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Thread: What if Nixon Succeeded

  1. #256
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    Quote Originally Posted by notorious_eagle View Post
    By British mindset, i meant Officers used to look down upon the Jawans simply because they couldn't speak English and weren't groomed like the Officers were. Officers prided themselves on being 'Gentlemen', and looked down upon anyone who didn't fulfill that standard.
    I think you mean colonial mindset. The British officer was a very respected individual by the rank and file and all old timers spoke of their command with respect. The odd clod did show up but they were exceptions than the norm.

    You are referring to the mindset within the Punjabi dominated PA officer lot, who look down upon all things civilian. We have a few of them too, but our civilian bureaucrats/politician system keeps them in check.

    Not sure about your experience but one only needs to look at the recent conduct of PA. Officers as high as 1 and 2 stars personally lead their troops from the front lines, lived with them and shared meals with them during the operations in Swat and SW. The most Senior Officer right now in PA and most likely the next COAS Lt Gen Haroon Aslam personally lead his troops in 2008 during the Swat Operation. He was a 2 star at the time and Commanding Officer of the SSG, i have already posted pictures of him having meal with the troops and sharing quarters with them.
    I'm sure you have officers who lead from the front, but I am refering to the regular unit officers - the 2nd LTs to Major level; you need them on the front line with the troops, more than the Brigadiers and Maj Generals, whose example you have given.

    You have to check the officer to soldier causality ratio to understand what I mean by junior officer leadership.

    Cheers!...on the rocks!!

  2. #257
    Military Professional Deltacamelately's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
    Major,

    I'm thinking Battle of Changsha (1942) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    A good, but not a great General, and an army nowhere close to the calibre of the British Indian Army manage to inflict a devastating defeat onto the IJA.

    Essentially, Dhaka is the bait. As the Indian Army advances, it meets and pushes aside Pakistani divisions though it may seem a total collapse as the road to Dhaka are blasted open one division at a time. Dhaka itself would be fortified to the hilt signalling a Pakistani intent to do or die there, something the InA would expect to see.

    As the InA engages in that do or die battle with every confidence of winning that battle, those Pakistani divisions that were pushed aside would start their true battle against the InA rear areas.

    The key to this is that the InA must be convinced that they have destroyed the blocking Pakistani divisions and that the main Pakistani effort is at Dhaka. As you can see Major, the vital point is the deception, not the actual combat power.
    Sir,

    The PA had inferior numbers to start with and very little arty and armour to prepare any formidable defence. Consequently the troops were also spread in thin lines all along the border, with some fortified stronghold here and there, that completely weakened the defence all over. There was no depth, no reserves, no second lines to wage war in the IA flanks. There was enemy IA, in the front and enemy Mukti Bahini at the back. They never realised that it was not the loss of any territory but the fall of the capital of a country that mattered. It had to be the Warsaw, the Paris, the Moscow, the Berlin and in our case Dacca that until captured, the country would not fall. The IA therefore just concentrated on bypassing fortification and rush to capture Dacca, something very different from the Battle of Changsha that you pointed out. Even if they had only concentrated all the troops in Dacca, made a fortress out of it and held in strength, which they probably could do and which you would suggest, the EP story would not have been very different. Bangla Desh would have still come into being. The best that could hypothetically happen in the Pak's favour, would probably be a BD, that instead of taking birth in battle field, would have come into being on a negotiating table. Negotiations by the world powers and probably the UNO.
    And on the sixth day, God created the Field Artillery...

  3. #258
    Military Professional Deltacamelately's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Blademaster View Post
    Major, where are you? Time to put in your opinion. Don't hold out on us.
    Hitesh,

    My apologies for getting in late, bit tied up somewhere. I have presented my opinion in page no. 18.

    The good Colonel believes the PA could have used deception as a key to get the IA bogged down in BD. I don't necessarily disagree, but I fail to see the intel and logistics for doing so. I also don't see how even making a fortress out of Dacca could have stopped the IA forward Divisions or its flanks. The objectives themselves were very fluid in the intial debrief that the Eastern Command had received. It was just that the terrain, the intel and most importantly the enemy's resolve, kept changing the initial objectives. The PA was either here or nowehere.
    And on the sixth day, God created the Field Artillery...

  4. #259
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    Quote Originally Posted by Deltacamelately View Post
    Hitesh,

    My apologies for getting in late, bit tied up somewhere. I have presented my opinion in page no. 18.

    The good Colonel believes the PA could have used deception as a key to get the IA bogged down in BD. I don't necessarily disagree, but I fail to see the intel and logistics for doing so. I also don't see how even making a fortress out of Dacca could have stopped the IA forward Divisions or its flanks. The objectives themselves were very fluid in the intial debrief that the Eastern Command had received. It was just that the terrain, the intel and most importantly the enemy's resolve, kept changing the initial objectives. The PA was either here or nowehere.
    But what if PA could buy enough time for US to interfere or make the Bay of Bengal incursion meaningful. US was not able to do anything because the war was over before they could do anything.

  5. #260
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    Quote Originally Posted by Deltacamelately View Post
    The PA had inferior numbers to start with and very little arty and armour to prepare any formidable defence. Consequently the troops were also spread in thin lines all along the border, with some fortified stronghold here and there, that completely weakened the defence all over. There was no depth, no reserves, no second lines to wage war in the IA flanks. There was enemy IA, in the front and enemy Mukti Bahini at the back. They never realised that it was not the loss of any territory but the fall of the capital of a country that mattered. It had to be the Warsaw, the Paris, the Moscow, the Berlin and in our case Dacca that until captured, the country would not fall. The IA therefore just concentrated on bypassing fortification and rush to capture Dacca, something very different from the Battle of Changsha that you pointed out. Even if they had only concentrated all the troops in Dacca, made a fortress out of it and held in strength, which they probably could do and which you would suggest, the EP story would not have been very different. Bangla Desh would have still come into being. The best that could hypothetically happen in the Pak's favour, would probably be a BD, that instead of taking birth in battle field, would have come into being on a negotiating table. Negotiations by the world powers and probably the UNO.
    Major, you're taking the point from when the Pakistani Army was already committed to battle. You have to step back, say 2-3 weeks before battle and see what they can do from that point. Once you commit to battle, you can't turn around and say ok, I will fight you 1000 miles from here in 30 minutes.

  6. #261
    Armchair Worrier Senior Contributor bolo121's Avatar
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    From a quick google on Changsha I understood that the Chinese had guerillas and other locals on their side.
    So naturally rear areas could be raided at will and close tabs be kept on the Japanese, leading to an attack when conditions were favourable.

    In contrast, here the PA were isolated from the people and the countryside belonged to the Mukti Bahini.
    Also Bangladesh being wet and flat there were no mountains to fort up in when waiting to launch the attack.

    The IA might have been delayed or disrupted a little bit but its hard to see how the PA could keep their numbers and movements concealed.
    In addition the Chinese could count on the people for food and shelter, the PA was operating in a hostile countryside.
    For Gallifrey! For Victory! For the end of time itself!!

  7. #262
    Military Professional Deltacamelately's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Blademaster View Post
    But what if PA could buy enough time for US to interfere or make the Bay of Bengal incursion meaningful. US was not able to do anything because the war was over before they could do anything.
    From purely an academic point of view, with your logistical tail cut off and an enemy airforce pounding you constantly, buying time against 3 corps already at your gates doesn't seems much of a chance. The US had its priorities elsewhere. The 1971 war was doomed for the Pakistanis on headstart.
    And on the sixth day, God created the Field Artillery...

  8. #263
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    Gentlemen,

    I think you are all missing the forest from the trees. Changsha is not applicable simply because Bangladesh is not Changsha but that is not my point. My point is deception. You present a picture that your enemy expects and wants to see while hiding your true intent. The Soviets did it at Stalingrad. They hid their armies and just fed enough soldiers into that city to tie down Paulis. If Paulis had known about the build up outside of Stalingrad, AGC would have left the city to confront the bigger threat.

    The IJA learned how to defeat Changsha the fourth time around. They left a blocking force in the rear.

    Major, it is way too late to commit to deception once the battle commenced. You have to commit to deception even before there is a hint of battle. Foritification is relative. What I want is to make Dahka look like my final stand, that I want the battle of annhilation at Dahka. It doesn't mean that I spend two months, two weeks, or even two hours fortifying it. I want the InA to think and concentrate on Dahka.

  9. #264
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    So countermeasures against deception is to have a rear blocking force to take care of any contigencies. That is called the relief force or reserve force, a standard component of modern military doctrine.

  10. #265
    Senior Contributor Mihais's Avatar
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    Reserve is a standard concept since Manius Dentatus
    You only need to cut the LOC in one place,and you have the reserve jumping all over the place.That's an opportunity to defeat them.After that,the rest almost doesn't matter.Standard deep battle,although Napoleon got bored doing it again and again.
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  11. #266
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    Quote Originally Posted by Mihais View Post
    Reserve is a standard concept since Manius Dentatus
    You only need to cut the LOC in one place,and you have the reserve jumping all over the place.That's an opportunity to defeat them.After that,the rest almost doesn't matter.Standard deep battle,although Napoleon got bored doing it again and again.
    How would the reserve jump all over the place if you cut off the LOC?

    By the way, can somebody explain to me the concept and the importance of recon battle? I need to understand why winning the recon battle is so important to winning the battle. The way I see it, if a recon platoon makes contact with the enemy and gets wiped out and you haven't heard from the recon platoon, you assumed that the platoon has met the enemy and got wiped out. How does that stop a division cold in its tracks considering that it has multiple platoons and is it not easy to reconfigure another platoon into a recon and send it after the missing recon platoon and find out what happened and whether it is a main force or a decoy force?

  12. #267
    Senior Contributor Mihais's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Blademaster View Post
    How would the reserve jump all over the place if you cut off the LOC?

    By the way, can somebody explain to me the concept and the importance of recon battle? I need to understand why winning the recon battle is so important to winning the battle. The way I see it, if a recon platoon makes contact with the enemy and gets wiped out and you haven't heard from the recon platoon, you assumed that the platoon has met the enemy and got wiped out. How does that stop a division cold in its tracks considering that it has multiple platoons and is it not easy to reconfigure another platoon into a recon and send it after the missing recon platoon and find out what happened and whether it is a main force or a decoy force?
    They'll try hell or high water to reopen the LOC.
    Taking out good recon platoons in one swipe works smoothless only in Tom Clancy's books.The recon coy precedes the Bde,the recon Plt. precedes the Btn TF.With multiple marching routes,you'll use the routes where no resistence is encountered,if the mission is to bypass and head for the enemy depth.With only one route,the division looks like a giant snake,that extends for scores of km's.For every encounter by the lead recon platoon,the vanguard has to deploy from marching formation to battle formation,overwhelm the resistence,clear the work of the enemy engineers and get back in column.Repeat as needed.
    Those who know don't speak
    He said to them, "But now if you have a purse, take it, and also a bag; and if you don't have a sword, sell your cloak and buy one. Luke 22:36

  13. #268
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    Quote Originally Posted by Blademaster View Post
    So countermeasures against deception is to have a rear blocking force to take care of any contigencies. That is called the relief force or reserve force, a standard component of modern military doctrine.
    No, in this case specifically, it was a blocking force. A battalion specifically tasked to protecting the assembly point. The reserves are an uncommitted force, usually the HQ's protection force, ready to be used for unexpected contingencies or opportunities as they arise. At Changsha, the Chinese managed local superiority at multiple points to overwhelm the reserves.

  14. #269
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    Quote Originally Posted by Blademaster View Post
    How would the reserve jump all over the place if you cut off the LOC?
    No reserves will be jumping, because holding formations are in location and they have their reserve contingency plans in place. I believe Mihais was referring to the strategic reserve, that only comes into play when an enemy strike corps launches a thrust into your territory.

    By the way, can somebody explain to me the concept and the importance of recon battle? I need to understand why winning the recon battle is so important to winning the battle. The way I see it, if a recon platoon makes contact with the enemy and gets wiped out and you haven't heard from the recon platoon, you assumed that the platoon has met the enemy and got wiped out. How does that stop a division cold in its tracks considering that it has multiple platoons and is it not easy to reconfigure another platoon into a recon and send it after the missing recon platoon and find out what happened and whether it is a main force or a decoy force?
    - A recon battle is the old method of warfare when you do not know the dept of enemy defences.
    - In simple terms its the section/ platoon level tactics of advance to contact that come into play here.
    - The whole formation is advancing on a given frontage, the vanguard platoons are not working in isolation. When they make contact, with enemy defences, then they assess the situation and attempt to clear the opposition. Depending on the strength of the enemy encountered, the battalions resources will be mobilized. This means the formation advance has to stop, and clear the hurdle before advancing again.
    - This is the reason that a weak defender will deploy screens or false defended localities, the troops deployed here are required fool the enemy by projecting a false frontage, the enmey is forced to deploy and launch an attack to clear the objective. The defender fighst and withdraws to his next screen location.
    - Everytime a unit deploys for an attack, it looses time - a section may take about 30 to 60 minutes clear a position; a platoon may take more time; and a company or battalion may spend the better half of the day to clear an objective.

    This delay screws up the time plan and phases of advance of the enemy, giving the defender more time to assess the strength and direction of the enemy's thrust. Thereby, allowing the defender the ability to analyse and deploy his resources to address the threat he is facing.

    A little trivia: In the Battle of Chamb, on 1st Sept 1965 - one section deployed (from my battalion) at a location called Bhurejal held up two Pak rifle companys and a sqn of armour from 0830 to about 1500 hours. They surrendered when they ran out of ammo - the section commander became the Battalion Subedar Major before he retired.
    Last edited by lemontree; 13 Sep 13, at 12:50.

    Cheers!...on the rocks!!

  15. #270
    Senior Contributor Doktor's Avatar
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    Captain,

    I have been using this in my games without knowing it

    Anyway, wouldn't a minefield give the same results without risking lives?
    No such thing as a good tax - Churchill

    To make mistakes is human. To blame someone else for your mistake, is strategic.

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