A Special Note on Compliance
JAD_333, et al,
References:
(PREFACE)
In March of 2010, four month before the (now dated) DOS Report (Ref "a"), the G-8 indicated that their primary concern was the "bomb" and Iran obtaining it. The US SECSTATE predicted then that new sanctions would be employed.
(COMMENT)
There is very often the focus on Paragraphs 43 and 44, Section G Possible Military Dimension, of the IAEA Report dated 8 Nov 2011 (Ref "c"); now revised somewhat by the report dated 24 FEB 2012 (last month).
There is a reference to "Dual Use" which is neither in violation of the NPT or the Additional Protocols.
It also refers to the Iranian Enrichment upgrade to above 20%. But while this is technically HEU, it is no where near what is necessary for a weapons system and has civilian applications. I've discussed this in detail. You will notice that sometime the IAEA refer to the 20% as LEU (Ref "d," supra).
There is also what I call the Scavenger Hunt (IRGC-QF and MOIS) that I discussed in another thread. It is suspicious, but not unusual for intelligence activities. What makes it a concern is that it appears to be the equivalent of what the US would call: A Priority Collection Requirement.
Bullet #4 I've discussed this. It is the only bullet point really worth mentioning. This refers to the computer modeling, implosion simulations and the R&D into the detonation devices. CLEARLY, this is suspicious activity. But it is in the R&D realm. It bares further evaluation and explanation.
Paragraph 44, actually is a amplification of Bullet #4 in Paragraph 43. Obviously, the modeling of a implosion type detonation devices sounds ominously like a military application; without a civilian application.
(THE THREAT)
Probably the best threat synopsis that I've seen, that approaches the topic in a un-inflamed and less sensationalized manner is the one by Dr Ford. A Nuclear-Armed Iran in the Future Security Environment « New Paradigms Forum
Dr Ford doesn't simplify it enough, in my opinion, but he covers all the wolf calls that are generally made relative to a Nuclear Iran.
Most Respectfully,
R
JAD_333, et al,
References:
- a. July 2010 Prepared by the U.S. Department of State: ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/145181.pdf
- b. 24 May 2011, Report by the Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran
http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/i..._24May2011.pdf
- c. 8 NOV 2011, Report by the Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Doc...gov2011-65.pdf - d. 24 FEB 2012, Report by the Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Doc.../gov2012-9.pdf
(PREFACE)
In March of 2010, four month before the (now dated) DOS Report (Ref "a"), the G-8 indicated that their primary concern was the "bomb" and Iran obtaining it. The US SECSTATE predicted then that new sanctions would be employed.
(COMMENT)
There is very often the focus on Paragraphs 43 and 44, Section G Possible Military Dimension, of the IAEA Report dated 8 Nov 2011 (Ref "c"); now revised somewhat by the report dated 24 FEB 2012 (last month).
Originally posted by Section G
It also refers to the Iranian Enrichment upgrade to above 20%. But while this is technically HEU, it is no where near what is necessary for a weapons system and has civilian applications. I've discussed this in detail. You will notice that sometime the IAEA refer to the 20% as LEU (Ref "d," supra).
There is also what I call the Scavenger Hunt (IRGC-QF and MOIS) that I discussed in another thread. It is suspicious, but not unusual for intelligence activities. What makes it a concern is that it appears to be the equivalent of what the US would call: A Priority Collection Requirement.
Bullet #4 I've discussed this. It is the only bullet point really worth mentioning. This refers to the computer modeling, implosion simulations and the R&D into the detonation devices. CLEARLY, this is suspicious activity. But it is in the R&D realm. It bares further evaluation and explanation.
Paragraph 44, actually is a amplification of Bullet #4 in Paragraph 43. Obviously, the modeling of a implosion type detonation devices sounds ominously like a military application; without a civilian application.
(THE THREAT)
Probably the best threat synopsis that I've seen, that approaches the topic in a un-inflamed and less sensationalized manner is the one by Dr Ford. A Nuclear-Armed Iran in the Future Security Environment « New Paradigms Forum
Dr Ford doesn't simplify it enough, in my opinion, but he covers all the wolf calls that are generally made relative to a Nuclear Iran.
Most Respectfully,
R
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