What if Nixon Succeeded

[Doktor]

The US was already backing the Chinese post-'60s.

Kissinger 1971, Nixon 1972.

[Tronic]

Kissinger 1971, Nixon 1972.

During the Sino-Soviet border war in '69, it were American nukes which were holding back the Soviet armies from invading China.

[Officer of Engineers]

During the Sino-Soviet border war in '69, it were American nukes which were holding back the Soviet armies from invading China.

Soviets weren't ready in 69. They were ready as of 72 and on full spring board mode in 73.

[Deltacamelately]

Soviets weren't ready in 69. They were ready as of 72 and on full spring board mode in 73.

Sir,

Yet Nixon believed the PRC would fall in line as per his contingency?

[Officer of Engineers]

Sir,

Yet Nixon believed the PRC would fall in line as per his contingency?

I don't see how. The Chinese were busy getting ready to face the Soviets and they were scrambling to get the last of their troops out of Vietnam to move north. They could not remobilize and reorient themselves fast enough to make a difference. At best, a punitive expedition after the fall of East Pakistan.

[lemontree]

There's a reason the invasion of East Pakistan was planned for December. The Himalayan passes are sealed due to heavy snow during the winter, allowing India to pull away troops from the Chinese border and concentrate them on her Eastern and Western fronts.

This left only one approach for the PLA into India - Walong sector in Arunachal Pradesh. All other sectors were a no go area due to the snow.
Walong was well covered in 1971.

[Firestorm]

This left only one approach for the PLA into India - Walong sector in Arunachal Pradesh. All other sectors were a no go area due to the snow.
Walong was well covered in 1971.

What about attacking through Bhutan? The PLA could have quickly overwhelmed the small Bhutanese forces, made a mad dash across western Bhutan and tried to strike straight at the Chicken's neck area. If it was fairly early during the war, any PA units present in northern east pakistan could have assisted by attacking from the south. The objective of course would be to cut off the entire northeast from the rest of India. But I'm unfamiliar with the topography of the region and don't know if this could be possible in winter.

[Tronic]

Soviets weren't ready in 69. They were ready as of 72 and on full spring board mode in 73.

I stand corrected, sir. Though I guess it still shows the intent to back China, whenever the Soviets got ready.

[Skywatcher]

I doubt that even western Bhutan is suitable for that sort of combat ops.

[lemontree]

What about attacking through Bhutan? The PLA could have quickly overwhelmed the small Bhutanese forces, made a mad dash across western Bhutan and tried to strike straight at the Chicken's neck area. If it was fairly early during the war, any PA units present in northern east pakistan could have assisted by attacking from the south. The objective of course would be to cut off the entire northeast from the rest of India. But I'm unfamiliar with the topography of the region and don't know if this could be possible in winter.

Bhutan is an Indian protectorate state.
The PLA will face the same terrian and climatic restrictions as in other regions.
Another thing, there can be no mad dash in mountains like in plains/ deserts.

[zraver]

Bhutan is an Indian protectorate state.
The PLA will face the same terrian and climatic restrictions as in other regions.
Another thing, there can be no mad dash in mountains like in plains/ deserts.

Sir, dissagree, look at the Battle of Capparetto in WWI.

[Deltacamelately]

Sir, dissagree, look at the Battle of Capparetto in WWI.

Jason,

Many striking differences -

1. The terrain is very different.
2. The Italian defence was extremely weak, lacked moral, had practically no mobile reserves and surrendered en-mass.
3. Their forces failed to give any meaningful counter fire, gave away all weather and tactical info over the radio.
4. The Germans along with arty fire, generously used poison gas, not possible in the current context.

[anil]

Gentlemen, many of my course mates have discussed this and its indeed an intriguing scenario.

What if Nixon was successful in convincing/coercing the Chinese to open the southern theatre with India in 1971, atleast 15 days before East Pakistan collapsed? How would that shape the course of the war? Would Bangladesh still come into existence?

I would like your individual analysis on this.

Regards,

@Deltacamelately

From a 1987 interview with K Subrahmanyam

Bengal Conflict

Interviewer: HOW DID INDIA'S SECURITY CONCERNS CHANGE DURING THE PERIOD THAT MRS. GANDHI WAS IN OFFICE THE FIRST TIME, '66-'77?

Subramanvam: Well it, the first major security crisis in 1971 when the Pakistani military action in Bengal exploded in such terrific violence and there were ten million refugees on... pushed into, onto our soil. And we had to face that situation. But the Pakistan's supported tacitly by the United States administration and China. And that was a very difficult period. And that was the period in which in order to countervail that inference India had turned to a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union which was a countervailing measure at that stage. But at the same time it drove home to India the point that India was in a very difficult position facing a combination of powers like the United States, China and Pakistan at that stage. Therefore we came through that crisis even though... I would say successfully. But it did leave India with the considerable concern about its security for the future.

Interviewer: WHY DID INDIA SIGN A FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH THE SOVIET UNION? WHAT DID SHE HAVE TO GAIN FROM IT?

Subramanvam: Well it was meant to be a countervailing inference against the United States going too far in its support to Pakistan. And it was proved in 1971 December, if you read Dr. Kissinger's memoirs, he himself says the US administration asked China to move against India and the Chinese asked the question, "What happens if the Soviet Union moved against China?" Even though in, the United States did give some guarantees to China about that contingency China did not move. And therefore it was quite obvious that the Indian action of entering into the friendship treaty with the Soviet did succeed in restraining China from acting in spite of all the goading from the United States.

Interviewer: HOW DID YOU INTERPRET NIXON'S DECISION TO SEND THE USS. ENTERPRISE INTO THE BAY OF BENGAL?

Subramanvam: Well it was one of the instances of what is known as demonstration of use of force without war, or diplomacy. And it didn't succeed. But it didn't succeed partly because for the fact the Enterprise came around two days late.

Interviewer: IN YOUR WRITING YOU'VE ALSO REFERRED TO IT AS THE ATOMIC GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY. WOULD YOU REMIND REPEATING THAT?

Subramanvam: Yes. Actually when you send your task force with the...

Interviewer: HOW DID YOU INTERPRET NIXON'S DECISION TO SEND THE USS. ENTERPRISE INTO THE BAY OF BENGAL DURING THE '71 WAR?

Subramanvam: It was a piece of class of diplomacy, when your... vessel which is known to contain nuclear weapons was sent into the Bay of Bengal in an attempt to exercise intimidation on India.

Interviewer: WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S DECISION TO SEND THE USS. ENTERPRISE INTO THE BAY OF BENGAL AND WAS INDIA ALSO CONCERNED CHINA WOULD INTERVENE AT THAT POINT?

Subramanvam: We were not very worried about China intervening at that point because the passes were covered with snow.

Interviewer: [REPEATS QUESTION]

Subramanvam: It was a threat because the Enterprise had come in close enough to the shores of Bangladesh. Then they could have started flying in the aircraft over Dhaka in which case it could have faced India with a problem whether the Indian air force should fire on the US aircraft.

Interviewer: WHAT EFFECT DID THIS HAVE ON FOREIGN POLICY?

Subramanvam: Well it would have stagnated completely the liberation of Bangladesh.

Transcript
Interview with Kandury Subramanvam, 1987 - WGBH Open Vault

Video interview
Interview with Kandury Subramanvam, 1987 - WGBH Open Vault

[Deltacamelately]

@Deltacamelately

From a 1987 interview with K Subrahmanyam



Transcript
Interview with Kandury Subramanvam, 1987 - WGBH Open Vault

Video interview
Interview with Kandury Subramanvam, 1987 - WGBH Open Vault

Anil,

Thanks for the the links. Though much of what is written is known to most of us, I would be more interested to know your personal analysis on the subject.

[anil]

India(with Russia as its protectorate)
v/s
Pakistan(with US and china as its protectorate)

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The chinese will not fight a war in which they don't think they can win

The americans will engage as long as the opponent doesn't acquire the capability to open a front(theater) on CONUS. If you go by this countrys past history, a logical front has to start with first strike.

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If the chinese had opened a front into india, the russians would have done the same. But the chinese knew that both of them have a capability that causes each to hesitate from ever fighting a real battle. So in reality, the US guarantee to china was lip service.

I personally and strongly feel that non-alignment was a mistake. India should have given the russians military bases around india. It would have given the russians confidence in india.

My actual unease is that 1971 keeps happening again and again. Kargil, 2003 stand off, mumbai attacks etc are nothing but a repeat of the 1971 predicament which subramaniam described as, that, "India is in a very difficult position facing a combination of powers like the United States, China and Pakistan".