Pakistan influence on Taliban commanders helped Afghan breakthrough

[Agnostic Muslim]

A Deadly Triangle : Afghanistan, Pakistan & India | Brookings Essay | June 25 2013

General essay on the regions dynamics, past & present.

Karzai already tried the talk to the Taliban bit in 2010 and making good with pakistan, it did not work out.

The Taliban won't talk to Karzai until the 'occupiers' vacate.

I read it earlier today - some pretty strong assertions by the author (such as the ISI setting up a shadow organization with former ISI/PA members) which I am skeptical about and which color the overall objectivity and accuracy of the piece, for me at least.

[Julie]

OBL was found living in a residential neighborhood close to Pakistan's military academy, and the US government itself has officially stated that they have found no evidence that the Pakistani State was complicity in sheltering OBL.

A view from a different perspective:

What is your opinion, AM, about the comfortability of OBL living a block away from the ISI Academy? I will be more specific....What is your opinion about OBL choosing that residential location?

[anil]

A Deadly Triangle : Afghanistan, Pakistan & India | Brookings Essay | June 25 2013

General essay on the regions dynamics, past & present.

Karzai already tried the talk to the Taliban bit in 2010 and making good with pakistan, it did not work out.

The Taliban won't talk to Karzai until the 'occupiers' vacate.

Indians and pakistanis have been fighting each other before india and pakistan existed. The rivalry dates back before islam and before the calender was divided into BC and AD. This side of the people have been having problems with people from that side for a long time. To make it more complex, this side has been infighting since time immemorial and same has been happening within that side. Every time an invader has landed on that side, it has found local allies. At times, invading empires have even been pre-invited.

The americans(like all others) simply landed themselves into a complex battlefield already occupied by dozens of ongoing battles(ancient and new) that overlap each other in various parts of these regions. Today the turks, the greeks, mughals and the british are gone, left or perished. Has this ceased the conflict? What will change after america leaves?

The americans have spent just 12 yrs in afghanistan but they have learned the lesson the hard way that they will never truly be able to rule these regions even with weapons superiority. At best, they will continue their covert programs in afg to pre empt any attacks back on CONUS, europe or the down under.

An interesting feature about the mongoloid race(the vietnamese and the japanese) is that they don't seem to have any desire to avenge their forefathers.

[antimony]

Indians and pakistanis have been fighting each other before india and pakistan existed. The rivalry dates back before islam and before the calender was divided into BC and AD. This side of the people have been having problems with people from that side for a long time. To make it more complex, this side has been infighting since time immemorial and same has been happening within that side. Every time an invader has landed on that side, it has found local allies. At times, invading empires have even been pre-invited.

The americans(like all others) simply landed themselves into a complex battlefield already occupied by dozens of ongoing battles(ancient and new) that overlap each other in various parts of these regions. Today the turks, the greeks, mughals and the british are gone, left or perished. Has this ceased the conflict? What will change after america leaves?

The americans have spent just 12 yrs in afghanistan but they have learned the lesson the hard way that they will never truly be able to rule these regions even with weapons superiority. At best, they will continue their covert programs in afg to pre empt any attacks back on CONUS, europe or the down under.

An interesting feature about the mongoloid race(the vietnamese and the japanese) is that they don't seem to have any desire to avenge their forefathers.

What the hell does this even mean? Folks of all colours, creeds, castes from the sub continent have been fighting each other for ages, just like folks out there in Europe.

[anil]

हे बगा नी खाझवा
http://i.imgur.com/qua0wZt.png

[Double Edge]

I read it earlier today - some pretty strong assertions by the author (such as the ISI setting up a shadow organization with former ISI/PA members) which I am skeptical about and which color the overall objectivity and accuracy of the piece, for me at least.

See the references at the bottom for the sources.

It was an interesting essay on getting people up to speed about the concerns the three countries have.

Found one answer i was looking for..

British diplomats in Islamabad take the view that because the Pakistani army now fears jihadi-generated instability more than it fears India it really has changed its attitude toward the jihadis. As General Kayani himself stated in a major speech in April on the eve of the elections:

“The menace of terrorism and extremism has claimed thousands of lives, including those of the Army, Rangers, FC, Police, Frontier Constabulary… and the innocent people of Pakistan… [A] small faction wants to enforce its distorted ideology over the entire nation by taking up arms and for this purpose defies the Constitution of Pakistan and the democratic process,” he said. He went on to call on militants to lay down their arms and accept the country’s constitution unconditionally.

This has led many Pakistan-watchers to speculate that the generals may have had a change of heart about the dangers of their longtime strategy in Afghanistan. General Kayani recently told a senior American military officer that if Afghanistan deteriorated into chaotic civil war after the Americans leave, it would be bad for Afghanistan but a disaster for Pakistan. The army now fears the possibility that the return of Taliban rule would create a reverse sanctuary for Pakistani Taliban and other malcontents.

Compare the underlined bit to your earlier article by Anatol Lieven for why Pakistan does not want the Taliban to win.

One of the most encouraging signs for the future of Afghanistan is that the Pakistani state and military have also in recent years made assiduous efforts to reach out to the leaders of these groups. The Pakistanis have assured them that Pakistan is no longer pursuing its strategy of the 1990s — unconditional support for a Taliban campaign to conquer the whole of Afghanistan — and that both the government and the military support a peace settlement between the Taliban and the former Northern Alliance.

The reasons for this are threefold. Pakistani officials and analysts fear that if the Taliban did win in Afghanistan, they would then be in a position to support the rebellion of the Pakistani Taliban with a view to uniting all the Pashtun lands in an Islamic emirate. However, they also fear that if the Taliban did try to conquer the whole country, they would be beaten back militarily, not least because India would give massive aid to the anti-Taliban forces — a fundamental Pakistani nightmare.

In the 90s these were the top two Pak concerns about Afghanistan
1) India
2) Pashtun Nationalism

Today Pak concerns are

1) Domestic unrest
2) Pashtun Nationalism
3) India

1) is expected to inform & guide Pakistan's future behaviour.

The reason Pakistan tries to get the Talban to the talks is with the view towards getting an inclusive Afghan reconciliation. The risk is if Pakistan overplays its hand. There is a delicate balance here.

This is the view today and into the future provided the political transition in Afghanistan next year (April 5?) is more successful than not. Otherwise all bets are off.

Also it remains to be seen whether the Taliban will bite. As Taliban have shown themselves not able to negotiate with anybody. Its their way or war.

[antimony]

हे बगा नी खाझवा
http://i.imgur.com/qua0wZt.png

You are supposed to provide a translation if you post in non-english. I can readh Hindi and this does not even make sense, neither does the convoluted map you posted

[Doktor]

Thank antimony,

I thought google translate is fooling me around

[zraver]

An interesting feature about the mongoloid race(the vietnamese and the japanese) is that they don't seem to have any desire to avenge their forefathers.

Have you looked at the level of simmering hate almost every race in Asia has towards Japan because of what Japanese forefathers did?

[anil]

You are supposed to provide a translation if you post in non-english. I can readh Hindi and this does not even make sense, neither does the convoluted map you posted

That map is from 1951.

This is afgs ethnic map
http://www.mapsofworld.com/afghanist...ethnic-map.jpg

This is afgs state map
http://www.ephotopix.com/image/asia/..._color_map.gif

उनका एस-आर-सी नही हुवा हे

[lemontree]

In the 90s these were the top two Pak concerns about Afghanistan
1) India
2) Pashtun Nationalism

Today Pak concerns are

1) Domestic unrest
2) Pashtun Nationalism
3) India

1) is expected to inform & guide Pakistan's future behaviour.

The reason Pakistan tries to get the Talban to the talks is with the view towards getting an inclusive Afghan reconciliation. The risk is if Pakistan overplays its hand. There is a delicate balance here.

This is the view today and into the future provided the political transition in Afghanistan next year (April 5?) is more successful than not. Otherwise all bets are off.

Also it remains to be seen whether the Taliban will bite. As Taliban have shown themselves not able to negotiate with anybody. Its their way or war.

I do not agree with this line of thinking. For Pakistan, India is the prime enemy, as India controls its water, India is the reason for the existance of the Pak Army and its supremacy in power.

Afghanistan is the reason they had to divide their forces in the past which denied them decisive edge over India in terms of bayonet strength on the ground.

Taliban is their proxy and shall remain so till they are flushed out and killed, and for that one has to take on Pakistan.

[Double Edge]

I do not agree with this line of thinking. For Pakistan, India is the prime enemy, as India controls its water, India is the reason for the existance of the Pak Army and its supremacy in power.

Afghanistan is the reason they had to divide their forces in the past which denied them decisive edge over India in terms of bayonet strength on the ground.

Course you don't, its the current Pak view, something rather hard to fathom let alone assess. At odds with Indian as well as western thinking. The above represents a moderation of pak policy objectives since the last three years. Now whether they manage to achieve this or overplay their hand is the risk here. The thing is even if they moderate their objectives sitting in Kabul or Delhi it seems like not much has changed. That is why you will not agree because you don't see anything here.

They don't want to kill the Afghan Taliban, the reason they support Talib talks is they want the Afghans to return home. That is their bottom line. They have no way to touch their own TTP otherwise. In fact right through the past few years they left the Afghan Taliban alone because to deal with them was to hit a hornets nest, which would increase domestic instability even more.

Now the question is how much influence do the Paks actually have over the Taliban. The Paks don't want Taliban to take Kabul. In fact i don't know why the Taliban should even listen to the Paks because to do so means to get neutered and checked by the other communities in Afghanistan. So the Paks are not exactly the Talibs best friend here as Pak objectives are at counter purposes.

Their thinking is an insurgent that has not been defeated has to lead to some sort of political solution. Course everybody else says we must defeat the Taliban and if there are any remnants then let them talk. This is where the Pak view differs sharply from the world.

Taliban is their proxy and shall remain so till they are flushed out and killed, and for that one has to take on Pakistan.

This is to do with Pak hedging. Its plan B if plan A does not work out. That is the change from the 90s. What if the political transition next year does not work out and a civil war ensues. The others are backing their horses so the Paks back theirs as well. We've already discussed the chance of the next afghan civil war in another thread. So long as the funds continue to flow things should hold. The political transition next year has to be successful for fund to keep flowing otherwise the donors back out. lots of uncertainty here hinges on the elections and how they are seen for everybody concerned.

The main point is the Paks do not have an interest in a civil war breaking out, they would prefer stability because it will just boomerang back on them. This moderation of objectives is a good thing as far as i'm concerned. As the Pak 'establishment' is coming around to the view that supporting insurgencies elsewhere has its price. Hoping that it will be followed through.

[Agnostic Muslim]

An interesting Pakistani Op-ed on Mullah Baradar and the circumstances around his capture/detention:

Mulla Baradar’s role
By Shaukat Qadir

The writer is a retired brigadier and a former president of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute

How can Mulla Abdul Ghani Baradar negotiate with the Taliban, while in Pakistani custody? In order to answer this question, it is essential to review some background information. The first point is that the founding father of Afghanistan was Ahmed Shah Durrani. During his reign, the capital of his kingdom was Kandahar. The Durrani tribe, consequently, dominates southern Afghanistan and to date, holds sway over the largest swathe of territory under any single Afghan tribe — though purely in terms of numbers. The Zadran tribe surrounding Kabul is larger. The sub-tribe of Durranis that claims direct descent from Ahmed Shah is the Popalzai.

Abdul Ghani, for whom “Mulla” is a title of respect and Baradar, meaning brother, one of affection, belongs to the Popalzai sub-tribe, the sub-tribe of kings. So, too, does Hamid Karzai. Mulla Omer, the Taliban leader, belongs to the Ghilzai branch, “Kissing-cousins” to the Popalzai, but not direct descendants of Ahmed Shah. Abdul Ghani and Hamid Karzai were among the first few influential Durranis to join Mulla Omer when he swept Kandahar in 1994. While Karzai betrayed Omer by seeking succour with Ahmed Shah Masood, in 1996, Ghani remained faithful. And to those sceptics who think this background irrelevant, I suggest they visit Kandahar and talk to the Durranis who thrive on these tales.

While Mulla Omer was on the rise to fame, Ghani was one of his more trusted lieutenants and was also ascending. If Omer was the dogged determined one, Ghani was the intrepid daring one, gifted with intellect, vision and foresight. He would dare anything and devise a workable solution for any problem.

In 2001, the US troops were unaware that they had surrounded Omer in his lair, in a small hamlet outside Kabul, when Ghani ran the gauntlet to rescue Omer and got him out, clad in the traditional Afghan woman’s burqa, riding pillion behind Ghani on a motorbike. At this stage, Ghani though not very high on the Taliban hierarchy, was generally acknowledged as having a greater following among the Durranis, than Omer. This is not the only tale of his daring. If Abdul Qadir’s daring — a scion of the Zadran tribe of northern Afghanistan — during the Soviet occupation merited praise, among the Taliban, the Ghani, the Popalzai and the Durrani merited it more. This rescue was to result in Ghani’s elevation to Omer’s number two man and the leadership of the so-called “Quetta Shura”.

Ghani was not only intrepid, he was also more moderate and, as far back as 2002-03, began to mention negotiating with the US at some stage. Seven years later, in 2010, that stage began to arrive but Omer was hesitant. The intrepid Ghani was not. When Ghani was captured in 2010 by a joint Pak-US effort, the ISI took him in custody, promising the CIA that Ghani would be handed over to them the next day. To the amazement of the ISI personnel, Ghani disclosed to them that his capture was “arranged” for him to negotiate a “deal” with the CIA which was unbeknownst to Omer and to the ISI. The ISI might be the more maligned of the two, but the CIA is probably the guiltier of duplicity.

Consequently, the ISI refused to hand over Baradar to the CIA. By this act of apparent “duplicity” and betrayal of Omer on his part, Ghani lost a considerable number of his admirers and adherents, but not for long. By late 2011, it was apparent that there was to be a negotiated settlement on Afghanistan’s future, which would include Omer’s Taliban. Suddenly, Ghani’s apparent duplicity was transformed to wisdom and foresight. His intrepidity was already folklore. His daring rescue of Omer was recalled again and, by mid-2012, I am told that the Pashto song of his rescue began to be sung again.

As negotiations “began to begin”, Omer became increasingly conscious of the fact that he needed the intellect and foresight of Ghani to assist in negotiating the future. Conscious of the fact that there are still many non-Durrani Pashtuns among the Taliban, apart from splinter factions which have broken from Omer, which are still baying for Ghani’s blood, his Pakistani “keepers” are reluctant to release him.

Perhaps, his keepers are also conscious of the possibility that he might broker an “independent” deal. If so, it is with good reason. Therefore, even as Ghani has returned to his front line role in negotiations, he must do so while in “protective custody” in Pakistan. A custody, which protects him from those who want his blood and protects Pakistan (and Omer’s Taliban) from the wiles of an intrepid negotiator.

Published in The Express Tribune, June 27th, 2013.

Mulla Baradar

[Agnostic Muslim]

Course you don't, its the current Pak view, something rather hard to fathom let alone assess. At odds with Indian as well as western thinking. The above represents a moderation of pak policy objectives since the last three years. Now whether they manage to achieve this or overplay their hand is the risk here. The thing is even if they moderate their objectives sitting in Kabul or Delhi it seems like not much has changed. That is why you will not agree because you don't see anything here.

They don't want to kill the Afghan Taliban, the reason they support Talib talks is they want the Afghans to return home. That is their bottom line. They have no way to touch their own TTP otherwise. In fact right through the past few years they left the Afghan Taliban alone because to deal with them was to hit a hornets nest, which would increase domestic instability even more.

Now the question is how much influence do the Paks actually have over the Taliban. The Paks don't want Taliban to take Kabul. In fact i don't know why the Taliban should even listen to the Paks because to do so means to get neutered and checked by the other communities in Afghanistan. So the Paks are not exactly the Talibs best friend here as Pak objectives are at counter purposes.

Their thinking is an insurgent that has not been defeated has to lead to some sort of political solution. Course everybody else says we must defeat the Taliban and if there are any remnants then let them talk. This is where the Pak view differs sharply from the world.



This is to do with Pak hedging. Its plan B if plan A does not work out. That is the change from the 90s. What if the political transition next year does not work out and a civil war ensues. The others are backing their horses so the Paks back theirs as well. We've already discussed the chance of the next afghan civil war in another thread. So long as the funds continue to flow things should hold. The political transition next year has to be successful for fund to keep flowing otherwise the donors back out. lots of uncertainty here hinges on the elections and how they are seen for everybody concerned.

The main point is the Paks do not have an interest in a civil war breaking out, they would prefer stability because it will just boomerang back on them. This moderation of objectives is a good thing as far as i'm concerned. As the Pak 'establishment' is coming around to the view that supporting insurgencies elsewhere has its price. Hoping that it will be followed through.

I agree with essentially everything you said, and I thought I had articulated the same views numerous times in the past, only to be met with derision - perhaps you just did a better job of putting thought on 'paper' :D

[Double Edge]

I agree with essentially everything you said, and I thought I had articulated the same views numerous times in the past, only to be met with derision - perhaps you just did a better job of putting thought on 'paper' :D

Not my ideas but those of Moeed Yusuf. I found his elaboration or at least his read of current Pak thinking to be very informative. Wish there was a transcript but you guys will have to listen for 15mins. The Q& A after is also very good.

Political and Economic Transition Challenges in Afghanistan (Panel 1) - YouTube

Could not get cueing to work in an embedded you tube vid but if you click the link above, starts just at the right position.