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  • Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
    Now the question is how much influence do the Paks actually have over the Taliban. The Paks don't want Taliban to take Kabul. In fact i don't know why the Taliban should even listen to the Paks because to do so means to get neutered and checked by the other communities in Afghanistan. So the Paks are not exactly the Talibs best friend here as Pak objectives are at counter purposes.
    The answer to the hilighted sentence is understanding guerilla warfare:
    - Any guerilla campaing needs a base. A safe haven from the enemy.
    - This base are provides it a safe retreat, a logistical base for arms and ammunition, medical treatment etc.
    - A training area, a storage area, a launch pad.
    - Without a safe haven/ base, a guerilla campaign is doomed to failure (LTTE was doomed the day they lost their bases in South India).
    VC had their bases in North Vietnam and before that the Vietminh had their bases in China.
    The Afghan Mujahideen of the 1980s had Pakistan as their safe haven.

    Today Pakistan is the safe haven for the Taliban. Where do you think they are getting ammunition from? These dont grow on trees and neither do the bazaars of Peshawar sell them.

    RDX/ PEK, rocket propelled grenades, HMG, and rifle ammo are being supplied to them by the Pak Army/ ISI. Where do you think the money for the rations comes?...they have to feed thousands of hungry Talibs.
    One requires a minimum of INR 20 million per annum to feed and arm a group of 1000 men per annum (approx USD 330,000 with the exchange rate INR 60 = 1 $).

    The Taliban have a manpower strenght of about 40,000 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taliban_insurgency)
    It would take about USD 13.2 million per annum to feed and arm these bands of men. The funds needed clearly show state patronage and assistance, in an organised and sustained manner. Otherwise 40,000 armed men cannot arm and feed themselves on their own.

    Without Pakistan, Taliban is dead, they have to take orders from the PA Generals.
    Last edited by lemontree; 28 Jun 13,, 06:14.

    Cheers!...on the rocks!!

    Comment


    • Originally posted by lemontree View Post
      Where do you think they are getting ammunition from? These dont grow on trees and neither do the bazaars of Peshawar sell them.

      RDX/ PEK, rocket propelled grenades, HMG, and rifle ammo are being supplied to them by the Pak Army/ ISI. Where do you think the money for the rations comes?...they have to feed thousands of hungry Talibs.
      One requires a minimum of INR 20 million per annum to feed and arm a group of 1000 men per annum (approx USD 330,000 with the exchange rate INR 60 = 1 $).

      The Taliban have a manpower strenght of about 40,000 (Taliban insurgency - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia)
      It would take about USD 13.2 million per annum to feed and arm these bands of men. The funds needed clearly show state patronage and assistance, in an organised and sustained manner. Otherwise 40,000 armed men cannot arm and feed themselves on their own.

      Without Pakistan, Taliban is dead, they have to take orders from the PA Generals.
      Try to look beyond your 'anti-Pakistan biases' and you'll find a whole host of information detailing sources of Taliban funding:

      Taliban raked in $400 million from diverse sources: U.N

      By Michelle Nichols

      UNITED NATIONS | Tue Sep 11, 2012 1:24pm EDT

      (Reuters) - The Taliban raised about $400 million last year from sources that included donations, taxing local economies and extorting money from such targets as drug dealers, cell phone operators and aid projects, according to a U.N. report on the militant Islamist group released on Tuesday.

      The report to the U.N. Security Council by the sanctions monitoring team said that about $275 million of that income reached Taliban leadership and the rest was collected, spent or misappropriated at the local level.

      "The team understands Taliban funding as follows: revenue raised from taxing the local economy serves primarily to support local operations and is only in a few cases channeled upwards," the report said.

      "Revenue extorted from nation-wide enterprises such as narcotics producers and traffickers, construction and trucking companies, mobile telephone operators, mining companies and aid and development projects goes to the Taliban Financial Commission which answers to the Taliban leadership," it said.

      Donations were another major source of funding, which also went directly to the Taliban leadership.

      The estimate covers the financial year ended March 20, 2012.

      The U.N. team warned against a general perception that the Taliban's main source of income was Afghanistan's opium poppy economy. Afghanistan has long been the world's leading supplier of opium, accounting for about 90 percent of global output.

      It said that Afghan officials estimate that the Taliban earned about $100 million in 2011/2012 from the opium poppy industry, a small share considering the annual value of the drug crop is estimated at $3.6 billion to $4 billion.

      "This suggests that the Taliban do not make great efforts to exploit this potential source of revenue," the report said.

      "While it provides enough to finance much of the insurgency in the main poppy growing provinces of Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan, the money raised from the drug trade is insufficient to meet the cost of insurgent activity elsewhere," it said.

      ATTACK FINANCING


      Local taxes imposed by the Taliban include a 10 percent tax on harvest and a 2.5 percent tax on wealth, the report said. The group will also tax services such as water or electricity, even though they have no control over the supply, and in some areas they will charge small businesses a 10 percent tax.

      Another lucrative source of income has been the foreign funding of aid and development projects.

      "Estimates of Taliban income from contracts funded by the United States and other overseas donors range from 10 to 20 per cent of the total, usually by the Taliban agreeing protection money with the contractor or demanding a cut," the report said.

      The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force estimated that between $100 million and $155 million of the Taliban's income was spent mounting attacks in 2011, while the rest maintained the insurgency, according to the U.N. report.

      "Since 2006 the Taliban have managed to finance an ever-increasing number of attacks, reflecting a year-on-year increase in income," the U.N. report said.
      ...

      Taliban raked in $400 million from diverse sources: U.N | Reuters
      With respect to where the actual weapons used come from, there are a variety of sources out there - weapons left over from the Soviet jihad, Afghan civil war, Iran, Pakistan, gun smugglers from Central Asia and even former Northern Alliance militias. Your desire to place all blame at the door of the Pakistani State, while entertaining, is getting rather old given the paucity of credible evidence supporting your varied claims.
      Last edited by Agnostic Muslim; 28 Jun 13,, 15:18.
      Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission - Jinnah
      https://twitter.com/AgnosticMuslim

      Comment


      • If one wants to be blunt would say that all the weapons Talibans got transited trough Pakistan at one point of time ;)
        No such thing as a good tax - Churchill

        To make mistakes is human. To blame someone else for your mistake, is strategic.

        Comment


        • Originally posted by Doktor View Post
          If one wants to be blunt would say that all the weapons Talibans got transited trough Pakistan at one point of time ;)
          You do realize that Iran and the Central Asian Republics share borders with Afghanistan don't you?
          Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission - Jinnah
          https://twitter.com/AgnosticMuslim

          Comment


          • I am fully aware of the geography.
            No such thing as a good tax - Churchill

            To make mistakes is human. To blame someone else for your mistake, is strategic.

            Comment


            • AM, lemontree

              Your posts indicate that the main thing Taliban has to manage is funding. So long as the funds come in they can support their patronage networks. It's not just the Taliban but many other communities in Afghanistan doing the same thing.

              The danger is if funds for any reason start to run short for these communities. At which point these communities will seek to convert their patronage capital into political capital. That means civil war along ethnic, tribal & sectarian lines in an attempt to corner funding or secure the most beneficial part of the pie.

              The challenge at the moment isn't securing Pak buy-in but Taliban buy-in. I wait to see how influential the Paks will be in handling the Taliban. If the Taliban still harbour ideas like 'just one push and we can take Kabul' then what the Paks say matters little.

              Taliban in charge of Kabul presents problems for Pakistan. It means they can't touch the TTP who will continue to make inroads into the country and force more lal masjids to happen. i don't think the Paks relish this prospect one bit. Its not like the 90s anymore when its was easy to send jihadis across the border and the blowback was non-existent.

              At this point in time the Taliban are a bigger long term threat to Pakistan and how they handle them will determine where things go.

              Comment


              • Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
                The challenge at the moment isn't securing Pak buy-in but Taliban buy-in. I wait to see how influential the Paks will be in handling the Taliban. If the Taliban still harbour ideas like 'just one push and we can take Kabul' then what the Paks say matters little.

                Taliban in charge of Kabul presents problems for Pakistan. It means they can't touch the TTP who will continue to make inroads into the country and force more lal masjids to happen. i don't think the Paks relish this prospect one bit. Its not like the 90s anymore when its was easy to send jihadis across the border and the blowback was non-existent.

                At this point in time the Taliban are a bigger long term threat to Pakistan and how they handle them will determine where things go.
                Agreed - Pakistani commentators who have argued in favor of a US dialog with the Taliban and a 'negotiated end' to the insurgency over the years have suggested that such a solution would deprive the Pakistani Taliban of their primary raison d'être which would offer a significant advantage to Pakistan in combating the TTP. I don't expect the TTP to simply melt away, but they will have to redefine themselves and in the process allow a window for the GoP to exploit.
                Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission - Jinnah
                https://twitter.com/AgnosticMuslim

                Comment


                • I don't know how Pakistan is going to deal with the TTP.

                  Let's say through some miracle the Taliban reach a settlement in Afghanistan, lay down arms and become part of the political landscape.

                  What then stops them funding the TTP. TTP has an issue with the Pak state. Now that they have tasted power, why should they lay down arms. You will have to seek a similar settlement with the TTP. The peace agreements by Pakistan in the past only served to allow the insurgents to regroup and come back stronger.

                  These people are not the negotiating types, its their way or death.

                  Jinnah's way of dealing with the tribals which gave the Brits lots of trouble was to pull out all soldiers and offer autonomy. Play to their honour. Is this way still workable ?
                  Last edited by Double Edge; 28 Jun 13,, 16:06.

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by Double Edge View Post

                    Let's say through some miracle the Taliban reach a settlement in Afghanistan, lay down arms and become part of the political landscape.

                    What then stops them funding the TTP. TTP has an issue with the Pak state. Now that they have tasted power, why should they lay down arms. You will have to seek a similar settlement with the TTP. The peace agreements by Pakistan in the past only served to allow the insurgents to regroup and come back stronger.

                    These people are not the negotiating types, its their way or death.
                    A peace deal in Afghanistan will not stop the TTP - that is why I said that I do not expect the TTP to melt away and instead 'redefine themselves', which is probably going to be along the lines of Mullah FM in Swat - wage war in the cause of Islam and the imposition of 'Shariah' (the extremist, degenerate Taliban type of Shariah that is).

                    As you pointed out, the TTP leadership (top level and local commanders) have tasted power, and their 'fund raising' activities, many criminal in nature, give them a huge financial incentive to continue their activities in some form or another. FATA was always known as being a haven for smugglers, kidnappers and criminals of all ilk, and that tradition has continued under the TTP, with many of the more intrepid criminal elements 'joining' the TTP cause to protect their interests.
                    Jinnah's way of dealing with the tribals which gave the Brits lots of trouble was to pull out all soldiers and offer autonomy. Play to their honour. Is this way still workable ?
                    No - the failed 'peace deal' in Swat showed that it isn't. But what the on and off violence in Swat (directed from the North Eastern Afghan provinces primarily) illustrates is that Pakistan (especially FATA and the NWFP), despite perhaps the most successful military anti-insurgent campaign so far against the TTP in Pakistan, will never have complete peace without peace in Afghanistan and coordinated effort between the Afghan and Pakistan governments to weed out the terrorists on both sides of the border.

                    A long term sustainable solution to the Taliban problem in Pakistan and Afghanistan is in fact an 'AFPAK solution' - neither country can achieve it without the other being completely on board as well.
                    Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission - Jinnah
                    https://twitter.com/AgnosticMuslim

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
                      I don't know how Pakistan is going to deal with the TTP.
                      A very important question

                      The political powers are convinced that the TTP can be brought to the negotiating table and a peace deal can be hammered. Both PML-N and PTI are in favour of a political dialogue in which the ideal scenario would be a negotiated settlement, although i have my sincere doubts about that.

                      Another very important factor is who is going to be the next COAS? The input of the COAS will play a huge role in determining the course of action Pakistan will take in dealing with the TTP threat. The COAS will not enjoy the same political power as he used to 10 years ago, but never the less he will play a major role. The 4 most Senior Officers are:

                      1. Lt Gen Haroon Aslam (CLS)
                      2. Lt Gen Rashad Mahmood (CGS)
                      3. Lt Gen Tariq Khan (Corps Commander Mangla)
                      4. Lt Gen Zaheer Ul Islam (DG ISI)

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
                        A Deadly Triangle : Afghanistan, Pakistan & India | Brookings Essay | June 25 2013

                        General essay on the regions dynamics, past & present.
                        Seema Sirohi has written a nice rebuttal of Dalrymple's finger-pointing at the India-Pakistan rivalry for all of Afghanistan's troubles.

                        Why US shouldn’t accept Dalrymple’s reading of Afghan ‘history’

                        Washington: Sometimes it is better to write about history that is long gone and archived for easy or privileged access.

                        But with his latest essay on Afghanistan, William Dalrymple has crossed into the wilds of contemporary geo-politics and proved the axiom that history can also be someone’s pet interpretation. Or more dangerously, a convenient narrative set to convenience some.

                        Dalrymple’s A Deadly Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan, & India is being promoted among the powerful in Washington almost as THE version of what happened over the past three decades in Afghanistan. He wrote the essay for The Brookings Institute, a major DC think tank, and with it his entry into the American wonk club is assured.

                        The story is told in Dalrymple’s typically engaging style with enough “live feeds” to keep up reader interest. But his thesis is deeply problematic and ultimately wrong. To sum it up in his words: “The hostility between India and Pakistan lies at the heart of the current war in Afghanistan.”

                        The theory fits right into Washington’s most popular narrative about South Asia – India-Pakistan rivalry is the root of all evil. It is regularly promoted by US analysts and officials. It ends with the fond hope that if only India would resolve the Kashmir problem as the Pakistanis fervently want, things would settle down. A version of it came recently from Bruce Riedel in his latest book, “Avoiding Armageddon: America, India and Pakistan.”

                        Dalrymple’s “proxy war” reasoning implies – even though he may not have intended it — that Pakistan’s use of jihadi militants is somehow justified to counter Indian influence. And whatever emanates from the bunch of jihadis is indirectly India’s fault. It creates a troubling moral equivalence between India and Pakistan, between building roads and hospitals and bombing embassies.

                        By his own accounting, Indian actions in Afghanistan today are positive and India’s presence small. So why blame India?

                        Dalrymple ignores the fact that Pakistan’s support of Afghan jihadis is an old policy, uncomfortably old and has nothing to do with India. It was spawned to fight Afghanistan’s support of Pashtun and Baloch nationalism and predates the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

                        Two citations should suffice: an article by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi in the Yale Journal and a book by Pakistani scholar, Rizwan Hussain, “Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan.” Kabul was largely responsible for an ambitious overreach to try to build support for the idea of an independent Pashtunistan, with chunks from Pakistan’s Pashtun areas. Tensions were high in 1955 and again between 1960-61. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto then crafted a response with a “forward policy” of supporting Islamist leaders inside Afghanistan. This policy grew and ultimately got married to the US Cold War objectives under Zia ul-Haq.

                        As many South Asian analysts have pointed out since Dalrymple’s essay came online on June 24, it is not because of India that Pakistani-trained jihadis and Al-Qaeda operatives are surfacing from Bosnia to Chechnya or that terrorists “decided to fly planes into the twin towers.” But his reasoning implies that vile actions by proxies of the Pakistan army can be laid at India’s doorstep.

                        Nitin Pai, a strategic analyst and director of Takshashila institution, tweeted: “US finances the war. NATO mucks up. Gulf kingdoms exert influence. Yet ‪@DalrympleWill sees Afghanistan as an India-Pakistan thing.”

                        Sorry, India can’t accept this special delivery. Dalrymple’s narrative will be contested hard. India has little to do in creating the terrorist forces now unleashed on the world. His casual causation is incorrect – to put it politely.

                        It has been reported that he was recently invited to meet President Obama at the White House to present his latest book “Return of a King” about the 1839-42 British invasion of Afghanistan. He also gave a series of talks around Washington where everyone is eager to hear reasons to end US involvement and bring the troops home.

                        When Dalrymple writes that the Afghan war is no longer a war between US/NATO troops on the one hand and the Taliban and al-Qaeda on the other, Americans nod in approval. “Instead our troops are now caught up in a complex war shaped by two pre-existing and overlapping conflicts: one local and internal, the other regional.”

                        Framing the issue in the language of “our troops” and those people out there itself is loaded with politics. Even the most pro-US government writers and academics use neutral language. But Dalrymple’s words help ease the qualms of departure without a proper exit strategy. He is essentially saying this is now an India-Pakistan issue, best left to them. We have done our bit or at least tried. Accept the fact that it became a graveyard for another empire.

                        On that last point it is important to cite a piece by Dhruva Jaishankar and Javid Ahmad where they demolish the myth of Afghanistan being the “graveyard of empires” and the western-centric reading of Afghanistan’s history.

                        Dalrymple’s analysis of the Afghan situation suffers from another major drawback – he cites a selective sequence of events from which the Americans and British are largely absent or make only cameo appearances. It would have been far more honest to write about “the deadly rectangle” with one arm representing US, British and Saudi subversions and meddling in the Afghanistan of 1980s and 90s.

                        But he dismisses this important aspect in one line: “the recruitment (of Afghan mujahedin) was always controlled by the ISI, but was originally also funded by the Saudis and the CIA.” He makes it sound like the CIA gave just some pocket change to the jihadis, not the bank. With that he ignores numerous accounts in as many books documenting the extent and amount of American involvement and money that went into Afghanistan.

                        George Crile’s “Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary History of the Largest Covert Operation in History” published in 2003 gives a full accounting of American enthusiasm for CIA’s Operation Cyclone, which pumped at least $3 billion through the ISI into the hands of extremists lovingly referred to by US officials as the “muj” in those days. The role of Britain’s MI6/SAS and Saudi cheque book diplomacy was equally important.

                        Surely, these factors changed the climate some.

                        But neither Washington nor London wants a history lesson at this time. Or ever for that matter. President Obama wants out of Afghanistan by whatever means necessary. The British, with their latest five-phase “peace plan” to open talks with the Taliban, are making it happen. Dalrymple’s narrative helps the process of rationalizing the exit.

                        Is it “Bollywood history” as Sunil Khilnani once said of his work?

                        Comment


                        • Here is Hussain Haqqani, the former Pakistani Ambassador to the US advising against talking to the Taliban.

                          Don’t Talk With the Taliban

                          Excerpts

                          As was the case in the 1990s, negotiating with the Taliban now would be a grievous mistake.

                          ...

                          Unlike most states or political groups, the Taliban aren’t amenable to a pragmatic deal. They are a movement with an extreme ideology and will not compromise easily on their deeply held beliefs. Before committing the blunder of negotiating with them again, American diplomats should read up on the history of Washington’s engagement with the Taliban during Bill Clinton’s presidency.

                          ...

                          There is no reason to believe — and no evidence — that the Taliban are now ready for political accommodation. Pakistan’s rationale for the talks differs little from the last two times it tried to save the Taliban from America’s wrath, after the bombings of the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and immediately after 9/11. Pakistan’s goal has always been to arrange American talks with the Taliban without being responsible for the outcome.

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by Firestorm View Post
                            Seema Sirohi has written a nice rebuttal of Dalrymple's finger-pointing at the India-Pakistan rivalry for all of Afghanistan's troubles.

                            Why US shouldn’t accept Dalrymple’s reading of Afghan ‘history’
                            I read that essay selectively. some points are pertinent others can be ignored.

                            For an example of the latter category, take this...

                            The hostility between India and Pakistan lies at the heart of the current war in Afghanistan. Most observers in the West view the Afghanistan conflict as a battle between the U.S. and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on one hand, and al-Qaida and the Taliban on the other. In reality this has long since ceased to be the case. Instead our troops are now caught up in a complex war shaped by two pre-existing and overlapping conflicts: one local and internal, the other regional
                            ..that underlined bit isn't going to get much traction on this board. The bolded bit is true.

                            From seema's article...

                            India-Pakistan rivalry is the root of all evil [and is] regularly promoted by US analysts and officials. It ends with the fond hope that if only India would resolve the Kashmir problem as the Pakistanis fervently want, things would settle down.
                            This bit isn't true either because and we go back to the Brookings essay for this interesting line from somebody in the Pak establishment that remains nameless.

                            There are clearly those in the army who are now alarmed at the amount of sectarian and political violence the jihadis have brought to Pakistan. But that view is contested by some in both the army and the ISI who continue to believe that the jihadis are a more practical defense against Indian hegemony than even nuclear weapons. For them, support for carefully chosen jihadis in Afghanistan is a vital survival strategy well worth the risk.
                            Pak fear irrational or not, paranoia or not about India means jihadis are a cost effective deterrent against India because they tied down half a million Indian troops. Whether Kashmir gets solved or not does not change the fact that Pakistan still has to counter India. Kashmir is just a pretext, Indian hegemony is the bigger challenge. Peace on the subcontinent holds so long as Pak deterrence holds, if it for any reason fails then we both are in trouble.

                            The irony of the Jihadi strategy is that it boomeranged back and Afghanistan is seen as a more immediate threat than India. What did India do to achieve this ? nothing. This is why i was pushing to understand whether the recent sectarian violence in Pakistan has caused a change of mindset. It would seem it has but that remains to be seen and its resolution in some ways isn't even in Pak hands but those of the Taliban & Afghans. Pakistan will have to live with the consequences either way and if you read AM's post, its a pretty hard problem.

                            But there is a flip side here too and that is if a fire catches in the Af-Pak region, India will feel it too. Rather than saying India-Pakistan is the cause for Afghanistan, its the opposite, a stable Afghanistan is important for both India & Pakistan. I think this realisation is going to cause some pretty hard & frank talking between these three countries. A stable Afghanistan might even create the conditions for better relations between India & Pakistan.

                            The punchline i get from India's pov is that if the Paks have a terrorist insurgent problem of their own it gets harder for them to support similar against India. This is the effect that I'm hoping for as a result of a moderation of previous Pak drivers & objectives. Otherwise Pakistan faces a LeT vs TTP style conflict of which winner takes all and Jinnah's idea of a secular Pakistan will have a slow painful death. As LeT & TTP have counter purposes.

                            LeT = Fight/kill the kuffar that is at war with us
                            TTP = Fight/kill the mounafiq (one that sows discord or basically anybody that disagrees with you)

                            The essay begins with the bombing of Indian residences and then uses this to set the scene of a regional conflict. But fails to note that India's footprint in Afghanistan is minuscule. The Pak actions are to discourage what they see as an overly India friendly due to Karzai govt from getting even more closer to India. The reasons are plain. If ever there was a conflict between India & Pakistan then the Pak planners have no way to know just what India might have planned on their western border. They are in effect dealing with a two front conflict and caught in a nutcracker. So those actions bombing embasies etc are just TCB from the Pak view.

                            One of things that struck me about the Brookings essay is that Pak thinking over the years appears driven more by fear of India than anything else. The recent irrational tactical nuke developments are another manifestation whose intent is to deter a cold start like manouver but once nukes entered the picture the days of manouver warfare were over. We're back to the good old days of attrition.

                            If fear is the main driver then maybe the Paks need to sit down with us and deal with this fear of theirs. At the time they were supporting jihadis it must have dawned on some of them that it would come back but they got shouted down. This sort of thinking isn't in Pakistans long term interest.
                            Last edited by Double Edge; 29 Jun 13,, 16:27.

                            Comment


                            • The western front up until durrand is afghan territory swindled during the collapse of the raj. The paks fear that it will eventually be taken back by the afghans. They want to hold it as long as it can until they can settle their score with indians.

                              On the eastern front, the 1857 mutiny ended the mughul rule. In 1947, the grand plan of a muslim nation that spread from east to west covering the regions of rajasthan, uttar pradesh, delhi and west bengal didn't turn out the way it did. Pakistan was divided into east and west. In 1948, the nizam rule in hyderabad collapsed following an indian military intervention and nizam rulers were allowed a safe passage to flee to pakistan. In 1971, ethnic genocide resulted into east pakistan becoming bangladesh. In the 70s, russian invasion of afghanistan resulted in american involvement and the arrival of pashtun nationalism(taliban). The illusion created after the collapse of the british raj where the punjabis fought for a muslim nation motivating the baloch and pashtun to serve them is also fading away. The ethnic violence in pakistan and its descent into radicalism has panicked the kashmiris.

                              If we take history into account, the picture says that pakistan is disintegrating. IMO, the paks themselves envisioned it but I guess they thought they would get a seat somewhere in delhi by the time it was all over. The disintegrating process is speeding up. Events that used to occur every hundred years are now occurring within decades. So in the next few decades the american experiments in afghanistan will steadily drive away pashtun territories under pakistan occupation back into afghanistan. Balochistan might become a sovereign country. ATM the pakistanis are trying to get the chinese involved in the western front(baloch ports) though the future of pakistan is so unpredictable and short that I doubt whether it'll happen.




                              The base:
                              Internal conflict among ethno-linguistic groups(tajik vs pashtun vs uzbek etc)

                              The first layer:
                              Islamic denominations(shia sunni ahmadiyya etc)

                              The second layer:
                              Internal with external battles because of involvement of foreign allies

                              Here
                              Pakistan is an ally of pashtuns,
                              Turkmenistan is an ally of turks,
                              Tajikistan is an ally of tajik
                              Uzbekistan is an ally of uzbek
                              etc
                              and etc

                              The third layer:
                              Non-muslims

                              russia in the 70s
                              the americans with its other western poodle nations(NATO) now
                              India and pakistan, here the later tries to keep afghanistan wild so as to keep india out

                              To solve afghanistan, the americans will have to redraw its provincial borders so that it gets marked according to ethno-linguistic territory as india did in 1953. All these new states will need to come together as a union in the capital.

                              Since the turkmen, the tajikis, the uzbekistan etc all have a nation of their own in their neighourhood, they are not regarded as natives of afghanistan. On the other hand, the pashtuns don't have a nation of their own. Almost half of it is gobbled up by the paks and the other hand is in limbo. The current pashtun movement(taliban) is just an expansion crusade because ethnic territories have not been marked so it motivates the pashtuns to expand.

                              The taliban movement is actually a true nationalistic movement of the nation state of afghanistan to drive out the foreigners(uzbeks, tajiks, american... basically everyone). Afghanistan is pashtun and pashtun is afghanistan. For this purpose, the pashtuns have(under the circumstances) allied themselves with the punjabis of pakistan.

                              for eg:

                              The Taliban and TTP is part of the base layer

                              Lashkar-e-jhangvi(anti-shia) comes in first layer

                              Northern alliance(tajik, uzbek and hazara v/s pashtun) is from the second layer

                              Global jihadi(al qaeda, LET) groups are part of the third layer
                              Last edited by anil; 30 Jun 13,, 14:40.

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by Agnostic Muslim View Post
                                Try to look beyond your 'anti-Pakistan biases' and you'll find a whole host of information detailing sources of Taliban funding:

                                With respect to where the actual weapons used come from, there are a variety of sources out there - weapons left over from the Soviet jihad, Afghan civil war, Iran, Pakistan, gun smugglers from Central Asia and even former Northern Alliance militias. Your desire to place all blame at the door of the Pakistani State, while entertaining, is getting rather old given the paucity of credible evidence supporting your varied claims.
                                You are free to live in your beliefs of innocence. For the rest of the world Pakistan remains a pariah.

                                Cheers!...on the rocks!!

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