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  • A Special Note on Compliance

    JAD_333, et al,

    References:



    (PREFACE)

    In March of 2010, four month before the (now dated) DOS Report (Ref "a"), the G-8 indicated that their primary concern was the "bomb" and Iran obtaining it. The US SECSTATE predicted then that new sanctions would be employed.

    (COMMENT)

    There is very often the focus on Paragraphs 43 and 44, Section G Possible Military Dimension, of the IAEA Report dated 8 Nov 2011 (Ref "c"); now revised somewhat by the report dated 24 FEB 2012 (last month).


    Originally posted by Section G
    43. The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device:
    • Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and materials by military related individuals and entities (Annex, Sections C.1 and C.2);
    • Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material (Annex, Section C.3);
    • The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network (Annex, Section C.4); and
    • Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components (Annex, Sections C.5–C.12).
    44. While some of the activities identified in the Annex have civilian as well as military applications,
    others are specific to nuclear weapons.
    There is a reference to "Dual Use" which is neither in violation of the NPT or the Additional Protocols.

    It also refers to the Iranian Enrichment upgrade to above 20%. But while this is technically HEU, it is no where near what is necessary for a weapons system and has civilian applications. I've discussed this in detail. You will notice that sometime the IAEA refer to the 20% as LEU (Ref "d," supra).

    There is also what I call the Scavenger Hunt (IRGC-QF and MOIS) that I discussed in another thread. It is suspicious, but not unusual for intelligence activities. What makes it a concern is that it appears to be the equivalent of what the US would call: A Priority Collection Requirement.

    Bullet #4 I've discussed this. It is the only bullet point really worth mentioning. This refers to the computer modeling, implosion simulations and the R&D into the detonation devices. CLEARLY, this is suspicious activity. But it is in the R&D realm. It bares further evaluation and explanation.

    Paragraph 44, actually is a amplification of Bullet #4 in Paragraph 43. Obviously, the modeling of a implosion type detonation devices sounds ominously like a military application; without a civilian application.

    (THE THREAT)

    Probably the best threat synopsis that I've seen, that approaches the topic in a un-inflamed and less sensationalized manner is the one by Dr Ford. A Nuclear-Armed Iran in the Future Security Environment « New Paradigms Forum

    Dr Ford doesn't simplify it enough, in my opinion, but he covers all the wolf calls that are generally made relative to a Nuclear Iran.

    Most Respectfully,
    R

    Comment


    • Originally posted by JAD_333 View Post
      With respect to the nuclear question, Iran is not in violation for refining uranium, which is its right under the NPT, but for violations of monitoring and reporting provisions. Iran has violated those provisions in the past by not disclosing enrichment facilities (Qom), breaking seals, and restricting inspection activity. Why? Why hide what you are doing if you claim its legal and for peaceful purposes.
      The reality is the US has obstructed Iran's attempts to acquire ENR as early as '83. Whatever enrichment Iran has was cobbled together from before the revolution and whatever they could get on the black market post revolution. Iran became secretive because any public attempts by Iran to acquire ENR were actively blocked. This secret behaviour forms the root of suspicion that then gets applied in different areas and inevitably grows.

      The deal open to Iran presently is a fuel swap. Give up enrichment in exchange for fuel. No domestic fuel. no possibility of enrichment to wep grade. no bomb. But this leaves Iran's energy security subject to international whims so they won't accept it. Despite the NPT allowing Iran to enrich, the US does not trust Iran with it and has not for a long time. The politics between the two countries is the primary reason. It thoroughly queers perceptions.

      About hidden activity & Qom ie Fordow, had posted a link earlier in the thread that said given Iran did not ratify the additional protocols of the NPT, they are not obliged to inform the IAEA about any plants until 6 months after the plant is in operation. The link explained that Frodow wasn't as hidden as made out in the media. The plans etc were made availaible to the concerned authorities at the time. Fordow went online in Jan, i expect inspectors to get access by June. Same applies to any plant that's in planning or about to open in the future. That link was enough to give me pause about the statements that are frequently made about compliance or alleged violations. There are a lot of details in here which get lost in the MSM.

      Still there are quirks here & there which muddy the water like why build Fordow under a mountain when Natanz is not and has ten times the capacity.

      Meanwhile in the background lurks the very real possibility that if Iran can enrich to 20%, then its also possible to enrich to weapons grade. So you can constuct any negative scenario from that and its very diffcult to refute. Proving a negative always was.

      Was reading another book from a think tank here about Iran and it said..

      The point to bear in mind, however, is that the hostility between Islamic Iran and Jewish Israel is due to strategic and not ideological reasons. Israel sees any large and strong country in the region a serious threat to its security, except those like Egypt and Turkey who are enmeshed in the web of security interests of the West. A strong Iran, even without nuclear weapons, comes in the way of Israel’s policies in the region.
      What difference does it make if the hostility is due to strategic reasons rather than idealogical ?

      For me it means that Israel isn't as implacable a foe to Iran than had the hostility been idealogical.

      Comment


      • Originally posted by RoccoR View Post

        Probably the best threat synopsis that I've seen, that approaches the topic in a un-inflamed and less sensationalized manner is the one by Dr Ford. A Nuclear-Armed Iran in the Future Security Environment « New Paradigms Forum.
        Rocco, thanks for the link.

        Dr Ford does a masterful job of explaining the potential complications and implications of a nuke-armed Iran will be for the ME, the major powers and the NPT. One comes away after reading it understanding why the situation is far more complex and dangerous than most people realize and that the outcome could reshape the world. Must read for commentators.
        Last edited by JAD_333; 26 Mar 12,, 01:53.
        To be Truly ignorant, Man requires an Education - Plato

        Comment


        • Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
          The reality is the US has obstructed Iran's attempts to acquire ENR as early as '83. Whatever enrichment Iran has was cobbled together from before the revolution and whatever they could get on the black market post revolution. Iran became secretive because any public attempts by Iran to acquire ENR were actively blocked. This secret behaviour forms the root of suspicion that then gets applied in different areas and inevitably grows.

          The deal open to Iran presently is a fuel swap. Give up enrichment in exchange for fuel. No domestic fuel. no possibility of enrichment to wep grade. no bomb. But this leaves Iran's energy security subject to international whims so they won't accept it. Despite the NPT allowing Iran to enrich, the US does not trust Iran with it and has not for a long time. The politics between the two countries is the primary reason. It thoroughly queers perceptions.

          About hidden activity & Qom ie Fordow, had posted a link earlier in the thread that said given Iran did not ratify the additional protocols of the NPT, they are not obliged to inform the IAEA about any plants until 6 months after the plant is in operation. The link explained that Frodow wasn't as hidden as made out in the media. The plans etc were made availaible to the concerned authorities at the time. Fordow went online in Jan, i expect inspectors to get access by June. Same applies to any plant that's in planning or about to open in the future. That link was enough to give me pause about the statements that are frequently made about compliance or alleged violations. There are a lot of details in here which get lost in the MSM.

          Still there are quirks here & there which muddy the water like why build Fordow under a mountain when Natanz is not and has ten times the capacity.

          Meanwhile in the background lurks the very real possibility that if Iran can enrich to 20%, then its also possible to enrich to weapons grade. So you can constuct any negative scenario from that and its very diffcult to refute. Proving a negative always was.

          Was reading another book from a think tank here about Iran and it said..
          Points all well taken, but largely moot. The key point is that Iran had a
          secret nuclear weapons program up until 2003. That establishes their intent.

          The question now is whether that stoppage was permanent or merely playing it safe. In 2003, they, like other ME countries with nuclear ambitions at the time, saw what happened to Iraq for having WMD programs, and didn't want to be in the crosshairs of a US attack. Lybia threw its program out the window with much fanfare. Iran did not. But it did allow a few scientists to grouse openly on the telephone about the program being stopped, and it must have been dismayed that US intelligence took 4 more years to figure it out.

          The proof of Iran's intentions are in the pudding. It's regional ambitions cannot be fully realized without immunity from attack and regime change. They believe that possession of nuclear weapons will give them that immunity. But let's suppose that is not their intent. Then why their failure to take advantage of the countless opportunities they have had to resolve the issue through diplomacy; why their haphazard compliance with the IAEA inspection regime; and finally why their willingness to risk war over an issue that could be easily resolved?

          It all points to one conclusion: Iran is intent on building a nuclear arsenal.

          This is the cue for the chorus that prefers to let Iran have its nukes rather than go to war to stop them. It's an option, but one few nations embrace given the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran. We're in diplomatic/sanction mode right now; so, you don't hear many nation's openly supporting war as a last resort, other than Israel, the US and a few of the Gulf states. But this could well change when the die is cast.



          What difference does it make if the hostility is due to strategic reasons rather than idealogical ?

          For me it means that Israel isn't as implacable a foe to Iran than had the hostility been idealogical.
          It's a matter of degree. Iran rails at the Zionists, not the Jews. But the message is clear: Israel must be dealt with.
          To be Truly ignorant, Man requires an Education - Plato

          Comment


          • Originally posted by JAD_333 View Post
            Points all well taken, but largely moot. The key point is that Iran had a
            secret nuclear weapons program up until 2003. That establishes their intent.
            Intent for what ?

            Research the subject or produce weapons

            The answer to that question lies in the nature of their accomplishments upto 2003.

            People say by the time Iran develops a bomb it will be too late so at what point does research turn into actual intent to produce weapons. Is there a way to tell. So for the last thirty years the overriding goal has been to interfere in efforts to enrich domestically. No fuel, no bomb.

            Originally posted by JAD_333 View Post
            The question now is whether that stoppage was permanent or merely playing it safe.
            An inability to distinguish on the part of the US would still lead to a negative outcome for iran so it was safer to stop.

            Originally posted by JAD_333 View Post
            The proof of Iran's intentions are in the pudding. It's regional ambitions cannot be fully realized without immunity from attack and regime change. They believe that possession of nuclear weapons will give them that immunity. But let's suppose that is not their intent. Then why their failure to take advantage of the countless opportunities they have had to resolve the issue through diplomacy; why their haphazard compliance with the IAEA inspection regime; and finally why their willingness to risk war over an issue that could be easily resolved?
            I cannot answer this one without knowing all the instances where Iran is said to have failed to comply. My guess is because whatever's been on the table upto now will not offer any future energy security.

            Originally posted by JAD_333 View Post
            It all points to one conclusion: Iran is intent on building a nuclear arsenal.
            How about pride and trying not to be pushed around.

            Originally posted by JAD_333 View Post
            This is the cue for the chorus that prefers to let Iran have its nukes rather than go to war to stop them. It's an option, but one few nations embrace given the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran. We're in diplomatic/sanction mode right now; so, you don't hear many nation's openly supporting war as a last resort, other than Israel, the US and a few of the Gulf states. But this could well change when the die is cast.
            This is the dilemma

            its not possible or at least i've not seen as yet a valid way in which to demonstrate that Iran has no intent to develop nukes.

            Rocco's 'nukes as a bargaining chip' idea carries with it the inherent implication that there is no intent but that theory has not been developed sufficiently yet.

            Originally posted by JAD_333 View Post
            It's a matter of degree. Iran rails at the Zionists, not the Jews. But the message is clear: Israel must be dealt with.
            Would it go any way to countering this statement by Pari


            Originally posted by Parihaka View Post
            My personal opinion is that their strategy is altogether more facile. They will burn all their capabilities, potential and assets of their people and nation simply to weaken and attack Israel. Israel is an affront to their religion, it's 'occupation' of their holy places an insult. The core of the theocratic rulers is their religion. They have structured every part of their nation to reflect this, and their ideological obsession means every other consideration is viewed through this lense. There can be no other rational explanation for their consistent, long term behavior.
            Pari's got netanyahu down to a t here.

            When i think of idealogical i'm thinking

            US vs USSR
            Shia vs Sunni

            Victory is the end goal and failure to accomplish such entails defeat.

            Strategic would be

            US vs China
            US vs Russia

            Not as zero sum as with idealogical. No dominos here.
            Last edited by Double Edge; 30 Mar 12,, 23:09.

            Comment

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