Stalin's three plans

[zraver]

So,we don't actually disagree.The thing is after R-M pact,compulsory military service was introduced.Up until then conscription was very selective.A massive number of new divisions was formed,with all those that until then were extempted from military service.We're talking hundreds of divisions of all sorts.Around mid-1941 (before the war)another batch of several hundreds was formed,and it showed up just in time to meet the Germans at Vyazma and Moscow.

Those expansions did not alter the fundamental offensive nature of the Red Army.

The thing is,of course,that the invasion was unexpected,so Stalin was preparing for the invasion he did not believed in.

Or preparing for the invasion he believed in, his own. Huge numbers of the Soviets best troops went into the bag near the border because they were massed there. Such massing had no legit defensive purpose. The only explanation besides gross incompetence from Stalin down to divisional commander is that it was an offensive massing.

What we do know from practice is that both the Finns and the Poles mopped the floor with the soviet troops they encountered,yet it did not stopped the Reds.The Finns ultimately lost land,and the Poles lost the chance to stop the Germans.If there was any grand lesson Stalin learned it was that numbers matter,and he was about to have 400 infantry divisions and 10000 T34's in fall 1941.

Plus the tanks he thought he had already. A Soviet, a mid-late summer attack cannot be ruled out anymore.

Btw,the term for the 1939 conscripts was 2 years.Meaning autumn 1941 they go home.

Easy enough to tell them to stay in uniform.

All sorts of weird things.[/QUOTE]

[Mihais]

Thanks for making my larger point.

The thing is,even if the Red Army always had an offensive nature,up until they got a border with the murderous Nazis,bla-bla,they still had a fortified line.It's irrelevant if said fortified line was not continuous,not as well fortified as others etc... It was more than nothing.After the Soviets shake hands with Adolf and attack 5 european nations,even that got away.
My point,which is not entirely mine(but it happens to make sense to me) is that the school of thought that argues Stalin was shaking in his boots is wrong.I don't care what commie more or less doctored archives say,interesting as that may be.Look at what the man does.

Btw,you said a Soviet in autumn '41 could not be ruled out.The SSI assesed the same in spring '41,although they gave it as highly probable.

[clackers]

Mark Solonin. Historian's personal webpage.Comrade Stalin's Three Plans

Solonin's a crackpot, Mihais, a follower of Rezun/Suvorov's conspiracy theories.

The article essentially memos and proposals from certain generals, not orders from Uncle Joe.

The traditional plans that we know were for counterattack are treated by Solonin in his article as plans for offensive action.

The description of the January 1941 wargames doesn't match historians' accounts, and his 'Third Plan' document is simply the handwritten Timoshenko/Zhukov preemptive proposal that Dmitri Volkogonov revealed in his Stalin biography - one the dictator didn't act on.

Glantz in Stumbling Colossus apparently relegates discussion of this memo to the back of his book, and historian Cynthia Roberts has doubts as to whether Stalin even read it.

So what is the actual history of pre-1941 planning?

"Soviet war planning since 1935 had focused on the twin threats posed by Nazi Germany and Japan. Strategic plans developed in November 1938 under the auspices of the chief of the General Staff, Colonel General BM Shaposhnikov, considered both threats but identified the Western Theater of war as the priority. The geographic reality of the Pripiat Marshes posed a particular problem to the planners since the marshes divided the theater in half. The question was whether German planners would focus their strategic attention north of the Pripiat into Belorussia or south of the marshes into the Ukraine.

In 1938 Shaposhnikov's plan postulated defence against both variants. After the partition of Poland in 1939, the General Staff revised its strategic plans to accord with the increasing German threat. Developed by [Vasilevsky], the July 1940 plan postulated a probable German thrust into Belorussia along the Minsk-Smolensk axis. Mobilization measures were adjusted to fit this plan. When Meretskov became chief of the General Staff in August 1940, another reevaluation took place. With Stalin taking an active role, the October 1940 war plan shifted strategic emphasis from the northwestern to the southwestern axis, probably because of Stalin's concern for the economically vital Ukraine. He was also influenced by the 'Kiev faction' formed around Zhukov, then commander of the Kiev military district. Yet another adjustment of mobilization plans was now required.

The January 1941 Moscow wargame was designed to validate the October plan. The war game, which exercised both defensive and counter-offensive scenarios, indicated, to Stalin's consternation, that the General Staff had overestimated Soviet defensive capabilities and underestimated German offensive potential. In the months after the wargame, the General Staff again revised its mobilization plans and probably held new wargames to develop a sounder defensive strategy against what appeared to be an ever-increasing likelihood of future German attack. Fragmentary evidence exists of this frenetic planning as the Soviet military press focused attention on hitherto neglected defensive themes.

By April 1941, Soviet-German relations were deteriorating, and Soviet intelligence began detecting German offensive preparations. As indications of future German attack increased during the ensuing months, Stalin and Soviet diplomats postured as if peace reigned supreme ... the dichotomoy between Stalin's frantic desire for peace (at least in 1941) and his desire to undertake prudent defensive measures to stave off defeat if war occurred produced confusion and paved the way for the catastrophic defeat of the Red Army in 1941.

... Despite [conducting a concealed mobilization], the Soviet Union was not ready for war in June 1941, nor did it intend, as some have contended, to launch a preventative war. Although the General Staff had expended more than three years in developing defensive plans and intelligence agencies had provided enough information to give clear warning, Soviet forces were poorly arrayed, trained and equipped, and the Soviet political leadership was paralyzed by its fixation on maintaining peace, at least until 1942. Hope clouded reality, and both the Red Army and the Soviet people would pay the price.

From When Titans Clashed, Glantz and House.

The trick of charlatans like Solonin or Rezun is to point only to the counter-attack deployment of 1941 and write lots of books.

[zraver]

The trick of charlatans like Solonin or Rezun is to point only to the counter-attack deployment of 1941 and write lots of books.

You mean like Glantz, who does not impress me. The dude is a clearly biased soviophile.

Please explain the offensive materials of war being produced. You can fake or spin records, you can't change what was actually produced. You know things like the KV-2 with its massive 152mm gun with concrete busting shells. Or the imbalance between fighters and bombers or the development of the katyusha bombardment system..

[Mihais]

Clackers,I'd really like to read such a plan.I mean really.I agree Solonin is a crackpot,but counter-attacks...First of all,Saposhnikov could not have planned for 1941.For 1935,certainly,but a plan need forces to execute it and the Red army changed drasticaly in the 6 years.A concept of operations,maybe.Second,to plan a war with Germany in 1935 needs a few prequisites.First it needs to attack Poland.Poland was no push-over and it had reliable allies,as well as the means to defend itself against what the Soviets had in the 30's.If there was no attack on Poland planned,another presumption should have been that Germany attacks Poland.USSR needed to prevent that at all cost.The reverse happened.The third presumtion is that Poland and Germany become allies and attack USSR,in which case there is the Stalin Line.This last piece of real estate was,as I said,dismantled right before the war.Poland and Soviet defenses share the same fate.

The only thing Stavka needed to do in 1941 was to order its troops to dig trenches and place minefields.

Btw,tell Marshall Bagramen,in his Communist heaven,that he's a crackpot.


ps A wargame is not a plan.

[zraver]

Mihais, you must remember that to Clackers, Glantz is the 14th Apostle of the Lord whose word is holy writ no matter how many times his various thesis' are soundly refuted by fact.

[Mihais]

Mihais, you must remember that to Clackers, Glantz is the 14th Apostle of the Lord whose word is holy writ no matter how many times his various thesis' are soundly refuted by fact.

Z,since the saying about the pot and the kettle could apply to me,I won't comment on clackers religious beliefs :)

Glantz has many merits,but he answers the wrong question and he commits a logical fallacy.The question is not whether the Soviet could win in 1941,but whether they could have attacked.I also believe the first Soviet attack would have been a failure,but regardless of that the soviets would have been in a much better strategic position,thus able to win the war long before the Allies can land in Europe.Say,late 42-mid 43,but that's my speculation.

The thing with this conflict between schools of thought is as much scientific as political,IMO.It's between the side that sees WW2 in black and white and the side that sees a lot of grey.The more we're distancing from that age,the more grey we're going to see.Take how the Romans viewed the Punic wars and particularly Hannibal.From scaring babies to a mixed view around Augustus to being a hero around Severus' time.

[zraver]

Z,since the saying about the pot and the kettle could apply to me,I won't comment on clackers religious beliefs :)

Glantz has many merits,but he answers the wrong question and he commits a logical fallacy.The question is not whether the Soviet could win in 1941,but whether they could have attacked.I also believe the first Soviet attack would have been a failure,but regardless of that the soviets would have been in a much better strategic position,thus able to win the war long before the Allies can land in Europe.Say,late 42-mid 43,but that's my speculation.

The thing with this conflict between schools of thought is as much scientific as political,IMO.It's between the side that sees WW2 in black and white and the side that sees a lot of grey.The more we're distancing from that age,the more grey we're going to see.Take how the Romans viewed the Punic wars and particularly Hannibal.From scaring babies to a mixed view around Augustus to being a hero around Severus' time.

Glantz makes more than a single logical fallacy. His writings are full of errors, half truths, and outright lies. If historians had professional standards like lawyers he would be disbarred.

[Mihais]

Yep,he failed the ''Stalingrad test''.That's my personal test on any paper concerning Ostfront.But I still regard his work valuable in many regards.

Now,what did you found wrong about him?

[Doktor]

Glantz makes more than a single logical fallacy. His writings are full of errors, half truths, and outright lies. If historians had professional standards like lawyers he would be disbarred.

Now you nailed it.

[zraver]

Yep,he failed the ''Stalingrad test''.That's my personal test on any paper concerning Ostfront.But I still regard his work valuable in many regards.

Now,what did you found wrong about him?

1. Attributing specific thoughts, motivations and actions to historical characters without supporting evidence.
2. Accepting Soviet casualty claims but inflating German and other Axis claims
3. Ignoring the impact of Lend Lease on the wars out come through its ability to free up Soviet industry and manpower and cover critical shortages during critical periods.
4. Ignoring evidence of Soviet intentions like the KV-2 and plans to create an airborne army that clearly indicate an aggressive expansionist posture as does the spate of Soviet moves to violate her neighbors after the R-M pact.
5. Generalized Stalinist hero worship and apologia, some one reading about the Soviets in WWII reading only Glantz would not get a picture of Stalin as anything but a national hero.
6. His horrible writing style and lack of editing. His writings on Zitadelle get map directions wrong, misplace units etc.

[1979]

Strongly disagree. They claimed to be peaceful and defensive to the world but lets look at where Soviet R&D and other rubles went.
Built 20,000+ tanks
built 12,000+ air craft
Development of the deep battle concept

BT fast cavalry tanks
T-28 Medium
T-35 heavy
KV-2 seige tanks
Gaz-AA-4M SPAA
122mm M30 Howizter (out ranged all contemporary 105mm)
Katusha rocket system
TB-3 4 engined bomber
DB-2 and Tupolev SB long range medium bombers
Comitern 5th column

but except for the 5th column , that is just hardware , as late as 1939 their armed forces were around 1.8 million ( twice as much as France but with a 3 times larger population base ) , the german Heer stood at 3.7 millions .

some of the weapons systems above were hardly the mainstay of the red army :

the first 639 122 mm howitzers m-30 were produced in 1940 as replacement for guns of 1909 or 1910 period.
the first 40 katiusha launcher were built in 1941 , in 1930's were just prototypes (the german nebelwerfer was mass produced since 1939 )
t-35 tank irc was built in 80-100 pieces ( one heavy brigade )


Gaz-AA-4M SPAA could be considered mainstay but consists of four ww 1 maxim machine guns on the back of commercial truck.
Four engine bomber sounds nice on paper but it was 200 km/h slower than the Italian fiat cr 42 biplane .

The BT and bombers were good weapons for 1930's but nothing exceptional by the 40's.

[zraver]

but except for the 5th column , that is just hardware , as late as 1939 their armed forces were around 1.8 million ( twice as much as France but with a 3 times larger population base ) , the german Heer stood at 3.7 millions .

some of the weapons systems above were hardly the mainstay of the red army :

the first 639 122 mm howitzers m-30 were produced in 1940 as replacement for guns of 1909 or 1910 period.
the first 40 katiusha launcher were built in 1941 , in 1930's were just prototypes (the german nebelwerfer was mass produced since 1939 )
t-35 tank irc was built in 80-100 pieces ( one heavy brigade )


Gaz-AA-4M SPAA could be considered mainstay but consists of four ww 1 maxim machine guns on the back of commercial truck.
Four engine bomber sounds nice on paper but it was 200 km/h slower than the Italian fiat cr 42 biplane .

The BT and bombers were good weapons for 1930's but nothing exceptional by the 40's.

They are more than hardware, they are reflections of Stavkas strategic assumptions, concepts and planning. You don't build tanks designed to assault fortifications unless you plan to assault fortifications. You don't build bombers capable of reaching central Europe unless you want to bomb central Europe etc.

[1979]

They are more than hardware, they are reflections of Stavkas strategic assumptions, concepts and planning. You don't build tanks designed to assault fortifications unless you plan to assault fortifications. You don't build bombers capable of reaching central Europe unless you want to bomb central Europe etc.

but they did not build tanks designed to assault fortifications until they had a meeting with finish bofors and antitank rifles .
bombers without fighter escort is a not a good assumption unless they intend to do night bombing as the British .

[zraver]

but they did not build tanks designed to assault fortifications until they had a meeting with finish bofors and antitank rifles .
bombers without fighter escort is a not a good assumption unless they intend to do night bombing as the British .

Both the T-28 Medium and T-35 heavy tanks were designed to breach fortifications and were designed and produced before the Winter War. The KV series also began development before the exposure to then modern AT rifles.

As for fighters, prior to WWII, no one knew that Douhet was wrong, that the bombers would not get through without an escort.