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  • OoE Reply

    Colonel,

    "...The answer in both 1967 and 1973 is a resounding yes..."

    Sorry, Colonel. Guess I'm just myopic but I sense, as you put it, you are not seeing the forest for the trees. Israel wasn't prepared to forego a pre-emptive strike in 1967 despite America imploring them to restrain from such. Israel, too, had no undue cause for concern of Soviet intervention after the Egyptians had been defeated as they'd attained all they were prepared to seize.

    That didn't include Damascus so they knew there'd be no Soviet intervention.

    Finally, sir, it was an empty threat. You refuse to acknowledge the Soviet inability to follow-through with prudent pre-positioning, adroit right-of-way access for follow-on forces, or valid operational planning measures. Israel clearly knew what the Soviets had done to avail themselves of their threat. While always a cause for concern it in no way restrained Israeli operational and strategic imperatives.

    Those are my conclusions regarding 1967 from the links offered by you.

    1973? Please help me to understand your view there. I'd likely not concur that the Soviet Union pressured America into restraining Israel from utterly destroying the Egyptian 3rd Army. In point of fact, America did so with Kissinger seeing it as an opportunity to gain leverage over the Egyptians at the expense of the Soviet Union. Syria? Don't know. I do know that Israel advanced on Damascus but never attempted to besiege the city. I do know that the Soviets never compelled a full Israeli disengagement from Syria until a treaty effecting such was signed in May 1974.

    Colonel, I can't imagine the Israelis ever willingly eager to fight the Soviets. I can't imagine, however, they not being prepared to do what they must against whomever stood or now stands in their way. Given where they've been to where they are now and the threats still remaining at their throat, Israel remain a people with little to lose when it comes to defending their interests.
    Last edited by S2; 09 Dec 12,, 08:55.
    "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
    "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

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    • Originally posted by S2 View Post
      Israel clearly knew what the Soviets had done to avail themselves of their threat. While always a cause for concern it in no way restrained Israeli operational and strategic imperatives.
      In addition, many Israelis (then and now) have deep connections to Russia and the former Warsaw Pact countries. This Humint reservoir helped Israel to easily distinguish rhetoric and viability.
      sigpic

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      • Steve, let me begin again

        Numbers have mattered to the Israelis in 1967 and 1973, namely they don't want to fight the USSR. I will put forth in even stronger terms. They can't fight the USSR. It was national suicide. Not even Dayan had any illusions about fighting the Soviet bear.

        Whatever the Israeli researchers found out is not applicable to this current discussion. We have no evidence that Tel Avi knew of these prep work or the secret missions of the MiG-25 prototype. What the research do show is an indication that Moscow was willing to fight ... and that was plainly told to Israel.

        What the documentation had shown was that Israel knew exactly where the Soviet Red Lines were and were extremely careful not to even approach it. The cabinet meeting documentation is the evidence of that where cabinet members voted against attacking Syria.

        You are right that Israel will do whatever it can to survive against her enemies ... and in both cases, survival was to avoid war against the USSR. Israel offered terms and accepted the surrender of 3rd Army. It would have been quite different had she gone the Mercy Neither Asked Nor Given route which she could very well have.

        So, yes, the threat of a Soviet front was very, very real ... to the Israelis. They did not want to face one and avoided any way they could. This does not mean that they cowed before Moscow but it does mean she did not give Moscow an excuse to come to rescue her proxies.

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        • Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
          Steve, let me begin again

          Numbers have mattered to the Israelis in 1967 and 1973, namely they don't want to fight the USSR. I will put forth in even stronger terms. They can't fight the USSR. It was national suicide. Not even Dayan had any illusions about fighting the Soviet bear.

          Whatever the Israeli researchers found out is not applicable to this current discussion. We have no evidence that Tel Avi knew of these prep work or the secret missions of the MiG-25 prototype. What the research do show is an indication that Moscow was willing to fight ... and that was plainly told to Israel.

          What the documentation had shown was that Israel knew exactly where the Soviet Red Lines were and were extremely careful not to even approach it. The cabinet meeting documentation is the evidence of that where cabinet members voted against attacking Syria.

          You are right that Israel will do whatever it can to survive against her enemies ... and in both cases, survival was to avoid war against the USSR. Israel offered terms and accepted the surrender of 3rd Army. It would have been quite different had she gone the Mercy Neither Asked Nor Given route which she could very well have.

          So, yes, the threat of a Soviet front was very, very real ... to the Israelis. They did not want to face one and avoided any way they could. This does not mean that they cowed before Moscow but it does mean she did not give Moscow an excuse to come to rescue her proxies.
          During the CW the Soviets had the worlds largest force airborne troops depending on year up to 7 combat divisions. Plus somewhere between a regiment and brigade each of naval infantry and Spetznaz. It would be a hard move, but possible. Going off my mental map the direct for the Soviets is an air bridge from Albania to Syria. Naval support will be limited to the Soviets med squadron plus what ever if any the treaty would have allowed the Soviets to push through the Dardanelles.

          Obviously light troops wont be very effective against tanks. But like Joffre in 1914, all the Syrians needed was one dead Russian infantryman.

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          • Zraver Reply

            "...Going off my mental map the direct for the Soviets is an air bridge from Albania to Syria..."

            No air bridge from Albania, especially by 1973. If Yugoslavia was problematic, at best, then Albania was out. Albania was firmly in the PRC camp. Not Soviet.

            "...Obviously light troops wont be very effective against tanks. But like Joffre in 1914, all the Syrians needed was one dead Russian infantryman..."

            Maybe. I don't know if Soviet personnel died in 1973 but 35 technicians and advisors evidently died in both Syria and Egypt in 1967.
            "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
            "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

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            • OoE Reply

              "...they don't want to fight the USSR..."

              Then we are arguing past one another. This is a given. Israeli strategic calculus during both wars never tangibly threatened Soviet core interests.

              "...I will put forth in even stronger terms. They can't fight the USSR..."

              I won't concur. It would have depended upon where, when, who else and why. If we're discussing a Soviet offensive operation against Israel in 1967 or 1973 then I don't see the Soviets as having conducted the requisite planning and assembly measures in a timely manner to do so. An empty threat also ignoring the presence of the U.S. 6th Fleet. Even a Soviet intervention into Egypt or Syria to prevent Israeli seizure of, for instance, Alexandria, Latakia or even Tartus would have required far more promptness and alacrity than displayed.

              Colonel, you are sold on this possibility. Based upon what I've learned through your links I am not as convinced that the Soviet Union presented a viable conventional force prepared to back up their threats.
              "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
              "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

              Comment


              • Originally posted by S2 View Post
                "...Going off my mental map the direct for the Soviets is an air bridge from Albania to Syria..."

                No air bridge from Albania, especially by 1973. If Yugoslavia was problematic, at best, then Albania was out. Albania was firmly in the PRC camp. Not Soviet.

                "...Obviously light troops wont be very effective against tanks. But like Joffre in 1914, all the Syrians needed was one dead Russian infantryman..."

                Maybe. I don't know if Soviet personnel died in 1973 but 35 technicians and advisors evidently died in both Syria and Egypt in 1967.
                Technicians and pilots are not the same as infantry. Once the infantry starts to die its [historically] time for for.

                BTW, I thought we were talking 67, not 73 since the discussion was secret Foxbat flights. Yugoslavia was a problem but I don't Albania was in the Chinese camp yet.

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                • Zraver Reply

                  "...Once the infantry starts to die its [historically] time for for..."

                  For...more infantry?

                  "...BTW, I thought we were talking 67, not 73 since the discussion was secret Foxbat flights..."

                  I dunno. The Colonel has a problem with my thoughts about Israel and numbers. I took a little exception to his suggestion of a Soviet Front coming down on Israel. He did say this-

                  "...Numbers have mattered to the Israelis in 1967 and 1973, namely they don't want to fight the USSR..."
                  Last edited by S2; 10 Dec 12,, 01:39.
                  "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                  "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by S2 View Post
                    "...Once the infantry starts to die its [historically] time for for..."

                    For...more infantry?
                    Sorry but yes, don't why I clipped that off. Once a nations run of the mill infantry start to die it generally means some sort of war is coming. Don't know why this is, but it seems to hold true across time place.

                    "...BTW, I thought we were talking 67, not 73 since the discussion was secret Foxbat flights..."

                    I dunno. The Colonel has a problem with my thoughts about Israel and numbers. I took a little exception to his suggestion of a Soviet Front coming down on Israel. He did say this-

                    "...Numbers have mattered to the Israelis in 1967 and 1973, namely they don't want to fight the USSR..."
                    In 73 direct Soviet intervention was blocked by as close as you could get to direct US intervention. In 67 its a much different Us posture in the area.

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