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  • bye bye armored divisions.

    This is one of the development professional folks are following and totally off the media radar screen. In one stoke, the PLA downsized all its armored divisions into two -- an armored brigade and an infantry brigade.
    The reform also covered the Praetorian Guard of the 6th Armor, 38th Group Army, Beijing MR.

    S= Armor division U = Brigade.

    Z1S to 195U
    Z2S to 35U
    Z3S to 202U
    Z4S to 67U
    Z6S to 151U
    Z8S to 78U
    Z10U to 178U
    Z11U to 160U
    Z12S to 62U
    “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

  • #2
    Is this a move that aims at phasing out their older armor and achieve "Quality over quantity"?

    Comment


    • #3
      the brigades probably retain all the tanks the division got, even if only in storage ?
      J'ai en marre.

      Comment


      • #4
        ace16807

        The China Army (the term PLA is being phased out also) is moving away from fire-powered based doctrine to that of a maneuver one at a extremely slow and painful speed. no, it is not a "Quality over quantity" move per se as the existing 3000 odd Type59 MBT are still in services. They want more organic armor at battalion and company level, instead the current regimental level. It is about spreading the love, so to speak. They are dropping towed arty in favorite of the SP-ed.

        1979

        There won't be any tanks in storage. At the current production rate of 400 MBT / year, it will a long time before all the battalions are equipped with the third generation of AFV (T34 85 Gen 1) (type 59, 69, 79 gen 2) (Type 96, MBT2000, Type99 gen3)
        Last edited by xinhui; 21 Dec 11,, 00:04.
        “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by xinhui View Post
          ace16807

          The China Army (the term PLA is being phased out also) is moving away from fire-powered based doctrine to that of a maneuver one at a extremely slow and painful speed. no, it is not a "Quality over quantity" move per se as the existing 3000 odd Type59 MBT are still in services. They want more organic armor at battalion and company level, instead the current regimental level. It is about spreading the love, so to speak. They are dropping towed arty in favorite of the SP-ed.

          1979

          There won't be any tanks in storage. At the current production rate of 400 MBT / year, it will a long time before all the battalions are equipped with the third generation of AFV (T34 85 Gen 1) (type 59, 69, 79 gen 2) (Type 96, MBT2000, Type99 gen3)
          What's the reasoning behind phasing out "PLA"? Does it have something to do with the term "liberation" and it perhaps being interpreted as being aggressive? Also, where/when did they announce this reform?

          Comment


          • #6
            Words Have Meaning: Chinese Nation, Chinese Army and no more PLA

            China welcomes Taiwan president's peace proposal
            ReutersBy Ben Blanchard and Sally Huang | Reuters – Wed, Oct 26, 2011

            China welcomes Taiwan president's peace proposal - Yahoo! News


            BEIJING (Reuters) - China on Wednesday welcomed a proposal by Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou to consider a peace treaty with its long-time rival, but warned Taiwan's China-skeptical opposition not to whip the matter up to make political capital.

            China and Taiwan have been ruled separately since 1949 when the Nationalists retreated to the island after losing control of the mainland to the communists in the civil war.

            China has never renounced the use of force to regain control of Taiwan, though Taiwan unilaterally announced the end of hostilities in 1991.

            "Ending the state of hostility between the two sides and reaching a peace agreement accords with the overall interests of the Chinese nation and is the common wish of compatriots on both sides of the Strait," Yang Yi, spokesman for China's Taiwan Affairs Office, told reporters.

            "This is a position we have upheld for many years and is the natural outcome of the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations."

            "Chinese nation" is a term used by China that refers to the people who live on both sides of the Taiwan Strait in line with its "one China" policy.

            Ma set off a controversy last week when he suggested a peace treaty with China could be signed in 10 years, drawing expressions of disquiet from his own party and charges from the opposition that he was jeopardizing Taiwan's security.

            Following the criticism, he later said that any deal would be preceded by a referendum to gauge public opinion, a comment that risked upsetting Beijing, for whom referendums in Taiwan on political matters are anathema.

            After Ma's comments, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) submitted a parliamentary proposal to change the island's referendum law to require all political talks with China to be submitted to a referendum.

            However the ruling Nationalists, with their big majority in the parliament's procedural committee, voted against adding the proposal to the parliament agenda, effectively blocking it.

            China spokesman Yang said all "important matters" which involved relations between the two sides should "consider the wishes" of both peoples. But he implied the DPP was playing games.

            "Political consultations are something ... for the future when conditions are right, and no political force ought to be allowed to use this as an opportunity to whip things up and seek political gain," he added.

            China has stepped up is rhetoric against the DPP in the past few weeks, despite the DPP's softening of its pro-independence stance which has angered Beijing in the past.

            Ma is facing a tight battle for re-election in January presidential polls and is campaigning on the success of his policy of engaging China economically, which he says has kept the peace between the one-time Cold War foes.

            The opposition says the policy is allowing China too much influence over Taiwan and is a first step toward reunification.

            (Reporting by Ben Blanchard and Sally Huang; Additional reporting by Jonathan Standing in Taipei; Editing by Nick Macfie)
            Attached Files
            “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

            Comment


            • #7
              ace16807

              Nothing official, but the word "libation" is no longer in any unit badges.
              Attached Files
              “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

              Comment


              • #8
                Originally posted by xinhui View Post
                1979

                There won't be any tanks in storage. At the current production rate of 400 MBT / year, it will a long time before all the battalions are equipped with the third generation of AFV (T34 85 Gen 1) (type 59, 69, 79 gen 2) (Type 96, MBT2000, Type99 gen3)
                how many tanks in a division and how many in a brigade ?
                for the former WP it was something like 300 div vs 150 bde.
                J'ai en marre.

                Comment


                • #9
                  300 is a good number and keep this in mind -- unlike the Soviet Tank Division, the PLA armored division has no infantry regiment in them. In the old PLA doctrine, they operate in a regiment basis with commands from Corp HQ. now they are getting organic infantry support as brigade.


                  something I write a while back.


                  A Brief History of the PLA 2nd Armor Division
                  By Xinhui



                  The 2nd Armor Division, 12th Group Army, Nanjing MR is one of the PLA’s elite divisions deployed across the Taiwan Strait. This essay outlines the humble beginning of the Division, important events, and details the frequent of order-of-battle (orbat) changes experienced by the Division. The structural evolution of the 2nd Armored Division can be seen as a microcosm of what the entire PLA has gone though from an army of nothing to what it is today.


                  Chinese Civil War Period:

                  2nd Armor Division’s linage can be traced back to March 3rd, 1947 when 30 students of the East-China Military Academy’s artillery training daidu (large group) were transferred to the Dongjiang Column (a PLA “Column” was an equivalent to an under-strength early WWII infantry division) to field 6 captured KMT tanks in two platoons under the direct command of the East-China Field Army’s HQ. It was giving the title of Special Tactical Detachment with Captain Wang Chongguo as the commander.

                  In March 1948, it was temporarily attached to the Jiaodong Military Region’s Artillery Regiment and saw its first action during the epic Huai Hai Campaign. By October 21st, 1948, it was returned back to East-China Field Army’s HQ as a Special Operation Detachment with an enlarged orbat of two zhongdu (mid-sized group) and one reconnaissance platoon with a grand total of 21 operational tanks. After the campaign 200 captured and subsequently defected KMT tank crewmen facilitated another enlargement of the formation. The Detachment was enlarged to become the East-China Armored Vehicle Regiment on March 15th, 1949 in the strategically important region of Xuzhou. The unit’s orbat consisted of two Vehicle Battalions with a total of six companies. 30 US M-3A tanks, ten IJA Type 97 tanks, 24 armored cars, and 87 automobiles of various types along with 1460 personnel made up the formation. During this period Tank Number 102, a captured IJA Type 97, was awarded the honorary title of “Zhu De” for its combat performance. It is currently on display at the Military Museum in Beijing.

                  East-China Armored Vehicle Regiment entered Nanjing on April 23rd, and Shanghai on May 1949 with rest of the East-China Field Army in pursuit of the retiring KMT forces. It was renamed as 1st Armored Vehicle Regiment on July 1st, 1949 and incorporated a new Amphibious Tank Battalion of captured US LVT Buffalos. Sha Feng, former deputy commander of the 62nd Division, served as its new commander and Wang Shiren as its Political Commissar.

                  On November 17th 1949, the formation added the 2nd Instructor (Training) Regiment of the 24th Army to became a full division of three regiments. They were: 1st Armored Vehicle Regiment (3 Battalions), Amphibious Tank Regiment (with 1000 personnel transferred from the 24th and 33rd Infantry Division), and a New Armor Regiment (two battalions) consisting of a grand total of 149 tanks, 95 miscellaneous armored vehicles, and 162 automobiles. Xiao Feng became its commander with Liang Chengmei as its Political Commissar.

                  The formation was renamed the PLA 2nd Armored Vehicle Division on January 3rd, 1950. Subsequently, the 1st Armored Vehicle regiment was renamed to 4th Regiment, Amphibious Tank Regiment renamed to 5th Regiment and the Armor Regiment to 6th Regiment. The 6th Regiment also took on an additional 90 LVT buffalos.

                  On November 3rd 1950 the formation was renamed once again to be the PLA 2nd Tank Division with injections of the 268th Regiment, 306th Regiment, two military police companies from Nanjing garrison HQ, 4th Battalion of 1st Nanjing Instructor (Training) Regiment, one special operations detachment, and two other additional companies. Its 4th Regiment was transferred out of 2nd Tank Division to serve as a basis for the newly created 2nd Tank Brigade.


                  2nd Tank Division, November 1950:

                  Division HQ (Commander Xiao Feng, Political Commissioner Wang Shiren)


                  - Recon Battalion.
                  - Engineering Battalion
                  - AAA Battalion
                  - Transport Battalion
                  - Medical Battalion
                  - Communication Company
                  - Military Police Company
                  - Repair and Maintenance Depot
                  - Field Hospital

                  3rd Tank Regiment

                  4th Tank Regiment

                  Motorized Infantry Regiment (former 258th Regiment)

                  Mobile Artillery Regiment (former 306th Regiment)



                  Korean War Period:

                  On November 11th, 1950, two Soviet Tank Regiments; one from the Ukraine Security Guards and the other from the Moscow Guards arrived in Xuzhou and transferred their equipment to the 2nd Tank Division en masse. Both the 3rd and 4th Tank Regiments received 30 T-34 tanks, six IS-2 heavy tanks, four ISU 122mm self-propelled guns, and two T-34 armored recovery variants each. The Mobile Artillery Regiment received one battalion of twelve ISU-122 and two battalions of twelve 76.2mm field guns and soon they were dispatched to the Korean War. Much as had been the pattern during the Chinese Civil War, in Korea the 2nd Tank Division was not employed as a whole unit, but rather split out to serve as infantry support units performing fire support tasks.


                  2nd Tank Division’s 3rd Tank Regiment, AAA Regiment, and Engineering Regiment entered Korea on May 30th, 1951 and saw action by June as a support element of the 39th and 43rd Army. They claimed two tank kills and one damaged in 18 engagements but were almost wiped out by UN forces at the same time. The 3rd Tank regiment left Korea on July 20th 1952 and returned back to Xuzhou on August 1st. The following year the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Company of the 3rd Tank Regiment took part in the 1953 National Day Parade in Tiananmen Square.

                  The 4th Tank Regiment arrived in Korea on June 27th 1952 as a replacement for the 3rd and had a better combat performance while supporting the 23rd and 38th Army. As an example, in eight engagements Tank Number 215, a T-34, claimed five tank kills and one damaged. In addition, it was credited with 26 bunkers, nine artillery pieces and one truck destroyed. As a result, Tank 215 was honored as a “People’s Heroic Tank” in July 1952 and is currently in display at the PLA’s Armor Engineering College in Beijing.

                  Both the Motorized Infantry Regiment and Mobile Artillery Regiment were deployed to Korea on Feb 15th, 1953, and served as mobile defense units to guard against a possible UN amphibious or airborne operation into China’s supply route into Korea and saw no action. On May 1953, they were ordered to the front to support the 23rd and 24th Army during the Battle of Seoul. The AAA Regiment returned back to Xuzhou on May 19th 1954, and the Mobile Artillery Regiment on December 9th 1954. On March 30th, 1955, the Motorized Infantry Regiment took on elements of 13 companies from the 12th, 20th, and 57th Army to reconstitute its former strength. It was placed under the command of Jinan Military Region on July 1st, 1955.


                  2nd Tank Division, March 15 1958:

                  Division HQ:

                  AAA Battalion
                  Engineering Battalion
                  Transportation Battalion
                  Communication Battalion
                  Artillery Liaison Platoon
                  Artillery Command Company
                  Military Police Company
                  Repair and Maintenance Battalion

                  3rd / 4th Tank Regiment (minus IS-2 and ISU-122 companies)
                  - T-34 Tank Battalion
                  - T-34 Tank Battalion
                  - T-34 Tank Battalion

                  Mechanized Infantry Regiment (Former Motorized Infantry Regiment)
                  - Motorized Infantry Battalion
                  - Motorized Infantry Battalion
                  - Motorized Infantry Battalion
                  - T-34 Tank Battalion
                  - Tank-crew Training Battalion (T-34)

                  Motorized Artillery Regiment (Former Mobile Artillery Regiment)
                  - 122mm Artillery Battalion
                  - 122mm Artillery Battalion
                  - 122mm Artillery Battalion
                  - Transport Company



                  After the War:

                  In August 1960, all AAA assets were temporary transferred to 29th AAA Division, 6th PLA Air Force Army to boost air defense around Jiangsu area during a period of active air combat with the Republic of China Air Force

                  On July 12th, 1963, 3rd Tank Regiment started to receive 80 domestic Type 59 tanks in four batches. The 4th Tank Regiment received the first of 80 Type 59 tanks on Feb 9th 1964 in two batches.

                  On August 26th, 1963, 2036 personnel of the 2nd Tank Division took part in the Tianjin flood rescue.

                  On September 18th 1967, some members of the 2nd Tank Division were transferred out to form the newly created 8th and 13th Tank Divisions. The open positions were backfilled by the members of the 331st Artllery Regiment, 203rd Division, 68th Army. As the PLA was planning to fight an all out war with the Soviets, elements of experienced units were transferred out to be used as the basis of new units in a rapid military buildup.

                  August 10th, 1969, 3rd Tank, 4th Tank, and the Motorized Artillery Regiment were renamed as 5th, 6th and 7th Tank Regiment. The 7th Tank Regiment received its 80 Type 59 tanks during February 1971 in two batches.

                  February 1976, 1st and 2nd Company of the Tank Battalion, Mechanized Infantry Regiment were transferred out to form the basis of the new Armored Troop and Political Cadre School of the Central Military Commission. At the same time the 3rd Company was reassigned to form the Armor Technical College. Upon the completion of these transfers the Mechanized Infantry Regiment had the following Orbat:


                  Armored Infantry Regiment (Former Mechanized Infantry Regiment) March 1967:

                  - Armored Infantry Battalion
                  - Armored Infantry Battalion
                  - Armored Infantry Battalion
                  - Machine Gun Battalion
                  - 122mm Mortar Company
                  - 85mm Howitzer
                  - Twin 37mm AAA Company
                  - Transport Company
                  - Special Operations Company
                  - Repair and Maintenance Company
                  - Medical Du
                  - Training Rotation Du


                  The 2nd Tank Division was transferred from Jinan MR to Nanjing MR on October 1st, 1978 and dispatched 110 officers and 1579 troops to the 1979 Sino-Vietnam war. It was transferred to 12th Group Army on August 1st, 1986 as part of a one-million troop decommission reform ordered by Deng Xiaoping.

                  Like other PLA units, its history was tainted by the Tiananmen Massacre of June 4th 1989; 76 personnel from 2nd Company, Recon Battalion and Communication Battalion were airlifted into Beijing and a total of 5300 troops were used in “police” duties in and around the Xuzhou area.

                  The Armored Infantry Regiment was decommissioned on October 1998 as part of the 500,000 force reductions and restructure ordered by Jiang Zemin. Its ranks and equipments were distributed to other surviving regiments. Following this restructuring the formation was renamed from 2nd Tank Division to 2nd Armor Division.

                  As of today, The 2nd Armor Division is equipped with two regiments of Type 59D and one regiment of Type 96 tanks. Some reports indicate Type 59D are being upgraded to Type 96G.
                  “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    "Nothing official, but the word "libation" is no longer in any unit badges."

                    So much for the Peoples Drinking Army...
                    "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                    "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by S2 View Post
                      "Nothing official, but the word "libation" is no longer in any unit badges."

                      So much for the Peoples Drinking Army...
                      Beat me to it... :)

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        People's liquidation army would work also
                        “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Originally posted by xinhui View Post
                          People's liquidation army would work also
                          Yeah, but they might sell themselves short... ;)

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            good, professional folks such as Col Blasko is picking this up.











                            Internet postings speak of downsizing the existing armored divisions to brigades.


                            China in 2012: Shifting Perspectives - Assessing the PLA from the Ground Up
                            Publication: China Brief Volume: 12 Issue: 2
                            January 20, 2012 04:06 PM Age: 54 min
                            By: Dennis J. Blasko

                            CMC Chair and General Secretary Inspecting the PLA

                            In 2012, most analysis of Chinese military developments probably will focus on the senior-level leadership changes expected to take place in the Central Military Commission (CMC) and new military equipment. To be sure, these issues are important, but in order to judge the degree of improvement in People’s Liberation Army (PLA) operational capabilities many other factors need to be assessed. These factors include examination of the PLA’s actual military operations, including the Navy’s continuing anti-piracy and other non-traditional security missions [1]; changes in PLA force structure and efforts to improve the quality of personnel; training, including experiments in command and control; and the state of military-civil integration (junmin ronghe).

                            The non-equipment elements of PLA modernization determine whether the new weapons that are entering the force can be operated, maintained and employed to their maximum effect and deserve greater attention. Unbalanced foreign assessments, focusing mainly on unproven weapons’ potentials, however, can lead to overestimation of PLA capabilities and result in the subsequent misjudgment of Chinese intentions [2]. Similarly, top leadership changes will be scrutinized for their political implications, but tactical and operational leaders have received much less attention despite their immediate impact on unit operational effectiveness.

                            Leadership and Politics of the CMC

                            With all eyes focused on the leadership succession, less attention will be spent on the new uniformed CMC leaders and the cascading effects felt in the four General Departments, services, military regions and lower levels of command. The chemistry among all CMC members and other senior national-level military leaders is important because of the consensus leadership practices that have been practiced since 1979. For the past two decades, the CMC chairman has reflected the collective view the entire CMC and this situation is unlikely to change in the near future (“China’s Assertive Behavior, Part Three: The Role of the Military in Foreign Policy,” China Leadership Monitor, Winter 2012).

                            While the senior leadership sets policy, lower level leaders must work with each other (commanders, political, logistics and armament officers) to interpret and execute that policy in units with whatever equipment and other resources are available. The PLA recognizes it is only halfway through its two-decade “Strategic Project for Talented People” to build an officer and noncommissioned officer corps capable of fighting informationized wars (China’s National Defense in 2004).

                            Important insights into adjustments to the direction of PLA modernization likely will be found in the new CMC chairman’s personal guidance he eventually issues to the troops, even if not this year. Such guidance actually will be the result of CMC consensus and probably will replace or modify Hu Jintao’s “Historic Missions.”

                            An indicator of how much progress the PLA leadership has assessed the force has made over the past decade may be revealed if Hu’s “major contradiction,” also known as “the two incompatibles” (liangge buxiang shiying), is changed in a major way. This assessment, which states, “the current level of our military modernization is incompatible with the requirement of winning local wars under informatized conditions and our military capabilities are incompatible with the requirement of performing the historical mission of our armed forces,” was first issued in January 2006 and has continued to be used as recently as this week (PLA Daily, January 17). Operational PLA commanders and staff officers have written numerous specific assessments of training, personal quality, force structure, logistics and levels of technology that support the CMC’s assessment. In particular, senior PLA generals frequently acknowledge a 20-year gap between PLA weapons and equipment and that of developed countries. This set of Chinese literature probably has received inadequate attention as measure of progress in PLA modernization.

                            New Equipment

                            This technology gap is closing in some areas. In 2012 additional tests for the PLA’s first aircraft carrier, the J-15 carrier-based fighter, J-20 stealth prototype and a variety of increasingly sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missiles, including the DF-21D medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), can be expected. The foreign media will follow many of these tests closely, often taking their cues from information derived from the Chinese Internet and blogosphere. Ironically, some of these tests are conducted by the civilian-led and managed defense industries—though PLA liaison officers are assigned to many civilian defense factories and research facilities.

                            Less visibility might be afforded to the PLA Navy’s third Type 071 Luzhao class landing platform/dock or amphibious transport dock (LPD), which, according to Internet reports, is now in the water but has not been commissioned into the Navy. Two Type 071s are active in the force and each gives the Navy the capability to take a battalion of marines, 15-20 amphibious armored vehicles and multiple landing craft and helicopters on extended voyages beyond China’s territorial waters—its first true “blue water” amphibious capability. The development of this class of ships and potentially other large amphibious transport ships over the next decade will dramatically augment the PLA’s force projection capabilities and its ability to conduct non-traditional security missions outside of the country.

                            Though there is little likelihood the Chinese themselves will discuss their ballistic missile inventory and deployments in public, PLA watchers will want to see if the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) provides any further information about its 2011 judgment that the total number of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) “represents little to no change over the past year” [3]. Based on analysis of the numbers of missiles the DOD reports to Congress from 2002 to 2011 have assessed to be in the PLA, from 2001 to the end of 2007 SRBM force roughly tripled in size (starting at about 350). Since 2008, that number however has leveled off somewhere between 1,000 and 1,200 while the number of launchers has remained constant between 200 and 250. Possibly in a related development, the PLA’s land-attack cruise missile (LACM) force came online in 2008 and has grown to some 200 to 500 missiles with 40 to 55 launchers. Unfortunately, observers made no attempt to investigate the significance behind these numbers provided by the DOD.

                            The PLA leadership might consider the addition of the LACM force to mitigate the need to increase the SRBM force. At the same time, SRBM capabilities have improved as newer, longer range variants replaced older models expended in live fire training. Could the PLA’s long-term development plan have called for building the SRBM force in the first decade of the century and a shift in focus to the development of its LACM and MRBM (all variants) capabilities in the coming decade? Since there is little chance the Chinese will explain these developments, perhaps the Pentagon can provide its analysis in the 2012 report to Congress.

                            Ongoing Military Operations

                            The PLA has announced it will continue to dispatch naval task forces on its most high-visibility, out-of-area operation: the Gulf of Aden anti-piracy patrols (PLA Daily, December 1, 2011). This decision was made despite the acknowledgement made by Chief of the General Staff Chen Bingde at the U.S. National Defense University in May 2011 that supporting the mission was causing difficulties within the PLA because of its limited number of modern ships.

                            The PLA Navy is in its tenth rotation of two combatants, a logistics support ship, ship-borne helicopters and Special Operations Forces personnel. Responsibility for providing ships for the mission has been shared between the South and East Sea Fleets. While the North Sea Fleet has not contributed surface vessels to the task, it has provided helicopters for half of the rotations (PLA Daily, January 6). Based on deployment patterns, five different destroyers out of about 26 and eight different frigates out of 53 along with one Type 071 LPD have been dispatched on the mission. The need for these destroyers and frigates to perform repeat missions, instead of assigning the task to other ships of the same type, supports Chen’s statement. This practice also supports the Pentagon’s assessment that only about 25 percent of the Navy’s surface ships are considered modern, though that still is a marked jump since 2000 [4].

                            The Gulf of Aden mission also gives the Navy opportunities to visit foreign ports and conduct exercises with foreign militaries on the voyages to and from the area of operation. In February 2011, a frigate was diverted from the anti-piracy mission to take up a position near Libya “to provide support and protection for the ships to evacuate Chinese nationals” (Xinhua, February 28, 2011), although the ship did not actually transport any Chinese citizens itself. On the other hand, four PLA Air Force Il-76 transports did assist Chinese civilian charter aircraft and cruise ships to evacuate Chinese citizens from the country (Ministry of National Defense, March 7, 2011).

                            While the PLA’s sealift capacity is increasing with the addition of Type 071 LPDs, its long-distance, heavy airlift capacity remains as it has for years with less than 20 Il-76 transporters. This shortcoming, along with relatively few helicopters (perhaps some 700 for the entire PLA), is understood to be a major limiting factor in the PLA’s participation in non-traditional security missions within and beyond its borders. In the last month, the Chinese media have reported on the expansion of two army aviation regiments into brigades (adding to the one existing army aviation brigade formed in 2009). More changes to the numbers of helicopters and fixed wing transport aircraft are likely in the future indicating the PLA’s long-term intention to gradually overcome this shortfall.

                            Reforming the Force Structure

                            In 2012, there may be some movement to rebalance and redistribute forces in the PLA. Officially, the Chinese state the active duty PLA consists of 2.3 million personnel, but they have not broken that figure down by service. The Army is estimated still to constitute over 60 percent of the force, but priority for development is given to the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery (China’s National Defense in 2004). Sometime in the near future another round of personnel reductions may occur with the ground forces taking the brunt of the cuts.

                            In many cases, more advanced weapons require fewer crew members and may replace older systems at less than a one-to-one ratio, allowing for equipment numbers to be reduced without a loss of capability or an actual increase in capability due to advanced technologies. At the same time, advanced equipment also requires a more extensive maintenance, repair and supply system than older weapons did.

                            Concurrently, the PLA is looking to flatten its command structure to take advantage of new communications and computer systems, which permit faster, secure horizontal and vertical coordination. Structural changes within the General Staff Department to help oversee these developments include changing the name of the Communications Department to the Informationization Department and the formation of the Strategic Planning Department. In addition to the formation of new army aviation brigades, recent Internet postings speak of downsizing the existing armored divisions to brigades. Assessing the extent and impact of these new structures should be an analytic priority in the coming year (“New Departments and Research Centers Highlight Military’s Concerns for the Future,” China Brief, January 6).

                            In 2012, structural reform in the PLA’s professional military education system probably will continue in order to better prepare officers and NCOs to execute the PLA’s new doctrine within its evolving force structure. Since the summer of 2011, nearly a dozen changes to military academy names and functions have been reported. (PLA Daily, November 3, 2011; November 8. 2011). In some cases, these reforms are aimed at producing a more qualified non-commissioned officer corps—two new NCO schools have been formed from former officer academies—but the majority of cases appear to be focused on updating existing officer academies to meet the requirements of the PLA’s changing force structure, enhanced equipment capabilities and joint doctrine. Examining these reforms offers insights into how the PLA is preparing its officers and NCOs to function within its ever-changing force structure and execute its doctrine.

                            The new CMC may execute decisions made already or further address these force structure issues in the coming years. In either case, the PLA’s force structure is likely to undergo significant change over the decade as the Army’s clout gradually is reduced. The goal is for a smaller, more technically advanced PLA to be prepared to handle both the combat and non-traditional missions it will encounter in the future. These structural changes require well-trained personnel and probably will take years to implement through a process of experimentation to determine the appropriate solution for the PLA—a solution that will be different from other advanced militaries. While analysts may not be able to predict the final outcome, Chinese-language publications have and will continue to make this evolution accessible.

                            Tracking PLA Training

                            A “process of experimentation” also is an apt description for the training underway in all services as the PLA seeks to raise its functional and joint capabilities to execute a new doctrine that has never been tested in modern combat. The creation of the Training Department in the General Staff Department in December 2011 aims to enhance joint training management for all the services to overcome this deficiency.

                            As a reminder to the troops of the increasing complexity of the PLA’s joint operations doctrine, over the past two years the term “system of systems operational capabilities” has been adopted as the formula to reflect the integration of all units and capabilities, especially capabilities derived as a result of “informationization.” This supersedes the older term of “integrated joint operations,” which itself updated the original concept of joint operations.

                            In contrast to other militaries that have conducted recent combat operations, PLA leaders identify the lack of real combat experience as an inhibiting factor on the force’s development (People’s Daily, November 20, 2009). Accordingly, making training as realistic as possible, in conditions replicating complex electromagnetic environments, has been the objective for many years.

                            Unit training follows guidance issued at the beginning of every year and is adjusted around mid-year as necessary. The annual training season culminates with large joint operations from September through November in which units are evaluated through force-on-force and live-fire drills. The PLA has established a process of reviewing each exercise to uncover shortfalls to be corrected through remedial training that year or in the next training season. Senior officers still perceive many improvements need to be made to the PLA’s joint training regime. In particular, technical and logistics support to training must be upgraded and the lack of personnel “expert” in joint operations remains an obstacle (PLA Daily, December 8, 2011).

                            In the coming year, additional attention could be given to the command and control experiments that have been the focus of numerous training exercises. Currently the PLA is exploring command structures for joint operations at the group army/corps (juntuan) and division and brigade (bingtuan) levels so that these headquarters can control units from multiple arms and services in multiple locations simultaneously. At the center of these experiments is the temporary formation of multi-service/multi-arm functional groups (qun) for specific tasks such as reconnaissance, assault, firepower and logistics. At the same time, the PLA also is practicing how to form combined arms task forces at the battalion level and has discovered the existing battalion headquarters is not structured adequately to control combined-arms operations (“The PLA's Evolving Joint Task Force Structure: Implications for the Aircraft Carrier,” China Brief, October 28, 2011 and “PLA Developing Joint Operations Capability (Part One): Joint Task Force Experimentation,” China Brief, May 20, 2011).

                            Command and control organization has been a major component of many trans-regional exercises, in which units move from one military region to another within China, since 2006. Large, joint exercises involving three or four military regions were conducted in 2009 and 2010, though no such exercises occurred last year. Navy and Air Force training has extended its reach beyond the traditional areas near China’s coasts and over the continent out to several hundred miles from the mainland. Amphibious training has become routine in several military regions. Second Artillery units have been included in many exercises involving the Army and Air Force, but to date no Second Artillery training in conjunction with the Navy has been reported. What new wrinkles will be reported in 2012?

                            In addition to active duty forces, the PLA often incorporates reserve units, People’s Armed Police and militia units into training for both combat and non-traditional security missions. Civilian elements frequently augment the armed forces in both training and during real world operations. Logistics support, especially in providing long-distance air, rail, or sea transport, as well as fuel, repair and subsistence support during road movements, is practiced regularly during exercises and disaster relief efforts. This is one aspect of the contemporary emphasis on military-civil integration (junmin ronghe).

                            Military-Civil Integration and Modern People’s War

                            Military-civil integration is regarded as an important way to enhance China’s comprehensive national power through a variety of means exploiting China’s population, economic base and natural resources. It also remains a persistently underexplored area of inquiry. The voluntary support of the civilian sector to the military in both physical and psychological ways helps lessen the need for higher defense expenditures as the PLA modernizes. Military-civil integration continues the PLA tradition of being a “people’s army” as well as a “party-army.”

                            The system of National Defense Mobilization Committees from national to county level, that integrates military, government and party leaders, is the basis for planning and implementation of military-civil integration. These local committees plan for many infrastructure projects to have both civilian and military purposes. They also keep track of civilian resources and capabilities that can be used to support military and non-traditional security missions. They have built joint civilian-military command centers supported by modern communications systems that are tested both in exercise and real world conditions. Though the efficiency of the National Defense Mobilization Committees probably varies from region to region, the Chinese media frequently reports on exercises that integrate military with paramilitary and civilian capabilities (PLA Daily, December 7, 2011 and February 22, 2011).

                            Civilian support to the military (and vice versa) is a basis for People’s War, a traditional concept that has been updated and adapted for modern times. In addition to the weapons and equipment the economy produces for the PLA, the armed forces need “the people” to understand the need for their children to serve. In the coming year, how enthusiastically and effectively “the people” support the Chinese armed forces will be an important indicator of China’s domestic stability and for PLA effectiveness as it seeks to attract more volunteers into the force (“Noncommissioned Officers and the Creation of a Volunteer Force,” China Brief, September 30, 2011).

                            Conclusion

                            Even considering the many improvements in PLA capabilities over the past decade, the complexities of modernization will not become any simpler, or less expensive, in 2012 and beyond. A large body of evidence exists in the Chinese media that reflects the internal assessments of PLA commanders of progress made to date and the tasks that remain ahead. Greater outside effort could be spent on analyzing the PLA on its own terms to better understand how well new equipment is being integrated into the force and the doctrine by which it will be employed. Admittedly, these areas are more difficult to analyze than new equipment capabilities and require a degree of judgment to be applied. With important information lacking, the Chinese themselves also could assist in providing direct answers to some of the questions frequently raised by foreigners, lest partial information give way to false assumptions based on worst-case scenarios.


                            Notes:

                            Non-traditional security missions include a wide range of non-war or military operations other than war, including, but not limited to, peacekeeping, disaster relief, internal stability and public health operations.
                            For an example of extrapolation of intentions based on potential weapons capabilities, see Jonathan Greenert, “Navy 2025: Forward Warfighters,” Proceedings Magazine, December 2011, at Navy 2025: Forward Warfighters | U.S. Naval Institute.
                            Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011,” p. 30.
                            Ibid., p. 43.
                            “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

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