Battle of the Atlantic

[JAD_333]

A rather poignant portrait of what it was like to be on shore during the height of U-boat attacks off the east coast.

When World War II Was Fought off North
Carolina’s Beaches...

excerpt:

....The greatest concentration of U-boat attacks happened off North Carolina’s Outer Banks,
where dozens of ships passed daily. So many ships were attacked that, in time, the waters
near Cape Hatteras earned a nickname: “Torpedo Junction.” U.S. military and
government authorities didn’t want people to worry, so news reports of enemy U-boats
near the coast were classified, or held back from the public for national security reasons.
For many years, most people had no idea how bad things really were. But families living
on the Outer Banks knew—they were practically in the war.
“We’d hear these explosions most any time of the
day or night and it would shake the houses and
sometimes crack the walls,” remembered Blanche
Jolliff, of Ocracoke village. Even though ships were
being torpedoed by enemy U-boats almost every
day, just a few miles away, coastal residents had no
choice but to live as normally as possible. “We sort
of got used to hearing it,” Gibb Gray said. “The
explosions were mostly in the distance, so we
weren’t too scared. I remember we were walking to
school one day, and the whole ground shook. We
looked toward the ocean, just beyond the Cape
Hatteras lighthouse, and there was another huge
cloud of smoke. That was the oil tanker, Dixie
Arrow.”

Some Outer Bankers came closer to the war than they would have preferred. Teenager
Charles Stowe, of Hatteras, and his father were headed out to sea aboard their fishing
boat one day when they nearly rammed a U-boat, which was rising to the surface directly...


http://www.ncmuseumofhistory.org/col...7s.Beaches.pdf

[tbm3fan]

I'm going to say that the reaction, or lack thereof, was partly psychological; the US, emotionally and psychologically (in 1942), was not prepared to participate in a "world war" yet. In a lot of people's minds (and this included the military), the European war was still "someone else's war"; it didn't have the immediacy of the Pacific war and Pearl Harbor. Therefore, I don't think a lot of people (again, the military included) had the inclination to devote a lot of resources to the Atlantic, aka "European", war; it wasn't until US assets were DIRECTLY involved (i.e.: ships, personnel, etc.) and got destroyed that the US got serious about the Atlantic war.

So very true. Many thought the real war was way off in the Pacific so it was business as usual along the Eastern Seaboard. Cities, up and down the coast, had lights burning through the nights. A nice silhouette presented to German subs. I have read that when it was suggested to turn off the lights some city fathers and businessmen complained it would be bad for business. Obviously really bad for 5000 merchant seamen.

Sharks in American Waters

[clackers]

As Albany Rifles points out, defeating the U-boats in 1943 was a great coalition effort, but the early cost was higher (perhaps 360 merchant ships for eight subs destroyed) than it should have been.

This second German 'Happy Time' was helped by Ernie King's reluctance to take Royal Navy advice (his previously mentioned Anglophobia was at work) to implement seaboard blackouts and convoying of merchant vessels, or accept a British offer of loaned escorts (converted trawlers).

[Gun Grape]

I'll agree with most of the reason mentioned here. But the Navy didn't need to "Get up to speed" on Convoy escort. They had been doing it since March 41. US Navy provided escorts up to Iceland. The RN took over from there.

The sinking of the Reuben James almost got us into the war in Oct.

[Albany Rifles]

Gunny,

It was not an issue about convoys across the Atlantic. It was a refusal of the Navy to organize effective ASW in coastal waters, convoys along the coasts and blackouts on the Atlantic seaboard....mostly because King was an obstinate SOB and mayors in coastal cities didn't want to go to blackout. Once America pulled or collective heads out of our ass we did what we did throughout the war....rolled up our sleeves and put our minds to the task at hand and figured out how to do the job right.

[Stitch]

Gunny,

It was not an issue about convoys across the Atlantic. It was a refusal of the Navy to organize effective ASW in coastal waters, convoys along the coasts and blackouts on the Atlantic seaboard....mostly because King was an obstinate SOB and mayors in coastal cities didn't want to go to blackout. Once America pulled or collective heads out of our ass we did what we did throughout the war....rolled up our sleeves and put our minds to the task at hand and figured out how to do the job right.

I will refer to my earlier post (#15); so much of what a country does or does not do has to do with the psychology of the situation; is it an immanent threat? No? Okay, don't worry about it, carry on . . . . What? Ships are getting sunk off the East coast? Ours? No, British ships; okay, don't worry about it.

In 1942, we were still avoiding the obvious, hoping that the War just off our coast would "go away"; Americans are very good at "avoiding the obvious" until it's too late.

[Chogy]

so much of what a country does or does not do has to do with the psychology of the situation; is it an immanent threat? No? Okay, don't worry about it, carry on

I see echoes of this in the WOT. "Pesky terrorists. They annoy, but nothing too horrific, carry on, business as usual." Then comes 9-11, and finally, decisive action is taken.

[astralis]

I see echoes of this in the WOT. "Pesky terrorists. They annoy, but nothing too horrific, carry on, business as usual." Then comes 9-11, and finally, decisive action is taken.

democracies tend to have a bad tendency to get lulled-- and then when the Big Bad happens, go to extremes.

[zraver]

If you subtract mine barrages from the the British totals for 1940 (not really an option the US had) the British score for their full first year of war is 15 and a shared kill with the French. The US turns in 18 so overall US performance for a new belligerent is on par with British efforts.

[clackers]

The US turns in 18 so overall US performance for a new belligerent is on par with British efforts.

But I think the British efforts were so poor at the start, that it's a pretty lousy baseline.

Prewar, there hadn't been a U-boat threat to the RN at all before 1937, and the perception (shared by the Germans) that submarines had been underachievers in the Great War, combined to result in the short-range corvette being the only convoy escort in service (frigates were only designed in 1940).

Additionally, unlike the First World War, the Germans now had Atlantic bases in France to operate from, but of the three British naval air groups, two were stationed for use in the North Sea.

So the RN and RAF Coastal Command was initially so badly prepared for the ASW role that not one U-boat was lost between 1 December 1940 and 28 February 1941. In the whole period between July 1940 and May 1941, just sixteen boats were sunk, including two probably due to stray mines and another in an accident in the Elbe.

[zraver]

But I think the British efforts were so poor at the start, that it's a pretty lousy baseline.

But an accurate one

Prewar, there hadn't been a U-boat threat to the RN at all before 1937, and the perception (shared by the Germans) that submarines had been underachievers in the Great War, combined to result in the short-range corvette being the only convoy escort in service (frigates were only designed in 1940).

Sinking over 800,000gwt of shipping in a single month is under achieving? Adm beatty saying it was a race to see who starved who first... Come on dude...

Additionally, unlike the First World War, the Germans now had Atlantic bases in France to operate from, but of the three British naval air groups, two were stationed for use in the North Sea.

And from March 41 the area they had to patrol to the America's got cut in half. This after getting Iceland in may and 50 destroyers from the US in Sep 1940

So the RN and RAF Coastal Command was initially so badly prepared for the ASW role that not one U-boat was lost between 1 December 1940 and 28 February 1941. In the whole period between July 1940 and May 1941, just sixteen boats were sunk, including two probably due to stray mines and another in an accident in the Elbe.

So Why expect the Americans to do better, the highly trained cadres have been split up to crew an increasing navy, they have less experience to draw on in ASW work and what they do have is mal-training. Positioning yourself between a wolf pack and a fat target and hunting u-boats are not the same thing.

[1979]

Positioning yourself between a wolf pack and a fat target and hunting u-boats are not the same thing.

I think there is point there .
Submarines have passive sonar too, so they should be able to hear the destroyer escorts from miles away. The later needs to keep moving ( generating noise in the process ) to find the submarine.

so my question is :
besides " Positioning yourself between a wolf pack and a fat target " how do you do it ?

[zraver]

I think there is point there .
Submarines have passive sonar too, so they should be able to hear the destroyer escorts from miles away. The later needs to keep moving ( generating noise in the process ) to find the submarine.

so my question is :
besides " Positioning yourself between a wolf pack and a fat target " how do you do it ?

In pairs, and once a submarine is submerged if he is being actively hunted all she can hear are the pings lashing her as the escorts close in. Well until the depth cahrges set off and beat the snot out of the hull and the crews ear drums.

[1979]

The pings like radar, are detected at twice the range the attacker gets returns.
the hunted gets a bearing on the destroyers long before the later even knows it's there.

[Shamus]

Poor command structure, Kings dislike of anything 'British' and refusal to listen to any of their lessons, and poor planning in not prioritizing building anti submarine assets. Apart from eventually convoying and daylight sailings, did the US ever develop effective protection?
It seems to me more like the RCN and RNA took on the job and ended the threat, and that the US never really developed an effective force.

Hit it right on the head here mate........King's ego prevented him from accepting the RN's help in any way shape or form costing us casulties that need not have happened.The USN developed effective anti-sub tactics by finally swallowing that God-awful "Not made here" attitude and listening to their RN counterparts,finally coming to grips with the fact that their defense of the US Atlantic coastal shipping routes had been pathetic at best.The USN,RCN and the RN finally tipped the scales in late '43.....the Happy Time was
over for good.
Operation Drumbeat is definitely a great read.
By the way.....Hello mates,rumours of my death were highly exaggerated..... and I have to say this......Yellow,you are still as pretty as ever ;)