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  • Firestorm, my timeline might be a bit off but the relevant reasoning about motivations and outside pressures is accurate.

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    • I know you Indian gentlemen have explained this before but would you kindly repeat it so that I can get this through my thick skull.

      Obviously, you had thought the Soviets had stopped the US for you.

      So, why would India not think she was a WWIII target after the ENTERPRISE Incident? I'm not looking for rights or wrongs here. I just want an insight into Indian strategic thought. The US has chosen sides with Pakistan and China. India signed a treaty and got weapons from the USSR. And according to the Indian/Soviet side, it was Soviet submarines that stopped the ENTERPRISE from going further.

      Would that not suggest that India now is a WWIII target?

      Again, just help me understand why did India not consider herself a WWIII target after this.

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      • DELETED (Double Post)

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        • Originally posted by zraver View Post
          Firestorm, my timeline might be a bit off but the relevant reasoning about motivations and outside pressures is accurate.
          The pressures were there. But we did not need the treaty to get the required hardware. The Soviets were selling it to us even without the treaty. That's why the timeline is important. Obviously, the treaty must have meant something more. Help against preventing more border adventures by China is my guess. The Chinese were even more dangerous than 1962 by then because of their nukes. Mere conventional parity with them might not have seemed enough.

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          • Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
            I know you Indian gentlemen have explained this before but would you kindly repeat it so that I can get this through my thick skull.

            Obviously, you had thought the Soviets had stopped the US for you.

            So, why would India not think she was a WWIII target after the ENTERPRISE Incident? I'm not looking for rights or wrongs here. I just want an insight into Indian strategic thought. The US has chosen sides with Pakistan and China. India signed a treaty and got weapons from the USSR. And according to the Indian/Soviet side, it was Soviet submarines that stopped the ENTERPRISE from going further.

            Would that not suggest that India now is a WWIII target?

            Again, just help me understand why did India not consider herself a WWIII target after this.
            Because we considered the treaty as a check against China and not America?

            Comment


            • Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
              I know you Indian gentlemen have explained this before but would you kindly repeat it so that I can get this through my thick skull.

              Obviously, you had thought the Soviets had stopped the US for you.

              So, why would India not think she was a WWIII target after the ENTERPRISE Incident?
              ....
              Even after the 1971 treaty, there were no Soviet bases of any kind on Indian soil. And the most common WWIII scenario was either the Soviets or NATO invading each other in Europe. India was far away and planned on basically staying out of the whole thing. Even in the case of a Sino-Soviet flare up, I'm pretty sure India planned on staying out of that as well even if the Soviets had asked India to open up a front. So the core thinking would have been, that as long as India did not make any concrete moves against US allies, they would ignore India since they had much more important targets to take care of.

              This is all the speculation of a layman of course. I have no idea what the Indian establishment actually believed back then. Another possibility is that they knew India could be a possible target despite our best efforts. If so, there was nothing we could do to prevent it and we couldn't afford a civil defense program to reduce the damage with our limited finances and huge population. It would have only caused panic while being largely useless.
              Last edited by Firestorm; 22 Aug 13,, 21:42.

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              • Originally posted by Firestorm View Post

                This is all the speculation of a layman of course. I have no idea what the Indian establishment actually believed back then. Another possibility is that they knew India could be a possible target despite our best efforts. If so, there was nothing we could do to prevent it and we couldn't afford a civil defense program to reduce the damage with our limited finances and huge population. It would have only caused panic while being largely useless.
                In a Cold War era global thermonuclear war scenario you were going to get hammered. A dozen or a hundred made in America Smiling Buddhas, for no other reason that if you are not with us, you must be against us and if we are going down we are taking everyone who wants us dead with us. After-all, we've lost everything already so there is nothing left to lose. Welcome to a deadman's party.

                Oingo Boingo Dead Man's Party - YouTube

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                • Originally posted by zraver View Post
                  In a Cold War era global thermonuclear war scenario you were going to get hammered. A dozen or a hundred made in America Smiling Buddhas, for no other reason that if you are not with us, you must be against us and if we are going down we are taking everyone who wants us dead with us. After-all, we've lost everything already so there is nothing left to lose. Welcome to a deadman's party.
                  That's just the thing. India didn't want the US dead and had no means to really affect the war in any meaningful way beyond defending ourselves against the Chinese if they decided to invade. More importantly it wasn't planning to. Either way, whether or not India was a target made no difference. There was nothing we could have done differently to avoid it considering the attitude that you are speaking of above.

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                  • Originally posted by Firestorm View Post
                    That's just the thing. India didn't want the US dead and had no means to really affect the war in any meaningful way beyond defending ourselves against the Chinese if they decided to invade. More importantly it wasn't planning to. Either way, whether or not India was a target made no difference. There was nothing we could have done differently to avoid it considering the attitude that you are speaking of above.
                    Yup, during the Cold war to join the nuclear club you had to sign your own death warrant to gain entry.

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                    • Jason,

                      I really did not want to get into whether India was a target or not. She was, if not by us, most definitely by the Chinese. They were expecting both India and Vietnam opening Southern Fronts while the Soviets strike from the North. Indian Gents, please, do not provide me with proof that India was not going to do that. That's not the point, the point is that the Chinese was expecting you to and they made contingencies ... and so did we.

                      What I was after, though, was what was going through their heads on how to stay out of WWIII.

                      The joker in all of this is Pakistan. What was she going to do?

                      And let's not get into a pissing contest on who can and who will do what? That is not the point of my questions. My point is to learn about the thinking of the times, not a dick measuring contest nor who's right or wrong. That is neither here not there. Decisions were made ... and I like to understand the reasoning behind those decisions.

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                      • Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                        Jason,

                        I really did not want to get into whether India was a target or not. She was, if not by us, most definitely by the Chinese. They were expecting both India and Vietnam opening Southern Fronts while the Soviets strike from the North. Indian Gents, please, do not provide me with proof that India was not going to do that. That's not the point, the point is that the Chinese was expecting you to and they made contingencies ... and so did we.

                        What I was after, though, was what was going through their heads on how to stay out of WWIII.

                        The joker in all of this is Pakistan. What was she going to do?

                        And let's not get into a pissing contest on who can and who will do what? That is not the point of my questions. My point is to learn about the thinking of the times, not a dick measuring contest nor who's right or wrong. That is neither here not there. Decisions were made ... and I like to understand the reasoning behind those decisions.
                        Sir,

                        Neither India expected NATO nukes nor was in the postion to make contingencies. India didn't expect a flourishing democracy and the leader of the free world to lob nukes on her. With respect to China, it was a different question. India didn't expect the PRC to nuke her for all totally different reasons. However, cosing up with the Soviets did take away whatever little apprehensions, the leaders of the time might have vis-a-vis China.

                        As we have deduced in the past, the perception that India had with respect to a nuclear China was different, else, Smiling Buddha would have happened immediately after 1962. The time lines of the test are an easy give away.

                        Personally speaking, contrary to all the reasonable logic Jason has quoted, I believe that Indira Gandhi was already done with all the cost-benefit and feasibility analysis of the 1971 war. I doubt she would stand down. Here is a hint - She was anxious to invade East Pakistan as early as Monsoon. It was the genius of FM Sam Manekshaw, which delayed the war till December, expecting the riverine water to go away and the Himalayan passes to close. She was just not bothered. Nah...I don't think she would back away. I also agree, it would otherwise become a bloody affair, wherein the war objectives would dramatically change from liberation of Bangladesh to dismantling of the PA.
                        sigpicAnd on the sixth day, God created the Field Artillery...

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                        • Delta,

                          In addition to your post, Nixon simply just did not have the power to move all those supplies and manpower as zraver suggests and Soviet Union was a powerful deterrent no matter how you cut it. There was no way in hell Nixon would risk a nuclear confrontation over East Pakistan when western media was already broadcasting human rights violations and the majority of US people were already anti-Vietnam. By going against India, Nixon would lose a lot of political support for what he was about to do: Go to China.

                          Nixon already did his cost vs benefit calculations and realize that a head on confrontation was not going to work in his favor on the greater geo-political scheme. I think the real lesson here was that US did not value Pakistan highly enough to risk a confrontation otherwize zraver's more than incredible assertions would come to pass.

                          In short, it was US that folded after making a half hearted bet. No other way to cut it.

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                          • Originally posted by Deltacamelately View Post
                            As we have deduced in the past, the perception that India had with respect to a nuclear China was different, else, Smiling Buddha would have happened immediately after 1962. The time lines of the test are an easy give away.
                            *** Grinning like a cat ***

                            Thank you for reminding me of that EUREKA moment. Something so obvious ... that until two thinkers started looking at all the facts ... and the traditional explanations didn't fit ... and then ... BAM!!!! That was fun ... and then, we had to convince others of what we saw. Unconventional thinking ... and that could not happen without two thinkers challenging each other. I don't think we could have came up with that without you debating and challenging me at every point.

                            Originally posted by Deltacamelately View Post
                            Personally speaking, contrary to all the reasonable logic Jason has quoted, I believe that Indira Gandhi was already done with all the cost-benefit and feasibility analysis of the 1971 war. I doubt she would stand down. Here is a hint - She was anxious to invade East Pakistan as early as Monsoon. It was the genius of FM Sam Manekshaw, which delayed the war till December, expecting the riverine water to go away and the Himalayan passes to close. She was just not bothered. Nah...I don't think she would back away. I also agree, it would otherwise become a bloody affair, wherein the war objectives would dramatically change from liberation of Bangladesh to dismantling of the PA.
                            The better question is what would happened if Pakistan had better Generals in East Pakistan. No one wanted that command, at least no one of worth.
                            Last edited by Officer of Engineers; 24 Aug 13,, 15:53.

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by Blademaster View Post

                              Nixon already did his cost vs benefit calculations and realize that a head on confrontation was not going to work in his favor on the greater geo-political scheme. I think the real lesson here was that US did not value Pakistan highly enough to risk a confrontation otherwize zraver's more than incredible assertions would come to pass.
                              But the reason wasn't Indian or Soviet strength but Nixon's desire to get a date with China.

                              In short, it was US that folded after making a half hearted bet. No other way to cut it.
                              Or the US played an incredibly cynical game and won the big prize in her eyes for the least amount of cost- China. India, Bangladesh and the US all got the big prizes they wanted and Pakistan got told thanks for playing...

                              Delta,

                              Sir,

                              Neither India expected NATO nukes nor was in the postion to make contingencies. India didn't expect a flourishing democracy and the leader of the free world to lob nukes on her.
                              Sir, this is something I've tried to explain in the past and have apparently failed so I will try again. In a global nuclear war situation with the Soviets the US isn't the words most powerful democracy, she isn't the leader of the free world, SHE IS DEAD. She is burned to a cinder and all her promise, hope, dreams as well as her ills and evils dead with her. Her only remaining action is to take all those who wished her ill in what ever capacity with her. India falls into that category twice, first as a defacto ally of the Soviets. Secondly, she had nukes and was not a US ally and an enemy of US allies.

                              That is why I call it a deadman's party.

                              Comment


                              • Deltacamelately, the dismantling of the PA back in west pakistan was in fact on the cards.

                                On December 5 Executive Secretary Eliot sent a memorandum to Kissinger attaching excerpts from security assurances provided to Pakistan by the United States. One such excerpt was from a January 26, 1962, letter from President Kennedy to President Ayub, which reads as follows: "As a firm ally, Pakistan is entitled to the re-affirmation you have requested of the prior assurances given by the United States to Pakistan on the subject of aggression against Pakistan. My Government certainly stands by these assurances." The full text of the letter is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIX, Document 100. On November 5, 1962, Ambassador McConaughy gave President Ayub an aide-mémoire which offered the more explicit assurance that the United States would "come to Pakistan's assistance in the event of aggression from India against Pakistan."
                                Kissinger told President Nixon that after their meeting, Vorontsov had needed no further proof of United States resolve. He said that "we got the message loud and clear from the President yesterday." Vorontsov added: "I can tell you informally that if they are not working through the night now in Moscow, they are not doing their duty." Kissinger concluded: "We're going to get it." He said he had underlined the significance of the understanding President Kennedy had with President Ayub about coming to Pakistan's assistance. "I showed him the secret treaty. I said now I hope you understand the significance of this. It isn't just an obligation. It will completely defuse the Democrats because they are not going to attack their own President. So I said when the President yesterday spoke of an obligation he was speaking of a Kennedy obligation. . . . He said within an hour this will be on Mr. Brezhnev's desk. And I told him we're moving some military forces, but it will not be visible until Sunday night. . . . In effect, it was giving him sort of veiled ultimatum."
                                Message From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon

                                (A handwritten note on the message indicates it was received at 5 a.m. Haig transmitted the text of this hot line message to Kissinger at 7:37 a.m. in telegram WH 11131 to Lajes in the Azores. Haig observed about the message: "Obviously we are still in a holding pattern.")

                                Moscow, December 13, 1971.

                                We have attentively examined your message over the direct communications link. In accordance with the confidential exchange of opinions existing between us, we are advising you that at the present time, we are conducting a clarification of all the circumstances in India.

                                We will inform you of the results of the clarification without delay.
                                Message From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon

                                Moscow, December 14, 1971.

                                We are in constant contact with the Indian side. One of the results of these very contacts was the message transmitted to you on December 12 that India has no intention to take any military action in connection with West Pakistan. We have firm assurances by the Indian leadership that India has no plans of seizing West Pakistan territory. Thus as far as intentions of India are concerned there is no lack of clarity to which you have referred.
                                The russians advised indira against launching the offensive on PA.
                                Last edited by anil; 24 Aug 13,, 18:56.

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