — in the Pentagon, on Capitol Hill, in the defense industry — agreed that the prospect is picking up steam.

“It’s quietly being socialized,” one source said, and others agreed.

Others emphasized that no decisions have been reached, and talks are being held in strict confidence.

“Stuff is in churn,” one source said.

That the Navy and the Pentagon, faced with the need to come up with drastic budget cuts, have contemplated reducing the fleet’s vaunted carrier strength is nothing new — Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel warned as much last summer.

“We would trade away size for high-end capability,” Hagel said July 31. “This would ... reduce the number of carrier strike groups from 11 to eight or nine.”

Hagel was discussing one scenario put forth in the Strategic Choices Management Review, an internal Pentagon effort to identify budget-cutting approaches and tactics.

The basic tradeoff, he explained, would be one of reducing capacity for “our ability to modernize weapons systems and to maintain our military’s technological edge.”

The Navy’s top leadership has said repeatedly over the past year that “all options are on the table” to reduce costs.

Asked for comment, the Navy declined to address the carrier issue directly.

“There is no question that we continue to face tough decisions in this fiscal environment,” Capt. Dawn Cutler, the Navy’s top spokeswoman, said Jan. 23. “Work continues on the fiscal 2015 budget and, at this point, conversations on our budget submission are both premature and pre-decisional.”

And if it’s happening, no one’s saying so publicly.

“This idea has probably been in and out the budget so many times that nobody feels comfortable prepping the battlefield,” observed Bryan Clark, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and, until last summer, an analyst for the Navy’s leadership. “If it’s in there, that’s certainly something you probably should be explaining — what’s the rationale, what are the tradeoffs.”

The carrier most often targeted is the Japan-based George Washington. Commissioned in 1992, GW is scheduled in 2016 to begin a three-year midlife refueling and complex overhaul at Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia — where all active carriers were built — that is expected to cost well over $3 billion.

The Navy already has announced the carrier Ronald Reagan will replace the George Washington in Japan. Any move affecting the decommissioning of a carrier would have no effect on the American commitment to maintaining a forward-based carrier in Japan, Navy officials said.

Carriers are designed for a 50-year lifespan and undergo only one refueling overhaul, during which nearly every major system in the ship is rebuilt, renewed or replaced.

A reduction of the carrier force has been analyzed on many occasions. A 2011 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report looked at a 10-ship, nine-wing fleet, achieved by decommissioning the George Washington.

The report noted the Navy could save “about $7 billion over the 2012-2021 period,” when GW would be returned to service. The report did not include anticipated savings over the 2021-2042 period, during which a refueled George Washington would be operating.

Decommissioning GW would cost about $2 billion, CBO estimated, although those costs would be spread out at least through 2021.

Numerous internal and external studies have concluded the Navy could carry out its missions with a reduced carrier force, although many of those same studies acknowledge that a 15-ship force would be necessary to meet most regional combatant commander requirements.

The carrier force has been slowly whittled down since it reached a Cold War high of 26 flattops in 1962, a number that included many smaller ships built in World War II. The Reagan-era buildup of the 1980s brought the level up from 13 to 15 ships — reached briefly in 1991 — reduced to 14 in 1992, 13 in 1993 and 12 in 1994.

It was further reduced to 11 ships in 2007 — the level where, despite a temporary reduction to 10 ships caused by the retirement of the carrier Enterprise before its replacement, the Gerald R. Ford, can be completed, it remains. That level is set by law. The ships have crews of about 3,000 or more.

The Navy maintains 10 carrier air wings made up of strike fighters, airborne command-and-control planes, electronic attack aircraft and helicopters combined into a single group that deploys onboard the carrier.

Since at least one carrier is always in long-term overhaul, there is no need to have an equal number of wings to ships.

While there is no set number, a wing generally consists of about 65 aircraft, with 1,500 to 2,500 sailors who embark the ship for exercises and deployments.

It is not clear how the carrier wing reduction would be managed. Squadrons could be disbanded, their aircraft redistributed among remaining squadrons, or some could be retained and added to the ever-rotating squadron-wing mix.

A reduction of as many as four strike fighter squadrons would help the service retire more F/A-18C “legacy” Hornet twin-engine jets, already being rapidly replaced by newer F/A-18 E and F Super Hornets.

Politics and fleet size
The Navy, like the rest of the Pentagon, is under great pressure to reduce spending, but proposing cuts and getting them approved by Congress present different prospects.

The service has been in a back-and-forth struggle for more than two years to decommission seven Aegis cruisers and two amphibious ships, saving money from operations, modernization and personnel reductions.

Congress, particularly House Republicans, have strongly opposed the proposal and, in the 2014 defense bills, the service is directed to continue operating the ships and to modernize them.

But, according to Clark, the $2.24 billion appropriated is less than half of what the service needs to comply with Congress’ direction, and it is not clear how the ships will be kept viable. Various internal discussions have included “shrink wrapping” some of the ships, essentially laying them up until money and assets are available to begin work.

In 2008, the Navy asked Congress for permission to temporarily drop the carrier force to 10 ships for the gap between Enterprise and Ford. The request, put forth in an election year, met with widespread condemnation on Capitol Hill and was soundly rebuffed.

The next year, however, the same request was sent over and — in a non-election year — virtually no objections were raised. In all four major posture hearings before the House and Senate, not a single lawmaker asked about carrier levels, and the measure was quietly approved.

If the carrier-cutting proposal goes over in 2014, an election year, it is likely to meet with widespread bipartisan objections. The timing, however, is not necessarily by choice — if George Washington’s refueling overhaul is to proceed on time, major funding is required in the 2015 budget submission.

A year’s delay would cause serious disruptions in other work scheduled at Newport News, likely raising costs on other projects. Even so, it is not clear whether the White House supports the move.

It’s also possible the carrier reduction could be something of a ploy, an effort by the Navy to show it’s doing its part by cutting something not only significantly expensive, but near and dear to a large segment of the service. If the carrier reduction is soundly rebuffed, it could be a major element — eventually — in modifying the march of annual budget reductions.Carrier cut could be back on table | Navy Times | navytimes.com

[surfgun]

WASHINGTON — Responding to this week’s Defense News story that the Pentagon is strongly considering moves to reduce the aircraft carrier fleet, 11 congressmen, led by Rep. Randy Forbes, R-Va., sent a letter Tuesday to Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel in support of current fleet levels.

House Armed Services Committee chairman Rep. Buck McKeon, R-Calif., three other Republicans, and six Democrats joined Forbes in signing the bipartisan letter.

“The Secretary of the Navy was right this past fall when he noted that a smaller aircraft carrier fleet would be unable to execute the missions described in the Defense Strategic Guidance,” Forbes wrote. “Such a reduction in the Navy’s carrier force would profoundly damage U.S. national security, limiting our ability to deter aggression around the world and respond to crises in a timely manner. It is unacceptable to pretend that the United States lives in anything less than an 11 carrier world given China’s growing assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific, rising instability in the Middle East and the persistent danger of global terrorism. As Rear Admiral [Thomas] Moore [the Navy’s program executive officer for aircraft carrier] has phrased it so starkly, we’re an eleven carrier Navy in a 15 carrier world.”

Republican Reps. Rob Wittman and Scott Rigell of Virginia and Duncan Hunter of California joined with Forbes and McKeon in signing the letter, as did Democratic Reps. Mike McIntyre of North Carolina, Susan Davis and Scott Peters of California, Rick Larsen and Derek Kilmer of Washington, and Bobby Scott of Virginia.

Navy Times’ sister publication Defense News reported that the Pentagon and the Navy are targeting the carrier George Washington as the most likely candidate to decommission. The ship, based now in Japan, is to return to the US by early 2016 to begin a planned three-year, $3 billion-plus refueling overhaul, a once-in-a-career event that would allow the ship to operate beyond two more decades.

The Navy also is reportedly considering inactivating a carrier air wing, dropping from the current 10-wing fleet.

The moves are considered budget reduction measures and are not connected to any strategy changes. Officials have stressed the US remains committed to shifting three-fifths of its fleet in the Pacific, and to maintaining a carrier in Japan.

Here’s the full text of the letter:

January 28, 2014

The Honorable Chuck Hagel

Secretary of Defense

Office of the Secretary of Defense

1000 Defense Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We write to reiterate our strong support that the United States Navy should continue to require a naval fleet of no-less than 11 nuclear aircraft carriers.

The constant state of “surge” our Navy has operated at for the past decade is a testament to the growing demand signal from our Combatant Commanders and the shrinking size of our fleet. With the United States entering an era where our sea-services are likely to be called on to provide more presence, deterrence, and engagement throughout the Indo-Pacific littoral and across the globe, we believe now is the time to reinvest in our fleet, not look for ways to reduce its size and accept greater risk. Indeed, in a letter Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus sent to us in October 2013, he stated that a smaller nuclear aircraft carrier fleet would “deliver less forward presence, increased response time, and delayed arrivals to conflict. This force would be unable to execute the missions described in the Defense Strategic Guidance.”

Last year the House of Representatives expressed its strong support for the nuclear aircraft carrier fleet by voting overwhelmingly to maintain a statutory requirement to retain 11 operational aircraft carriers by a vote of 318 to 106. There is no doubt that there is enduring bipartisan support for a robust Navy supporting a capital fleet of 11 nuclear aircraft carriers. We strongly agree with Rear Admiral Thomas Moore who stated last year that “We’re an 11-carrier Navy in a 15-carrier world ... The demand signal is not likely to go down any time soon.”

Thank you for your attention to this matter. We look forward to working with you on this issue and to strengthen our sea services in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

HOWARD P. “BUCK” MCKEON Chairman House Armed Services Committee MIKE MCINTYRE Member of Congress
J. RANDY FORBES Member of Congress SUSAN DAVIS Member of Congress
ROB WITTMAN Member of Congress RICK LARSEN Member of Congress
SCOTT RIGELL Member of Congress DEREK KILMER Member of Congress
DUNCAN HUNTER Member of Congress SCOTT PETERS Member of Congress
BOBBY SCOTT Member of Congresshttp://www.navytimes.com/article/20140128/NEWS05/301280030/Hill-rises-support-11-ship-carrier-fleet

[surfgun]

In this article, there is the interesting bit about cost of the Ohio Class replacement.

Posted: May 1, 2014 1:25 PM

Lawmaker Says Sequester Could Force Navy to Drop to Eight Carriers

BY JOHN C. MARCARIO, Associate Editor

ARLINGTON, Va. — The Navy will have a huge fight on its hands to keep the current fleet of carriers at 11, U.S. Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., the ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, said May 1 in discussion hosted by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

“They will have a devil of a time keeping them at eight carriers,” he said.

The main culprit for this, Smith said, would be the return of sequestration in fiscal 2016, as the Navy has to balance building Littoral Combat Ships, Virginia-class submarines and destroyers along with refueling costs for aircraft carriers. Smith said the challenges will only get worse once the Ohio-class submarine replacement program kicks into gear.

Defense officials have said the first Ohio-class replacement boat will cost $6.3 billion in fiscal 2021 and each subsequent submarine will cost $4.9 billion with the last one will begin being built in fiscal 2035.

“That eats up a huge chunk of the budget,” he said, especially if sequester cuts, which were enacted on March 1, 2013, but eased for two years in December by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, return in full.

Sen. Tim Kaine, D-Va., a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told Seapower April 16 that discussions had begun on how to reduce the cuts in future years, but Smith said he does not know anyone who is overly optometric that there is a path to get rid of the cuts.

The possibility a decrease in the carrier fleet already has met with fierce opposition from lawmakers, notably Rep. Randy Forbes, R-Va., the chairman of the House Armed Services seapower and projection forces subcommittee.

Forbes has criticized the Navy’s decision to defer a decision on the planned midlife overhaul and nuclear refueling USS George Washington for another year, or potentially decommission the ship, pointing out that the law says the Navy must have 11 carriers in the fleet.

In his subcommittee’s April 30 mark of the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act, Forbes included funding that would support the nuclear refueling of the carrier, which he pointed out has 25 years of service life remaining.

The Navy has said it would take $7 billion over five years to keep George Washington and its air wing in the fleet, and it would not have that money under the sequestration-level budgets.

[tbm3fan]

The main culprit for this, Smith said, would be the return of sequestration in fiscal 2016, as the Navy has to balance building Littoral Combat Ships, Virginia-class submarines and destroyers along with refueling costs for aircraft carriers. Smith said the challenges will only get worse once the Ohio-class submarine replacement program kicks into gear.

You would know better than me since you are keeping up with this but in the above sentence we have Littorals, Virginia Class and destroyers mentioned are being built. Exactly how many cruisers and destroyers have been recently decomm'd or slated to be decomm'd and yet still have years of service life left? Just seems to me the Navy has gone bug eyes over getting their new toys as soon as possible as one might want a shiny new car when they still have a shiny 4 year old car.