I am arguing that the first DAK offensive of 24 march changed the course of WWII. Although ordered to defend what remained of Cyrencia and support Germany's Italian allies instead Rommel went on the attack. He achieved a stunning tactical victory that secured Benghazi and locked him into the siege of Tobruk and a mindset that he could take Egypt.
This is where long term disaster sets in. By almost winning he committed Germany to a long and costly campaign he never really had a chance of winning as long as Malta was in British hands. By the time of Rommels evacuation from North Africa his gamble in March 41 had cost Germany almost 30,000 lives, several divisions worth of equipment and precious trucks, 300,000 tons of supplies a gutted Luftflotte and had squarely focused allied the med.
More important this diversion of resources prevented the seizure of Malta and this is where it really gets bad for the Axis. If Malta had fallen and the Axis had been able to effectively shut off the med to allied efforts the resulting increased burden to allied shipping might have had huge effects on LL efforts. In the med/black sea alone the US lost 251 ships (1/7th of all US losses in WWII spread among 17 areas).
German losses from this period all occur 1943 or earlier during the period when German production of trained men and material was at low ebb and thus are truly irreplaceable.The surrender at Tunis and fight to defend Italy would cost Germany a further 50,000 lives killed and tens of thousands more made POW and several divisions worth of equipment. The resources devoted to defend Romania from 4 engined bomber attacks are a further drain on Axis resources that can be laid at Rommels feet.
Combined I believe these events, especially before 43 cost Germany its only real (however slim) chance of beating the USSR and thus being able to switch back to a one front an possibly winnable war.
This is where long term disaster sets in. By almost winning he committed Germany to a long and costly campaign he never really had a chance of winning as long as Malta was in British hands. By the time of Rommels evacuation from North Africa his gamble in March 41 had cost Germany almost 30,000 lives, several divisions worth of equipment and precious trucks, 300,000 tons of supplies a gutted Luftflotte and had squarely focused allied the med.
More important this diversion of resources prevented the seizure of Malta and this is where it really gets bad for the Axis. If Malta had fallen and the Axis had been able to effectively shut off the med to allied efforts the resulting increased burden to allied shipping might have had huge effects on LL efforts. In the med/black sea alone the US lost 251 ships (1/7th of all US losses in WWII spread among 17 areas).
German losses from this period all occur 1943 or earlier during the period when German production of trained men and material was at low ebb and thus are truly irreplaceable.The surrender at Tunis and fight to defend Italy would cost Germany a further 50,000 lives killed and tens of thousands more made POW and several divisions worth of equipment. The resources devoted to defend Romania from 4 engined bomber attacks are a further drain on Axis resources that can be laid at Rommels feet.
Combined I believe these events, especially before 43 cost Germany its only real (however slim) chance of beating the USSR and thus being able to switch back to a one front an possibly winnable war.
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